ROBERT GROSSETESTE ON CONFESSION AS COGNITIO EXPERIMENTALIS: A MULTIDIMENSIONAL APPROACH TO MEDIEVAL MEMORY

Thesis submitted for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

at the University of Leicester

by

Rosamund Melania Gammie

Department of History

Bishop Grosseteste University

June 2021

Abstract.

ROBERT GROSSETESTE ON CONFESSION AS COGNITIO EXPERIMENTALIS: A MULTIDIMENSIONAL APPROACH TO MEDIEVAL MEMORY.

Rosamund Melania Gammie.

This thesis examines how Robert Grosseteste († 1253) saw in the act of confession the ultimate manifestation of *cognitio experimentalis*, or experiential knowledge (Prooemium to the *Hexaëmeron* §61). In the act of confession Grosseteste is adeptly able to combine the Augustinian notion of memory as the *habitus* of God (*Confessions* 10.25) with the Aristotelian concept that from sensation comes memory, from memory comes experience and from experience, knowledge of the universal (*Metaphysics* 1.1). I explore the concept of memory in Grosseteste's works in a number of ways to arrive at this conclusion, each chapter examining a distinct feature of memory and its purpose. Starting with corporeal sensation I establish memory's role within Grosseteste's epistemology and the dynamic nature of memory, recollection, and imagination within this paradigm. I then approach spiritual sensation; it is here that Grosseteste's originality in his *lux* and *lumen* distinction is so central, complicating the usual metaphoric language of spiritual sensation with frequent somatic inferences.

Having established the centrality of sensation to Grosseteste's theology and epistemology I move on to determine his knowledge of the *ars memorativa* and the relationship between memory and the written and spoken word. In doing so I show in my final chapter how Grosseteste is able to combine these various strands of memory in the act of confession. It is in confession where memory's autobiographical nature arises; not only its relationship with human experience and sensation but in the penitent's ability to search and at times manipulate it for meaning and to bring one closer to God. It is here, in this act of verbal, experiential recollection, that Aristotelian *experimentum* is given its theological polish by firmly emphasising the centrality of man's agency in God's creation.

Acknowledgements.

There are numerous people to whom I must extend my heartfelt thanks and gratitude. Without the support of Bishop Grosseteste University's generous four-year, fully funded studentship I would never have been able to undertake this PhD. The University has been supportive of me in every aspect I could need and has offered me so many opportunities to nurture my skills into a confident researcher and lecturer. My supervisors, Jack Cunningham and Robert von Friedeburg, have perilously placed so much faith and trust into me, guiding me through the process with expertise, patience, and kindness. I owe them so much gratitude and hope that this final thesis goes someway to honouring and repaying their benevolence and fortitude over the last three and a half years. I would also like to thank Helen Smith who has helped me every step of the way with book and article requests, a particular challenge during the COVID-19 related library closures. In light of these world-wide library closures I would like to extend my thanks to Dr. Anna Siebach-Larsen at the University of Rochester, Dr. Andrew Taylor at the University of Ottowa, and Dr. Kimberly Rivers at the University of Wisconsin Oshkosh, all of whom were so kind and willing to provide me with chapter and article requests and to engage with me and my work. I would like to thank Dr. Gwilym Dodd, who, in my final year of Undergraduate study at the University of Nottingham impressed on me for the first time the beauty of the Middle Ages and encouraged me to continue my academic studies, an encouragement which I have always held dear. A thank you too to Dr. Louise Hampson at the Centre for the Study of Christianity and Culture at the University of York who acted as a mentor during my Master's degree and who has always provided support and a friendly face.

Thank you to my family and friends who have always encouraged and buoyed me, providing me with, at times, much needed relief, and a special thank you to Natalie who was always right next to me, keeping me smiling. Finally, to my mother; your love shines brighter in me even as the memories become more distant. You, like Grosseteste, saw the beauty in nature. This is for you.

Table of Contents.

Acronyms.

Acronyms for series.	
AL	Aristoteles Latinus, ed. L. Minio-Paluello, Bruges-Paris, 1961-
BO	Bernardi Opera, ed. Leclercq. Rome, 1957-77.
CCCM	Corpus Christianorum: Continuatio mediaevalis. Turnhout: Brepols, 1966-
CCSL	Corpus Christianorum: Series latina. Turnhout: Brepols, 1953- .
CF	Cistercian Fathers Series. Cistercian Publications, Kalamazoo, MI, 1970-
CSEL	Corpus scriptorum ecclesiasticorum latinorum. Vienna: Hölder, Pichler, Tempsky, 1866- .
DDGC	Disciplinary Decrees of the General Councils, ed. Shroeder. St. Louis, MO: B. Herder, 1937.
FOTC	Fathers of the Church, Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1947-
LCL	Loeb Classical Library, ed. Henderson Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1911-
PL	Patroligae cursus completus: series latina, ed. Migne. Paris 1844-55.
SC	Sources Chrétiennes, Paris: Éditions de Cerf, 1955-
Abbreviations of Grosseteste's works.	
cPA	*Commentarius in Posteriorum Analyticorum Libros,* ed. Rossi. Firenze: Leo S. Olschki, 1981.

List of Unpublished Manuscripts Consulted.

Durham, Cathedral Library, MS A.III.12 ff. 14v-15r.

Viewed online at https://iiif.durham.ac.uk/index.html?manifest=t1m9593tv186&canvas=t1t1r66j2302, accessed 10th May 2021.

Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, MS Latin 3473 ff. 79v-212v.

Viewed online at https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/btv1b10074019n, accessed 21st March 2021.

Textual Notes.

I have standardised quotations from American-English to English, changing ‘z’ to ‘s.’ In the Latin quotes, I have also standardised the spelling, changing ‘c’ to ‘t’ and so forth.

Introduction.

The epistemology of Aristotle, introduced into the Latin West ca. 1150-1250 with the availability of newly translated texts, centres on the abstraction of universals from sensible particulars. Traditionally, scholars have put this epistemology in direct contrast to that of Divine Illumination which holds God as the ultimate source of all knowledge, and attempts have been made to establish exactly how individual medieval scholastics assimilated this new epistemology with that of Augustine.[1] Aristotle's epistemology allows for the knowledge of all reality to be discovered (abstracted) from the observation and experience of the sensible world. Fundamental to this is the role sensation plays in knowledge. By disallowing the role of God and of Platonic Forms in this new Aristotelian epistemology, emphasis came to be placed on human experience, sense-perception, and, importantly, cognition. Thus, it potentially removed the need for God, or of any Divine essence, in the epistemological process. Grosseteste's role in the dissemination of Aristotle via his commentary on the *Posterior Analytics* (*cPA*), the first such Latin commentary, positioned him at this crossroads, not least because of his interest in natural phenomena finding light of day with the treatises of *De sphaera*, *De lineis*, and, perhaps most famously, *De luce*.[2] Grosseteste produced a large number of similar works early in his career, prior to his entry into the clergy later in life where he ultimately became Bishop of Lincoln in 1235. It is these works produced prior to his entry into the clergy that have drawn the attention of the recent Ordered Universe Project, an interdisciplinary group of global academics based at Durham University

[1] See for example Z. Kuksewicz, "Criticisms of Aristotelian Psychology and the Augustinian - Aristotelian Synthesis," in *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy from the Rediscovery of Aristotle to the Disintegration of Scholasticism, 1100-1600*, eds. Eleonora Stump, Norman Kretzmann, Anthony Kenny, and Jan Pinborg, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 623-8; Edward Grant, *The Foundations of Modern Science in the Middle Ages: Their Religious, Institutional, and Intellectual Contexts*, 11th ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011). For more on this debate as it applies to Grosseteste, see n. 4 below.

[2] Grosseteste, *Commentarius in Posteriorum Analyticorum Libros*, ed. Pietro Rossi (Firenze: Leo S. Olschki, 1981).

whose objective it is to edit and translate many of these previously untranslated texts opening them up to a wider audience and positioning Grosseteste more firmly in the intellectual and scientific history of the High Middle Ages.[3]

Because of the *cPA*'s focus on empiricism, observation, and *experimentum* Grosseteste has been at the centre of scholarly debate for over fifty years on the influence of Aristotle's epistemology during the High Middle Ages.[4] The topic of Grosseteste's incorporation of Aristotle, however, predates modern scholarship; his probable pupil Roger Bacon, either consciously ignoring or ignorant of Grosseteste's other translations

[3] See the Ordered Universe Project, an interdisciplinary research group whose objective is to publish new editions and translations of the corpus of Grosseteste's scientific works. More can be discovered at "The Ordered Universe Project," https://ordered-universe.com/, accessed 21st March, 2021. As this thesis intends to show, it is also his later texts, produced when his focus was much more on the *cura animarum* than on observation, that reveal something about his own understanding of the psychology behind *experimentum* and the practical, Christian application of this in the form of the sacrament of Confession.

[4] See Etienne Gilson, "Pourquoi Saint Thomas a Critiqué Saint Augustin," *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age* 1 (1926-1927): 5-127; Lawrence E. Lynch, "The Doctrine of Divine Ideas and Illumination in Robert Grosseteste, Bishop of Lincoln," *Medieval Studies* 3 (1941): 161-73; A. C. Crombie, *Robert Grosseteste and the Origins of Experimental Science 1100-1700* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1953); Bruce Eastwood, "Grosseteste's 'Quantitative' Law of Refraction: A Chapter in the History of Non-Experimental Science," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 28, no. 3 (1967): 403–14; Eileen F. Serene, "Robert Grosseteste on Induction and Demonstrative Science," *Synthese* 40, no. 1 (1979): 91-115; James McEvoy, *The Philosophy of Robert Grosseteste* (1982, repr., Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2011); Stephen P. Marrone, *William of Auvergne and Robert Grosseteste: New Ideas of Truth in Early Thirteenth Century* (1983, repr., Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014); Richard Southern, *Robert Grosseteste: The Growth of an English Mind in Medieval Europe,* 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992); Simon Oliver, "Robert Grosseteste on Light, Truth and Experimentum," *Vivarium* 42, no. 2 (2004): 151-80; Christina Van Dyke, "An Aristotelian Theory of Divine Illumination: Robert Grosseteste's Commentary on the Posterior Analytics," *British Journal for the History of Philosophy* 17, no. 4 (2009): 685-704; Van Dyke, "The Truth, the Whole Truth, and Nothing but the Truth: Robert Grosseteste on Universals (and the Posterior Analytics)," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 48, no. 2 (2010): 153-70. Lynch and McEvoy, following Gilson, argue that Grosseteste is firmly Augustinian; Marrone that he is Aristotelian. Southern, Oliver, and Van Dyke suggest different Aristotelian-Augustinian syntheses. Crombie's *Experimental Science* attempts to establish Grosseteste's scientific methods as akin to modern *experiment*, a view which has little currency today.

and commentaries on Aristotle (his commentary on the *Nicomachean Ethics* and *De caelo et mundo)* famously wrote that he,

> neglected the books of Aristotle and their arguments and, by using his own experience [*et per experimentiam propriam*] and other authors and other means of learning, he worked his way into the wisdom of Aristotle and came to know and write about the subjects of his works a hundred thousand times better than those who used only the perverted translations of these works.[5]

The two great modern biographers of Grosseteste, Richard Southern and James McEvoy both emphasise his endorsement of Augustinian illumination, with Southern describing knowledge's reliance on sense-perception as akin to a man with a walking stick, the stick being not the cause but the *sine qua non* of the man's ability to walk.[6] Etienne Gilson has suggested that by allowing light a role in sense-perception as an intermediary between the spiritual substance (soul) and the material substance (body), Grosseteste was able to maintain an Augustinian doctrine of illumination, one that affirms positive science and the application of mathematics to physics which would, ultimately, lead to Bacon's focus on optics and geometry.[7]

---

[5] McEvoy, *Philosophy of Grosseteste,* 471-8; Roger Bacon, "Compendium philosophiae," in *Fr. Rogeri Bacon Opera Quaedam Hactenus Inedita,* vol. 1, ed. S. Brewer (London:1859), 391-520, at 469, 'unde dominus Robertus, quondam episcopus Lincolniensis sanctae memoriae, neglexit omnino libros Aristotelis et vias eorum, et per experientiam propriam, et aucotres alios, et per alias scientias negotiatus est sapientialibus Aristotelis; et melius centies milesies scivit et scripsit illa de quibus Aristotelis loquuntur, quam in ipsisu perversis translationibus capi possunt.' Trans. taken from Southern, *English Mind*, 16.

[6] See Southern, *English Mind,* 164-9; McEvoy, *Philosophy of Grosseteste,* 296-7, and 332-3.

[7] Etienne Gilson, *History of Christian Philosophy of the Middle Ages*, 3rd ed. (London: Sheed and Ward, 1978), 261-5.

Only recently have attempts been made to suggest that rather than forcing Grosseteste into an either/or dichotomy of Aristotle or Augustine it is possible to construct a largely successful synthesis of both arguments that go further than McEvoy and Southern in not simply subordinating Aristotelian epistemology *within* an Augustinian framework.[8] Christina Van Dyke's contribution suggests that Grosseteste's account of Aristotelian knowledge-theory of abstraction from the singular to the universal and then back again is possible *only because* God illuminates and makes necessary the objects of our intellection.[9] Simon Oliver's combination of the two arguments is slightly different, basing it as he does on Eileen Serene's 1979 article that argues for Divine Illumination to be seen as a mental state of the enquirer similar to Aristotle's *nous.*[10] Oliver continues in this vein and, using Grosseteste's distinction between *lux* and *lumen* suggests that participating in this transcendent light is unifying in itself.[11]

Grosseteste's *lux/lumen* distinction is one of his greatest intellectual developments; *lux* being the first corporeal, substantive form, always attached to matter, and *lumen* its accidental quality.[12] Because light has a role to play in all sensation the *lux/lumen* distinction forms a crucial aspect of Grosseteste's ability to elucidate his thoughts on both the workings of corporeal sensation as well as on the workings of the interior senses that rely on sense-data; namely the memory and the imagination. This is not to

---

[8] The two most recent attempts are made by Van Dyke, "Aristotelian Theory," and "Nothing but the Truth," and Oliver "Grosseteste on Light."

[9] Van Dyke, "Aristotelian Theory," 699-704.

[10] Serene, "Grosseteste on Induction," 100-1.

[11] Oliver, "Grosseteste on Light," 151-80, and Serene, "Grosseteste on Induction," 97-115.

[12] Grosseteste, *De luce,* ed. Cecilia Panti in *Robert Grosseteste and His Intellectual Milieu,* eds. John Flood, James R. Ginther, and Joseph W. Goering (Toronto, Canada: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 2003), 193-238. The translated text is by Neil Lewis in the same edition, *Intellectual Milieu*, 239-48; Yael Raizman-Kedar, "Plotinus's Conception of Unity and Multiplicity as the Root to the Medieval Distinction between Lux and Lumen," *Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science Part A* 37, no. 3 (2006): 379-97, at 390-1.

say that Grosseteste is always consistent in his distinction. In other works, such as his *Dicta, lux* and *lumen* are used almost synonymously. What is established in *De luce* is the operation and function of light; what is expanded on in his later works is its theological purpose. When Grosseteste discuses light elsewhere, it is largely through this lens. As Simon Oliver remarks, 'for Grosseteste...to study light was to study God, and all things in relation to God.'[13]

To understand Grosseteste's psychology, therefore, one must understand his attitude to memory; and memory is responsible for far more than mere sense-perception. As such, a broader approach to memory must be taken; one that looks at not just its role in sense-perception but in learning, Confessing, and *remembering* God. Whilst both these theories offered by Van Dyke and Oliver incorporate more Aristotelian input than earlier scholars have conceded, they both rely heavily on the *cPA* as their source for Grosseteste's psychology, to their detriment.[14] This is problematic because the discussion of memory as an internal faculty in the *cPA* (and, similarly, in *Deus est*) is not only brief but is also epistemological and physiological; where the memory is located in the brain, its role in sense-perception, its relationship with *imaginatio* and its place in the form/intention divide are discussed. Modern scholarship (regarding Grosseteste) has thus focused almost exclusively on memory's role as it relates to sense-perception, with a glaring omission of any exploration of memory ontologically speaking. For this, one must look elsewhere.

---

[13] Oliver, "Light, Truth, Experimentum," 154.

[14] The *cPA* and *Deus est* are used almost exclusively by scholars interested in Grosseteste's psychology. The short extract from *Deus est*, for example, is used by David C. Lindberg and Katherine H. Tachau in "The Science of Light and Color, Seeing and Knowing," in *The Cambridge History of Science*, eds. Lindberg and Michael H. Shank (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 485-511, at 499-500; Oliver uses *cPA* 2.6 in "Grosseteste on Light," 168 as does Rega Wood, "Imagination and Experience in the Sensory and Soul and Beyond: Richard Rufus, Robert Bacon & Their Contemporaries," in *Forming the Mind. Essays on the Internal Senses and the Mind/Body Problem from Avicenna to the Medieval Enlightenment*, ed. Henrik Lagerlund (Dordrecht: Springer, 2007), 27-57, at 28.

During the twelfth and thirteenth centuries it was not just ideas concerning memory's role in cognition that was in a state of change. By identifying four crucial "sea-changes" in the concept of memory I will show that much more can be gleaned regarding Grosseteste's attitude towards memory from his other works, those not necessarily considered "scientific." (1) The first sea-change is the one I have already raised, that is, Aristotelian psychology and its dissemination through Avicenna and Averroes, particularly the role of the internal faculties. (2) Second, the invention and inclusion of scribal apparatus that resulted, in part, from the demands of the universities and needs of their students; that is, memory's relationship with the written word not just in meaning but in practice.[15] (3) A third change in the role of memory in thirteenth-century life comes from the Canons of Lateran IV; Canon 10's emphasis on preaching led to a resurgence in interest in classical rhetoric, whilst the very act of confession requiring everyone, once a year, to reflect on their own memory and experience was newly-enshrined in Canon 21.[16] (4) Fourth and finally it is the shift of memory from the realm of rhetoric to the realm of ethics, attributed to Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas, that points to 1250 as being the period when memory became a speculative art, its role in ethics impacting the very notion of *prudentia*.[17] Clearly, it was not *just* the psychological works of Aristotle that impacted twelfth- and thirteenth-century notions

[15] Richard Rouse and Mary Rouse, "Statim Invenire: Schools, Preachers, and New Attitudes to the Page," in *Renaissance and Renewal in the Twelfth Century,* eds. Robert L. Benson, Giles Constable, and Carol D. Lanham (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982), 201-28, at 201-3; Charles Burnett, "Give Him the White Cow: Notes and Note-Taking in the Universities in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries," *History of Universities* 14 (1998): 1-30; Michael Clanchy, *From Memory to Written Record. England 1066-1307,* 3rd ed. (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley & Sons, 2012) remains the key text for the transition from memory to writing.

[16] The texts of the Canons of Lateran IV (*Consilium Laterenanse IV*) in both the English and the Latin are in *Disciplinary Decrees of the General Councils. Text, Translation, and Commentary,* ed. and trans. H. J. Schroeder (St Louis, MO: B. Herder, 1937). *Consilium Laterenanse IV* Canon 10 (ed. and trans. DDGC, p. 566, pp. 252-3); Canon 21 "*Omnius utriusque sexus*" (ed. and trans. DDGC, p. 570, pp. 259-60).

[17] Mary Carruthers, *The Book of Memory. A Study of Memory in Medieval Culture,* 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 187; Francis Yates, *The Art of Memory* (1966, repr., London: Routledge and Paul, 1972), 57.

of memory, but its role in administration, learning, teaching, preaching, confession, and living a morally virtuous life.

In the secondary literature there is an oversimplification of Grosseteste's psychology in part due to McEvoy's conviction that Grosseteste followed the doctrine of Avicenna 'to the details' and because McEvoy makes the claim that (emphasis added) 'it is *only* in the works dating from his episcopal period, however, that we are able to determine the exact extent of Grosseteste's psychological studies,' using as his evidence the *Ecclesia sancta celebrat, Tota pulchra est, Deus est* and *Ex rerum initiarum* to highlight an Avicennian leaning.[18] Because *Deus est* was written towards the end of his career, sometime after 1240, it is suggested that this is proof of a journey, a maturation from a to b, of his psychological understanding, and that, given the longer time he has to incorporate the works of Avicenna into his thinking the more Avicennian he becomes. This is not to say that there is an outright consensus on the matter, or that Grosseteste was fully Avicennian; Siegfried Wenzel has suggested that Grosseteste was far more 'superficial and pragmatic' when it came to Avicenna's *Liber de anima,* taking from it 'what he needed,' a view that is compelling.[19] As I will show, *Deus est* is not, in fact, a particularly faithful interpretation of Avicennian faculties, enumerating as it does four, not five internal senses, and giving a very un-Avicennian interpretation of memory.[20]

[18] McEvoy, *Philosophy of Grosseteste,* 291-2. McEvoy uses the tree-branch metaphor of Avicenna, as well as his description of an intention as not only a sheep fearing a wolf but of a mother loving their child, to make his case. The tree-branch metaphor is found in Grosseteste, *Ecclesia sancta celebrat* §14, ed., James McEvoy, "Robert Grosseteste's Theory of Human Nature with the Text of His Conference Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat," *Recherches de Théologie ancienne et médiévale* 47 (1980), 131-87, at 176, n. 63. The sheep-wolf/mother-child is from Grosseteste, *Deus est,* ed., Siegfried Wenzel, "Robert Grosseteste's Treatise on Confession, Deus est," *Franciscan Studies* 30 (1970): 218-93, at 262.

[19] Wenzel, "Treatise on Confession," [*Deus est*], 238.

[20] Lindberg and Tachau have noted on Grosseteste's numeration of four not five faculties but they, like McEvoy, still use it as evidence of Avicennian form and intention, see Lindberg and Tachau, "Seeing and Knowing," 499-500.

James R. Ginther reinforces McEvoy's oversimplification when he states that 'he employed the most recent theories of the psychological make-up of humanity in his pastoral writings.'[21] Ginther references here an exposition of Grosseteste's psychological interests in an 1995 article written by Joseph Goering who, focusing predominantly on the *Templum Dei,* observes that Grosseteste's interest and fame in the art of confession allowed him to marry his 'native psychological skills' with the 'growing facility [of] the psychological doctrines of the schools,' Grosseteste incorporates into *Templum Dei* not only the Platonic/Augustinian division of the powers of the soul but the Aristotelian division, that is, the vegetative, sensible, and rational.[22] Goering concludes that,

> Grosseteste developed and deepened this interest in academic psychology during the following years, partly, it would seem, because it permitted a nice conjunction between his scholastic activities as a master of arts and his practical interests in the Church's penitential discipline and cure of souls.[23]

Goering suggests that it is the *Perambulavit Iudas* that 'illustrates clearly the value of Grosseteste's academic studies in medical physiology and in psychology for the practice of confession.' [24] Whilst Goering is one of the few scholars to go into any level of depth in pairing Grosseteste's psychological/physiological knowledge with his

---

[21] James R. Ginther, "The Super Psalterium in Context," in *Editing Robert Grosseteste,* eds. Evelyn A. Mackie and Joseph Goering (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003): 31-60, at 32. Ginther is referring to Joseph Goering," When and Where did Grosseteste Study Theology?" in *Robert Grosseteste: New Perspectives on His Thought and Scholarship. Instrumenta Patristica* 27, ed. James McEvoy (Turnhout: Brepols, 1995), 17-52, at 29-36.

[22] Goering, "When and Where," 32-3.

[23] Goering, "When and Where," 33.

[24] Goering "When and Where," 33.

pastoral work by referring to it as a 'nice conjunction,' the psychological traces in *Perambulavit Iudas* largely relate to sense-perception as well as the resulting sin and there is no identification of memory as being a particularly pertinent faculty. Other confessional texts, such as *Quoniam cogitatio*, offer an insight into Grosseteste's understanding of memory far more than *Perambulavit Iudas*; this thesis thus expands on the seeds planted by this underexplored area of Grossetestian scholarship.

Grosseteste's life, spanning approximately 80 years from ca. 1175-1253 came at a time of rapid intellectual, scholastic, and pastoral change. The rise of scholasticism, with a focus on Aristotle, as well as the huge social and theological influence of Lateran IV in 1215 impacted Grosseteste – this can be seen not just in his "scientific" output but also in his focus on the *cura animarum* which became manifest in his production of confessional and penitential manuals, many of which survived in popularity (such as the *Templum Dei*). When it comes to an exploration of memory outside of the parameters of sense-perception there is some scholarship as it pertains to Grosseteste but it is piecemeal and not contextualised within the broader scope of his life and work, focusing almost exclusively on Grosseteste's use of mnemonics in his computational and pastoral works.[25] Mary Carruthers included Grosseteste in her monumental *The*

[25] Leonard E. Boyle discusses the mnemonics of Grosseteste's *Templum Dei* in Leonard E. Boyle, "Robert Grosseteste and the Pastoral Care," *Medieval and Renaissance Studies* 8 (1976): 3-51, at 11-17, and reprinted in Leonard E. Boyle, *Pastoral Care, Clerical Education and Canon Law, 1200-1400* (London: Variorum Reprints, 1981) with the same page numbers. Grosseteste's use of architectural mnemonics in *Templum Dei* and *Château d'Amour* are discussed by Christiania Whitehead, *Castles of the Mind: A Study of Medieval Architectural Allegory* (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2003), 24-7, and 93-100; Abigail Wheatley, *The Idea of the Castle in Medieval England* (York: York Medieval Press, 2004), 92-7 both of which build on the work of Roberta D. Cornelius's PhD thesis published as "The Figurative Castle: A Study in the Mediaeval Allegory of the Edifice with Especial Reference to Religious Writings," (PhD diss, Bryn Mawr College, 1930). Mnemonic verse, as found most explicitly in Grosseteste's *Compotus,* is discussed briefly by Matthew F. Dowd, "Astronomy and Compotus at Oxford University in the Early Thirteenth Century: The Works of Robert Grosseteste," (PhD diss., University of Notre Dame, 2003), 289, who uses the verses to argue that the *Compotus* was written for students. In their edition of the text Alfred Lohr and Philipp E. Nothaft use the verses to highlight the similarity between the *Compotus* and the contemporary but anonymous *Compotus ecclesiasticus;* see *Robert Grosseteste's Compotus,* trans. Alfred Lohr and C. Philipp E. Nothaft (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), 7. Arguably the most famous mnemonic device of Grosseteste's is his *Tabula* or *Topical concordance*,

Book of Memory but only with reference to his *Tabula* thereby limiting her conclusion on Grosseteste's contribution to medieval memory (or rather, lack thereof) by her omission of his other work. Thus, she describes Grosseteste as having a 'remarkable, though by no means rare' realisation of medieval memory.[26] By using the "sea-changes" mentioned above, I will show the way in which Grosseteste adopted and adapted to these new concepts of memory, and suggest that it was Grosseteste's focus on confession that allowed him to really explore the nature, purpose, and even meaning of memory.

1150-1250: Memory in Flux.

(1) Both Avicenna and Averroes attempted to explain the number and role of the internal faculties in the process of cognition which were located in the brain and based on Aristotle's *De anima* and *Parva naturalia*.[27] Both systems differ, particularly in relation to the *aestimatio* of Avicenna, but both rely fundamentally on a division between form and intention and, crucially for this thesis, both place a different level of emphasis on *imaginatio* and *memoria*. When Aristotle writes in *De anima* 431a18 that

---

reproduced by Samuel Harrison Thomson, "Grosseteste's Concordantial Signs," *Medievalia et Humanistica* 9 (1955): 39-53 and discussed by Philip W. Rosemann, "Robert Grosseteste's Tabula," in *New Perspectives*, 321-56. Rosemann has compiled Grosseteste's *Tabula* categories together with their corresponding references; see Roseman, "Tabula," in *Opera Roberti Grosseteste Lincolniensis*, ed. James McEvoy, CCCM 130 (1995), 235-320. Richard Hunt details the extent of the symbols as found in other manuscripts in Richard Hunt, "Manuscripts Containing the Indexing Symbols of Robert Grosseteste," *Bodleian Library Record* 4 (1953): 241-54. The only discussion however that explores the utility of the *Tabula* is in Carruthers, *Book of Memory,* 146-9 which relies heavily on Hunt's article and does not place the *Tabula* in the context of Grosseteste's other works incorporating mnemonics.

[26] Carruthers, *Book of Memory,* 149.

[27] A comprehensive account of the internal senses remains Harry Wolfson "The Internal Senses in Latin, Arabic, and Hebrew Philosophic Texts," *Harvard Theological Review* 28, no. 2 (1935): 69-133. For more recent studies on Averroes and Avicenna specifically see Deborah Black, "Memory, Individuals, and the Past in Averroes's Psychology," *Medieval Philosophy and Theology* 5 (1996): 161-87; Black, "Imagination and Estimation: Arabic Paradigms and Western Transformations," *Topoi* 19 (2000): 59-75, at 69 n. 1.

'the soul never thinks without a mental image' a heavy burden is placed on the role of *phantasmata* in the cognitive process and whether or not this is a pictorial *image* or rather an *apprehension* (and not pictorial).[28] Other new works also appeared which had an influence on notions of memory during, in or just prior to, Grosseteste's lifetime; Aristotle's *De memoria et reminiscentia*, for example; the anonymous author of the influential *De spiritu et anima* and other Cistercian treaties on the soul which were produced in the twelfth century.[29] All of this leads to what Michelle Karnes has described as a zenith in discussions of the cognitive process; 'debated with more passion in the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries' than since Aristotle or before the Enlightenment.[30]

(2) The rise of the universities was responsible for another aspect of memory-craft; that of scribal technologies and apparatus and a change in attitude towards the written word. Mary and Richard Rouse have shown that scribal innovations such as headings,

[28] Aristotle, *De anima* (ed. and trans. LCL 288, p. 177).

[29] James of Venice (ca.1125-1150) translated the text from the Greek into the Latin, a version known as *translatio vetus* from around 1150. This version was used by William Moerbeke to produce what is the *translatio nova* around 1260-1270, whilst the commentary by Averroes written around 1170 reached Paris via Michael Scot's translation of the text around 1230. See David Bloch, *Aristotle on Memory and Recollection. Text, Translation, Interpretation, and Reception in Western Scholasticism* (Brill, Leiden, 2007), 166-7; Bernard G. Dod, "Aristoteles Latinus," in *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy: From the Rediscovery of Aristotle to the Disintegration of Scholasticism, 1100–1600*, eds. Norman Kretzmann et al. 2nd ed., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 43-79 at 76; Janet Coleman, *Ancient and Medieval Memories: Studies in the Reconstruction of the Past* (1992, repr., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 401. The High Middle Ages witnessed a boon in works on the soul; for example Aelred of Rievaulx, *Dialogus de anima* (CCCM 1). Translations of William of St. Thierry's *De natura corporis et animae,* Isaac of Stella's *Epistola de anima ad Alcherum* and the anonymous *De spiritu et anima* can be found in *Three Treatises on Man: A Cistercian Anthropology,* ed. Bernard McGinn (Kalamazoo: Cistercian Publications, 1997).

[30] Michelle Karnes, *Imagination, Meditation and Cognition in the Middle Ages* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2017), 3.

subheadings, tables, lists, and charts had become standardised by 1220.[31] They note that the twelfth-century rise in concordances and other devices to help organise and order material (such as headings and sub-headings) was 'not so much to aid the memory as to perform tasks for which the memory was unsuited,' including the demand of the universities for the collection and ordering of knowledge; to write more, and faster.[32] Universities demanded more of their students, a greater consumption of knowledge which required new ways of recording and disseminating this knowledge; a greater strain on the memory.[33] Thus note-taking, headings, concordances and references all became necessary additions to memory, introduced not to replace it but to aid it in its speed, a demand that was paralleled with efforts in civil and ecclesiastical administration reflected in Grosseteste's *Reulles* (1240-42), which he suggests one keeps at hand for ease of reference.[34] Grosseteste utilises such technical devices; his *Tabula* is perhaps the most obvious but *Templum Dei* is perhaps a more sophisticated example. The sheer number of lists, charts, tables, and diagrams as mnemonic craft included in the *Templum Dei*, though clearly intended to aid the reader are arguably more prohibitive than useful; proving too cumbersome to be effectively utilised by others.[35] Grosseteste is very self-aware in his use of these new technologies and their novelty; in his *recapitulatio* to a copy of his *Dicta* he writes that he has included with the chapters titles and brief notes to help not only his own memory but for the ease and

[31] Rouse and Rouse, "Statim Invenire," 207.

[32] Rouse and Rouse, "Statim Invenire," 201-3 at 203; Burnett, "White Cow," 1-30.

[33] See Clanchy, *From Memory*; Rouse and Rouse, "Statim Invenire," 201-28; Burnett, "White Cow," 1-30; Joseph Goering and Randall Rosenfeld, "The Tongue is a Pen: Robert Grosseteste's Dictum 54 and Scribal Technology," *The Journal of Medieval Latin* 12 (2002): 114-40; and Andrew Taylor, "Was Grosseteste the Father of English Literature?" *Revista Canaria de Estudios Ingleses* 47 (2003): 73-86.

[34] Grosseteste, *Reulles* §2, ed. and trans. Dorothea Oschinsky, "The Rules of Robert Grosseteste," in *Walter of Henley and Other Treatises on Estate Management and Accounting*, ed. Dorothea Oschinsky (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), 388-407 at 388-9, 'e retenex co roulle od vus e sovent regardez le primer roulle e cetuy ausi ke prestement sachez trover co dunt averez a fere.' Discussion of the dating of the different versions is in Oschinsky, *Walter of Henley,* 196-7.

[35] Joseph Goering and F. A. C. Mantello, *Robert Grosseteste. Templum Dei* (Toronto: PIMS, 1984), 7-8.

use of the reader too.[36] Thus Grosseteste was negotiating these new technologies over the course of his own lifetime, with varying degrees of success.

(3) Perhaps the greatest role for memory in this time period came not due to its epistemological or administrative utility but as a result of the demands of Lateran IV in 1215. Canon 10 declares a need for preaching the word of God; this requires not only techniques on behalf of the orator (priest) in remembering their material but in communicating it in such a way that it would be remembered by their audience (the audience not being a concern in Classical oratory tradition).[37] It is for this reason that there was a revitalisation of the Classical oratory tradition in the early thirteenth century, one which was aided and abetted by the new scribal technologies discussed above and that would help not just the orator (priest) but also the listener.[38] This included a revival of the works of Cicero, Quintilian, C. Julius Victor, Martianus Capella, Consultus Fortunatianus and Boethius.[39] Included in this application of classical rhetoric to the demands of the preacher was a revival in architectonic mnemonics, stemming from the rhetoricians use of *loci* or places as means of

---

[36] Goering and Rosenfeld, "The Tongue is a Pen," [*Dictum* 54], 115, 'in hoc libello sunt 147 capitula quorum quedam sunt brevia verba que dum in scolis morabar scripsi breviter et in composito sermone ad memoriam […] quorum titulos posui ut facilius quod vellet lector posset invenire.' See also Samuel Harrison Thomson, *The Writings of Robert Grosseteste, Bishop of Lincoln 1235-1253* (1940, repr., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 214.

[37] Kimberly Rivers "Memory and Medieval Preaching: Mnemonic Advice in the Ars Praedicandi of Francesc Eiximenis (ca. 1327-1409)," *Viator* 30 (1999): 253-84 at 255.

[38] Kimberly Rivers, *Preaching the Memory of Virtue and Vice: Memory, Images, and Preaching in the Late Middle Ages* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2010), 2-3; George Kennedy, *Classical Rhetoric and its Christian and Secular Tradition from Ancient to Modern Times* (London: Croom Helm, 1980), 191.

[39] Mary Carruthers and Jan M. Ziolkowski, eds., *The Medieval Craft of Memory: An Anthology of Texts and Pictures* (Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002) contains translations and discussions of some of these texts; Rita Copeland and Ineke Sluiter, *Medieval Grammar and Rhetoric: Language Arts and Literary Theory AD 300-1475* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) and Coleman, *Medieval Memories,* are also excellent monographs in tracing these influences.

remembering. Thus, the twelfth and thirteenth centuries saw a shift in the use of architectonic mnemonics away from the religious (epitomised by Bede's *De templo* and *De tabernaculo,* for example) to the secular; Grosseteste's *Château d'Amour* is illustrative of this, with its central focus on a castle rather than temple and with its incorporation of popular rhyme.[40]

However, it is Canon 21 which I will show had an enduring impact on Grosseteste's acknowledgement of not only the importance of memory but a necessity and desire to understand how it works. Canon 21's insistence that lay confession take place annually emphasises the autobiographical nature of memory and its intrinsic relationship with experience and sense-perception. It is here, in the act of confession, that recollection becomes truly introspective, reflecting Augustine's personal search in *Confessions* 10 to find not only God but also himself. Memory, then, becomes a collection of life experiences that requires the penitent and the priest to communicate, search, discern, and judge - a stark contrast to Aristotle's *Metaphysics* 1.1 which focuses on the repetition of sense-experience, memory, and *experimentum.*[41] It is in the act of confession that Grosseteste is able to combine the Augustinian memory of *Confessions* 10.8 (as being a great *aula* or hall/court) with rhetorical memory theory, particularly the number-location-occasion prompts of Hugh of St. Victor and illustrative of the incorporation of rhetorical *circumstantiae* as a method of ordering confession.[42] Though

[40] See Carruthers, *Book of Memory*, 186; Whitehead, *Castles of the Mind,* 87-8; Cornelius, "Figurative Castle," 12-13; Wheatley, *Idea of the Castle,* 97.

[41] Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 1.1 981a1, (ed. and trans. LCL 271, p. 5), 'it is from memory that men acquire experience, because the numerous memories of the same thing eventually produce the effect of a single experience.' Grosseteste refers to this reference in the *cPA* 2.6 (ed. Rossi, 404), 'in quibus autem est sensus cum hac retentiva, est colligere ex multis sensibus unam memoriam, et hoc commune est brutis cum rationalibus; sed in rationalibus iam contingit ex multis memoriis excitata ratione fieri experientiam; in brutis vere non est hoc. Ex sensu igitur fit memoria, ex memoria multiplicata experimentum, ex experimento universale.'

[42] William Green, "Hugh of St. Victor: De Tribus Maximis Circumstantiis Gestorum," *Speculum* 18, no. 4 (1943): 484-93 which contains an edition of the text. This is translated by Mary Carruthers, "The Three Best Memory Aids for Learning History," in *Craft of Memory,* 33-40. For a discussion of Hugh's use of

it is a different use of memory from *Metaphysics*, which relates more to sense-perception, the art of recollection has Aristotelian authority; in *De memoria et reminscentia* 453a12 it is described as 'a sort of search.'[43] It is in the act of confession that Grosseteste reaches an apex in the understanding of memory, not just how it functions but how it can be manipulated (for better and for worse) and its role as pertains to the individual experience of each Christian.

(4) The emphasis on vice and virtue that arose during the thirteenth century as a result of Lateran IV formed the groundwork for a shift in the place of memory in contemporary thirteenth-century reflection away from Classical rhetoric and into the realm of ethics.[44] Carruthers suggests that by 1250 the *ars memorativa* was given 'serious attention in the universities' based not least on the attention afforded it by the likes of Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas.[45] There were three commentaries made on the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* prior to Albertus Magnus's attempt at contextualising the art within the context of Aristotelian ethics.[46] The first was a twelfth-century gloss by William of Champeaux, followed by a commentary by Thierry of Chartres, and finally a commentary of around 1180 by, it is believed, Alan of Lille.[47] However it was Albertus Magnus's and Thomas Aquinas's commentaries on *De memoria et*

---

circumstances see Kimberly Rivers, "Memory, Division, and the Organisation of Knowledge in the Middle Ages," in *Pre-Modern Encyclopaedic Texts. Proceedings of the Second COMERS Congress, Groningen, 1-4 July 1996*, ed. Peter Binkley (Leiden: Brill, 1997), 147-58, and for a brief examination of the role Boethian circumstances played in thirteenth-century theology, particularly in the act of Confession, see D. W. Robertson Jr, "A Note on the Classical Origin of 'Circumstances' in the Medieval Confessional," *Studies in Philology* 43, no. 1 (1946): 6–14. I discuss these *circumstantiae* at length in Chapter 4.

[44] Yates, *Art of Memory,* 50-82; Carruthers, *The Book of Memory* 81-9; Coleman, *Ancient and Medieval Memories,* 416-61.

[45] Carruthers, *Book of Memory*, 186.

[46] Carruthers, *Book of Memory*, 187.

[47] Carruthers, *Book of Memory*, 187.

reminscentia that were to have lasting impact focusing as they did on the 'associative nature of memory and the principles by which it operates with the example of the advice and images adduced in the *ad Herennium*.'[48] It is Albertus Magnus's and Aquinas's work on memory that moves the subject away from rhetoric (and dialectic) to the realm of ethics, which accounts for this shift in the role of memory to occur by around 1250.[49] Thus, Frances Yates writes, 'if Simonides was the inventor of the art of memory, and 'Tullius' its teacher, Thomas Aquinas became something like its patron saint.'[50] Moving the art of memory from rhetoric to ethics is based in part on Cicero's trifold partition of *prudentia* in Book 2 of *De inventione,*

> wisdom is the knowledge of what is good, what is bad and what is neither good nor bad. Its parts are memory, intelligence, and foresight. Memory is the faculty by which the mind recalls what has happened. Intelligence is the faculty by which it ascertains what is. Foresight is the faculty by which it is seen that something is going to occur before it occurs. [51]

The shift from rhetoric to ethics is attributed to Albertus Magnus and Aquinas, but Aquinas's 'proof' in *Summa Theologia* 2.2, Question 49 Article 1 is made using the same sources available to Grosseteste; the *Nicomachean Ethics*, and the *Metaphysics*.[52]

---

[48] Carruthers, *Book of Memory,* 190.

[49] Yates, *Art of Memory,* 57.

[50] Yates, *Art of Memory,* 82.

[51] M. Tullius Cicero, *De inventione* 2.53 (ed. and trans. LCL 386, pp. 326-7), 'prudentia est rerum bonarum et malarum neutrarumque scientia. Partes eius: memoria, intellegentia, providentia. Memoria est per quam animus repetit illa quae fuerunt; intellegentia, per quam ea perspicit quae sunt; providentia, per quam futurum aliquid videtur ante quam factum est.'

[52] See also Carruthers, *Book of Memory,* 83.

> But we need experience to discover what is true in the majority of cases: wherefore the Philosopher says [*Nicomachean Ethics* 2.1] that *intellectual virtue is engendered and fostered by experience and time*. Now experience is the result of many memories as stated in [*Metaphysics* 1.1] and therefore prudence requires the memory of many things. Hence memory is fittingly accounted a part of prudence.[53]

Though Grosseteste does not make this leap so explicitly (not least because he has no commentary on Herennian art, *De memoria et reminiscentia*, or any other memory-specific tract) he does identify prudence with memory in *Dictum* 54, where 'wise circumspection' (*circumspectio prudens*) acts as a porter between the memory and the mouth.[54] It is this focus on the role of memory in the act of confession that establishes a firmer connection with *prudentia.* It was Albertus Magnus and Aquinas who declared

---

[53] Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae secunda secundae*, in *Sancti Thomae Aquinatis Doctoris Angelici Opera Omnia,* vol. 8, ed. Leonina Commission XIII P. M. (Rome: Ex Typographia Polyglotta, 1895), Question 49 Article 1 (p. 367). The English translation is taken from *The "Summa Theologica" of St. Thomas Aquinas. Part II (Second Part) Second Number (QQ. XLVII-LXXIX.),* ed. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (New York, NY: Benziger Brothers, 1918), 34. 'Quid autem in pluribus sit verum oportet per experimentum considerare, unde et in II *Ethic*. Philosophus dicit quod virtus intellectualis habet generationem et augmentum ex experimento et tempore. Experimentum autem est ex pluribus memoriis; ut patet in I *Metaphys*. Unde consequens est quod ad prudentiam requiritur plurium memoriam habere. Unde convenienter memoria ponitur pars prudentiae,' (ed. Leonina, 367). See also Carruthers, *Book of Memory*, 83

[54] Grosseteste, *Dictum* 54 f. 43vb. All references to the Dicta, unless otherwise stated, are taken from "The Electronic Grosseteste," a website organised by Joseph Goering that hosts various Latin editions of Grosseteste's works. The *Dicta* are all taken from the same manuscript; Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Bodley 798, ff. 1ra-121va. All references to the *Dicta*, unless otherwise stated, use this edition. "The Electronic Grosseteste," by Joseph Goering, https://grosseteste.com. The *Dicta* have been translated into English by Gordon Jackson, *Robert Grosseteste. The Complete Dicta in English,* vols. 1-13 (Lincoln: Asgill Press, 2003-2006). All translations of the *Dicta* used in this thesis however are my own, unless otherwise stated.

that Aristotle's psychology affirmed Ciceronian/Herennian memory techniques, based on the concepts of images and *loci*, as well as identifying the role of prudence (and thus, memory) with the virtues, which grew in importance with Lateran IV and the translation of the commentary on the *Nicomachean Ethics* by Grosseteste in the 1240s.[55] Carruthers suggests that it is Aquinas who distorts Aristotle's line in the *Metaphysics* 1.1 away from the iterative repetition of memories of the same thing ('*rei multe memorie'* in William Moerbeke's version, '*multe enim memorie eiusdem rei*' in James of Venice's) which is indeed faithful to Aristotle's original repeated single memory and used by Albertus Magnus, to a concatenative plurality; multiple memories.[56] In the *cPA* Grosseteste refers to this quote from the *Metaphysics* both in the singular and plural. At 2.6 he writes that,

> many senses form one memory [*unam memoriam*] […] from many memories [*multis memoriis*], once reason is excited, comes *experimentum* […] therefore, from sense comes memory, from the repetition of memory [*ex memoria multiplicata*] comes *experimentum* and from the *experimentum* the universal.[57]

[55] Yates, *Art of Memory,* 61.

[56] *Iacobus Veneticus translator Aristotelis - Metaphysica: libri I - IV.4 (translatio 'vetustissima.')* Aristoteles Latinus 25.1-1a*,* ed. G. Vuillemin-Diem (1970), 980b, p. 5, 'fit autem ex memoria experimentum hominibus; multe enim memorie eiusdem rei unius experimenti potentiam perficiunt.' *Guillelmus de Morbeka revisor translationis Aristotelis. Metaphysica: libri I - X; XII - XIII.2 (translationis 'mediae' recensio).* Aristoteles Latinus, 25.3, pars secunda, ed. G. Vuillemin-Diem (1995), 980b, p. 12, 'fit autem ex memoria hominibus experimentum; eiusdem namque rei multe memorie unius experientie potentiam faciunt.' Carruthers, *Book of Memory,* 83-4; Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 1.1 (ed. and trans. LCL 271, p. 5).

[57] Grosseteste, *cPA* 2.6 (ed. Rossi, 404), 'est colligere ex multis sensibus unam memoriam, et hoc commune est brutis cum rationalibus; sed in rationalibus iam contingit ex multis memoriis excitata ratione fieri experientiam [...] ex sensu igitur fit memoria, ex memoria multiplicata experimentum, ex experimento universale.' Author's translation.

When Grosseteste uses *multis memoriis* he is also referring to a concatenative use of memory, more similar to autobiographical memory, rather than the stricter sense of the repeated impression of one singular memory, whilst at the same time acknowledging Aristotle's repeated, singular memory.

Thus, what is missing from scholarship on Grosseteste's synthesis, or attempted synthesis, is not only far more of a nuanced study of Grosseteste's own psychological understanding of the internal senses, central to any account of human cognition that claims to be successful, but to be able to place this in the context of his understanding of memory more generally. This broad view of memory that Grosseteste embraced will be reflected in the methodology in which I undertake this thesis. By avoiding a particular focus on one range or chronological period of Grosseteste's corpus, or by determining as McEvoy does that we can only glean his psychological understanding from works produced during his episcopacy, I am able to draw a far more comprehensive and unrestricted picture of memory. In each work discussed memory has a certain role to play; as a faculty or function of the brain in sense-perception, as a repository of images necessary for thought experiments, as a tool that can be trained to improve one's recollective abilities to aid in preaching, confession, learning, and administration, and as a *topos* that can be explored to find God and the self in order to live a virtuous life. These aspects of memory must be contextualised together if any substantive conclusions are to be drawn from memory's role as a whole; each providing some illumination of the other.

By tracing Grosseteste's scholastic training in rhetorical memory I will show that the utility of memory for Grosseteste and his contemporaries lies not only in its role in sense-perception, as the storehouse of sensible-impressions that are relayed to it from the *sensus communis*, but that memory has a much larger and arguably far more important role to play in the *cura animarum.* It is for this reason that Grosseteste uses memory not only as a *topos* to explore the very nature of humankind but also uses the heuristics of memory devices in order to help attain the practical demands of Lateran IV for not just the preacher responsible but in order to benefit the souls of his parishioners. By focusing on the role of memory this thesis will draw together these disparate strands

of Grosseteste's life and work in order to suggest that it was in the memory, and, specifically, in man's ability to recollect that Grosseteste was able to reconcile not only Augustine with Aristotle but also his own education and training in the universities with that of a Bishop. He was, after all, responsible for the implementation of Lateran IV, with its particular emphasis on confession, and the cure of souls for what was then the largest Diocese in what is now Western Europe.

Chronological Survey of Sources

In this section I will briefly outline the corpus of Grosseteste's works that I will rely on in this thesis and why they are of interest to this study. I will order them chronologically here for ease of reference, though for a lot of Grosseteste's work it is difficult to identify exact years or even decades of composition. When there is a large window for composition I have ordered the work according to a *terminus ante quem*. This list is not exhaustive of either Grosseteste's work nor of his works that I use in my thesis.

De generatione sonorum, ca. 1200-09.[58] A treatise on sound, this text is 'indicative of direct familiarity with parts of the Aristotelian corpus,' specifically *De anima*.[59] This text briefly discusses the relationship between *imaginatio,* speech, and writing. The next two works look at two aspects of natural philosophy; astronomy, and the nature of colour. *De sphaera*, ca. 1215 is an astronomical text; I will discuss this text as it relates to thought experiments, *experimentum,* and the power of *imaginatio.*[60] *De colore*, ca. 1225, also utilises thought experiments; I will use this text in my discussion of the relationship between thought experiment, *experimentum,* and *imaginatio.*[61] A more

[58] The editors of the most recent edition of *De generation sonorum* have suggested a date of around 1210, for a fuller historiography of the dating of the text see "On the Generation of Sounds: Translation, Historiography, and Synopsis," eds. Sigbjørn O. Sønnesyn, Giles E. M. Gasper, Cecilia Panti, and Neil Lewis, in *The Scientific Works of Robert Grosseteste. Volume 1, Knowing and Speaking: Robert Grosseteste's De artibus liberalibus "On the Liberal Arts" and De generatione sonorum "On the Generation of Sounds*," edited by Giles E. M. Gasper, Cecilia Panti, Tom C. B. McLeish, and Hannah E. Smithson under the aegis of the Ordered Universe Research Project (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), 237-55, at 238. The text, in Latin and in English, is edited and translated by Sigbjørn O. Sønnesyn, "De generatione sonorum," in *Knowing and Speaking*, 245-55.

[59] Sigbjørn O. Sønnesyn and Giles E. M. Gasper, "Aristotle, Priscian, and Isidore," in *Knowing and Speaking,* 267-306, at 270.

[60] McEvoy, *Philosophy of Grosseteste,* 506. The Latin text is taken from Grosseteste, *De sphaera,* in Ludwig Baur, ed., *Die Philosophischen Werke des Robert Grosseteste, Bischofs von Lincoln* (Münster i.W: Aschendorff, 1912), 11-32.

[61] The Latin and English translations of *De colore* is taken from *The Dimensions of Colour. Robert Grosseteste's De Colore. Edition, Translation, and Interdisciplinary Analysis,* eds. Greti Dinkova-Bruun et. al (Toronto: PIMS, 2013), at 16-19. This source also shows a possible knowledge of Averroes's

theoretical discussion of *imaginatio* arises in *Letter* 1, ca. 1225-28.[62] This letter to Adam Rufus of Exeter leans heavily on *imaginatio* and the difference between something existing *in arte* and in actuality. It also discusses the seal-in-wax analogy often used to describe memory; the practical aspects of which are discussed in the *Compotus*, which had been written by 1229.[63]

An early, popular textbook written by Grosseteste for students, this text contains some 28 mnemonic verses as well as instructions on the construction of referential charts and tables. It also contains innovative textual styling, such as the inclusion of headings, and an index. As with the *Compotus* the dating of the *Perambulavit Iudas* is difficult to determine; it was likely written sometime 1200-30.[64] A penitential writing, this text is a long treatise on confession and the sins arising from corporeal pleasures. It discusses the corrupting relationship between *imaginatio* and memory, and the power of dream *phantasmata* per Augustine's *Confessions.* Whilst the text warns of the dangers of lust and corporeal pleasures it also defends sense-perception as a gift from God. His most popular penitential writing for priests is *Templum Dei*, ca. 1220-30.[65] This text is

---

commentary on Aristotle's *De sensu*, likely available to Grosseteste after 1225 (Dinkova-Bruun et al., *Dimensions of Colour,* [*De colore*], 24-6).

[62] The Latin edition of the letters is *Roberti Grosseteste quondam episcopi Lincolniensis epistolae,* ed. Henry Richard Luard, Rolls Series (London: 1861), (*Letter* 1 at 1-17). The English translation is *The Letters of Robert Grosseteste, Bishop of Lincoln,* eds. F. A. C. Mantello and Joseph Goering (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010), (*Letter* 1 at 35-49).

[63] The text in both English and Latin is taken from Lohr and Nothaft, eds. and trans., *Grosseteste's Compotus.* Lohr and Nothaft in their introduction to the *Compotus* in their recent edition of the work give a terminus ante quem of 1229 (ed. Lohr and Nothaft, *Grosseteste's Compotus,* 19) but dating is difficult. For an extended historiography on the variety of opinion in dating this text see Dowd, "Astronomy and Compotus," 208-19.

[64] The Latin edition of this text is taken from Joseph Goering and F. A. C. Mantello, eds., "The 'Perambulavit Iudas…' (Speculum Confessionis) Attributed to Robert Grosseteste," *Revue bénédictine* 96 no. 1-2 (1986): 125-78, at 148-68. There is no English translation.

[65] The Latin edition of this text is taken from Goering and Mantello, *Templum Dei,* 29-68, see also 6.

illustrative of not only the type of scribal innovation similar to that found in the *Compotus* such as headings and tables but also contains architectural and anthropological mnemonics. In the same decade that Grosseteste produced the *Templum Dei* he also wrote his *cPA,* ca.1220-30.[66] This is one of the most heavily relied upon texts of Grosseteste's, with discussions on sense-perception and the internal senses. A crucial passage for this thesis lies at *cPA* 2.6, where he discusses sense perception, memory, experience, and knowledge of the universal, referring to *Metaphysics* 1.1, and *phantasmata* as sense-impressions are also discussed.

By 1230 Grosseteste had also created (though never finished) a very different piece of work; his *Tabula*.[67] Described by Mary Carruthers in her *Book of Memory* the *Tabula* is a concordance of over 400 symbols that was used by himself and subsequent Franciscan scholars.[68] It is used by modern Grossetestian scholars as a bench-mark for Grosseteste's own studies by 1230 as it contains a list of works in his possession, though it is not exhaustive. I will use the *Tabula* for both its content and style. Though the *Perambulavit Iudas* and the *Templum Dei* were written by 1230, the late 1220s to early 1230s witnessed several more texts that focused on elements of natural philosophy, similar in content to the likes of *De sphaera* and *De colore*. *De luce*, ca. 1225-30 is a short treatise on light that is considered 'Grosseteste's most central contribution to cosmology' containing as it does a description of the multiplication of

---

[66] Grosseteste, *cPA* (ed. Rossi). There is no English translation. McEvoy, *Philosophy of Grosseteste*, 501. Grosseteste, *cPA* 1.14 and 2.6 (ed. Rossi, 212-15 and 404) are often discussed together; see Wood, "Imagination and Experience," 28; Serene, "Grosseteste on Induction," 103; Oliver "Light, Truth, Experimentum," 173-2; Bruce Eastwood, "Mediaeval Empiricism: The Case of Grosseteste's Optics," *Speculum* 43, no. 2 (1968): 306-21 at 310; Van Dyke "Whole Truth," 164 n. 36. Though the *cPA* remains untranslated, a large portion of 2.6 is translated by Crombie, *Origins,* 72-4.

[67] The Lyons manuscript is transcribed reproduced in Thomson, "Grosseteste's Concordantial Signs," [*Tabula*]*,* 39-53. There is also an edition by Roseman, "Tabula," (ed. CCCM 130, pp. 235-320). See also McEvoy, *Philosophy of Grosseteste,* 492.

[68] Carruthers, *Book of Memory,* 146-9.

the species, one of Grosseteste's most original suggestions.[69] I will argue that the multiplication of the species is implicit in his idea of sense-perception including in the operation of the internal senses. *De iride* and *De lineis*, both written ca. 1230-33, are the final two overtly "scientific" texts that I will discuss in this thesis. *De iride* discusses sense-perception, particularly vision, with some thoughts concerning extramission and intromission, but in it he does not establish a theory of vision.[70] The rules which govern optics are established more clearly in *De lineis*.[71] One of Grosseteste's most original texts it argues for the application of the rules of geometry to natural phenomena. It discusses the role of light in sensation, which receives its fullest discussion in the *Hexaëmeron*, ca. 1228-35.[72] A comprehensive account of the creation of the world, the *Hexaëmeron* contains descriptions of sensation including the functioning of the common sense and its relationship with imagination. It also relies heavily on the Augustinian trinity of memory, understanding, and love, and the role of light in sensation (all sensation, not just vision) is explicit.

---

[69] McEvoy, *Philosophy of Grosseteste,* 488 (quote). The most recent publication of both the Latin (ed. Panti, 226-38) and English (trans. Lewis, 239-47) editions are in *Intellectual Milieux,* 226-47.

[70] Latin for *De iride* is taken from Baur, *Philosophischen Werke,* 72-8. The English translation is by Amelia Carolina Sparavigna, "Translation and Discussion of the De Iride, a Treatise on Optics by Robert Grosseteste," *International Journal of Sciences* 2, no. 9 (2013): 108-113. Grosseteste's thought in *De iride* is used by David C. Lindberg, *Theories of Vision from Al-Kindi to Kepler* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976), 32 and 101. See also James McEvoy, "The Chronology of Robert Grosseteste's Writings on Nature and Natural Philosophy," *Sepculum* 58, no. 3 (1983): 614-55, at 654.

[71] The Latin for *De lineis* is take from Baur, *Philosophischen Werke,* 59-65. See also McEvoy, "Chronology," 655.

[72] The Latin edition is Richard Dales and Servus Gieben, eds., *Hexaëmeron*, Auctores Britannici Medii Aevi 6 (1) (London: Published for the British Academy by Oxford University Press, 1982). There is an English translation, see *On the six days of creation: a translation of the* "*Hexaemeron,*" trans. C. F. J. Martin. Auctores Britannici Medii Aevi 6 (2) (Oxford: Published for the British Academy by Oxford University Press, 1999). For dating see *Hexaëmeron* (eds. Dales and Gieben, xii).

The next few works are more theological than his earlier works focusing on penance and the role of the clergy in the *cura animarum. De cessatione legalium*, ca. 1230-35 is a lengthy text concerning the Old and New Testaments.[73] It contains a discussion on the relationship between the memory and written word, returning to an interest in the topic that is raised in his earlier *De generatione sonorum.* A very different piece of work, the *Château d'Amour*, written by 1235 was originally composed in Anglo-Norman. This poem details the loss and restoration of creation as an allegory.[74] It contains an extensive architectural mnemonic and is evidence of Grosseteste's ability to write for a specific, perhaps lay, audience, its popularity is attested by the number of translations and versions that have survived. The *Hexaëmeron*, the *Château d'Amour* and the *De cessatione legalium* are three very different works in style but are similar in the aim; an attempt at examining the world and its history in its larger context. Grosseteste turns from focusing on individual phenomena; colours, lines, angles and so forth, and expands his scope to contextualise and explain.

From here, Grosseteste's final works look far more to human nature, to the role of the priest and clergy and to man's role in his own salvation. The *Dicta*, composed by 1235,

[73] The Latin edition of this text is Richard Dales, *De cessatione legalium,* Auctories Britannici Medii Aevi 7 (London: Published for the British Academy by Oxford University Press, 1986). The English translation is *On the cessation of the laws,* trans. Stephen Hildebrand, FOTC 13 (Washington DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2010).

[74] The version of this poem used in this thesis is the Anglo-Norman as it appears in James Murray, ed., *Le Chateau D'Amour de Robert Grosseteste, Évêque de Lincoln* (Paris: Librairie Champion, 1918). The poem, which was quickly translated into Middle English, is discussed extensively in Kari Sajavaara, *The Middle English Translations of Robert Grosseteste's 'Château d'Amour'. Mémoires de La Société Néophilologique de Helsinki* 32 (Helsinki: Société néophilologique, 1967) which also contains editions of a number of Middle English versions of the poem. There is an English prose translation of the original Anglo-Norman by Evelyn Mackie, "Robert Grosseteste's Anglo-Norman Treatise on the Loss and Restoration of Creation, Commonly Known as Le Château D'Amour: An English Prose Translation," in *Robert Grosseteste and the Beginnings of a British Theological Tradition. Papers Delivered at the Grosseteste Colloquium Held at Greyfriars, Oxford on 3rd July 2002*. Bibliotheca Seraphico-Capuccina 69.2, ed. Maura O'Carroll (Rome: Instituto Storico de Cappuccini, 2003), 151-79.

are a diverse collection of sermons.[75] I shall not detail each one that I use individually here, but they vary from *Dictum* 7, which discusses the internal faculties, to *Dictum* 50 which is a prototypical architectural mnemonic, to *Dictum* 55 which details the role of *lux* as being an instrument of sensation within the internal faculties, elaborating not only on what is discussed in the *Hexaëmeron* but also in *De luce.* The *recapitulatio* to the *Dicta* is interesting in that it details Grosseteste's acknowledgment of the novelty in "new" stylistic elements in things like headings and titles - techniques that he uses in his *Compotus* and *Templum Dei.* Whilst Grosseteste produced some penitential writings before he became Bishop, such as *Perambulavit Iudas* and *Templum Dei*, both of which have been studied to some extent, one of his least studied works is the *Quoniam cogitatio,* ca. 1239-40.[76] As a confessional manual this work details a reckoning of the importance and place of memory in the act of confession. It incorporates the importance of order, location, and time in recollection as well as listing the seven *circumstantiae* as useful aids for not just the priest but for the penitent. It also discusses the relationship between *imaginatio* and memory as being a positive one (compared to the *Perambulavit Iudas,* for example, that warns of the dangers of this relationship). This work also mentions *reminiscentia* as the process involved in the act of confession, suggesting a knowledge of the particularly human activity of intended recollection, positing it as a search or *perscrutatio*, to use Grosseteste's terminology.[77] Slightly later, by ca. 1246 Grosseteste had produced the first full Latin commentary and translation of Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*.[78] As McEvoy suggests, 'he was forcibly impressed both by the

[75] McEvoy, *Philosophy of Grosseteste,* 499.

[76] The *Quoniam cogitatio* has been edited by F. A. C. Mantello and Joseph Goering, "Robert Grosseteste's Quoniam cogitatio, A Treatise on Confession," *Traditio* 67 (2012): 341-384, text at 369-81. There is no English translation. Mantello and Goering, "Quoniam cogitatio," 353.

[77] Grosseteste, *Quoniam cogitatio* §28 (ed. Mantello and Goering, 376).

[78] Grosseteste's commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics has been edited by H. P. F. Mercken, *The Greek Commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle*, vols. 1 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1973) and vol. 3 (Leuven: University Press, 1991). Vol. 1 contains an edition of Grosseteste's translation of the commentary on Book 1 (by Eustratius) and Books 2-4 (anonymous). Vol. 3 contains Grosseteste's translation of the commentary on Book 7 (anonymous), Book 8 (by Aspasius) and Books 9-10 (by Michael of Ephesus). See also Jean Dunbabin, "Robert Grosseteste as Translator, Transmitter, and

originality of the content of the *Ethics* and by the unheralded quality of its scientific ambition.'[79] Alexander Murray has suggested that there are traces of his interest in the *Nicomachean Ethics* in *Deus est*, ca. 1239-53, and I will suggest that there are vestiges of it in his other works too.[80] *Deus est* is a much longer treatise on confession and penance than *Quoniam cogitatio* but it contains a short description of the internal senses that is considered Avicennian because of its reference to the passage in the *Liber de anima* of a mother loving her child, as well as detailing the various ventricles of the brain. However, it contains four, not five (as per Avicenna) internal faculties. Finally, *Ecclesia sancta celebrat* is also considered (by McEvoy) as being evidence of a psychology that has influences from Aristotle, Avicenna, and Alcher of Clairvaux.[81] Written ca. 1243 it details the powers of the soul and considers the idea of a spiritual resurrection.[82]

As I suggested in my introductory paragraphs, Grosseteste's understanding of memory must be gleaned from more than those works that are "psychological" in topic. Whilst these works do not place memory as the topic of consideration per se they can all contribute to this discussion on memory broadly speaking, and some of them, such as *Quoniam cogitatio*, have been insufficiently looked at. Thus, whilst memory may not be

---

Commentator: The 'Nicomachean Ethics,'" *Traditio* 28 (1972): 460-72, at 461 remains an exhaustive account of the text.

[79] James McEvoy, "Grosseteste's Reflections on Aristotelian Friendship: A 'New' Commentary on Nicomachean Ethics VIII. 8-14," in *New Perspectives,* 149-68, at 164.

[80] Grosseteste, *Deus est* (ed. Wenzel, 239-93). See also McEvoy, *Philosophy of Grosseteste*, 492; Alexander Murray, "Confession as a Historical Source in the Thirteenth Century," in *Conscience and Authority in the Medieval Church*, ed. Alexander Murray (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 49-86, at 82-5. Lindberg and Tachau refer to the internal faculties of *Deus est* in their study of Grosseteste's internal senses that appears in "Seeing and Knowing," 499-500.

[81] McEvoy bases his argument that Grosseteste follows Avicenna 'to the details' in his doctrine of the internal senses is based on this text, see McEvoy, *Philosophy of Grosseteste,* 295-6.

[82] Grosseteste, *Ecclesia sancta celebrat* (ed. McEvoy, 169-87). There is no English translation. See also McEvoy, *Philosophy of Grosseteste*, 498.

in their titles, and whilst memory may not even be a major or minor subject matter in each text looked at, they are all relevant to our knowledge of Grosseteste's thinking on the issue. Taken together as a whole they provide indispensable insight into how Grosseteste thought about memory and understanding. The table that follows is a brief overview of these texts coupled with memory-related topics and areas of interest that can be gleaned from them.

Table 1: Memory as a Topic in Grosseteste's Works.

Title	*Phantasmata* / Mental Images	Sensation	*Imaginatio*	*Memoria*	Thought experiments	Scribal Innovation / production	Mnemonics	Etymology / exegesis	Somatic / Sensory language	*Prudentia*
Château d'Amour						x	x		x	
Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics								x		x
Compotus correctorius	x					x	x	x		
De cessatione legalium		x		x				x		
De colore			x		x					

Title	*Phantasmata* / Mental Images	Sensation	*Imaginatio*	*Memoria*	Thought experiments	Scribal Innovation / production	Mnemonics	Etymology / exegesis	Somatic / Sensory language	*Prudentia*
De generatione sonorum	x	x	x							
De iride		x			x					
De lineis		x			x					
De luce		x			x					
De sphaera	x				x					
Deus est		x	x	x						
Dicta	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

Title	*Phantasmata* / Mental Images	Sensation	*Imaginatio*	*Memoria*	Thought experiments	Scribal Innovation / production	Mnemonics	Etymology / exegesis	Somatic / Sensory language	*Prudentia*
Ecclesia sancta celebrat	x		x	x						
Epistola 1	x		x	x						
Hexaëmeron	x	x	x	x				x		
Perambulavit Iudas	x	x	x	x						
Quoniam cogitatio	x		x	x	x		x			x
Tabula			x	x		x	x			x
Templum Dei						x	x		x	

Chapter Structure

Rather than follow the four areas of change mentioned above I have structured my chapters slightly differently. In doing so I will show how a notion of memory permeated a variety of aspects of Grosseteste's life, stemming in part from his education that included rhetoric. Thus, when Grosseteste discusses confession, for example, which is explored in Chapter 4, he utilises Augustine's description of memory as an *aula,* Plotinus's pairing of memory and speech, and the *circumstantiae* as heuristic, rhetorical, and ethical tool.[83] Additionally, the discussion of confession illustrates an understanding of the complex relationship between memory and imagination and how both of these relate to sense-perception. Finally, there is recourse to an examination of scribal technologies in how he conveys this information to preachers in his manuals, and insight into how memory and confession relate autobiographically to the experience of both penitent and priest and their relationship therein. Thus, it is by placing the four changes within the context of my chapters together that I am able to show Grosseteste's conception of memory goes far beyond that discussed by Avicenna, underpinning a wide range of his works rather than those on sense-perception or preaching exclusively.

Chapter 1 looks at memory's role in sense-perception; its reliance on and contribution to human experience, starting with Grosseteste's use of *Metaphysics* 1.1 in the *cPA* and an exploration of *experimentum* as he understood it. Grosseteste, as an ardent defender of sense-perception in general (though also simultaneously wary of sensation's central role in sin) uses light's role in sensation as a means of approaching the necessity of sensation whilst allowing room for God's place in it. By exploring Grosseteste's treatment of memory as an internal psychological faculty, one that is often confused with imagination, I will show that whilst he is comfortable using the "new" Avicennian terms he does not necessarily adhere to their qualities. By looking at the role of mental images and Grosseteste's frequent references to *phantasmata* in the thought process I will show that he understood the value and power of the imagination's image-making capabilities when used correctly, through thought experiments, whilst simultaneously warning of the perils of an over-active imagination that can ultimately lead to heresy.

[83] As I will show in Chapter 4, Grosseteste's use of *circumstantiae* changes slightly in what, I will argue, is an increasing affinity with the *Nicomachean Ethics*; another indication that he aligns memory with prudence.

The imagination is perhaps the only internal faculty of Grosseteste's that has been explored by modern scholarship in any detail, by Richard Southern and James Ginther, but both scholars failed to associate the faculty with memory.[84] Medieval imagination and memory were far harder to distinguish from each other and I will show that whilst Southern correctly identifies several important traits of Grosseteste's psychology, he assigns them to the imagination rather than the memory.[85]

Chapter 2 explores the notion of spiritual sensation as it applies to Grosseteste's scriptural exegesis. This chapter will therefore examine spiritual sensation as a means of navigating a Biblical *topos*, including metaphoric use of sensory- and somatically-derived language to that of prophesy and mystical experience, and light's role as more-than-metaphorical. Grosseteste's biblical exegesis has been a topic of scholarship with the likes of Beryl Smalley and James Ginther but not as it pertains to a connection with the art or role of memory. [86] I will examine any correlation between corporeal and spiritual sensation using current scholarship on the topic, and will explore the notion of "voluntarist optics" and Grosseteste's repeated use of anthropological metaphors and analogies to describe theological concepts to reinforce his unusually positive theological

[84] James Ginther discusses imagination as it pertains to thought experiments in "Robert Grosseteste and the Theologian's Task," in *British Theological Tradition,* 239-63 at 257-60, and in James Ginther, *Master of the Sacred Page: A Study of the Theology of Robert Grosseteste, ca. 1229/30-1235* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004), 61-4. Richard Southern discusses it as it pertains to his consideration of natural phenomena and as the bridge between Grosseteste's *affectus* and *aspectus* in *Growth of an English Mind,* 40-5.

[85] Mary Carruthers, *The Craft of Thought. Meditation, Rhetoric, and the Making of Images, 400-1200,* 4th ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 68.

[86] Beryl Smalley, "The Biblical Scholar," in *Robert Grosseteste Scholar and Bishop, Essays in Commemoration of the Seventh Centenary of his Death,* ed. D. A. Callus (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1955), 70-97; James Ginther "Laudat Sensum et Significationem: Robert Grosseteste on the Four Senses of Scripture," in *With Reverence for the Word: Medieval Scriptural Exegesis in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam*, eds. Jane Dammen McAuliffe, Barry D. Walfish, and Joseph W. Goering (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 237-55.

anthropology.[87] As with the myriad weavings of memory in the thirteenth century, so too does spiritual sensation appear to fluctuate at this time. Again, the idea of combining Aristotelian physiology with Augustinian theology will be discussed.

Chapter 3 shifts the focus of memory from the natural to the artificial. By examining his work for evidence of aide-memoires I will show that he applied the mnemonic principles learned in his education to his role as Bishop for theological and administrative effect. The popularity of his preaching material and literature show that he consciously incorporated mnemonic principles and recognised their usefulness; combining them as he did with new scribal techniques to produce literature that was memorable for a variety of audiences as well as his own administrative and scholarly needs. The secondary literature on this area of Grosseteste's corpus is small but encouraging, identifying him as a 'pioneer of mnemonic methods' able to maximise scribal and technical innovation.[88] How he did this is based in large part on his experience as a pupil and as a teacher and his understanding of memory's function. This includes an exploration of Grosseteste's attitude towards the role of documentation as an aid to memory, an attitude that can be adduced from his use of *cedulae* (notes) and his own 'highly abbreviated cursive' resulting from the demands of the universities as well as his early adoption of registers, an administrative practice not common until Edward I's reign, 1272-1307.[89] It also looks at how the relationship between scriptural exegesis, discussed in Chapter 2, cohered with his own scholastic interest in etymology, a pervasive yet under-studied element of Grosseteste's own personality.[90]

---

[87] Richard G. Newhauser, "Peter of Limoges, Optics, and the Science and the Senses," *The Senses and Society* 5, no. 1 (2010): 28-44, at 36 for "voluntarist optics."

[88] Wheatley, *Idea of the Castle,* 97 (quote); Taylor, "Was Grosseteste?" 83

[89] Carruthers, *Book of Memory*, 146-7 (quote); Clanchy, *From Memory,* 77-8.

[90] Southern notes Grosseteste's penchant for 'endless etymologies' in *English Mind*, 184. see Chapter 3 below.

Grosseteste's use of mnemonics, particularly his architectonic mnemonics in *Château d'Amour*, *Templum Dei,* and *Dictum* 50 all reflect varying degrees of sophistication and reveal a comfortableness with the craft but it his ability to adapt classical skills with contemporary needs that is so revealing; his change in architecture from religious to secular and his incorporation of a new octosyllabic rhyming style are illustrative of the twelfth to thirteenth-century shift that saw rhetoric as a means in not only helping the preacher in their oration but the audience in their retention.[91] As well as classic architectural mnemonics Grosseteste also incorporates other methods as learning aids to help his audience; mnemonic verse in the *Compotus* to help his students, and the use of anthropological mnemonics in the *Templum Dei* and *Dictum* 50 (in addition to the architectural) reflect an incorporation of the theological emphasis on the Incarnation, one which Kimberly Rivers suggests was popular amongst Franciscans by the fourteenth century.[92] Whilst Rivers argues convincingly that the Franciscans contributed just as much to the art of mnemonics and the value of memory as the Dominicans (notably, Albertus Magnus and Aquinas), the latter's importance emphasised by Carruthers, her full-length study of this contribution neglects Grosseteste almost entirely; she mentions him just once and in passing.[93] I will show that there are instances where Grosseteste uses anthropological mnemonics, inspired by, and reflecting, his own position regarding the theological importance of the incarnation.[94]

---

[91] Rivers, *Preaching the Memory,* 7; Wheatley, *Idea of the Castle* 97; Whitehead, *Castles of the Mind,* 88.

[92] Kimberly Rivers, "Writing the Memory of the Virtues and Vices in Johannes Sintram's (D. 1450) Preaching Aids" in *The Making of Memory in the Middle Ages*, edited by Lucie Doležalová (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 31-48, at 39.

[93] Rivers, *Preaching the Memory*, 101.

[94] For more on the Incarnation in Grosseteste's theology see Dominic J. Unger, "Robert Grosseteste Bishop of Lincoln (1235-1253) on the Reasons for the Incarnation," *Franciscan Studies* 16, no. 1/2 (1956): 1–36, and Ginther, *Sacred Page,* 121-49; Hildebrand, *Cessation of the Laws,* 3-27, and Jim Rhodes, *Poetry Does Theology. Chaucer, Grosseteste, and the Pearl-Poet* (Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame Press, 2001), 43-63.

In Chapter 4 I use evidence from my previous chapters to show how, inspired by Lateran IV and by combining his own understanding of memory's role in sense-perception with his training in and incorporation of rhetorical memory he transformed the act of confession into an act of memory, specifically an act of recollection. In detailing the act of confession, Grosseteste combines several different aspects of memory; it remains Augustine's great *aula* and *habitus* of God and self but it also allows for a structured Aristotelian *search* to take place through the act of recollection, one that can be (re)constructed and (re)managed. Grosseteste includes a number of authorities including Hugh of St. Victor in his discussion of confession and his emphasis on the role and responsibility of memory in the process suggests that he was able to identify a relationship between prudence and memory, though not as explicitly as Aquinas or Albertus Magnus. The act of confession as an act of memory has been explored by David Tell who refers to it as 'performative remembering' on behalf of the penitent, but Alexander Murray has also noted how it is a sharing of experience and memories between the said penitent and the priest; the experience of the penitent becomes, through the verbalisation of the sin, the experience of the priest.[95] Leonard Boyle and, more recently, Jacqueline Murray have commented that this act of confession is personal and self-aware, and that confession 'helped the laity to develop skills of self-analysis and self-knowledge, skills that would allow them to understand themselves, think for themselves, and perhaps even reach their own conclusions' similar, I suggest, to a process of *experimentum.*[96] The language of Canon 21 reflects this idea of confession as an act of 'discernment' (*discerno*) not just of the penitent but of the priest who must evaluate the 'circumstances' (*circumstantiae*) using their own

[95] David Tell, "Beyond Mnemotechnics: Confession and Memory in Augustine," *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 39, no. 3 (2006): 233-53, at 234. Alexander Murray, "Counselling in Medieval Confession," in *Conscience and Authority,* 87-104, at 98.

[96] Leonard Boyle "The Fourth Lateran Council and Manuals of Popular Theology," in *The Popular Literature of Medieval England,* ed. Thomas J. Heffernan (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1985), 30-43, at 34; and Jacqueline Murray, "Cultural Studies/Sexual Anxiety: Confessions of a Medieval(ist)," *Cultural Studies, Medieval Studies, and Disciplinary Debate*, *held at The University of Saskatchewan March 13-14 1998,* accessed 21st March, 2021, http://www.usask.ca/english/colloqu/murrayp.htm.

'experience' (*diversis experimentis*).[97] This places the memory of confession in stark contrast with the memory of *Metaphysics* 981a1. In *Metaphysics* (and repeated in the *Posterior Analytics*) memory precedes *experimentum*; in confession, memory is the repository of sense-experience which must be navigated by and communicated to the priest. This emphasis on searching, on looking for God in the memory is not at odds with Aristotle's memory more generally however if one is to take into account Aristotle's use of recollection which he elevates to an action akin to 'a sort of search.'[98] It is this search that is described by Grosseteste as a *perscrutatio* in his *Quoniam cogitatio*.[99] It is telling that Augustine's emphasis on memory and Lateran IV's emphasis of confession is again, not actually at odds with an Aristotelian notion of memory. As James Warren writes, 'Aristotle is also inclined to think that a subject's memories and expectations – again in the sense of 'autobiographical' or 'introversive' memory and expectation – reveal something important about that subject's moral character.'[100] An emphasis on confession, then, is an emphasis on memory; not just the penitent's ability to remember (or, as we will see, to invent) events in their past, but in its relationship to experience too. Not just the experience of the occasion of the sin recalled, but in the shared experience between priest and penitent in its (re)telling.

These four chapters all focus on different aspects of memory from the artificial to the natural to the spiritual and in doing so I will show that Grosseteste's concept of memory is multidimensional and broad, though admittedly inconsistent. Because of the fundamental role memory plays in sense-perception, by broadening the scope of my investigation into his understanding of memory to that of mnemonics, memory's role in confession and the peculiarities of spiritual sensation, I will show that, for Grosseteste it

[97] *Concilium Lateranense IV,* Canon 21 (ed. and trans. DDGC, p. 270, pp. 259-60).

[98] Aristotle, *De memoria et reminscentia* 453a12. The translation for this is in Richard Sorabji, *Aristotle on Memory,* 2nd ed. (2004, repr., London: Bloomsbury, 2012), 47-62, unless otherwise stated.

[99] Grosseteste, *Quoniam cogitatio* §16 (ed. Mantello and Goering, 372-3).

[100] James Warren, *The Pleasures of Reason in Plato, Aristotle, and the Hellenistic Hedonists* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 157.

is memory's relationship with experience, *experimentum*, that is so vital not just epistemologically but theologically too. Memory, as one third of the Augustinian trinity memory, understanding, love, is intimately tied to both soul *and* body.

Chapter 1. Experiential Memory.

In this chapter I will show that, despite modern scholars' reliance on using Grosseteste's *cPA* and *Deus est* for their account of his internal senses, these texts on their own do not evidence a cogent theory of sense-perception or of the power and role of memory and imagination in the intellectual process.[1] Instead, a far broader corpus of work needs to be looked at; such as the *Perambulavit Iudas* and his *Dicta* which both reveal something about the relationship between imagination, memory, and understanding. Additionally, texts such as *De lineis* and *De sphaera* are useful in examining the broad power of imagination's reliance on *phantasmata*, the residue of sense-impressions. The role of *phantasmata* in sensation is critical, as Ned O'Gorman writes, in establishing a theory of 'perception, knowledge and memory' and is a topic of debate amongst modern Aristotelian scholars particularly as its relates to images; this chapter will thus explore Grosseteste's understanding of *phantasmata* and its sister-process of *phantasia.*[2] Whilst I will show in subsequent chapters that there are still other aspects of memory that can be gleaned from his writings this chapter focuses on sense-perception as a process and thus memory's relationship with what can be seen, heard, touched and so on. Light, a crucial element of this process as discussed in the *Hexaëmeron*, will be examined as it pertains not only to the external but to the internal senses too; as an *instrumentum sentiendi* or instrument of sense that allows Grosseteste to combine Augustinian illumination with Aristotelian abstraction via his theory of the multiplication of the species. I will also show that emphasis is placed on the *imaginatio's* ability to manipulate sense-data for thought experiments, a crucial component of Grosseteste's notion of *experimentum.* It is this manipulation of *phantasmata*, with their necessary

[1] The short extract in *Deus est*, for example, is used by Lindberg and Tachau, "Seeing and Knowing," 100; Oliver uses cPA 2.6 in Oliver, "Grosseteste on Light," 168 as does Wood in "Imagination and Experience," 28.

[2] Ned O'Gorman, "Aristotle's *Phantasia* in the Rhetoric: Lexis, Appearance, and the Epideictic Function of Discourse," *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 38, no. 1 (2005): 16-40, at 18.

origin in sensation, that is so useful for thought experiments but so dangerous if not used correctly, a danger that potentially culminates in heresy.

Cognitio Experimentalis.

In his magisterial account of Grosseteste's life and contribution to medieval scholasticism Richard Southern declares that it was Grosseteste's emphasis and weight given to *observation* that reflected his 'peculiarly independent personality.'[3] He continues that Grosseteste's 'process of enlightenment has almost nothing in common with the scholastic method' but rather is a 'method of discovery, initiated by an observer looking at individual events and seeking to discover their nature and causes.'[4] Southern gives as an example the introduction to *De cometis* (ca. 1222) which opens with Grosseteste's admission that 'the recent appearance of a comet gave me the opportunity to apply my mind to the nature of comets' to illustrate what he believes is one of the most critical aspects of Grosseteste's non-scholasticism; a reliance on observation and experience.[5] A somewhat similar admission arises in *De impressionibus aeris* (completed 1215-20) where, as McEvoy describes, confirmation of reliability was found, 'the value of which in his own eyes lay precisely in its power of prediction, by referring to the weather experienced in the month *before* his writing.'[6]

[3] Southern, *English Mind,* 150, see also 146-69.

[4] Southern, *English Mind,* 168.

[5] Grosseteste, *De cometis,* in M*oti, Virtù E Motori Celesti Nella Cosmologia Di Roberto Grossatesta: Studio Ed Edizione Dei Trattati De Sphera, De Cometis, De Motu Supercelestium*. Testi E Studi Per Il "Corpus Philosophorum Medii Aevi," 16, ed. Cecilia Panti (Firenze: SISMEL, 2001): 321-28, at 321, 'occasione comete que nuper apparvit, applicui animum ad cogitandum aliquid de natura cometarum.' See also Thomson, 147.

[6] McEvoy, "Chronology," 621; Ezio Franceschini, "Sulla presunta datazione del 'De impressionibus aeris' di Roberto Grossatesta," *Rivista di filosofia neo-scholastica* 44 (1952): 22-3. Grosseteste, *De impressionibus aeris,* in *Philosophischen Werke,* 42-51, at 50-1.

This focus on observation of natural phenomena has its roots not only in Aristotle but in the Fathers of the Church, and it is this appeal to experiential knowledge that I argue is so important to Grosseteste, not just theologically but epistemologically too. Basil the Great describes the world as 'a school for attaining the knowledge of God, because through visible and perceptible objects it provides guidance to the mind for the contemplation of the invisible.'[7] Thus when Grosseteste etymologises on the word πεῖραν or *peiran* in his *Prooemium* to the *Hexaëmeron;* he renders it as 'cognitio experimentalis.'[8] C. F. J. Martin in their translation of the *Hexaëmeron* has translated this as 'knowledge by experience' although a smoother definition may be 'experiential knowledge.' Much has been made of Grosseteste's understanding and use of *experimentum* and its derivatives and whether his meaning is tantamount to a modern notion of experiment or anything approaching such a definition. Starting with A. C. Crombie in 1953 there has been debate about whether *experimentum* consciously anticipates a modern notion of scientific experiment, 'a controlled procedure intended to verify a scientific hypothesis' as Stephen P. Marrone has defined it.[9] The common example taken for "proof" of Grosseteste's "modern" understanding of this concept is the (Avicennian) example of bile-producing scammony in the *cPA* 1.14, which observes that a discharge of red bile is preceded by the ingestion of scammony. Indeed, Marrone and Eastwood have said that this is the 'only' reference to 'experimental method' in the entire of Grosseteste's corpus, and Eastwood has successfully argued that it does not suppose a modern rendering of experiment.[10]

---

[7] Basil the Great, *Homily on the Hexaemeron* 1.6 (trans. FOTC 46, p. 11).

[8] Grosseteste, *Prooemium* to the *Hexaëmeron* §61 (eds. Dales and Gieben, 33; trans. Martin, 30).

[9] Marrone, *William of Auvergne*, 273.

[10] Stephen P. Marrone, "Metaphysics and Science in the Thirteenth Century: William of Auvergne, Robert Grosseteste and Roger Bacon," in *Routledge History of Philosophy, Vol 3: Medieval Philosophy*, ed. John Marenbon (New York, NY: Routledge, 1998), 203-24, at 212. See also Eastwood, "Mediaeval Empiricism," 311.

Using Grosseteste's reference to the Avicennian example of bile-producing scammony in the *cPA* and suggesting that it is evidence of an experimental procedure akin to modern understanding and definition, as Marrone, Folke Nordström, and Crombie do, is problematic for a number of reasons.[11] The first and most basic is that it is Avicennian in origin, not Grossetestian. Eastwood has suggested that this alone shows it is 'theoretical only' and should not be emblematic of a practical application.[12] The argument that this particular example is evidence of scientific method derives from the conclusion that it indicates a method of verification and falsification. In Jeremiah Hackett's discussion of Grosseteste's scientific corpus he proffers two examples seemingly in favour of *experimentum*-as-experiment*,* one from *De sphaera* and the other from *De iride*, the latter containing a reference to 'that experiment' of *De speculis,* the former referring to the 'experiments of astronomy' showing that the earth is round, using his words, 'by experiment.'[13] Additionally, it could be suggested that in *De colore* there is perhaps the most convincing ideation of repeated observable *experiment* in the discussion of the medium at the end of the text, where Grosseteste says that there are those with knowledge who, 'through skilful manipulation [*artificium*] they can show visibly, as they wish, all kinds of colours.'[14]

Whilst initially these examples seem to suggest 'controlled mathematical verification of a natural phenomenon,' Dinkova-Bruun et al. have convincingly argued in their

[11] Nordström's understanding of *experimentum* as 'experiment' seems to rest heavily on what was then Crombie's pioneering 1953 text. See Folke Nordström, "Peterborough, Lincoln, and the Science of Robert Grosseteste: A Study in Thirteenth Century Architecture and Iconography," *The Art Bulletin* 37, no. 4 (1955): 241-72, at 255-72.

[12] Eastwood, "Mediaeval Empiricism," 311.

[13] See Jeremiah Hackett, "Scientia Experimentalis: From Robert Grosseteste to Roger Bacon," in *New Perspectives,* 89-120, at 110.

[14] Grosseteste, *De colore* (eds. and trans. Dinkova-Bruun et al., 19), 'et sic per artificum omnes modos colorum quod volerint visibiliter ostendunt.'

discussion of *De colore* this is not at all the case.[15] Instead the scammony example (and the others I have referenced above) simply show, in Grosseteste's own words, 'a repeated observation of two concomitant events.'[16] This then should be taken as Grosseteste's own definition of *experimentum.* Added to this that Bacon's investigations, following that Alhazen's observations in *De aspectibus* were unavailable to Grosseteste, Dinkova-Bruun et al. have concluded that *experimentum* is best rendered in modern terminology as "experience" equivalent to Aristotelian *emperia,* that is, 'personal experience and careful observation of nature.'[17] In addition to what has been argued by Dinkova-Bruun et al. I would like to include two other key texts, one by Bacon the other by Grosseteste that argue for this case of *experimentum* as experience rather than experiment. I will show in Chapter 4 that Grosseteste, following the wording of Canon 21 of Lateran IV, also identifies confession with *experimentum*.

The first example is from Bacon's description of Grosseteste's attitude to the books of Aristotle appearing in his *Compendium Studii Philosophiae,* quoted in my introduction. The focus for this description by Bacon is not a debate about the true meaning of *experimentum* but is rather on the relative usefulness of translations and translated texts (and whether or not Grosseteste relied on them). However, in this context it does not seem that 'individual experiment' would be as appropriate as 'individual experience' thus Southern's apt rendering of the word in his translation.[18] Lohr and Nothaft likewise translate *experimentum* as 'experience' in Grosseteste's *Compotus* based on Grosseteste's comment 'and this agrees more strongly with what we find from

[15] Dinkova-Bruun et al., *Dimensions of Colour,* [*De colore*], 29.

[16] Grosseteste, *cPA* 1.14 (ed. Rossi, 215), 'ex frequenti visione horum duorum visibilium.' Discussed in Dinkova-Bruun et al., *Dimensions of Colour,* [*De colore*], 28.

[17] Dinkuva-Bruun et al., *Dimensions of Colour,* [*De colore*], 26.

[18] Southern, *English Mind,* 16.

contemporary experience concerning the recession of the solstice,'[19] asserting that 'no instrument-based research was necessary to support Grosseteste's conclusion.'[20]

Second, I would like to offer an example from the *Hexaëmeron* that fully encapsulates a rendering of *experimentum* as "experience". In Book 6 Grosseteste writes that 'it has been discovered by *certis experientiis* that fish keep in their memory the usual times of feeding' referencing Book 3 of Augustine's *De genesi ad litteram.*[21] Here, Augustine writes that in Bulla Regia is a large fountain full of fish so used to having food thrown at them by passers-by that when the fish are 'aware' (*sentiunt*) of people passing along the outskirts of the fountain they swim to the surface back and forth in the hopes of being fed.[22] What is important for our purpose here is that Augustine refers to the 'insufficient experience' (*experientia minor*) of some authors compared to that of others (such as Pliny). Additionally, when discussing the relative likelihood of fish having memory, Augustine writes that 'this is something that I myself have experienced, and that is experienceable by those who can and want [to experience this].'[23] Whilst the subject of the debate is whether fish have memory, observing people throwing food into the water is certainly not a Marrone-defined 'controlled procedure intended to verify a scientific hypothesis' but rather 'a repeated observation of two concomitant events,' to

[19] Grosseteste, *Compotus* (eds and trans. Lohr and Nothaft, 60-1), 'et hoc plus consonat ei, quod invenimus per experimentum nostri temporis de antecessione solstitii.'

[20] Lohr and Nothaft, *Grosseteste's Compotus*, 189.

[21] Grosseteste, *Hexaëmeron* 6.9.1 (eds. Dales and Gieben, 191; trans. Martin, 193), 'nam certis experientiis compertum est pisces retinere memoria consuetas nutrimentorum receptiones.' Martin renders '*experientiis'* as 'experiment.'

[22] Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram libri duodecim* 3.8.12 (ed. CSEL 28/1, p. 71), 'quo pastu assuefacti, deambulantibus super oram fontis hominibus, ipsi quoque cum eis gregatim natando eunt et redeunt, exspectantes unde aliquid iactent, quorum praesentiam sentiunt.'

[23] Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram libri duodecim* 3.8.12 (ed. CSEL 28/1, p. 71), 'quod se ipse sum expertus, et experiantur qui possunt et volunt.' Author's translation.

quote Grosseteste.[24] As such, when Grosseteste refers to this activity as *per certa experimenta* in the *Hexaëmeron*, he is, and can only be, referring to *experience*, one which relies fundamentally on sense-perception and one that is akin to *peiran* and *empeiria*. For Grosseteste, focusing on experience as a mediator between God and man, between theory and practice does not present a problematic gap between Augustine and Aristotle that Van Dyke and Marrone have tried to navigate.[25] By using experience in the Augustinian sense (such as the fish episode in the *Hexaëmeron*) Grosseteste is able to identify in Aristotle a similar concept of education, one that 'flows out of real experience and is controlled by no bureaucracy, an education leading to the apprehension of real objects, number and the power of beauty.'[26] As I will show, experience for Grosseteste is fundamental epistemologically and theologically; as it relates to the incarnation of Jesus, and to the redemptive, essential and newly-emphasised act of confession. Both have recourse to the memory.

Grosseteste thus saw no fault with Aristotle's statement in *Metaphysics* 1.1 that sense-perception leads to memory, leading to experience and finally knowledge of the universal (although, as discussed in my Introduction, he does seem unsure as to whether experience is the result of the repetition of one memory, or of many memories). His theory of *lux/lumen*, the central mainstay in any Augustinian-aligned argument to suggest otherwise, need not be so polemical when one incorporates both the internal and external senses into the fray. Thus, the role of *lux/lumen* will be explored as it reveals truth to the external corporeal senses but also the internal psychological ones. Fundamental to any notion of experience, then, is sense-data. It is our interactions with the sensible world that build the objects of memory which form the "contents" of

[24] Grosseteste, *cPA* 1.14 (ed. Rossi, 215). See n. 9 and n. 16 above.

[25] Brian Stock, "Experience, Praxis, Work, and Planning in Bernard of Clairvaux: Observations on the Sermones in Cantica," in *The Cultural Context of Medieval Learning: Proceedings of the First International Colloquium on Philosophy, Science, and Theology in the Middle Ages, September 1973,* eds. John Emery Murdoch and Edith Dudley Sylla (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1973), 219-70, at 230 and 245.

[26] Paul Olson, *The Journey to Wisdom, Self-Education in Patristic and Medieval Literature* (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1995), 60.

experience, resulting in knowledge of the universal. It is unsurprising therefore that Grosseteste has, compared to his contemporaries, a favourable view of sense-perception; his most striking support of sense-perception is found in the *Perambulavit Iudas*.[27] He writes that 'the five corporeal senses, which God gave to me to do good' allow him to know and live correctly by avoiding sin.[28] This defence of sense-perception is fundamental to Grosseteste's insistence on the necessity of the Incarnation and of the unity of body and spirit epitomised by Jesus's humanity. In his work on the theology behind the *Château d'Amour* (which I discuss at length in Chapter 3) Jim Rhodes sees it as the pinnacle of Grosseteste's views on the possibility of human deification and the centrality to his thought of the 'goodness of the creation and the centrality of human beings in it.'[29] Dales has suggested that it is this unity of body and soul that is Grosseteste's most original thought, and that because of this it 'rode roughshod' over Aristotle, favouring Augustine.[30]

Of course, sense-perception manifesting as bodily desire has a large role to play in sin and this is not lost on Grosseteste; the first 209 lines of the Mantello and Goering edition of *Perambulvit Iudas* list the dangers of sensual pleasures, a warning repeated in other texts such as *Deus est* and *Notus in Iudea Deus*.[31] As Chris Woolgar explains in his subject-defining tome *The Senses in Late Medieval England,* the pre-scholastic view was that the Incarnation of Jesus had legitimised sensation 'as a way of knowing God.'[32] Given Grosseteste's belief in the necessity of the Incarnation it would seem that

[27] C. M. Woolgar, *The Senses in Late Medieval England* (Yale, CT: Yale University Press, 2006), 16.

[28] Grosseteste, *Perambulavit Iudas* §5 (eds. Goering and Mantello, 149), 'quia corporis v sensus, quod Dominus dedit mihi ad bonum, ut sciret et possem recte.'

[29] Rhodes, *Poetry does Theology,* 46-55, quote 55.

[30] Richard C. Dales, *The Problem of the Rational Soul in the Thirteenth Century* (Leiden: Brill, 1995), 45.

[31] Grosseteste's *Notus in Iudea Deus* is edited by Joseph Goering and F. A. C. Mantello, Notus in Iudea Deus: Robert Grosseteste's Confessional Formula in Lambeth Palace MS 499," *Viator* 18 (1987): 253-74.

[32] Woolgar, *Senses,* 17.

this emphasis on the personal experience of the natural world left him unusually open to the method of discovery posited by the reintroduction of Aristotle. Indeed, in his *cPA* 2.6 he explicitly defends sense-data albeit based on a misinterpretation of the original text. Aristotle allegorises perception as soldiers retreating from battle, with only the soldiers of sense-perception remaining steadfast.[33] Slowly, as the other soldiers (specifically identified as memory and imagination) realise their comrades-in-arms are standing their ground, they stop their retreat and the army of perception is unified once more. This gives Grosseteste the opportunity to defend the weakness of the senses.[34] Sense perception, as the weakest of the human powers, survives in spite of its corruptibility. This survival of sense-perception thus halts the retreat of the other, higher human powers; namely, imagination and memory.[35] Not only does this highlight the relationship of sense-perception, imagination, and memory, but it defends even the corruption of the senses as a result of the Fall.[36] As such Grosseteste regards the senses, despite being the lowest of human faculties, as playing a vital role in the awakening of the other, higher faculties of imagination and memory.

The different levels of abstraction possible from sense-data are detailed in *Dictum* 7, which I will explore more below with regards to the internal faculties, and in Chapter 3 as an example of an architectural mnemonic. However, here it is relevant because it details three levels of knowledge, all of which originate in sense-data. The lowest

[33] Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* 100a11 (ed. LCL 391, p. 259).

[34] Southern, *English Mind,* 166-7; Grosseteste, *cPA* 2.6 (ed. Rossi, 405).

[35] There is a discussion and translation of this passage in Southern, *English Mind,* 167. Grosseteste, *cPA* 2.6 (ed. Rossi, 405), 'sic existente sensu, qui est debilissima virtutum apprehsnivarum apprehendens res singulares corruptibiles, stat imaginatio et memoria et tandem intellectus, qui est nobilissima virtutum apprehensivarum apprehensiva universalium primorum incorruptibilium.'

[36] Both the Latin and English editions of Grosseteste's *De artibus liberalibus* are edited and translated by Sigbjørn O. Sønnesyn in *Knowing and Speaking,* 74-95. In *De artibus liberalibus* §1 (ed. and trans. Sønnesyn, 74-5) Grosseteste declares that the 'instruments of the body are weak and imperfect on account of the corruption of the flesh.'

category is filled with those who use their senses for pleasure, specifically fornication.[37] The middle category use their senses for the 'good management of life' (*vita regende*) and this group is followed by the third and most noble group, those who perceive the vestiges of the creator (*vestigia creatorum*) in their sensible perceptions.[38] All three groups of people, then, rely on their senses for their own conduct in life and it is the use of their senses that will, at least in *Dictum* 7, dictate their place in death. This *Dictum* is similar in theme to *De vera religione* 54.106 where Augustine remarks that those people who make good use of their five *talenti* will enter into the joy of the Lord.[39] However, before these three levels of sensible abstraction can take place, the sense-perceptions must arrive at the *sensus communis* where they are conducted into the memory. It is the *court of memory* that leads Robert Rypon († 1421) to *Dictum* 7 in his exploration of 'the way the mind works, how what a person thinks dictates that person's behaviour, and the power of the mind to rationalise what it wants.'[40] Rypon describes the meaning of *Dictum* 7 in his own words in a sermon for the Sunday after Epiphany. He writes that Grosseteste compares memory to a court 'because it is spacious and retentive of forms

[37] Grosseteste, *Dictum* 7, f. 8va, 'cum populo hoc intrante importune et imprudenter sepe se ingerit inimica et meretricalis turba illicebrarum rerum sensibilium, quam obvia excipit libido sensuum, et cum introducta fornicatur et fornicando moritur.'

[38] Grosseteste, *Dictum* 7, f. 8va, 'est alius populus verecundus qui ad has portas venit, scilicet utilitates rerum sensibilium, cui si [sibi MS] obvia sit scientia huius vite regende, eum introducit, et cum hoc populo consilium iniit. Est et quartus adhuc venerabilior populus, scilicet in ipsis speciebus sensibilibus vestigia creatorum, cui si obvia fuerit scientia speculativa, eum introducit, celebratque canticum laudis et exultationis.' See Chapter 4 below for more use of the word *vestigum.*

[39] Augustine, *De vera religione* 54 (ed. CCSL 32, ll. 36).

[40] Holly Johnson, "The Imaginative Landscape of an English Monk-Preacher: Robert Rypon and the Court of Memory," *Medieval Studies* 75 (2013): 117-204, at 183-6, quote 183. Grosseteste, *Dictum* 7, ff. 8rb-8va describes the *aula* of memory. This concept of a court of memory, an *aula memoriae,* is heavily Augustinian who refers to his own court of memory in *Confessions* 10.8. Augustine, again in *Confessions* 10.8 is also influential in the utilisation of the memory as a *thesaurus*, a treasure-chest, which is taken from ideations of memory in the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* and from Quintilian; for more see Carruthers, *Book of Memory,* 40-1. Much more will be made of these architectural comparisons below.

and intentions as is a court of people entering.'[41] Given that Rypon routinely refers to *Dictum* 7 through a thoroughly Avicennian viewpoint it is clear that, for Rypon at least, Grosseteste's *Dictum* 7 is usefully Avicennian itself, despite the description of memory as being retentive of intentions *and forms.* Sense-perception thus has its purpose not just in this life but in helping in the attainment of the next.

The Four Instruments of Sensation.

There are, for Grosseteste, four instruments of sensation. The brain is recognised as one; this is identified by Grosseteste as the *primum instrumentum sentiendi* in *Dictum* 15 because of the brain's role in dreams, and in *Dictum* 2 because various limbs are connected to it via a nervous system.[42] In the *Hexaëmeron* at 7.14.5 the heart is identified as another instrument of sensation; Grosseteste describes the 'one organ that is the radical origination principle of sense' as 'the heart, or something analogous to the heart.'[43] The heart then is the second instrument of sensation. The third *instrumentum sentiendi* of Grosseteste's is the sense-organ itself; in *Dictum* 41 he designates the eye as instrument of sense.[44] The eye, then, is the third instrument of sensation, as would any other corporeal body part be designated as such. The eye, of course, relies on light; this is Grosseteste's final and most original *instrumentum sentiendi* as described in the *Hexaëmeron* 2.10.1, *lux* 'acts as in instrument in all of them' referring to all five senses.[45] Light, as the fourth instrument of sensation, works not only in accordance with

[41] English translation from Johnson, "Robert Rypon," 185. The MS transcribed by Johnson in "Robert Rypon" *Appendix* 2, p. 199, is London, British Library Harley 4894, ff. 6v-9r, at 7r, 'quam scilicet dominus Lincolnensis dictis suis, dicto scilicet septimo, comparat uni aule qua est capax et retentiva [recentiva MS] specierum et intentionum sicut est aula intrantium populorum.'

[42] Grosseteste, *Dictum* 15, f. 12rb; *Dictum* 2, f. 2va.

[43] Grosseteste, *Hexaëmeron* 7.14.5 (eds. Dales and Gieben, 212; trans. Martin, 216), 'in omnibus autem animantibus est unum membrum radicale principium sensus et motus et omniam virium naturalium et vitalium et sensibilium, cor videlicet.'

[44] Grosseteste, *Dictum* 41, ff. 30ra-rb, 'solum autem hoc instrumentum sentiendi agit luce pura.'

[45] Grosseteste, *Hexaëmeron* 2.10.1 (eds. Dales and Gieben, 98; trans. Martin, 98), 'lux igitur est per quam anima in omnibus sensibus agit et que instrumentaliter in eisdem agit.'

the eye, but with any of the bodily instruments used in sense-perception (tongue, nose, so on).

Light

Etienne Gilson emphasises the role of light in Grosseteste's account of sense perception by stating that he 'introduced light as the intermediary between the purely spiritual substance, the soul, and the grossly material substance, the body.'[46] Gilson focuses on the Augustinian element in Grosseteste's psychology, that of illumination, and it is this that is picked up by Oliver who concludes that, for Grosseteste, 'all levels of knowledge are analogically related in light.'[47] Though, as David Lindberg asserts, Grosseteste 'pays scant attention to the theory of vision' other than his discussion of extramission in *De iride*, I suggest it is necessary to establish *a* theory in order to highlight the role of light in sense perception, particularly as it relates to the internal senses.[48]

Katherine Tachau, in what is perhaps the fullest answer on Grosseteste's behalf to the question 'what happens when we open our eyes?' emphasises the point that, for Grosseteste, spiritual light (*lux*) is not *just* a metaphor.[49] Rather, just as a visible, corporeal object is irradiated by a suffused light, so too is the mind. Accordingly, corporeal vision occurs when the light emitted from our eyes meets the species

---

[46] Gilson, *Christian Philosophy,* 264.

[47] Oliver, "Light, Truth, Experimentum," 170.

[48] Lindberg, *Theories of Vision,* 100. Grosseteste, *De iride,* (ed. Baur, 72-8, at 3).

[49] Katherine Tachau, "Seeing as Action and Passion in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries," in *The Mind's Eye: Art and Theological Argument in the Middle Ages,* eds. Jeffrey F. Hamburger and Anne-Marie Bouché (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), 336-59, at 340-1 and 343-4. A similar description can be found in Lindberg and Tachua, "Seeing and Knowing," 499.

multiplied within this suffused light. As explained in *De lineis,* the 'power' (*virtus*) or species that is multiplied from itself 'sends the same to sense as it does to matter.'[50]

For Grosseteste, there is no doubt that light is involved in all five methods of sense-perception (taste, touch, and so on); in the *Hexaëmeron* he writes that 'light, then, is that by which the soul acts in all the senses.'[51] This has clear influences from Augustine's *De genesi ad litteram* 12.16 and the anonymously-written pseudo-Augustinian *De spiritu et anima* 22 which both maintain light's role in sense-perception.[52] All senses are linked to *lux;* he writes in *Dictum* 124 that 'taste it light incorporated,' emphasising light's role in all of sensation.[53] As such, it is not just the eye that emits this spiritual light; in *De iride* it is also hearing and smell that all 'issue from the organs [of perception] as water issues from pipes,' citing Aristotle's *De generatione animalium.*[54] For Aristotle no such explanation is necessary for the sense of taste and touch because they require no medium. For Grosseteste, however, light still plays a role; as Oliver explains, 'each of the elements is a more or less dense form of light;' touch, and its

[50] Grosseteste *De lineis* §3 (ed. Bauer, 60) 'agens naturale multiplicat virtutem suam a se usque in patiens, sive agat in sensum, sive in materiam. Quae virtus aliquando vocatur species, aliquando similitudo, et idem est, quocunque modo vocetur; et idem immittet in sensum et idem in materiam, sive contrarium, ut calidum idem immittit in tactum et in frigidum.'

[51] Grosseteste, *Hexaëmeron* 2.10.1 (eds. Dales and Gieben, 98; trans. Martin, 98), 'lux igitur est per quam anima in omnibus sensibus agit et que instrumentaliter in eisdem agit.'

[52] [Anonymous], *De spiritu et anima* 22 (ed. PL 40, col. 0795, ll. 21). There is an English translation, "Treatise on the Spirit and the Soul," trans. Erasmo Leiva and Benedicta Ward in *Three Treatises on Man, a Cistercian Anthropology,* ed. Bernard McGinn (Kalamazoo, MI: Cistercian Publications, 1977), 179-288, at 214.

[53] Grosseteste, *Dictum* 124, f. 102rb, 'sapor est lux incorporata.'

[54] Grosseteste, *De Iride* (ed. Baur, 72-8 at 73), 'tres dicti sensus scilicet visus, auditus, olfactus, exeunt ab instrumentis, sicut aqua exit a canalibus.' Translation taken from Lindberg, *Theories of Vision,* 101, also 250 n. 79. The reference to pipes or *channels* is from Aristotle's *De generatione animalium* 5.1 at 781b1-12 (ed. and trans. LCL 366, p. 509).

corresponding concern with earth, is the densest and thus 'least actual' form of light, but it is still a form of light.[55]

For McEvoy this active nature of sensation involving light radiating from the senses confirms an Augustinian-aligned emphasis.[56] However, if Grosseteste accepted a purely Augustinian account of vision based solely on extramission whereby the eye emits a ray that touches the visible object, a ray that then returns similitudes to the eye, there would be no need for him to posit his theory of the multiplication of the species.[57] As such, Grosseteste needs an element of intromission in his theory of vision. Lindberg suggests that Grosseteste, in his discussion of the two theories in *De iride*, proffers a combined theory of extramission, as posited by Augustine, with that of intromission, posited by Aristotle and defended by Averroes and Avicenna.[58] Grosseteste explains this himself in *cPA* 2.4 where he writes that 'vision is not completed solely in the reception of the sensible form without matter' but in the 'energy going forth from the eye,' similar, he opines in *De operationibus solis*, to the rays emitted from the sun.[59]

The multiplication of the species has clear implications with regards to Grosseteste's theory of vision; light is diffused by 'multiplying itself and instantaneously spreading

[55] Oliver, "Light, Truth, Experimentum," 167.

[56] McEvoy, *Philosophy of Grosseteste*, 297.

[57] Ronald Nash, *The Light of the Mind: St. Augustine's Theory of Knowledge* (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1969), 44-51 for a discussion on Augustine's theory of extramission.

[58] Lindberg, *Theories of Vision,* 101.

[59] See Lindberg *Theories of Vision*, 101, Grosseteste, *cPA* 2.4 (ed. Rossi, 386), 'radius namque visualis est lumen digrediens a spiritu visbili luminoso usque ad obstaculum, quia non perficitur visus in recepetione dicta et radiositate egrediente ab oculo.' Translation taken from Crombie, *Origins,* 114. See also Grosseteste, *De operationibus solis* §7, ed. James McEvoy, "The Sun as Res and Signum: Grosseteste's Commentary on Ecclesiasticus; ch. 43, vv. 1-5," *Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales* 41 (1974): 38-91, at 71.

itself in every direction.'[60] Thus, the act of sensation (not just visual perception) as an *intentio animi* occurs when the two lights meet; the light from the object and the light from the perceiver. Grosseteste says as much in the *Hexaëmeron* 8.4.7,

> the colour of the coloured thing begets from itself a species that is like it in the eye of the seer; and the inclination of the soul [*intentio animi*] of the seer connects the species of colour that is begotten in the eye with the begetting colour outside it. Thus it unites the begetter and the begotten, since the apprehension of sight does not distinguish between the begotten species and the begetting colour. And there is one seeing that comes from the begetter, the begotten, and the inclination [*intentione*] that connects [*copulante*] the begotten with the begetter. And likewise this trinity is found in any of the outward senses [*in quolibet exteriorum sensuum*].[61]

The nobility of the multiplication of the species lies in its role in the act of sensation; according to *De lineis* it is 'in sensation this power [*virtus*], when received, produces a spiritual and nobler operation.'[62] According to the *Hexaëmeron* it appears that the multiplication of forms does not end with the meeting of the sense-organ's light with that of the sensible object's, but rather, that it continues into the actions of the internal senses. Thus, at *Hexaëmeron* 8.4.8-9, the forms continue to be multiplied to the *sensus communis* and finally into the memory, where the process of perception finally ends. This assertion is repeated in later works, such as the *Ecclesia sancta celebrat,* where he writes that the *imaginatio* is the part of the soul that 'retains the species of sensible

[60] Grosseteste, *De luce* (ed. Panti, 226; trans. Lewis, 239).

[61] Grosseteste, *Hexaëmeron* 8.4.7 (eds. Dales and Gieben, 223; trans. Martin, 227).

[62] Grosseteste, *De lineis* §4, (ed. Baur, 59-65, at 60), 'in sensu enim ista virtus recepta facit operationem spiritualem quodammodo et nobiliorem.'

things that exist in sense.'[63] Thus, just as the fundamental role of light allows for the multiplication of the species and for the forms to be apprehended by the sense-organ so too is it instrumental with regards to the internal senses.

Grosseteste writes in *Dictum* 55 that 'sight is light' (*visus enim lux*).[64] If all sensation results from a more-or-less-dense form of light, then sensation works, as Oliver posits, 'in accordance' with Grosseteste's own geometric principles regarding light.[65] 'Lux' Grosseteste writes in the opening lines of *De luce* 'is the first form created in first matter' as such it is present in everything and, as Yael Raizman-Kedar summarises, 'always attached to matter as the form of corporeity.'[66] Raizman-Kedar argues that *lux,* according to Grosseteste, cannot reach our eyes, that it is expressible only through the visibility of the *lumen.*[67] However, *Dictum* 55 seems to contradict this statement, that vision (and any sense) acts with both *lux* and *lumen* in both the rays that we emit from our eyes and in the rays that are emitted from the visible object. Because the role of light in the multiplication of the species and in sense-perception does not end at the reception of this light by the pupil but rather continues into the soul via the internal faculties, I would suggest that Grosseteste's 'sight is light' is a clear indication that *lux* can be received (though, not consciously perceived in the same way one can consciously perceive a strawberry). Grosseteste identifies the light that is emitted from the eye as being similar to that of the sun's rays in *De operationibus solis,* but that it is

[63] Grosseteste, *Ecclesia sancta celebrat* §13 (ed. McEvoy, 176) 'habet humana anima potentiam retentivam specierum sensibilium quales fuerunt in senseu, quae potentia vocatur fantasia et imaginatio.' Trans mine.

[64] Grosseteste, *Dictum* 55, f. 44rb.

[65] Oliver, "Light, Truth, Experimentum," 167.

[66] Grosseteste, *De luce* (ed. Panti, 227; trans. Lewis, 240), 'lux itaque, que est forma prima in materia prima creata...' See also Raizman-Kedar, "Unity and Multiplicity," 390.

[67] Raizman-Kedar, "Unity and Multiplicity," 390-1.

lux, not *lumen*.[68] Despite Grosseteste's *lux/lumen* differentiation in *De luce*, it is not one that necessarily permeates his other writings. As will be shown in Chapter Two, his conception of light differs again when discussing the spiritual senses. The usual metaphoric use of light in discourse on the spiritual senses and spiritual sensation more generally is elevated by Grosseteste's scientific knowledge and experimentation with light, but his *lux/lumen* distinction is absent. This inconsistency with regards to *lux/lumen* does not distract from his earlier distinction in *De luce*, nor does it contradict it. Rather, in his later works the operation of light is of far less importance than the theological implications of our actions within it.

The involvement of light in sense-perception and the inner senses is supported by *Dictum* 55, though with some hesitation, where Grosseteste comments on the role of light within the *sensus communis*. The *sensus communis* receives the forms of sense-perception, sending them to the imagination to be stored. In *Dictum* 55 he writes that this revelation of forms to the *sensus communis* occurs by way of light, wary as he is of assigning an activity or passivity onto the function of the *sensus communis*; he acknowledges that he himself is unsure as to whether it is the light of the common sense that reveals the forms, or whether the light of sensation reveals the forms *to* the *sensus communis*.[69] What he is sure of, however, is that light is somehow involved. By extending the role of light as an instrument of sensation by which not only the external senses operate but the internal too, Grosseteste is able to maintain an illuminatory theory of knowledge that is not in opposition to that of Aristotelian abstraction but is

[68] Grosseteste, *De operationibus solis* (ed. McEvoy, 70-1), 'et in actione videndi agit anima per lucem huiusmodi puram radios emittentem per oculum.' See also Lindberg and Tachau, "Seeing and Knowing," 499, and Raizman-Kedar, "Unity and Multiplicity," 390-1.

[69] Grosseteste, *Dictum* 55, f. 44rb, 'est enim et alia lux cui manifestantur quedam alia, nec ipsa adhuc sibi ipsi est manifesta, ut visus ceterique sensus particulares, quibus manifestantur sensibilia, nec ipsi tamen sibi ipsis sunt manifesti. Non enim visus se videt, vel auditus se audit, nec aliquis ceterorum sensuum particularium se sentit. Hec tamen lumina sensuum particulariorum superiori luci cuidam statim manifestantur. Sentit enim sensus quidam sensus communis sensus particulares agentes. Sed an sensus particulares se manifestant sensui communi, an in altero quodam lumine ei manifestentur, non temere diffinierim.'

necessary to it. He explains his position in one of his sermons, that the senses (he specifically refers to vision, touch, and hearing) when combined with reason, intellect, and memory are the means by which a person learns (*reperio*).[70] Importantly, Aristotle too concedes a role for light in the process of perception beyond its ability to make things visible to the eye. In *De anima* 3.3 he etymologises on the word *phantasia* (φαντασία) and its derivative, light (φάνος). Whilst Aristotle maintains that this is *because* of the fact that vision is the chief sense, for someone as committed to etymology as Grosseteste was it may well have given him the opportunity to establish light as key to the functioning of the internal senses too.[71]

It is possible that John Blund († 1248) provided some inspiration for Grosseteste's incorporation of his light metaphysics into his account of sense perception and abstraction. Blund and Grosseteste had a close professional relationship; Blund was Chancellor of York from 1234 but in Grosseteste's *Letter* 19 to Blund it is clear that their relationship was also one of friendship.[72] An almost direct contemporary of Grosseteste, Blund's *Tractatus de Anima* was written 1200-04, intended for arts faculty students at Oxford/Paris and one of the first assimilators of the new Aristotle.[73] In his *Tractatus de Anima* Blund discusses light as particular and universal; it is *seen* as a particular but it is *known* as a universal.[74] As such Blund concedes that light (or, the

[70] A select number of Grosseteste's sermons as found in Durham, Cathedral Library MS A. III. 12 have been edited by Suzanne Paul, "An Edition and Study of Selected Sermons of Robert Grosseteste," 2 vols., (PhD diss., University of Leeds, 2002). I use the numbering that Paul uses. See Grosseteste, T.43.25 (ed. Paul, vol. 2, 297), 'set plura possunt reperiri in te ex quibus non dare minium eorum pro regno, ut visum, tactum, auditum, rationem, intellectum, memoriam et huiusmodi.'

[71] This will be discussed more in Chapter 3.

[72] Grosseteste, *Epistola* 19 (ed. Baur, 68-9; trans. Mantello and Goering, 99-100).

[73] Coleman, *Medieval Memories,* 364; John Blund, *Tractatus de anima*, in *Iohannes Blund Tractatus de Anima,* eds. D. A. Callus and R. W. Hunt, Auctores Britannici Medii Aevi 2 (London: Oxford University Press for the British Academy, 1970).

[74] Blund, *Tractatus de anima* 8.87 (eds. Callus and Hunt, 23).

universal) 'is sensed, but not *as* a universal.'[75] This would allow for Grosseteste to receive *lux* via *lumen*. Only through the process of abstraction are they then separated.

The Internal Senses

McEvoy has described Grosseteste's psychology, specifically of the internal senses, as Avicennian, citing *Deus est* as containing 'a brief summary of Avicenna's classification of its powers. His debt to Avicenna is very great, and can be documented even to the details of the language he employs.'[76] Before offering evidence of where Grosseteste strays from Avicenna in other works, I will first survey McEvoy's sources for his conclusion and suggest that even these sources are not as Avicennian as perhaps McEvoy would have liked. I would suggest, rather, that his debt to Avicenna is great *only* to the details of the language he employs.

The sources that McEvoy employs to turn Grosseteste Avicennian are *Ecclesia sancta celebrat*, *Deus est*, and *Ex rerum initiarum*, all of which were written after 1239.[77] McEvoy highlights the Avicennian metaphor of 'branches' (*rami*) in *Ecclesia sancta celebrat* to describe the relationship of the internal faculties, which is lifted from Avicenna's *De anima.*[78] His use of *Deus est* as his main evidence is based on *De anima's* description of the faculties and their location in the brain, and that, like Avicenna, Grosseteste uses the example of a lamb judging a wolf and a mother loving her child as being the function of the *aestimatio.*[79] However, *Deus est* offers only weak

[75] Janet Coleman discusses this in *Medieval Memories*, 365; Blund, *Tractatus de anima* 8.87 (eds. Callus and Hunt, 23), 'potest concedi quod id quod est universale sentitur, non tamen universale.'

[76] McEvoy, *Philosophy of Grosseteste*, 292.

[77] McEvoy, *Philosophy of Grosseteste,* 296-9. See 492, 498-9 for dating.

[78] Grosseteste, *Eccclesia sancta celebrat* §14 (ed. McEvoy, 176-7), especially n. 63.

[79] Parts of Book II of Avicenna's *Liber de* Anima are translated in F. Rahman, *Avivenna's Psychology. An English Translation of Kitab al-Nakat, Book II, Chapter VI with Historico-Philosophical Notes and Textual Improvements on the Cario Edition* (Westport, CN: Hyperion Press, 1981). Avicenna, *Liber de anima* (trans. Rahman, 31); Grosseteste, *Deus est* (ed. Wenzel, 262).

evidence for an Avicennian psychology. What is immediately apparent is that Grosseteste offers only four internal senses, not the five of Avicenna; he posits the *sensus communis,* the *memoria,* the *aestimatio*, and the *imaginatio* compared to Avicenna's five (s*ensus communis*, *imaginatio*, *cogitans*, *aestimatio*, *memoria*).[80] For Avicenna, the *sensus communis,* which can also be called *phantasia*, receives the sensible forms, these are then stored in the *imaginatio,* often referred to as the formative or retentive imagination.[81] When one wishes to manipulate, combine, divide these forms, the *cogitans,* or compositive imagination, is employed. For intentions, these are comprehended by the *aestimatio* and it is the *memoria* that retains and stores these intentions.[82] In addition to comprehending the intentions, the *aestimatio* combines forms and intentions (stored by the *imaginatio* and *memoria* respectively).[83] Avicenna concludes this brief classification of the internal faculties by explaining that *sensus communis* or *phantasia* is located in the front ventricle of the brain, *cogitans* in the middle, *aestimatio* in the far end of the middle, and *memoria* in the rear ventricle.[84]

In *Deus est*, whilst Grosseteste reiterates the location of the *sensus communis* in the front, *aestimatio* in the middle and *memoria* in the rear ventricles of the brain, his enumeration of the senses is slightly different. Whilst he accepts that the *imaginatio* receives and stores the *formae* sent to it by the *sensus communis*, and that the *aestimatio* allows for a lamb to judge the wolf or a mother to love her child via its apprehension of *intentiones* (though not explicitly mentioned), the *memoria* 'recalls that which is no longer present' (*qua non praesentis recordatur*).[85] Thus, only in the description of the

---

[80] Grosseteste, *Deus est* (ed. Wenzel, 262). Bloch, *Aristotle on Memory,* 148.

[81] Black, "Imagination and Estimation," 60.

[82] Bloch, *Aristotle on Memory,* 148-9.

[83] Wood, "Imagination and Experience," 20.

[84] Avicenna, *Liber de anima* (trans. Rahman, 31).

[85] Grosseteste, *Deus est* (ed. Wenzel, 262).

imaginatio is there a distinction of form and intention; not in the description of *memoria* or *aestimatio.* Indeed, the description of *memoria* as being the faculty which simply, but broadly, recalls that which is no longer present could easily refer to form and/or intention. It also suggests an active element; it is not just storing but it is also recalling. There is a similar description of memory in *Dictum* 113, where he compares spiritual vision to corporeal. He writes that, after the physical sight of something, 'a man will remember [*memoratur*] what he has seen before though it is there no more [*que non est*].'[86]

Importantly for Grosseteste the man in question is aware not only that what he is recalling is a memory (*memoriam*), but that he is aware *he* has 'seen' it (*se vidisse*) and that he 'knows' (*scit*) that it has 'already happened' (*fuisse*); thus he is aware of the passage of time. This self-reflective capacity of memory, aware of its own past-perceptions, is more akin to Aristotle than to Avicenna, and is noted by Blund in his *Tractatus de Anima*.[87] Recollection is an ability of the memory only, not the imagination, and will be of note in Chapter 4. The internal senses of *Deus est* are worded similarly to Blund; both refer to the exterior senses as *foris* and the interior senses as *intus.*[88] This is not to say that Grosseteste ignores the form/intention division entirely; in the *cPA* he writes that the 'imaginative memory' retains the forms of things sensed whilst the 'memory properly speaking' (*memoriam proprie dictam*) retains the intentions, a clear acceptance of this Avicennian division, but it does show that he is

---

[86] Grosseteste, *Dictum* 113, ff. 93ra-93rb, 'numquid sicut post visionem corporalem alicuius rei memoratur homo visionem suam preteritam que non est, sciensque memoriam visionis sue preterite scit se vidisse, et scit rem quam vidit fuisse?'

[87] Coleman, *Medieval Memories,* 366-7; Blund, *Tractatus de anima* 18.253 (eds. Callus and Hunt, 68).

[88] Coleman, *Medieval Memories,* 365; Blund, *Tractatus de anima* 6.60 (eds. Callus and Hunt, 18).

perhaps more comfortable with the names of the faculties more so than their operations.[89]

The power of the *memoria* is discussed in *Dictum* 60 which goes into detail on the Augustinian trinity of memory, understanding, and love. Though a theological concept we can glean something from it about the physiology of memory and its role in the process of understanding. The first thing he says is that 'memory draws from itself actual understanding.'[90] This understanding, he writes, 'does not destroy the memory but rather confirms and strengthens it in us.' He recognises that memory 'does not recall [*memini*] all things simultaneously,' despite holding within itself 'all things memorable.' Thus, when we recall a triangle we do not recall absolutely everything our memory holds, nor is it "disposable;" we can recall the triangle again and again. Memory, by nature of its role in this Augustinian trinity, has a far more powerful role than Avicennian memory would allow. The longevity of our memory; the ability to store things for repeated use is an important aspect of memory for Grosseteste which he discusses in *Letter* 1, something which I will explore more below.

The activity of the *memoria* is only briefly acknowledged by Avicenna, who calls it the 'retentive and recollective' faculty, or *vis memorialis et reminiscibilis.*[91] It is described in similar terms in Grosseteste's *Tabula*; under Distinction 9 he lists *De reminiscentia vel memoria,* suggesting a thoroughly un-Aristotelian differentiation between memory

[89] Grosseteste *cPA* 2.6 (ed. Rossi, 404), 'hic enim dicimus memoriam communiter ad imaginativam, que retinet formas sensatas, et ad memoriam proprie dictam, que retinet intentiones extimatas.'

[90] Grosseteste, *Dictum* 60, ff. 48ra-48rb, 'intelligat itaque memoriam suam gignentem de se actualem intelligentiam quarundam scientiarum. Cum vero actu intelligit que prius meminit, ipse actus intelligendi non destruit memoriam, sed pocius confirmat et roborat eam in nobis [...] Per memoriam itaque suam, que non omnia simul meminit, et que quandoque intelligentiam actu de se non gignit, sed quedam meminit et aliquando intelligentiam actualem intelligentem quedam de se gignit, intelligat homo memoriam quandam omnia memorabilia simul memorantem.'

[91] Bloch, *Aristotle on Memory,* 149; Avicenna, *Liber de anima* (trans. Rahman, 31).

and recollection; Aristotle's *De memoria et reminiscentia* emphasises the difference between the two, here Grosseteste combines them. However, the ordering of the internal faculties in the *Tabula* does not necessary suggest an Avicennian leaning, where one might expect to find the internal senses to be listed in order. Instead, whilst '*De reminiscentia vel memoria'* is listed relatively high underneath *'De intellectu et ratione'* the *sensus communis* is separated by two other categories and '*De imaginatione'* is not found until one arrives at sleep ('*De somno et somnio'*); the *aestimatio* is nowhere to be seen.[92] It seems clear from this elaboration of Grosseteste's comments in *Deus est* then that his position is not *entirely* Avicennian, even if he uses the same wording. To build up a further picture of the influences on his psychology, we must broaden the scope of enquiry into Grosseteste's psychology beyond that of McEvoy's survey, though it is important to re-emphasise that there is no one text where Grosseteste discusses the internal senses at length; rather, his thoughts manifest themselves, sometimes inconsistently, in a number of works.

The first inconsistency concerns the relationship of the *sensus communis* with that of *phantasia.* In the *Liber de anima*, *phantasia* is synonymous with the *sensus communis*.[93] In the *Hexaëmeron*, at 8.4.9, Grosseteste adheres to this consistency, he writes that the sensible species is 'begotten in the fantasy of the common sense.'[94] Whilst this, per Avicenna, aligns the *sensus communis* with *phantasia,* he is distinctly un-Avicennian in the second half of his sentence, where this species that is begotten in the fantasy of the *sensus communis* 'begets of itself a species that is like it in the memory' (*gignit de se speciem sibi similem in memoria*). Here, clearly, there is no distinction between form and intention within the workings of the memory. A similar description is found in *Dictum* 7. The *sensus communis* is a vestibule - it is where the sensible impressions are collected together. The *phantasia* is not exactly synonymous with the *sensus communis* in this instance; it instead acts as a 'porter' (*ostiarius*) who stewards the *phantasmata* of

[92] Grosseteste, *Tabula* f. 18b (ed. Thomson, 43).

[93] Bloch, *Aristotle on Memory,* 177; Avicenna, *Liber de anima* (ed. Rahman, 31).

[94] Grosseteste, *Hexaëmeron* 8.4.9 (eds. Dales and Gieben, 224; trans Martin, 227), 'tertio, species genita in fantasia sensus communis gignit de se speciem sibi similem in memoria.'

sensible impressions to the 'hall of memory' (*aula memorie*).[95] Here, as with the *Hexaëmeron*, the end-goal for sensible perceptions is to end up in the *memoria.* This is contrasted to *Ecclesia sancta celebrat* §13 where Grosseteste names the faculty that has the power to retain sensible species, that is; forms, as the *phantasia et imaginatio.*[96] Grosseteste here has an understanding of the *imaginatio* as being linked to species, similitudes, and forms, in keeping with Avicenna. It is the *imaginatio's* ability to manipulate these similitudes that piques Grosseteste's interest in it as a faculty responsible for thought experiments.

Second, as discussed above, is the question whether the memory retains intentions, forms, or both. For Avicenna the memory is explicitly the storehouse of intentions received via the *aestimatio* in the same way that the *imaginatio* is the storehouse of forms received from the *sensus communis.* Although there are some occasions where Grosseteste adheres to this division, such as *cPA* 2.6, in others, such as the *Perambulavit Iudas,* it is clear that it is memory that stores these forms - after all, it is *from* the memory *into* the *imaginatio* that leaves the process vulnerable to sin. The definition of memory from *Deus est*, discussed above, as being the faculty that recalls what is no longer present, is also not particularly Avicennian. As such it is clear that Grosseteste does not hold a strikingly Avicennian understanding of the internal faculties.

This lack of differentiation between the imagination and memory would not have labelled Grosseteste as particularly unusual in the thirteenth century. Mary Carruthers has identified the relationship between the two as 'shifting and very permeable,'

[95] Grosseteste, *Dictum* 7, f. 8va, 'contra hunc populum intrantem egreditur vivacitas sensuum, et intrantem populum excipit et introducit in communem sensum, quasi in vestibulum ante ostium, ubi ostiarius, quasi fanthasia, hunc populum excipit et in aulam memorie introducit.'

[96] Grosseteste, *Ecclesia sancta celebrat* §13 (ed. McEvoy, 176), 'habet humana anima potentiam retentivam specierum sensibilium quales fuerunt in sensu, quae potentia vocatur fantasia et imaginatio.' Similarly emphasised at §14.

particularly amongst those who belonged to religious orders who often failed to distinguish between the ability to, for example, *imagine* the heavenly city or *remember* the heavenly city.[97] This lack of definition between the two faculties could not be answered by Aristotle, either; as David Bloch notes, memory and imagination were 'practically identical' to the Peripatetic, a difference that could only be marked by the passage of time.[98] Thus when Grosseteste writes in *Dictum* 43 that the heavenly city is held in either the imagination *or* the memory, he is reflecting this lack of differentiation.[99]

Imaginatio and Thought Experiments.

The *imaginatio* is, for Grosseteste, retentive (as relayed in *Ecclesia sancta celebrat* §13) but it is its ability as described in the *Perambulavit Iudas* that makes it the perfect faculty for the activity of thought experiments to occur because it is the *imaginatio,* he writes, that 'represents similitudes of things to the mind.'[100] Thought experiments are an aspect of Grosseteste's imagination that have been discussed by modern scholars, albeit briefly. Richard Southern's discussion of imagination notes Grosseteste's idiosyncratic instruction to 'consider' (*considera*) that it was 'one of his favourite words' that had a 'code-word' status amongst his associates; Southern describing it as a 'memoranda for thought.'[101] This, Southern argues, suggests that for Grosseteste the imagination was

[97] Carruthers, *Craft of Thought,* 68.

[98] Bloch, *Aristotle on Memory*, 61-2.

[99] Grosseteste, *Dictum* 43.

[100] Grosseteste, *Perambulavit Iudas* §17 (eds. Goering and Mantello, 155), 'licet imaginatio non nisi rerum similitudines anime representaret, sensus ipsas res.' Author's translation. See also Goering and Mantello, "Perambulavit Iudas," 139.

[101] Southern, *English Mind*, 39. Unfortunately Southern does not specify which words he identifies as to an instruction to 'consider;' in his footnote he explains that he takes his examples from 'Grosseteste's works and from manuscripts associated with Grosseteste and his circle' (Southern, *English Mind*, 39 n.21). R. W. Hunt, "The Library of Grosseteste," in *New Perspectives,* 121-45 at 143-4 identifies and discusses the word *considera* as it pertains to Grosseteste and his milieux.

'peculiarly important for him in his close examination of natural phenomena' thus playing a part in his emphasis on *experimentum*.[102] Take for example Grosseteste's exhortation in *De sphaera* to consider (*intelligo*) a certain scenario that can only be imagined (*possunt imaginari*).[103] By linking 'consideration' with the prompt to imagine, consideration becomes, quite literally, imagination. *De sphaera* then contains instructions to manipulate a variety of these mental images, often revolving around manipulating the movement of the stars and the zodiac, an imaginative exercise repeated in his commentary on the *Physics*.[104]

Ginther more explicitly aligns Grosseteste's imaginative faculty with an ability to conduct thought experiments, writing that 'his use of images and thought experiments is yet another reason to consider him as perhaps not just out of date with his contemporaries, but 'in a different world altogether.''[105] Ginther declares the imagination to be the 'bridge between the *aspectus mentis* and the *affectus mentis*' and that it was Grosseteste's upbringing in scholasticism that allowed him to combine logical argument with geometric visualisation based in part on a keen interest in Euclidian geometry.[106] Bruce Eastwood's article on Grosseteste's optical work suggests, but only in a footnote, that Grosseteste 'considers his thought experiment equivalent to experience,' a statement deserving of more attention.[107] In his article on the place of thought experiments in medieval inquiry Peter King writes that the true

[102] Southern, *English Mind*, 43. Imagination is discussed 40-5.

[103] Grosseteste, *De sphaera* (ed. Baur, 24-5).

[104] Grosseteste's commentary on the *Physics* has been edited by Richard C. Dales, *Commentarius in VIII Libros Physicorum Aristotelis* (Boulder, CO: University of Colorado Press, 1963). Grosseteste, commentary on the *Physics* 4 (ed. Dales, 95).

[105] Ginther, "Theologian's Task," 61.

[106] Ginther, "Theologian's Task," 63.

[107] Eastwood, "Medieval Empiricism," 319 n.83.

'method of mediaeval science was thought-experiment rather than actual experiment or testing.'[108] What Eastwood and King are acknowledging then is the high regard placed on thought experiments, that they themselves were a type of experience no less useful than observation and no less subject to the *experimentum* debate detailed at the beginning of this chapter.

Grosseteste himself acknowledges the beneficial aspects of what we would now term "thought experiments" and their initial reliance on sense-data in *De sphaera* where he remarks on a concept that is 'known to the sense and also to imagination.'[109] He uses the directive to 'consider' or to 'imagine' in a number of his early works on natural science. *De sphaera* is the work that most prolifically and directly instructs the audience to engage in thought experiments, but so too does *De lineis* and the commentary on the *Physics*.[110] Even in his *Dicta* he exhorts his audience to use their imagination such as in *Dictum* 44 where we are asked to 'imagine' (*imaginor*) a point of light directed toward a concave mirror.[111] Thus he writes in the *cPA* that 'mathematical things are the most certain, because the *phantasmata* of the imagination received through vision help our

[108] Peter King, "Mediaeval Thought-Experiments: The Metamethodology of Mediaeval Science," in *Thought Experiments in Science and Philosophy*, eds. Tamara Horowitz and Gerald J. Massey (Savage, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1991) 43-64, at 43-4.

[109] Grosseteste, *De sphaera* (ed. Baur, 20), 'hoc patet sensui et imaginationi.'

[110] The audience of *De sphaera* is asked to imagine certain concepts on 17 separate occasions. See Grosseteste, *Phsyics* 4.10 (ed. Dales, 95-6). The whole of *De lineis* is a thought experiment in itself.

[111] Grosseteste, *De colore* (eds. Dinkova-Bruun et al., 16), 'sed sicut in puncto colligitur lux multa, cum speculum concauum opponitur soli et lux cadens super totam speculi superficiem in centrum spere speculi reflectitur.' Grosseteste, *Dictum* 44, f. 32va, 'imaginemur itaque punctum lucis positum in medio alicuius possibilis fieri speculum concavum, quod dico punctum diffusione luminis sui undique illud in cuius medio ponitur rotundet et cavet, et a cavato radios in se reflexos suscipiat, ipsumque centrum accendat.'

understanding'[112] echoing Hugh of St. Victor's *Didascalicon* 2.17 that 'mathematics never operates without the imagination.'[113]

Grosseteste is also aware of the imagination's ability to go beyond what is evident to the senses. Thus his *Dicta* are peppered with instructions to *imagine* certain situations or topics.[114] Indeed he uses the instruction to *imagine* or similar exhortations in at least fifteen separate *Dicta*.[115] Despite the usefulness of the imagination and its kinship with experience, Michelle Karnes notes that as a faculty it remained 'relatively low in the hierarchy of mental powers,' its power lying as 'a means of mental picture-making in medieval rhetoric.'[116] This is reflected in the ordering of the internal faculties in Grosseteste's *Tabula*, where '*De imaginatione*' lies below the categories of memory, intellect and sense, positioned as it is below sleep.[117] The reason for this is that, if unchecked or unordered, imagination has a corruptible power, one that can ultimately lead to heresy. Imagination's place in the ordering of the internal faculties forms a large part of the discussion in *Perambulavit Iudas* where we are told that imagination must precede cogitation or it will be at risk of being swamped by the *phantasmata* of

[112] Grosseteste, cPA 1.17 (ed. Rossi, 257), 'intellectui igitur humano, qualis est adhuc in nobis, sunt res mathematice certissime ad quas comprehendendas iuvant nos phantasmata imaginabilia a visu recepta.' Trans Crombie, *Origins,* 129.

[113] Hugh of St. Victor, *Didascalicon,* edited as *Hugonis de Sancto Victore Didascalicon De Studio Legendi* 2.17, ed. C. H. Buttimer (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1939), 36, 'mathematica autem nnumquam sine imaginatione est.' English translation taken from *The Didascalicon of Hugh of St. Victor,* trans. Jerome Taylor (New York: NY: Columbia University Press, 1961), 73.

[114] See for example *Dictum* 52 where we are asked to imagine heaven and hell (f. 38vb), *Dictum* 138 to imagine Daniel (ff. 114rb-va), and *Dictum* 16 to imagine a snare (f. 13va).

[115] See Grosseteste, *Dicta* 3, 10, 16, 21, 31, 38, 44, 52, 72, 90, 106, 118, 127, and 138.

[116] Karnes, *Imagination,* 7.

[117] Grosseteste, *Tabula,* f. 18b (ed. Thomson, 43).

pleasurable sensations emanating from the memory, revealing, again, the manipulative ability of the *imaginatio* but also a reliance on memory for its objects of thought.[118]

Grosseteste explains why the *imaginatio* is so useful for thought experiments in the *Hexaëmeron* 1.2.3 though he does not refer to *phantasmata* explicitly. He explains the reason why he begins the *Hexaëmeron* with the creation of the sensible world as being the same reason God began with the creation of the world. He writes,

> so the creation of the sensible world, on account of the way in which the world is imaginable [*imaginabilis*] and graspable by the external senses of the body, should be told in the opening part of Scripture. This is in order that anyone, even among the uneducated, may be able to grasp a story [*narrationem*] of this kind easily, through his imagination [*per imaginationem*] and through the images of corporeal things [*rerum corporalium imagines*], and grow stronger in faith among the authority of the one who speaks.[119]

The universality of the *imaginatio* amongst humans is here beneficial; its reliance on *phantsamata* is necessary and useful because it allows for a level of observation (and thus experience) that even the uneducated can glimpse. *Phantasmata*, which Grosseteste defines as 'images of things corporeal,' if used correctly, can be a tool of faith.[120] For Ginther, this is proof of an Aristotelian understanding of imagination, its role in

---

[118] Grosseteste, *Perambulavit Iudas* §17-20 (eds. Goering and Mantello, 155-6).

[119] Grosseteste, *Hexaëmeron* 1.2.3 (eds. Dales and Gieben, 51-52; trans. Martin, 49), 'species autem huius mundi, secundum quod nunc gubernantur, habent sensus et scienti certitudinem. Secundum ordinem vero quo creabantur, non accipiuntur primo nisi per fidem. Mundi igitur sensibilis creatio, per modum quo mundus imaginabilis est et per corporis exteriories sensus apprehensibilis, in primordio huis scripture debuit enarrari, ut quivis etiam rudis huiusmodi narrationem facillime possit per imaginationem et rerum corporalium imagines apprehendere, et per dicentis auctoritatem in fide firmare.'

[120] Grosseteste, *cPA* 1.17 (ed. Rossi, 257), 'affectu rerum corporalium.' Trans. Crombie, *Origins*, 129.

abstraction and knowledge that relies on natural observance of *rerum corporalium*.[121] Again, it echoes Grosseteste's emphasis on creation and man's role in it; even the imagination's reliance on the corporeal world for its *phantasmata* is, here at least, reflective of his positive anthropology.

More often than not, however, *phantasmata* are considered negatively by Grosseteste. In the secondary literature there has been some focus on Grosseteste's use of *phantasmata* in the cognitive process. Richard Dales has written that a 'favourite notion' of Grosseteste's was that 'the gaze and desire of the mind could only be purged of corporeal phantasms by the Christian faith' suggesting that *phantasmata* are inherently negative or detrimental and in need of conquering.[122] For Grosseteste it is *phantasmata's* connection to corporeity that subjects it to heresy. This notion is repeated throughout his *Dicta* too, where *phantasmata* are considered negatively because of their relationship to the corporeal world. Described frequently as *nubilo phantasmatum* or considered within the context of their relationship with objects of vision, they are held in low regard, responsible as they are for dragging down the *aspectus*.[123]

The problem with these types of *phantasmata* is that they, according to *Dicta* 52 and 59, 'agglutinate' (*glutinare*) to the soul, forming clouds that the *affectus mentis* cannot rise above or see (or hear) past. The *aspectus*/*affectus* relationship has been described by McEvoy as Grosseteste's 'theme song.'[124] Both are powers of the rational soul but the *aspectus* is responsible for intellectual perception and knowledge, and the *affectus* is

[121] Ginther "Theologian's Task," 258.

[122] Richard C. Dales, "Robert Grosseteste's Place in Medieval Discussions of the Eternity of the World," *Speculum* 61, no. 3 (1986): 544-63, at 562.

[123] Grosseteste, *Dicta* 41, 52, 59, 99, 102 for example.

[124] James McEvoy, *Robert Grosseteste* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 78.

responsible for volition, desire, and love.[125] When Grosseteste writes in the *Perambulavit Iudas* that the memory mediates between the *ratio* and the *voluntas* it is clear that memory has a role as relates to the *aspectus/affectus* dichotomy responsible as it is for the retention of *phantasmata* but also because of its role in the trinity of the soul; memory, understanding, love.[126] The *aspectus* cannot rise higher than the *affectus*, thus it is limited by it, but if the *affectus* is correctly ordered then the *aspectus* can, as Brett Smith writes, 'ascend to contemplate the eternal reasons in God, free from all phantasms based upon the created world.'[127] It is for this reason that *phantasmata* are responsible for Aristotle's heretical *falsa imaginatio* of the eternity of the world, which I will explore more below.

Phantasia and *Phantasmata*: Apprehension or Image?

By describing *phantasmata* in these terms, that is, as *nubilii* or of *rerum corporalium* Grosseteste manages to avoid a contentious (to modern scholars) debate as to whether or not *phantasmata* are exclusively pictorial. I will briefly outline the debate in modern Aristotelian scholarship on the issue before exploring Grosseteste's own attitude. One of the most famous lines in *De anima* 3.7 is at 431a17 that claims 'the soul never thinks without a mental image [*phantasma*],' repeated at 431b3 'so the thinking faculty thinks the forms in mental images [*phantasmata*].'[128] At 3.8 (432a8) Aristotle then writes 'even when we think speculatively, we must have some mental picture [*phantasma*] of which to think; for mental images [*phantasmata*] are similar to objects perceived except

[125] Brett W. Smith, "Aspectus and Affectus in the Theology of Robert Grosseteste," (PhD diss., Catholic University of America, 2018), 25.

[126] Grosseteste, *Perambulavit Iudas* §17 (eds. Mantello and Goering, 155).

[127] Smith, "Aspectus and Affectus," 25-6.

[128] Aristotle, *De anima* 431a17, 431b3 (ed. and trans. LCL 288, p. 175, and p. 177). James of Venice, *Iacobus veneticus translator Aristotelis. De anima* (ed. AL 12.1), 'ex quo nequaquam sine fantasmate intelligit anima,' and 'species quidem igitur intellectivum in fantasmatibus intelligit.' See Ronald M. Polansky, *Aristotle's De anima,* 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 485-9 for a discussion of this specific part of the text and the Greek transliteration. Similar assertions are made in Aristotle, *De anima* 432a3 and *De memoria* 449b30.

that they are without matter.'[129] *Phantasmata* are thus similar to sensory contents, *aisthemata*, but ones without matter. *Phantasia,* translated by James of Venice to *imaginatio*, is more akin to a process; according to Aristotle at 429a1 'imagination [*phantasia*] must be a movement produced by sensation actively operating.'[130] As Dorothea Frede acknowledges, when it comes to the translation/transliteration of *phantasia* 'repetitions and inconsistencies abound' in the secondary scholarship on Aristotle because it 'designates the capacity, the activity or process, and the product or result.'[131] It is not surprising then that at times, such as *Dictum* 7, *phantasia* is a process, it is compared to a porter (*ostiarius*) who ferries the sensible perceptions from the *sensus communis* to the memory; at other times it appears to be more synonymous with the *imaginatio* as a faculty, such as in *Ecclesia sancta celebrat*. Michelle Karnes has suggested that Augustine is more-than-partly responsible for the *phantasia-as-imaginatio* translation, a translation that places an etymological 'premium' on images.[132] Thus modern scholarship on Aristotle tends to more commonly translate *phantasia* as 'appearance' which removes this connection to image, a stance taken by Richard Sorabji, Richard King and Dorothea Frede, although one that is not universal.[133] There is less consensus on whether or not *phantasmata* are exclusively

[129] Aristotle, *De anima* 3.8 (ed. and trans. LCL 288, p. 181). James of Venice, *Iacobus veneticus translator Aristotelis. De anima* 432a (ed. AL 12.1) reads 'sed cum speculetur, necesse est simul fantasmati specular: fantasmata enim sicut sensibilia sunt, preter quod sunt sine materia.'

[130] Aristotle*, De anima* 429a1 (ed. and trans. LCL 288, p. 163). James of Venice, *Iacobus veneticus translator Aristotelis. De anima* 429a (AL 12.1), 'cum speculetur, necesse est simul fantasmati specular: fantasmata enim sicut sensibilia sunt, preter quod sunt sine materia.'

[131] Dorothea Frede, "The Cognitive Role of Phantasia in Aristotle," in *Essays on Aristotle's De Anima*, eds. Martha Craven Nussbaum and Amélie Rorty (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 279-96, at 281.

[132] Karnes, *Imagination*, 32, and 138.

[133] Frede, "Cognitive Role," 279; Richard Sorabji, *Animal Minds & Human Morals: The Origins of the Western Debate* (London: Duckworth, 1993), 18-19; Sorabji, *Aristotle on Memory,* xv-xxvi; Malcolm Schofield, "Aristotle on the Imagination," in *Essays on Aristotle's De Anima,* eds. Martha C. Nussbaum and Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (1993, repr., Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003), 249-78, at 251. Schofield's article was originally published in G. E. R. Lloyd and G. E. L. Owen, eds. *Aristotle on Mind and the Senses. Proceedings of the Seventh Symposium Aristotlelicum* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,

pictorial. David Bloch and Sorabji argue that, because the *phantasmata* make up the content or object of the imagination, they must be pictorial.[134] Frede however argues that 'any kind of retained sensory impression would be a *phantasma*, according to Aristotle,' a view shared by John Shannon Hendrix who defines them as 'mnemic residues of sense impressions.'[135] Thus they are not 'mutated' (as Watson inelegantly describes) into images, instead they retain their original sense-form; thus, you can have entirely aural *phantasmata*.[136]

As noted above, Augustine's translation of *phantasia* as *imaginatio* has contributed to the enduring, almost inseparable association of *phantasia* and *phantasmata* with images. However, he himself seems conflicted on the difference between the two concepts. In *Letter* 7 to Nebridus, written 389CE, he writes that there are three different types of *phantasia* that can be divided as originating from sense impressions, things supposed, and things thought.[137] Broadly speaking, the first category refer to the mnemic residue of sense-impressions, such as an image of our friend's face. The second would be akin to an image of a city never seen, the third, numbers, figures, shapes and

1978), 99-140. Richard King, *Aristotle and Plotinus on Memory* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2009), 57. Sorabji has two categories of phantasia, perceptual and post-perceptual, see Sorabji, *Animal Minds,* 18-20.

[134] Sorabji, *Aristotle On Memory,* xvi; Bloch, *Aristotle on Memory,* 65. David Bloch for example calls those who translate *phantasmata* as 'appearance' rather than 'image' as being too 'cavalier' 64-70, 67.

[135] Frede, "Cognitive Role," 285; John Hendrix, *Unconscious Thought in Philosophy and Psychoanalysis* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 131.

[136] Frede, 'Cognitive Role' p. 285; Hendrix, *Unconscious Thought*, 131; Gerard Watson, "ΦAnta∑ia In Aristotle, De Anima 3.3," *Classical Quarterly* 32, no. 1 (1982): 100-113, 108-9.

[137] Augustine, *Epistola* 7.4 (ed. CCSL 31, p. 16; trans. FOTC 12, p. 16), 'omnes has imagines, quas phantasias cum multis uocas, in tria genera commodissime ac verissime distribui uideo, quorum est unum sensis rebus impressum, alterum putatis, tertium ratis.'

music.[138] Ronald Nash argues that this final category of *phantasia* 'cannot be pictured' and Augustine himself is at pains to point out, in the introduction of the letter, that not all memory requires images.[139] In *De musica* (387-391CE) at 6.11.32 Augustine again discusses *phantasia* but this time he includes *phantasmata*. He says that a memory of his father, whom he has seen, would be a *phantasia*, but the image of his grandfather, whom he has never seen, would be a *phantasma.*[140] Here then *phantasia* are objects of memory, *phantasmata* of imagination. He concludes that one must not mistake either for knowledge.

As discussed above, Grosseteste sometimes uses *phantasia* as synonymous with *imaginatio* and sometimes as a process of the *sensus communis* (as in the *Hexaëmeron*). Regarding *phantasmata*, the most common use is in his warnings of focusing too heavily on them because of their role in dragging down the *affectus* due to the connection with corporeal sense-impressions. But are they pictorial? In his thought experiments the answer seems to be yes - we are required to manipulate images of triangles, spheres and so on which necessarily requires a mental *picture* of one. The necessity of *phantasmata* in the action of understanding is clear; in *De causis* he writes that 'understanding is not without *phantasmata*.'[141] These then are the types of *phantasmata* he finds so useful in his thought experiments. The role of *phantasmata* in

[138] Nash, *Light of the Mind,* 55-9. Nash points out that Augustine stopped referring to this third class in terms of images.

[139] Augustine, *Epistola* 7.1 (ed. CCSL 31, p. 15; trans. FOTC 12, pp. 14-15), 'memoria tibi nulla videtur esse posse sine imaginibus vel imaginariis visis, quae phantasiarum nomine appellare voluisti.' See also Roland Teske, "Augustine's Philosophy of Memory," in *The Cambridge Campanion to Augustine,* eds. Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 148-58, at 149.

[140] Augustine, *De musica* 6.11.32 (ed. CSEL 102, p. 216) 'aliter enim cogito patrem meum quem saepe vidi, aliter avum quem numquam vidi. Horum primum phantasia est, alterum phantasma.'

[141] Grosseteste, *De causis,* in *Philosophischen Werke,* 120-6, at 125, 'intelligit enim non sine phantasmate, quod est actus virtutis sensitivae.' Author's translation.

understanding is repeated in the *cPA* where he indicates additionally that *phantasmata* are pictorial when he writes that 'the *phantasmata* of the imagination received through vision help our understanding.'[142] Whilst this *could* imply that *phantasmata* are always, exclusively, and implicitly visual, what is more likely is that visual *phantasmata* are simply easier to describe and in the context of the quote above he is discussing sight explicitly. Even in his description of *phantasmata* as clouds he is employing visually descriptive language; after all, clouds do not stop one from smelling, or hearing, only from seeing. However, when one remembers the role of light in *all* sense perception it is possible that he is not simply referring to clouds blocking out (sun)light for vision but blocking out the *lux* necessary for all sense-perception. Additionally, as he mentioned in both *Dictum* 50 and his commentary on the *Super Psalterium*, Grosseteste acknowledges the beneficial nature of clouds (and thus *phantasmata*), recognising that they 'allow a person to see the sun, an object that one cannot behold directly;' they are akin to a medium and thus susceptible to manipulation, inherently neither bad nor good.[143] In *Dictum* 78 we learn that a cloud is an apt metaphor for the protective qualities of Jesus.[144] Grosseteste, detailing the physical quality of clouds and comparing it to the Godhead, concludes that clouds can protect us from the heat of the sun (God's wrath), a slightly different inference than that of *Dictum* 50.[145]

There are other occasions where Grosseteste seems at ease with allowing for *phantasmata* to be the mnemic residues of *any* of the five senses. In *De generatione*

---

[142] Grosseteste *cPA* 1.17 (ed. Rossi 257), trans. Crombie, *Origins,* 129, 'quas comprehendendas iuvant nos phantasmata imaginabilia a visu recepta.'

[143] Ginther, "Laudat Sensum," 243; Grosseteste, *Dictum* 50 f.34vb, 'incarnationem Christi, quia lux deitatis, que infirmis oculis fuit invisibilis, per carnis tegumentum facta est visibilis, sicut sol corporalis, in quem non defigit contuitum oculus infirmus carnis, per nubis rare et lucide tegumentum fit eidem oculus visibilis.'

[144] Grosseteste, *Dictum* 78 f. 56rb, 'nubes itaque Christum signat.'

[145] Grosseteste, *Dictum* 78 f. 56va, 'nubes umbraculum est ab estu solis. Sic et predicatores ab estu ire Dei nos protegunt.'

sonorum §3, one of the earliest works of Grosseteste written around 1200, he refers to *imaginatio vel apprehensio* as being part of the 'primary motive force' in the making of a sound, similar to the modern translation of appearance.[146] The use of *apprehensio* suggests that this does not necessarily have to be visual. Nor, it should be said, does *imaginatio*, although it is translated as such.[147] On another occasion, Grosseteste refers to *phantasmata* in explicitly aural terms; in *Dictum* 72 he writes that one can become 'inwardly deaf by the din of *phantasmata*.'[148] Whilst this may be an observation that all types of pleasurable sensation can lead to sin (not just visual), it does suggest that even taking pleasure in our sense of hearing, detailed in *Perambulavit Iudas* §9, can lead to the production of aural *phantasmata*.

According to the *Perambulavit Iudas* it is imagination's reliance on what is sent to it by the memory that leaves it vulnerable to contamination. At §17 he writes that the corrupted sensations 'swarm into the *imaginatio* and *cogitatio* from the memory' (*ex memoria enima corrupta catervatim irruunt in imaginationem et cogitationem visa, audita, olfacta, gusta et tacta*). Clearly this is not an Avicennian rendering of the function of the internal senses as this places emphasis on the memory as the holding-place of sense *phantasmata,* not the imagination. It also suggests that these *phantasmata* are apprehensions of all the five senses; thus not exclusively visual. This two-way relationship between imagination and memory as it relates to sense-perception will be explored more in Chapter 4; the idea that the imagination can supplement the memory when the memory fails. Just as the inventive nature of the *imaginatio* is useful in thought experiments, so too will it become useful in the act of confession as a means by which the penitent can complement, supplement, and even invent their own memory(s) to fulfil the requirements of the act.

---

[146] Grosseteste, *De generatione sonorum* §3 (ed. and trans. Sønnesyn, 246-7).

[147] Sønnesyn's translation of *imaginatio* here to 'mental images' is perhaps misleading. In an alternative witness, Venice Biblioteca Marciana VI. 163 (s.XIV/XV) 83v-84r *imaginatio* is replaced with *imago* which *does* emphasise an image-making capability, see Sønnesyn, 246-7.

[148] Grosseteste, *Dictum* 72 f. 55ra, 'nisi strepitu fantasmatum et vanitatum intus obsurduiscemus.'

In *De generatione sonorum* the *imaginatio* has the power to produce movement; that is, speech. A further explanation of the motive power of *imaginatio* can be found in *De motu supercaelestium.* Grosseteste writes,

> if the form of the chest in the craftsman's [*artifex*] soul or mind [*anima vel in mente*] were the actual chest itself then the craftsman would not be moved [*motus*] to make the chest.[149]

This chest is imagined (*imaginatum*) and its existence in the soul prompts and inclines the *artifex* to produce it *in actu*; the references to the *Metaphysics* are frequent. In *Letter* 1 Grosseteste expands on this metaphor to illustrate the nobility of the imagination using Augustine's *In Iohannis evangelium tractatus* 1.17 as his authority. Written to Adam Rufus ca. 1225-28 *Letter* 1 contains a discussion about the difference between something existing in the mind (*in arte*) and physically (*in actu*). He writes that even when the craftsman produces the chest, the chest *in arte* still exists, and is in fact more superior to the chest that exists in person because it can be produced again and again. This is illustrated in *Dictum* 60, discussed above, where we are reminded of the infinite possibilities of being able to hold something in our memory; that we can recall the same thing again and again without destroying the memory of it.[150] Additionally, the chest that exists *in arte* is 'life' (*vita*) more proper because it exists in the soul, whereas the chest that physically exists has no belonging in the soul. Here is Grosseteste, through Augustine, showing the importance of *ars.*[151] The editors of *Letter* 1 have translated '*in*

[149] Grosseteste, *De motu supercaelestium,* in *Philosophischen Werke* (ed. Baur, 92-100, at 95-6), 'sicut enim si forma arcae, quae est in ipsa anima vel in mente ipsius artificis, esset esse ipsius arcae, non moveretur artifex ad faciendam arcam, similiter in his, cum quod imaginatum est de illis formis sit esse istorum et non indigeat motu.'

[150] The destruction of memories is discussed further in Chapter 4 - the act of Confession "purges" memories from the 'book of conscience.'

[151] Grosseteste, *Epistola* 1 (ed. Bauer, 6-7; trans. Mantello and Goering, 40), 'attendite ergo arcam in arte, et arcam in opere; arca in opere non est vita, arca in arte vita est.'

arte' as 'creative imagination' bordering on anachronism; 'idea' holds perhaps a closer rendering. Creativity as understood today is different from the *creatio* of the Middle Ages which was reserved for God's power of *creatio ex nihilo* and, as Michael Mack observes, whilst people of the Middle Ages may 'attribute their own powers of art to God, as a rule they do not claim his creative power for themselves.'[152] He adds the caveat that 'this is not to say that before the Renaissance people were not creative, but only that they did not think – or at least did not speak – of themselves as such.'[153] A strict understanding of Aristotle's *phantasia* would not have been thought of as creative or productive but rather, as Anne Sheppard writes, 'the creativity of the artist was far more commonly attributed to inspiration from an external source than to imagination.'[154] Grosseteste's use of *in arte* is complemented by the verb he uses to describe the imagining of God; *fingare.*[155] As Mary Carruthers notes, the verbs *fingo, pingo, depingo* and their derivatives were commonly used to conjure up mental images and refer to the process of imagining structures, featuring elsewhere in Grosseteste's work as in *Dictum* 112.[156]

Whilst in *De generatione sonorum* it is the *imaginatio* that precedes the very action of speech, in *Dictum* 54 Grosseteste has a slightly different interpretation of the process. He writes that the 'interior word proceeds from the bedchamber of memory.'[157]

---

[152] Michael Mack, *Sidney's Poetics. Imitating Creation* (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2005), 18.

[153] Mack, *Sidney's Poetics,* 18.

[154] Frede, "Cognitive Role," 279 n. 2; Anne Sheppard, *The Poetics of Phantasia*. *Imagination in Ancient Aesthetics* (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2014), 3; quote 103.

[155] Grosseteste, *Epistola* 1 (ed. Baur, 7; trans. Mantello and Goering, 40).

[156] Mary Carruthers, "Rhetorical Memoria in Commentary and Practice," in *The Rhetoric of Cicero in its Medieval and Early Renaissance Commentary Tradition,* eds. Virginia Cox and John O. Ward (Leiden, Brill, 2006), 209-37, at 215.

[157] Grosseteste, *Dictum* 54 f. 43vb, 'verbum autem interius, de thalamo memorie procedens, quasi vehiculum verbi sonantis ascendit, et progreditur per cavum oris quasi per ostii aperturam, cuius ostii

Between the "door" of the mouth and the "bedchamber" of memory lies an *ostiarius* as in *Dictum* 7 although this time the *ostiarius* represents not *phantasia* but 'prudent circumspection' (*circumspectio prudens*). This *ostiarius* checks that the words intended for speech are 'clothed in the light of truth' (*amictum veritatis lumine*) and, if so, carries them to the doorkeeper of the mouth where they become actualised (spoken). Here there is no acknowledgement that *images* are involved in speech; instead he suggests that words are stored in the memory perhaps as aural *phantasmata*. The role of the *ostiarius* is considerable in mediating between the *aspectus* and the *affectus*, only chaperoning those words that 'illuminate the *aspectus'* of either the speaker or the listener. Whilst *De generatione sonorum* is clearly discussing verbal speech, *Dictum* 54 insists that the *ostarius* (the mouth) only permits the expression of words that illuminate the *aspectus* and *affectus* of 'another' (*alienus*) as well as oneself.[158] This idea of an internal speech is a clear reference to concepts held by both Plotinus and Aristotle that, as Richard King describes 'memory performances consist in saying that something is the case.'[159] This idea of memory as a verbal act will be explored to a much greater extent in Chapter 4 which establishes the act of confession as the ultimate verbal performance.

Richard Southern argues that Grosseteste was 'one of the first to appreciate its [imagination's] new importance' in part because of the imagination's role in thought experiments (discussed above).[160] However, Southern also argues that the imagination's purpose was, theologically, to 'increase the warmth of reception,' acting as it does as a

---

valve sunt instrumenta vocalia. Inter quod ostium et dictum thalamum quasi deductrix quedam sedet circumspectio prudens, que omne verbum volens egredi prudenter et vigilanter considerat an ipsum sit amictum veritatis lumine ut possit aspectum mentis, ad quam vult progredi, illuminare, et an sit effective rectum et vivax ut possit affectum rectificare et vivificare.'

[158] Grosseteste, *Dictum* 54 f. 43vb, 'est autem ostiarius aperiens amor illuminandi aspectum et accendendi affectio mentis aliene.'

[159] Plotinus, *Enneads* 5.3.3 (ed. and trans. LCL 444, pp. 76-9); see also King, *Aristotle and Plotinus,* 174. Aristotle, *De Memoria et Reminiscentia* 449b22 (trans. Sorabji, 48) 'for whenever someone is actively engaged in remembering, he always says in his soul in this way.'

[160] Southern, *English Mind*, 43.

'jump' or rather bridge between the *aspectus* and the *affectus*.[161] Ginther also views the imagination as a 'bridge' between the *aspectus* and the *affectus.*[162] Southern uses as evidence the similarities between Grosseteste's symbols for eternity and imagination, but he does not include the symbol for memory, which is also similar.[163] Additionally, as Mary Carruthers observes, the *aspectus* and the *affectus* are 'both words that resonate in memory training as the concentrated inner "seeing," and the richly sensory emotional, and fully experiential recreation of "things," that profound memory work requires.'[164] It is possible then that Grosseteste's use of the word has an origin in memory-craft. He is clearly aware of such use; when discussing the usefulness of mnemonic verse he insists that it must 'easily present themselves to the gaze [*aspectus*] of the inquirer.'[165]

For Grosseteste, the role of *phantasmata* is complicated; they aid understanding of the corporeal world because of their imitable link to corporeity, and they are clearly utilised by both the memory and the *imaginatio.* Because of this, they implicitly impact on Grosseteste's *aspectus/affectus* distinction; they can pull one up as well as drag one down. Thus, one must be wary of dreams, and of overburdening the *imaginatio* with memories of pleasurable sensations. Their link to the corporeal world is what gives them their power in thought experiments, but it is also what leads to false, or even heretical, conclusions.

---

[161] Southern, *English Mind,* 44-5. Another of Southern's arguments in elevating the *imaginatio* in Grosseteste's outlook is based on his reading of Alexander Murray's exploration of Confession in "Confession as a Historical Source." However I will show in Chapter 4 how this misplaces emphasis which instead belong to the memory, per a more faithful reading of Murray's work.

[162] Ginther, "Theologian's Task," 63.

[163] ⊛ is the symbol for *De eternitate* (f. 17a), ❀ is the symbol for *De imaginatione* (f. 18b) and ⊕ the symbol for *De memoria et reminiscentia* (f. 18b), Grosseteste, *Tabula* (ed. Thomson).

[164] Carruthers, *Craft of Thought,* 84.

[165] Grosseteste, *Compotus* (eds and trans. Lohr and Nothaft, 70-1), 'ut facile possint occurrere aspectui qurentis.'

From Sin to Heresy.

Grosseteste's emphasis on natural phenomena and the human ability to abstract universals from sense-data gives sensation an enormously positive role to play in the human condition, one which was not always shared with his contemporaries. However, this is not to say that sense-data is not problematic. Grosseteste is keenly aware of the sin that can arise from corporeal temptation and from focusing on the memories of these sinful experiences; the sin of *curiositas.* Modern understanding of curiosity is not inherently dangerous, it allows for discovery and innovation. Grosseteste acknowledges discovery as a positive; in Book 9 of the *Hexaëmeron* he writes that he is encouraged to 'arouse the ingenuity [*ingenium*] of the reader; so that he may look more closely [*investigare*] and more carefully into the matter and explain it more clearly when he has made his discovery [*inventum*].'[166] Indeed his very emphasis on natural phenomena emphasises *inventum* and *experimentum* as positive activities. Medieval *curiositas*, however, was not viewed with the same positivity as *inventum* or *ingenium*.

In *Dictum* 138 Grosseteste defines *curiositas* as the immoderate appetite for the desire to know the sciences, but not the sciences of piety.[167] Grosseteste is clearly espousing an Augustinian view of curiosity here, found in *Confessions*, citing Augustine's definition of curiosity as the 'lust [*concupiscenciam*] of the eyes' and the 'pleasure of knowing.'[168] The sciences here are *not* the sciences of piety and may be referring to magical sciences, or, perhaps more likely, referring to science without the application of theology. In *Dictum* 44 a very similar definition arises, it is the 'desire [*appetitus*] for

[166] Grosseteste, *Hexaëmeron*, 9.2.6 (eds. Dales and Gieben, 268; trans. Martin, 274), 'volo autem lectorem scire me istud dicere non tam asserendo quam lectoris ingenium exsuscitando, ut investiget aliquid secrecius et melius et inventum explanet dilucidius.'

[167] Grosseteste, *Dictum* 138 ff. 113rb-va, 'que curiiositas dicitur, est immoderatus appetitus voluptatis que habetur in cognitione scientiarum, maxime illarum que non scientie pietatis.'

[168] Grosseteste*, Dictum* 138 f. 113rb, 'concupiscentiam carnis appellat libidinem sentiendi, concupiscentiam oculorum libidinem cognoscendi vel curiostitatem, superbiam vite libidinem principandi.' See Augustine Confessions 3.8.

knowing' and the 'pleasure [*voluptatis*] in knowing.'[169] Grosseteste explains that the pleasure of curiosity reflects back onto knowledge, suffocating it, just as smoke blown back onto a candle can suffocate the flame.[170] Curiosity, he says, is the result of 'malignant spirits' subverting our imagination with the pleasure and promise of power, physical gratification, and knowledge.[171] This type of curiosity is the same as that found in *Perambulavit Iudas*, the sin that arises through 'mental wandering' (*per vagationem*) reflected in the very title of his work, hence his emphasis on the correct ordering of imagination and cogitation that features as a prominent theme in the work.[172] Mary Carruthers describes *curiositas* as the 'great vice of memoria,' noting the link between wandering (*vagus*) and a mental lack of focus dating to John Cassian (360-435 CE).[173] Grosseteste's confessional formulas all explore the sins arising from corporeal pleasure, and many of these manuals had 'enduring influence' throughout the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.[174] Of these confessional manuals it is *Deus est* and *Templum Dei* that are of importance in discussions of *curiositas*. *Templum Dei*, written sometime between 1220 and 1230, formulaically preempts what is discussed in *Deus est* approximately a decade later, likely composed between 1240 and 1250.[175] At 11.9 in a

[169] Grosseteste*, Dictum* 44 f. 32vb, 'curiositas autem est appetitus sciendi fine voluptatis que est in sciendo.'

[170] Grosseteste*, Dictum* 44 f. 32vb, 'delectacio itaque super ipsam scientiam reflexa est sicut fumus super lucernam reflexus ipsam extinguens.'

[171] Grosseteste, *Dictum* 43 f. 32rb, 'hostes autem sunt maligni spiritus qui ad hunc murum confringendum tormenta iaciunt cum imaginationem nostram voluptuosis in principando, vel sciendo, vel sentiendo tangunt.'

[172] Grosseteste, *Perambulavit Iudas* §6 (eds. Mantello and Goering, 149), 'peccavi enim in visu per vagationem et leivtatem, unde incurri multotiens inconstantiam mentis.' I discuss this relationship between *vaga, vestgia* and memory craft in Chapter 4.

[173] Carruthers*, Craft of Thought*, 82-3.

[174] Woolgar, *The Senses,* 11 (quote). See for example, *Templum Dei*, *Quoniam cogitatio*, *Perambulavit*, *Templum Dei*, *Notus in Iudea est.*

[175] Mantello and Goering, *Templum Dei*, 6; Wenzel, "Deus est," [*Deus est*], 231.

schemata indicating the excesses and deficiencies of various virtuous traits Grosseteste posits that the virtuous mean of occupation (*occupatio*) is tempered by deficiency, in laziness (*accidia)*, and excess, in *curiositas.*[176] The format of *Templum Dei*, intended as a 'quick reference and as an aid to study' forbids an extended commentary on this unusual choice of antonym for sloth*,* which is why *Deus est* is perhaps more useful.[177] Wenzel has commented on the 'extraordinary' and 'quite unique' deployment of *curiositas* for what is essentially 'exaggerated zeal.'[178] *Curiositas*, writes Grosseteste, is the immoderate (in this case, excessive) practice of good work.[179] Having divided *accidia* into mental and corporeal counterparts, laziness of the soul (inner grief of the mind) as *interna mentis tristitia* and idleness of the body as *otium corporis,* he does not seek to do the same with *curiositas,* indicating that it can apply both physically and mentally.[180]

In *Permabulavit Iudas*, after detailing 209 lines (in the modern edition) of the cornucopia of sinful activities arising from all of the five senses, he writes that it is actually more sinful to 'recount [*memorantes*] in the cloister or in meditation the images of things seen privately;' it is one thing to witness an act of fornication, it is another to constantly and consciously recall it.[181] The memory of this sinful act intensifies the harmful nature of sensation and leads the *imaginatio* to corruption; the *imaginatio* can

---

[176] Grosseteste, *Templum Dei* §11.9 (eds. Goering and Mantello, 52).

[177] Mantello and Goering, *Templum Dei*, [*Templum Dei*], 7

[178] Wenzel, *Deus est*, [*Deus est*], 233 (quote). See also Siegfried Wenzel, *The Sin of Sloth*: *Acedia in Medieval Thought and Literature* (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1967), 76, and 226 n.41.

[179] Grossesteste, *Deus est* (ed. Wenzel, 274), 'curiositas est immoderatum bonurm operum exercitum.'

[180] See Wenzel, *Sin of Sloth,*173 for more on this distinction.

[181] Grosseteste, *Perambulavit Iudas* §17 (eds. Mantello and Goering, 155), 'memorantes in solas specierum imagines in silencio vel in claustro quam ipsas species videntes in seculo.'

become overrun with harmful *phantasmata* stored in the memory.[182] When improper desires arise first in the imagination and then become objects of cognition, whilst potentially harmful, are not particularly problematic.[183] This would be the above-mentioned monk, mentally replaying the act of fornication he was witness to for his own gratification. However, what *is* of concern is when cogitation precedes imagination, suggesting things to the imagination that have never been experienced, which can not only lead to sin but to heresy.[184]

Perhaps the most frequently cited account of Grosseteste's use of the *phantasmata* is in his description of Aristotle's error of eternity which can be found in many of his other works.[185] In his denunciation of the eternity of the world Grosseteste uses the example of a thought experiment as proffered by, specifically, Aristotle, as being *too* dependent on *phantasmata*. Here, the problem is not that the *phantasmata* are too fantastical, but that they are too corporeal; Aristotle is erroneous in applying corporeal concepts to a non-corporeal entity and arriving at an incorrect conclusion (that the world is eternal). His argument against Aristotle and the pagans is that they cannot think outside of, or beyond, their *phantasmata rerum corporealium*. As he puts it in *De finitate motus et temporus* 'they falsely affirm many corporeal properties of noncorporeal [sic] things.'[186]

---

[182] Grossetste *Perambulavit Iudas* §17 (eds. Mantello and Goering, 155), 'ex memoria enim corrupta catervatim irruunt in imaginationem et cogitationem visa, audita, olfacta, gustata, et tacta.'

[183] Grosseteste, *Perambulabit Iudas* §18-19 (eds. Mantello and Goering, 156); see also 139.

[184] Grosseteste, *Perambulavit Iudas* §20 (ed.s Mantello and Goering, 156), 'ubi autem cogitatio precedit imaginatiomen, solet formare in animo non solum que sensu percepta sunt, set eciam que percipi aliquo modo potuerunt, et ea vehemencius imprimit imaginationi que numquam experta est.' See also 139.

[185] Grosseteste, commentary on the *Physics* 8 (ed. Dales, 145-55); Grosseteste, *Hexaëmeron* 1.8.4-5 (eds. Dales and Gieben, 60-1; trans Martin 58-9); Grosseteste, *De finitate motus et temporus* which is transcribed in Richard C. Dales, "Robert Grosseteste's Treatise 'De Finitate Motus et Temporis,'" *Traditio* 19 (1963): 245-66, at 256; Grosseteste, *Compotus* (eds. and trans. Lohr and Nothaft, 62-3). See also Dales, *"Medieval Discussions,"* 558 n. 67.

[186] trans. Dales "Eternity of the World," 559. Grosseteste, *De finitate motus et temporis* (ed. Dales, 264), 'multas proprietates corporales de non corporalibus false affirmant.'

Aristotle's problem, according to Grosseteste, was that he did not actually utilise his *imaginatio* enough, so that the conclusions of this thought experiment were incorrect. He simply applied a corporeal product (*phantasmata*) as evidence for a non-corporeal subject (the eternity of the world).[187]

Another way in which the imagination can lead not just to sin (such as the rumination of temptation that one may find themselves in when *in silencio vel in claustro*) but to heresy is described in *Dictum* 20.[188] A short sermon on the necessary resurrection of Jesus, Grosseteste writes 'there have been heretics who have said that Christ was not really a man but that he only had an imagined [*phantasticum*] physical body.'[189] This challenge against Docetism puts *phantasticus* at the heart of the problematic Manichaean/Gnostic belief in the non-corporeality of Jesus, touting the idea that he was not *really* man but only the *appearance* of a man, an issue raised by Augustine in his *Contra faustam.*[190] This reveals again an important facet of Grosseteste's theology - the necessity of Jesus's corporeity.[191] Dominic J. Unger, in exploring Grosseteste's account for the significance of the Incarnation, reiterates the importance of *total* beatification of one's *entire* nature, intellectual and sentient.[192]

---

[187] Dales, "Eternity of the World," 562, 552-4.

[188] Grosseteste, *Perambulavit Iudas* §17 (eds. Mantello and Goering, 155).

[189] Grosseteste, *Dictum* 20 f. 20ra, 'fuerunt heretici qui dixerunt Christum non esse verum hominem sed illum habere corpus fantasticum.' Author's translation.

[190] Augustine, *Contra faustum manichaeum libri triginta tres* 29.2 (ed. CSEL 25/1, p. 744).

[191] See Unger, "Incarnation," 1-36; Ginther, *Sacred Page*, 121-51.

[192] Unger, "Incarnation," 33. This emphasis on Jesus's incarnation will be explored more below.

Thus, the image-manipulating power of the imagination can be problematic when the tools of *imaginatio,* the *phantasmata*, are used incorrectly. Whilst this does not always amount to heresy, the polluting of the mind by *phantasmata* of things corporeal does occur, particularly in sleep; the topic of *Dictum* 15. The problem occurs when someone takes dream images, *simulacra*, to be the real thing, something which could result in a sleepwalker falling down a well (*phantasmata* thus being the motive cause).[193] By 1230 Grosseteste had read Aristotle's *De somno et vigilia* 3 as it appears in his *Tabula.* In *Dictum* 15 Grosseteste writes that 'sleep occurs when the vapour that is released from nourishment rises to the brain and there it cools and occupies the prime instrument of sensation' and disables it.[194] Dreams then occupy the brain, they dull its ability to distinguish sense-data and to discern reality from this vapor. *Phantasmata*, he says, work in the same way. Both dream images and *phantasmata* burden the *anima*, occupying its senses so that it cannot function.[195] According to Grosseteste, the dream vapour 'occupies the prime instrument of sensation so that it is not able to function' (*occupat primum instrumentum sentiendi ut non possit agere*).[196] The parallels to the anonymous translation of the Aristotelian text, *De memoria et reminiscentia*, at 458a, which reads '*primi organi sentiendi interceptio ut non possit agere,*' are manifest.[197]

[193] Grosseteste, *Dictum* 15 ff. 12vb-13ra.

[194] Grosseteste, *Dictum* 15 f. 12rb, 'somnus namque fit cum vapor resolutus a nutrimento ascendit ad cerebrum, et ibi infrigidatus redit et occupat primum instrumentum senciendi ut non possit agere.' Author's translation.

[195] Grosseteste, *Dictum* 72 f. 12rb, 'fantasmata [...] gravant animam, occupantque eius predictos sensus ut non possint agere.'

[196] Grosseteste, *Dictum* 15 f. 12rb. Author's translation. See Aristotle, *De memoria et reminiscentia* 3 458a12 (ed. and trans. LCL 288, p. 343).

[197] *Anonymous saec. XII translator Aristotelis. De somno et vigilia (translatio 'vetus'),* ed. H. J. Drossaart Lulofs (Leiden, 1943), 3, col.1, ll.12 (p.10).

Though Grosseteste uses the wording of Aristotle in *Dictum* 15 to explain the operation of dreaming, in *Dictum* 113 there is a far more Augustinian account of dreaming. He quotes a large passage from *De trinitate* 11.4 that the will, in sleep, informs the 'sharpness of the mind' (*animi aciem*) of images of sensible things, fooling the sleeper into believing that these images are actually occurring.[198] A similar sentiment can be found in *Perambulavit Iudas* §17. Grosseteste reiterates this uneasiness on whether these images originate in the 'memory or some other hidden force' (*ex memoria, sive ex aliqua alia occulta vi*).[199] For Grosseteste it seems that imagination is closely tied with sleep and dream images; the two are listed next to each other in his *Tabula.* Dreams then work in the direct opposite way than sense-perception; imagination is stirred by memory, which affects the *sensus communis* and can even lead to movement of the sense-organs (such as arms and limbs).[200]

Outside of the *Perambulavit Iudas* memory's exact relationship to the *imaginatio* is often blurry and ill-defined; the technical description in *Deus est* hides a more confused understanding in his *Dicta*, such as *Dictum* 43 where he is unsure whether it is imagination or memory that has the responsibility for prophecy and knowledge of God. Having shown the role of *phantasmata* in both imagination and memory I will now explore memory specifically by looking at the various descriptions and metaphors Grosseteste uses in his corpus. From these metaphors it is clear that Grosseteste combines a variety of sources for his ontology of memory; it is an Augustinian hall and *thesaurus*, a Neoplatonic *speculum,* a Platonic/Aristotelian wax-tablet, as well as a pumice stone.

[198] Grosseteste, *Dictum* 113 f. 93ra, cf Augustine *De trinitate* 11.4 (ed. CCSL 50).

[199] Grosseteste, *Dictum* 113 f. 93ra.

[200] Simon Kemp and Garth J. O. Fletcher "The Medieval Theory of the Inner Senses," *American Journal of Psychology* 106, no. 4 (1993): 559-76, at 564.

Metaphoric Memory: Hall, Wax, Pumice, Mirror.

Grosseteste uses an Augustinian metaphor for memory, describing it as an *aula* in *Dictum* 7 and as a *thesaurus* in *Quoniam cogitatio.* He also describes memory as a *thalamus* or bedchamber in *Dictum* 54, a reference to not only the size and expanse of memory but perhaps to its intimate relationship to us as individuals. However, there are a number of other metaphors that he uses that each incorporate a different aspect of memory. Perhaps the most common metaphor for memory was the seal-in-wax analogy that originated in Plato's *Theaetetus* 191c and which is incorporated into Aristotle's discussion of sense perception in *De anima* 424a17. The wax (memory) receives the impression (form) of the seal that is pressed into it, and what remains is this form without matter (similar to his description of *phantasmata).* Grosseteste uses this metaphor in *Letter* 1 and in the *recensio posterior* of *De libero arbitrio.* In *De libero arbitrio* at 16.10 the metaphor is used to describe how one can see the traces of God in the impression's 'imitative likeness' (*imitatoria similitudine*).[201] Clearly, Grosseteste is knowledgeable of the metaphor, and more of its use in this particular work and its inclusion of the *vestigia* of creation will be discussed in Chapter 4.

In *Dictum* 54 Grosseteste alters the analogy slightly. When comparing Jesus to a pumice stone he uses language reminiscent of the seal-in-wax analogy whilst incorporating Aristotelian/Galenic physiology and the difference between reception and retention. He writes 'that which is written upon will be soft for reception [*receptio*] and feeling, but also firm and stable for the preserving [*retentabilitate*] inscription.' [202] The hardness and softness of the brain's cells is recalled in the *Prose Salernitan Questiones* ca.1200 where it is acknowledged that if the memory cell (in the rear ventricle of the brain) is too soft then forms will be imprinted more easily but with a far less enduring

[201] Grosseteste's *De libero arbitrio* appears as both *recensio prior* and a later *recensio posterior.* Both have been edited and translated by Neil Lewis, *Robert Grosseteste on Free Decision,* Auctores Britannici Medii Aevi 29 (Oxford: Published for the British Academy by Oxford University Press, 2017). Grosseteste, *De libero arbitrio recensio posterior* 16.10 (ed. and trans. Lewis, 226-9). It is worth noting that in the *recensio prior* 17.10 (ed. Lewis, 92-3) the imitative likeness of traces of the creator is discussed without reference to the wax seal.

[202] Grosseteste, *Dictum* 54 (ed. and trans. Goering and Rosenfeld, 123).

impression; if too hard, forms will not be imprinted at all, thus accounting for no possibility for recollection.[203] Again, this supposes the idea that Grosseteste saw memory as receptive and retentive of forms. For Grosseteste, however, the seal-in-wax analogy is ineffective. There is no need for light as an *instrument* in the process, and it is a passive (re)action to an external force. Grosseteste, then, turns to Plotinus for a more relatable metaphor; Plotinus dislikes the seal-in-wax analogy because it implies that perception is an impression requiring an inactive memory (*Enneads* 4.3.26 and 4.6.1).[204] It also does not account for any deterioration in memory such as that experienced by the elderly, or indeed forgetting in general (*Enneads* 4.6.3). For Plotinus the act of perception leaves an experience within the soul - he likens it to the soul as being in labour with memory, suggesting that it is impregnated by perception; this idea is repeated somewhat by Grosseteste in *Dictum* 60 with the repeated use of *gignere*.[205] Plotinus, then, is useful for Grosseteste because he gives an active agency to sense-perception and memory.[206] By likening the image-making faculty (*phantasia)* to a mirror as Plotinus does at *Enneads* 4.3.30, he suggests that memory is the apprehension of this reflection.[207] This metaphor, considering Grosseteste's interest in reflection and light and Aristotle's etymological linkage of *phantasia* with light is far more appealing to Grosseteste. *Dictum* 60 elaborates on the 'mirror of the mind' (*speculum mentis*) which can be used to '(re)present God' (*representat Deum*).[208] Grosseteste has thus

[203] Coleman, *Medieval Memories,* 333-6.

[204] King, *Aristotle and Plotinus,* 110-3; Plotinus, *Enneads* 4.3.26 and 4.6.1 (ed. and trans. LCL 443, p. 119 and pp. 321-3).

[205] King, *Aristotle and Plotinus,* 119; Plotinus, *Enneads* 4.6.3 (ed. and trans. LCL 443, p. 329).

[206] Plotinus, *Enneads* 4.6.3 (ed. and trans. LCL 443, p. 329).

[207] Plotinus, *Enneads* 4.3.30 (ed. and trans. LCL 443, p. 131), 'the intellectual act is without parts and has not, so to speak, come out into the open, but remains unobserved within, but the verbal expression unfolds it content and brings it out of the intellectual act as if in a mirror, and this is how there is apprehension and persistence and memory of it.' King, *Aristotle and Plotinus,* 110. n. 469, and 179 n. 761.

[208] Grosseteste, *Dictum* 60 f. 48rb.

shifted the *speculum* of Plotinus, that is the *phantasia*, to the *memoria* of the Augustinian trinity. He warns us that we must look after our mind-mirror, keeping it free from distortion and blemish.[209]

The role of the mind-mirror is explicated most effectively in *Dictum* 44 which is, I will show, a detailed account of Grosseteste's theory of sense-perception. First of all, we are invited to imagine a ray of light hitting a concave mirror.[210] He continues that 'to this point of *lux* God can be compared, entering into the *anima* by the diffusion of his *lumen*' (*huic puncto lucis comparari potest Deus qui, veniens in animam, diffusione lumnis sui*). This, then, is the multiplication of the species, the reception of God's *lux* via *lumen*; received through sensation and carried on into the internal senses, all ideas that have been hinted at in works discussed above. Once this light has entered into our internal faculties it reaches the mind-mirror where the *lux* is reflected instantaneously, 'radiating out knowledge and love' (*radios cognitionis et amoris*). Thus, Grosseteste's theory of cognition combines a heavy reliance on sense-perception as ideated by Aristotle which he then, because of light's role as an *instrumentum sentiendi* and his theory of the multiplication of the species, combines with an illuminatory theory of immediate, irradiated knowledge because of the interaction of this *lux* with our own mind-mirror.

That is not to say that all knowledge immediately arises from sense-perception without the need for abstraction or any kind of reasoning; instead, the memory *as mirror* is where this process of understanding takes place. This descriptive quality of memory-as-mirror is particularly theological; Aelred of Rievaulx (1110-67) refers to the idea in

[209] Grosseteste, *Dictum* 60 f. 48rb, 'ne speculum istud sit prave figuratum et distortum aut sordidum.'

[210] Grosseteste, *Dictum* 44 ff. 32va-vb, 'imaginemur itaque punctum lucis positum in medio alicuius possibilis fieri speculum concavum, quod dico punctum diffusione luminis sui undique illud in cuius medio ponitur rotundet et cavet, et a cavato radios in se reflexos suscipiat, ipsumque centrum accendat. Huic puncto lucis comparari potest Deus qui, veniens in animam, diffusione lumnis sui eam supradicto modo rotundat et cavat, et radios cognitionis et amoris sui in se reflexos suscipit, ibidemque substantiam anime quasi centrum speculi accendit.'

Book 2 of his *Dialogus de anima.* Aelred, in dialogue with his student John, states 'now the memory has one supreme quality that overrides all else: it has the capacity of receiving God.'[211] Aelred is explicitly Augustinian in his discussion of the power of memory; he references *De quantitate animae* 5.8.9 when observing that the reflection of something (in Aelred's case, London) cannot be bigger than the mirror, concluding that 'no image can be greater than the thing on which it is reflected.'[212] This leads Aelred to the conclusion that 'your memory is greater than the world, not in material size but in spiritual nature' thus emphasising the spiritual role memory plays.[213] Thus memory does not just retain images of sense impressions (detailed in Book 1) but, because memory, understanding, and will are one substance, either present in the soul or actually constituting the soul, memory is spiritual; the soul cannot think without memory, which has an almost inseparable relationship (in man) with reason. Aelred concludes his topic on memory in Book 2, before moving on to will, that 'in short, memory cannot be conceived without reason or reason without memory, because they are one simple substance' but they are not one and the same.[214] For Aelred, these two functions of nature suggest to him, as they did Augustine, that there are two memories, one irrational which deals with the imaginary (*phantasticus*) and the other which deals with 'past and future' (*praeteritus et futurus*).[215] Here, as Janet Coleman observes, Aelred offers almost no distinction between imagination and memory, but reserves the second type of

---

[211] Aelred of Rievaulx, *Dialogus de anima* 2 (ed. CCCM 1, ll.155; trans. CF 22, p. 77), 'nam quod his omnibus superexcellit, memoria capax est dei.'

[212] Aelred of Rievaulx, *Dialogus de anima* 2 (ed. CCCM 1, ll.50; trans. CF 22, p. 73), 'vides igitur nullam omnino imaginem eius rei, cui imprimitur, posse mensuram excedere.'

[213] Aelred of Rievaulx, *Dialogus de anima* 2 (ed. CCCM 1, ll.78; trans. CF 22, p. 75), 'est igitur memoria tua maior mundo, non mole corporea, sed spirituali natura.'

[214] Aelred of Rievaulx, *Dialogus de anima* 2 (ed. CCCM 1, ll.176; trans. CF 22, p. 78), 'et, ut breuiter dicam, nunquam memoria potest cogitari sine ratione, uel sine memoria ratio, quia una sunt et simplex substantia memoria et ratio.'

[215] Aelred of Rievaulx, *Dialogus de anima* 3 (ed. CCCM 1, ll.466; trans. CF 22, p. 130), 'et memoria, non illam dico qua recordamur, discernentes inter praeteria et futura, sed illam quae phantastica dicitur.'

memory for memory of God and other more spiritual thoughts (and, as relates to things future, prophesy).[216]

By placing emphasis on the role of memory as a mind-mirror Grosseteste is able to show the role of light in both the internal and external faculties. That the memory is the mediator between the *voluntas* and the *ratio*, with its role in the tripartite soul of memory, understanding, love, all suggest that it is, for Grosseteste, far more than simply the faculty that records what is no longer present, or that simply stores intentions. Ginther and Southern both identify the *imaginatio* as the 'bridge' between the *aspectus* and the *affectus;* I would posit that actually, it is the memory that unifies body and soul because it is where experience is formed and found.

Conclusion

Grosseteste's understanding of memory (and imagination) is thus generally in keeping with his contemporaries, despite his knowledge of the Avicennian inner faculties and corresponding use of his terms. Grosseteste's understanding of the psychological faculties is, depending on his audience and purpose, inconsistent; as Siegfried Wenzel has noted, his use of *Liber de anima* is 'superficial and pragmatic: he took from it what he needed.'[217] Despite Grosseteste's work on optics and his emphasis on geometry he makes no attempt to describe the act of sense-perception or vision in any detail; though he produces an impressive account of the multiplication of the species and its reliance on light, incorporating into it his own theological understanding and suggesting that it indeed does continue into the internal faculties he does not explain how although he does point to the four instruments of sense as being involved in the process. This is surprising, given that he is aware of the particular physiological functioning of sense-organs such as the eye as in *Dictum* 77.[218]

---

[216] Coleman, *Medieval Memories,* 212.

[217] Wenzel, "Deus est," [*Deus est*], 238.

[218] Grosseteste, *Dictum* 77 is a short sermon on the seven humours of the eye and the seven virtues, I discuss this further in Chapter 2.

However, some conclusions can still be drawn. The first is that he appreciates the Aristotelian link between experience, memory, and sense-perception. This will become important in Chapter 4 that looks at confession as the ultimate theological manifestation of this maxim, and one that shows Grosseteste as holding a similar conceptualisation of the role of memory in ethics held by the likes of Aquinas and Albertus Magnus. This also relies on Grosseteste's own vague demarcation between the faculties of imagination and memory, one which he acknowledges himself (as in *Dictum* 43). Indeed, this emphasis on repeated perceptions(s), memory(s) and experience(s) in the *cPA* as Simon Oliver posits, is 'strikingly reminiscent' of Platonic Recollection, the 'awakening' of one's soul by the 'motions' of corporeal sensation, a metaphor that is discussed at length in *Dictum* 15.[219]

Second, his theory on the multiplication of the species allows for an opportunity to synthesise Aristotelian intromission with Augustinian illumination. Though Aristotle refutes extramission as a theory in general, Grosseteste's use of *De generatione animalium* 5.1 in *De iride* gives him the opportunity to suggest a combined theory of extra- and intromission because of Aristotle's ill-chosen wording of sensation as proceeding *ab instrumentis* like water from pipes. As such Grosseteste can maintain an active element in sensation, one that works with and within his understanding of *lux* and *lumen*. Third, when Grosseteste acknowledges in *Sermo* T.43 the role of memory in learning it is because of the memory's role in the educative process; it is for this reason he mentions the senses of *vision* and *hearing* specifically, the two senses involved in sitting in a lecture hall, for example. This will be explored more in Chapter 3, where I will explore memory's role as an educative tool more exhaustively.

Fourth, Grosseteste's *phantasmata* are not exclusively pictorial; they form the content of understanding via the impressions of each individual sense be they from hearing, touch and so on. He clearly appreciates the usefulness of thought experiments in his

---

[219] Oliver, "Light, Truth, Experimentum," 169.

own teaching, and, as *Letter* 1 indicates, it is imagination's relationship with the soul rather than with *rerum corporalium* that elevates it as a function of human cognition. However, the *imaginatio* of *Letter* 1 is not necessarily akin to our modern concept of imagination; Grosseteste's term '*in arte*' is not the same as 'creative imagination.' Thus, the imaginary chest that forms the topic of conversation in the Letter does not necessarily belong to the *imaginatio* per se. *Phantasmata* themselves are not inherently bad or good; in their representation of corporeity, they are unique in that they can bind the soul with the body, allowing for thought-experiments that can take them beyond the limits of corporeity. Aristotle did this, though his conclusion was incorrect; he did not go *far enough.* In their imitable quality with the corporeal world *phantasmata* are reflective of Grosseteste's emphasis on creation and the Incarnation. *Phantasmata* are fundamentally necessary for our understanding as they help make the "outside" intelligible on the "inside." Just as sense-perception is more than a necessity because it is a means by which one can 'do good,' so too can *phantasmata* be beneficial, based as they are on the corporeal, tangible world. Thus they are not inherently negative, they just need to be utilised correctly.

Memory as pertains to sense perception is retentive and it is by a process of the memory; recollection, that one can remember what one has seen. Sometimes the memory and imagination are Avicennian in their differentiation between intention and form such as in the *cPA*, whereas sometimes they are not, as in *Deus est.* At other times, memory is very much an Augustinian *aula* that receives the forms of sense impressions, such as *Dictum* 7 and *Perambulavit Iudas*. Grosseteste utilises both the seal-in-wax metaphor of Aristotle and Plato as well as the mind-mirror metaphor of Plotinus to different effects, although it appears that the mind-mirror analogy is far more useful for him because it complements his theory of light, the multiplication of the species, a more active nature of both sensation and memory whilst still maintaining an illuminatory theory of cognition.

Chapter 2. Spiritual Sensation

In the previous chapter I explored sensation as it pertains to the external and internal senses. What is immediately clear from Chapter 1 is the role that light plays in sensation, it surpasses metaphor and plays an active, participatory role in both how the external senses receive the species or form and how the internal senses interpret and abstract knowledge from corporeal sensation. In this chapter I will explore an element of sensation that has not been discussed by Grossetestian scholars; the role of the spiritual senses as potentially analogous to any corporeal counterpart. Scholarship on Grosseteste's biblical exegesis began with Beryl Smalley and her seminal 1955 essay 'The Biblical Scholar.' Ginther in 2003 takes this biblical exegesis and applies it to Grosseteste's *Dicta*; specifically, *Dictum* 19 which features an extended discussion on the four modes of Biblical interpretation; a topic repeated at length in his *Hexaëmeron*.[1] In *Dictum* 19 (and also *Dictum* 52) Grosseteste acknowledges the four modes of scriptural interpretation; literal or historical, allegorical or Christological, moral or tropological, and anagogical or eschatological.[2] Grosseteste himself refers to the senses of scripture in *Dictum* 19 and in *Dictum* 52 he compares these senses to colours. Grosseteste's use of exegetical spiritual senses is well acknowledged; ever since Smalley wrote that he gave 'high priority' to spiritual exegesis scholars have identified this as an interest of Grosseteste's.[3] The *Hexaëmeron* is perhaps Grosseteste's longest exposition of this type of study; he declares at 1.3.2 that there are *six* ways of interpreting scripture that reflect the six days of creation. It is in *Dictum* 19 however, written ca. 1229-35 that informs the reader of the relationship between these

[1] Beryl Smalley, "Biblical Scholar," 70-97; Ginther, "Laudat Sensum," 237-55; Grosseteste, *Dictum* 19, Grosseteste, *Hexaëmeron* (eds. Dales and Gieben; trans. Martin).

[2] Edward Synan, "The Four "Senses" and Four Exegetes," in *With Reverence for the Word,* 225-36, at 225. See also Grosseteste, *Dicta* 19 ff. 16ra-rb, and Grosseteste, *Dicta* 52.

[3] Smalley, "Biblical Scholar," 85. The *Hexaëmeron* and *De Cessatione legalium* are the two greatest examples of Grosseteste's exegesis, as is his commentary on the *Super Psalterium*.

interpretations, starting with the most basic historical/literal sense and ending with the 'highest contemplation' (*superne contemplatio*) of anagogy.[4] It is for this reason Grosseteste writes in the *Hexaëmeron* 1.2.3 that Genesis starts with the Creation story, so that everyone, even the uneducated, can grasp the literal (in this case, sense-based) level, leading (it is hoped) to the higher interpretations.[5] For Grosseteste, then, the truth of the Bible lies in the experience of the Bible read through the lens of these four interpretations. If our corporeal senses help us experience the world, then a set of spiritual senses is necessary to help us experience this Biblical *topos*.

When Grosseteste, following a similar crisis in Augustine's *Confessions*, writes that the ambiguity of Biblical narration is intentional (and they both give here the example of Moses) he argues that it is up to the reader and their task of 'investigating and distinguishing the different possible ways' of reading the sources.[6] The different possible ways are, of course, exegesis and the four interpretations of scripture, and, if the Biblical narrative is a *topos* to be investigated, then the only way one can do this is by means of our senses. Whilst the Bible itself is a narration of experience, it needs to be experienced also by the reader. This is done by the engagement of spiritual senses not only with scripture but also in contemplation. Thus, the spiritual senses discussed in this chapter are not the same as those explored by Smalley and Ginther, but rather a distinct set of senses to be negotiated akin to corporeal sensation.

This section will explore this notion of spiritual sensation by examining attempts made by Grosseteste in applying somatic language relating to the body as a way of either

[4] Grosseteste, *Dictum* 19 ff. 16ra-vb; Ginther, "Laudat Sensum," 238.

[5] I discuss this in Chapter 1.

[6] Grosseteste, *Hexaëmeron* 4.3.2 (eds. Dales and Gieben, 125; trans. Martin, 126), 'nullam autem dictarum expositionum asserunt expositores nisi tanquam possibilem. Unde eidem auctores diversas ponunt sententias sub disiunctione. Et forte Moyses non intendebat nisi sententiam communem modis particularibus possibilibus, reliquitque sanctis expositoribus modorum possibilium investigationem et divisionem.'

metaphorically describing or actually experiencing God. By examining this aspect of Grosseteste's theological anthropology I will show that he utilises somatic language and perception to describe theological concepts. As Boyd Taylor Coolman writes, 'a remarkable feature of medieval scholasticism is the use by its practitioners of metaphors drawn from sense perception to characterise both theological expression and Christian experience.'[7] Bonaventure is routinely held to be the 'most celebrated' of medieval scholastics to discuss this idea of spiritual sensation, and it plays a prominent role in Christian mysticism; however, it was Origen of Alexandria (185-254 CE) who first began to address the potential problem of sensory language in theology with the term *sensus spiritualis*.[8] Theologian Karl Rahner's influential 1979 essay 'The Doctrine of the 'Spiritual Senses' in the Middle Ages' lay the groundwork for a large corpus of more recent scholarship that has looked at the influence of Origen on medieval mystics and theologians, particularly Bonaventure.[9] Paul Gavrilyuk and Sarah Coakley's edited 2012 volume *The Spiritual Senses: Perceiving God in Western Christianity* fills in the gaps left by Rahner, who afforded only a cursory glance to patristic or medieval authors in the millennium between Origen and Bonaventure.[10] By allowing for a far more meaningful study of the variety of ways writers used and referred to the spiritual senses Gavrilyuk and Coakley conclude that Rahner was 'unduly restrictive' in his definition and study.[11] In including such writers as Gregory of Nyssa, Gregory the Great, Pseudo-

---

[7] Boyd Taylor Coolman, *Knowing God by Experience: The Spiritual Senses in the Theology of William of Auxerre* (Catholic University of America Press, 2004), 1.

[8] Coolman, *Knowing God,* 2; Gordon Rudy, *The Mystical Language of Sensation in the Later Middle Ages. Medieval History and Culture*, vol. 4 (London: Routledge, 2002), 1; Paul L. Gavrilyuk and Sarah Coakley, *The Spiritual Senses: Perceiving God in Western Christianity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 1-2.

[9] Karl Rahner, "The Doctrine of the 'Spiritual Senses' in the Middle Ages," in Rahner, ed. *Theological Investigations,* vol. 16, trans. David Morland (Darton: London, 1979), 104-34, at 104. See also Rahner, "The 'Spiritual Senses' According to Origen," trans. Morland, in the same volume, 81-103.

[10] Gavrilyuk and Coakley, *Spiritual Senses.*

[11] Gavrilyuk and Coakley, *Spiritual Senses,* 4-5.

Dionysius the Aeropagite (and, indeed, taking their chronological search up to and including John Wesley) they conclude that there is no one doctrine of the spiritual senses, rather, each author treats them 'non-systematically.'[12] By examining a variety of different attitudes of spiritual sensation from different Patristic and Medieval authors they dispute Rahner's unconvincing assertion that 'all that was achieved in the time between Origen and Bonaventure was to prevent the doctrine from passing into complete oblivion.'[13] Thus, Coolman writes, spiritual senses and their corresponding metaphors used by their medieval theologians form a 'remarkable feature' of scholasticism, particularly between the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.[14] Gordon Rudy, writing that medieval scholastics 'developed the notion of the spiritual senses using Aristotelean concepts of faculty psychology and epistemology and Augustinian ideas about theological anthropology and grace,' a development based on what he describes as the 'crucial pivot' of an understanding that their bodies 'have a central role in our approach to and union with God.'[15] Rudy warns of the pitfalls in modern scholarship in detailing concepts of the spiritual senses. He argues that they do not necessarily have to refer to any kind of experience with, or of, God; indeed, he argues that this concept of experiencing God was often a way of medieval men and women to garner some sort of authority, after all he writes, 'appeals to experience are rhetorically powerful.'[16] Thus he argues that rather than looking for meaning in any accounts of potential sensory experience of God this way it is more useful to explore spiritual sensation as a rhetorical device and to avoid any attempts at trying to define actual spiritual experience in this way.[17] Considering Grosseteste's myriad interest and output in a variety of topics, and particularly his commentary on the *Mystical Theology*, a survey of his own attitude

[12] Gavrilyuk and Coakley, *Spiritual Senses*, 5.

[13] Rahner, "Doctrine," 105.

[14] Coolman, *Knowing God,* 1.

[15] Rudy, *Language of Sensation*, 2, and 5.

[16] Rudy, *Language of Sensation*, 9-15, quote on 10.

[17] Rudy, *Language of Sensation*, 13.

towards the spiritual senses is useful to establish whether he uses spiritual sensation merely as a rhetorical device or whether he is describing an actual experience with God.

Grosseteste's Spiritual Senses.

In Ginther's study on Grosseteste's biblical exegesis he raises an important and overlooked literary comment of Grosseteste's from the *Super Psalterium* on revelation.[18] His comment dissects the definition of allegory and criticises those who accept prophetic vision, that is, vision without signs or corporeal images, as allegorical – referring explicitly to the Psalms. He asks 'if [these truths] are in the imagination [*in spiritu*] without any corporeal signs expressed, how can these songs speak allegorically?'[19] As Ginther writes, 'it is a question that does not appear to have caused any other medieval commentator concern' yet it is a valid point regarding the veracity of allegorical comparisons; if there is no corporeal sign (*signis corporalibus*) then the purpose of the vision cannot be, by definition, allegorical.[20] Grosseteste concludes that the prophesy of the Psalms is different to that of prophetic vision for this reason. They are soliloquies, not allegories; Grosseteste writes of the Psalmists that their 'imagination [*spiritus*] is not shaped by images of corporeal [things].'[21] Ginther notes the unfortunate lack of response that Grosseteste has to his own question, leaving it largely un-answered.[22] Grosseteste's comment in the *super psalterium* is pertinent to discourse on

[18] Ginther, "Laudat Sensum," 243.

[19] This quote is taken from James R. Ginther, "The Super Psalterium of Robert Grosseteste (ca. 1170-1253): A Scholastic Psalms Commentary as a Source for Medieval Ecclesiology," (PhD diss., University of Toronto, 1995), 157-8, 'sed <queritur si. [add. DO] mens eius illuminata ad contuendam in veritatem sine signis corporalibus in spiritu expressis, quomodo cantica aliqua loquebantur allegorice?' respecting Ginther's punctuation. See also Ginther, "Laudat Sensum," 243.

[20] Ginther, "Super Psalterium," 158.

[21] Ginther, "Super Psalterium," 157. Ginther's reading of Grosseteste's *Super Psalterium* taken from Bologna, Biblioteca dell Archiginnansio, MS A.983 ff. 1ra-173vb he transcribes as follows 'et hec pluralitas locutionum excluditur in hac prophetia per hoc nomen 'soliloquim' quia non spiritus formatus erat imaginationibus corporalibus,' at f. 1vb (in Ginther, "Super Psalterium," 157 n. 59).

[22] Ginther, "Super Psalterium," 159.

the spiritual senses, and its related, modern scholarship. As Mark McInroy notes, 'the dividing line between metaphorical and analogical uses of sensory language has become blurred.'[23] Thus Grosseteste's comment deftly highlights the problematic use of somatic language to describe experience with God. McInroy follows Rahner's insistence that any notion of spiritual senses must 'resemble their corporeal counterparts' in their ability to detect a presence of God.[24] Gavrilyuk and Oakley criticise this dualistic approach of correlating corporeal and spiritual sensation and instead argue that spiritual sensation is far more diverse.[25] As I will show, Grosseteste does not have a system of spiritual sensation that resembles any corporeal counterpart, but the role of *light* in sensation, *all* sensation, is not only unique but also entirely instrumental in both his metaphysics and theology. Thus when "hearing lights" is dismissed as an example of 'radical' rhetorical synaesthesia below, useful only for its rhetorical qualities, for Grosseteste it cannot be; because light, as shown in Chapter 1, is involved in *all* sensation.[26]

I will show that Grosseteste's light metaphysics blends the traditional distinctions between corporeal and spiritual sensation. In its simplest form the most direct reference to the spiritual senses as directly analogical to their counterpart corporeal senses can be found in *Sermon* T69, *Renovamini spiritu mentis vestre* (Ephesians 4:23 'and be renewed in the spirit of your mind').[27] He writes that,

> in youth, by nature, the senses are well-disposed, but they are deficient in old age. Similarly, in youth, by grace, the spiritual senses are well-disposed: vision

---

[23] Mark McInroy, "Origen of Alexandria," in *Spiritual Senses,* 20-35, at 25.

[24]McInroy, "Origen," 26

[25] Gavrilyuk and Coakley, *Spiritual Senses,* 4-5.

[26] Chidester, "Symbolism," 33-4.

[27] Grosseteste, *Sermo* T69 (ed. Paul, 328-39).

> is faith, smell [is] hope, hearing [is] obedience, taste [is] charity and touch [is] humility.[28]

He then goes into varying levels of detail as to why he attributes these virtues to their corporeal counterpart, in an order in which I will adhere to, the details of which I will include under each sense-based subheading starting with vision. The importance of grace on the spiritual senses, however they are formulated, is fundamental. Grace helps restore not only our spiritual senses but also our corporeal; this will be of importance in Chapter 4.

In T69 Grosseteste writes that both corporeal and spiritual senses are 'well-disposed' (*bene dispositi*) to us in *iuventute* between the ages of 20-40. He also goes on to say that, if we are not careful, the spiritual senses are at threat of being lost; he writes at T69.11 that it is possible to lose one's spiritual senses (*sensus spirituales amiserunt*); one's nose and ears will be cut off, cf. Ezekial 23:25 'they shall cut off thy nose and thy ears.'[29] Thus if we have no organ to rely on (organs being one of the *instrumentum sentiendi,* as discussed in Chapter 1) we cannot engage in sensation. Taken with *Hexaëmeron* 8.32.1-6 the outward senses are fixed in us in *infantiam*, however it is in seniority and old age (senior/*senectus*) that the corporeal senses grow weak whilst the interior grow stronger – however, the only interior sense mentioned is memory. It is in *iuventus* that humanity makes most of both their spiritual and corporeal senses, suggesting that perhaps the two have a relationship; the spiritual senses are most heightened during the time our corporeal senses are. I would suggest that Grosseteste believed both spiritual and corporeal sensation were endowed in us at birth, and just as one can lose the sense of sight, one can lose their spiritual senses if not habituated

[28] Grosseteste, *Sermo* T69.6 (ed. Paul, 330), 'in iuventute nature bene dispositi sunt sensus, set deficiunt in senectute. Similiter in iuventute gracie bene dispositi sunt sensus spirituales: visus scilicet fidei, olfactus spei, auditus obedientie, gustus caritatis et tactus pacientie humilis.'

[29] Grosseteste, *Sermo* T69.11 (ed. Paul, 332), 'alios enim sensus spirituales amiserunt, unde propheta ad peccatores loquens ait: Precident tibi aures et nares, scilicit demones.'

through good works, similar to Bonaventure; the spiritual senses 'are acts whereby the soul perceives that which is given to it by the graced habits.'[30] Thus the object of the spiritual sense is to recognise and know the presence of God.

In *Dictum* 15 Grosseteste makes use of another set of spiritual senses in a more unfamiliar and unusual way. Rather than comparing them to their corporeal counterparts, he first acknowledges that the *sensus spirituales* are the Augustinian trinity of memory and understanding united by love.[31] This trinity of memory, understanding, and love is found throughout the corpus of Augustine's work, such as at *De trinitate* 10.11-17, 14.6.8 and remains a major theme of his. It is love, sometimes translated as will, that unites the memory with the understanding, and it is this that forms Augustine's "inner man." This idea is repeated again at *Dictum* 49, the soul's power of remembering, understanding, and loving the Trinity.[32] It is however at *Dictum* 60 where this relationship between memory, love and understanding is given a much larger examination by Grosseteste. Here, the begotten memory gives birth to understanding, and the two are united in love for each other, and the Trinity.[33] The passage in this *Dictum* seems to be a more thorough exploration of the relationship between the three parts than that found in the *Hexaëmeron*.[34] In the *Hexaëmeron* Grosseteste uses the trinity to describe God – in God is the begetting memory, the

[30] Gregory LaNave, "Bonaventure," in *Spiritual Senses*, 159-73, at 163.

[31] Grosseteste, *Dictum* 15 f. 12ra, 'sensus autem spirituales anime sunt memoria, et intelligentia, et dilectio Trinitatis'

[32] Grosseteste, *Dictum* 49 f. 33vb, *'*caput anime est potencia memorandi, intelligendi, diligendi Deum creatorem scilicet Trinitatem. Conformatio qua conformatur anima Trinitati memorando et intelligendo et diligendo ipsam, protectio est huius capitis et salus.'

[33] Grosseteste, *Dictum* 60 f. 48ra-rb, *'*has igitur tres, scilicet memoriam talem eternam gignentem, et intelligentiam eternam de tali memoria genitam, et amorem eternum quo se mutuo diligunt memoria gignens et intelligentia genita, has inquam tres intelligere unius et indivise simplicisque essentie, est intelligere Trinitatem unum Deum.'

[34] Grosseteste, *Hexaëmeron* 8.3.2 (ed. Dales and Gieben, 220; trans. Martin, 225).

begotten understanding, and the proceeding love, but in the *Dictum* the trinity is used to describe man before it is used to describe God – he explains how a person can remember something they do not understand, that it is possible to be understood (presumably if it is reflected on), and that remembering something does not destroy the memory but rather 'strengthens and confirms it' (*confirmat et roborat eum*).[35] This is perhaps what he is suggesting in *Dictum* 43, discussed further below, where he describes the soul as a city so that his listeners may remember more easily, or visualise more clearly, what is being said. That Grosseteste poignantly writes that remembering something does not destroy the memory but rather strengthens it is perhaps done to acknowledge the difference between the psychological senses and the corporeal; as Aristotle writes in *De anima*, overpowering the sense organs with their sense objects (taste, light, etc) can destroy them.[36] Here then Grosseteste is keen to point out that the opposite occurs with remembering and memory; after all, per the *cPA* 2.6 it is the repetition of multiple memories that forms experience, leading to knowledge of the universal.[37] This is, perhaps, the closest Grosseteste arrives at comparing the two sets of senses, and indeed it is the psychological senses here that take on a "spiritual" aspect rather than a distinct set of senses in their own right.

Immediately following the description of Augustine *sensus spirituals,* and just before discussing the five spiritual senses of love as per Bernard of Clairvaux, Grosseteste writes that the spiritual senses of the soul are wisdom, intellect, knowledge, art, and prudence.[38] These are the same spiritual senses that occur in the *Nicomachean Ethics* at 1139b15 translated by Grosseteste, it is suggested, during his time as Bishop.[39]

---

[35] Grosseteste, *Dictum* 49 f. 48ra.

[36] Aristotle, *De anima* 3.13 435b10 (ed. and trans. LCL 288, p. 201).

[37] Grosseteste, *cPA* 2.6 (ed. Rossi, 404).

[38] Grosseteste *Dictum* 15 f. 12ra, 'hoc est, sensus spirituales anime sunt sapientia et intellectus, scientia, ars, et prudentia sive consilium.'

[39] I will discuss the dating of this text in much greater detail in Chapter 4 below. See Rosamund Gammie, "Robert Grosseteste on Eudaimonia, Happiness, and Learning: Why the Nicomachean Ethics May be

Grosseteste does not, unfortunately, go into any more detail; rather, he immediately goes on to repeat Bernard of Clairvaux's five spiritual senses from *Sermones de diversis* 10.2, all of which revolve around love.[40] According to Rachel Fulton, Bernard's hierarchy here is based on distance from God; whilst sight is the most perfect sense (both spiritually and corporally), God is the object, however, he is furthest away; unlike friends and family who are closest to use, hence their corresponding sense of taste and touch.[41] However in other works, Bernard inverts this hierarchy instead placing taste and touch as the highest senses to us, as Rudy describes, 'articulate the immediacy and mutuality of union with God;' a union that is unmediated.[42] What follows is a systematic examination of Grosseteste's concept of the spiritual senses, following the order taken from T69.

Vision as Faith.

Just as with corporeal sensation, spiritual vision, as a mediated sense, is routinely the most revered. It is spiritual vision that gives rise to the notion of seeing God face to face (*facie ad faciem*) and Augustine's ultimate goal for human life to see (and hear) God.[43]

Useful," in *Robert Grosseteste and Theories of Education* eds. Jack P. Cunningham and Steven Puttick (Oxford: Routledge, 2020), 34-54 for more on the dating of the *Nicomachean Ethics*.

[40] Bernard of Clairvaux, *Sermones de diversis* 10.2 (ed. BO 6/1, p. 122), 'est enim amor pius, quo parentes diligimus; est amor iucundus, quo diligimus socios; est et erga omnes homines amor iustus: erga inimicos amor violentus, erga Deum sanctus sive devotus.' See Grosseteste, *Dictum* 15 f. 12ra, 'amor pius, quo parentes diligimus, est sicut tactus; amor iocundus, quo diligimus socios, est quasi gustus; amor erga omnes homines iustus est sicut odoratus; amor violentus erga inimicos est sicut auditus; amor sanctus erga Deum sive devotus est sicut visus.'

[41] Rachel Fulton, "Taste and See that the Lord is Sweet (Ps. 33.9): The Flavor of God in the Monastic West," *The Journal of Religion* 86, no. 2 (2006): 169-204, at 191. See also Rudy, *Language of Sensation*, 51-2.

[42] Rudy, *Language of Sensation,* 57. See Bernard of Clairvaux, *Sermones super Cantica Canticorum* 76 (ed. BO 2, p. 258).

[43] Lootens, "Augustine" in *Spiritual Senses*, 57. See Augustine, *De genesi ad litteram libri duodecim* 10.25 (ed. CSEL 28/1, pp. 328-30).

Beatific vision is discussed at length in *De civitate Dei* 22:29 where he concludes that in the resurrection it will be with bodily eyes that we see God.[44] Margaret Miles describes that, for Augustine 'spiritual and physical vision will be, in the fulfilment of the resurrection, not only continuous but identical;' that the vision of God will be observed with bodily eyes.[45] Grosseteste shares this view; in *Dictum* 20 he reiterates that 'eternal life is the vision and knowledge of God' citing both Augustine and John 17:3.[46] Linguistically, somatic language is at the heart of all of Grosseteste's theology; it is the *aspectus* that is often described as a "gaze" subject to the direction of the *affectus*. As he writes himself in *De artibus liberalibus*, 'first, the *aspectus* observes.'[47]

The privileging of sight above all other senses was, and indeed remains, commonplace. In his discussion of Grosseteste's treatment of the senses in the sermon *Ecclesia sancta celebrat*, McEvoy, when examining any potential synthesis between Augustinian and Aristotelian (or rather, Avicennian) concepts of the senses, argues that Grosseteste 'fully accepts Augustine's doctrine that sight is privileged within the hierarchy of the senses' yet he seemingly ignores the fact that for Aristotle too, sight is privileged (*Metaphysics* 1.1, at 980a24).[48] Augustine's emphasis on sight, Chidester suggests,

---

[44] Augustine, *De civitate Dei libri XI-XXII* 22:29 (CCSL 48); Margaret Miles, "Vision: The Eye of the Body and the Eye of the Mind in Saint Augustine's De Trinitate and Confessions," *The Journal of Religion* 63, no.2 (1983): 125-42, at. 141-2.

[45] Miles, "The Eye of the Body," 141

[46] Grosseteste *Dictum* 20 f. 18ra, 'igitur cum vita eterna sint cognitio et visio Christi.' Grosseteste here cites Augustine's *De moribus ecclesiae catholicae* 1.

[47] Grosseteste, *De artibus liberalibus* §2 (ed. and trans. Sønnesyn, 74-5), 'aspectus vero primo aspicit.' See also Smith, "Aspectus and Affectus," 108.

[48] McEvoy, "Theory of Human Nature," [*Ecclesia sancta celebrat*], 157.

ultimately lies in the vision of God and man's transformation into the Divine at the sight of the Divine, discussed at length at *De civitate Dei* 21.[49]

Grosseteste is clearly influenced by Augustine's theology of vision and his use of visual metaphor for spiritual understanding. *Dictum* 113 detailing Paul's intellectual vision is based on Book 12 6.15-26 of *De genesi ad litteram*, taking into account Augustine's three-tiered description of vision. In sermon 69 (T69), Grosseteste makes a reference to *facie ad faciem* – seeing God face to face. The idea of spiritual blindness (*caecitas*) is again apparent; those without Christian faith will not see clearly but rather obscurely, and it is only with faith in Jesus that one might be able to see God face to face. It is a sentence a few lines down from this that is most interesting, whereby he declares that it is 'with the glorification of the pupil where it will be possible to see the glory of God.'[50] This seems to imply that the corporeal eye will behold the image of God in the resurrection, per Augustine. However, Grosseteste maintains that God cannot be seen by man nor by the corporeal eye, at least not in this life, in *Dictum* 58.[51] This need for perfect physical sight to require perfect physical light and perfect physical health as mirroring the same in spiritual sight and vision is taken not only from Origen's commentary on the *Psalms* 4.1 but both Margaret Miles and Ronald Nash remark on the analogy Augustine repeatedly makes between physical and spiritual sight.[52]

[49] David Chidester, "Symbolism and the Senses in Saint Augustine," *Religion* 14, no. 1 (1984): 31-51, at 41. 1 John 3:2 'we know, that, when he shall appear, we shall be like to him: because we shall see him as he is.'

[50] Grosseteste, *Sermo* T69.6 (ed. Paul, 331) 'set cum glorificabitur pupilla, tunc videre poterit Deum in gloria in quam.'

[51] Grosseteste, *Dictum* 58 f. 47ra, 'brevis ratio quod Deus non potest perfecte a nobis hic videri.'

[52] See McInroy, "Origen," 32; Miles, "Eye of the Body," 134; Nash, *Light of the Mind*, 91.

Voluntarist Optics: A Reconfiguration of Vision as a Spiritual Sense?

Just as a diseased corporeal eye cannot see perfectly, nor can the eye of the mind, the *oculus mentis*, see into the most perfect light. In the commentary on the *Mystical Theology* Grosseteste writes that the inner man is 'seeking to see God' (*querens videre Deum*).[53] Deidre Carabine has commented that it was the realm of mystical theology that allowed theologians of Grosseteste's time to 'solve' the 'problem' of the generally accepted view that man could not see God; instead, a direct vision of God *could* be obtained through mystical experience.[54] It was the metaphorical descriptions of the eye that, for years, had led to the belief that Grosseteste was the author of the thirteenth-century *Tractatus Moralis de Oculo* which was actually authored by Peter of Limoges sometime between 1275 and 1289.[55] This notion of voluntarist optics, that, as Richard G. Newhauser encapsulates, 'seeing, in other words, can indeed be believing, but only with the involvement of the well-educated will' can be applied to Grosseteste.[56] Rahner's description of the eye as the 'organ of theology' is perhaps a neater declaration, and it is clear that Grosseteste held a special place for the spiritual sense of vision, particularly the organ of the eye itself.[57] There are three *Dicta* where Grosseteste directly compares the functioning of the corporeal eye, that of the outer man, to the functioning of the spiritual eye, of the inner man; *Dicta* 41, 58, and 77. *Dictum* 41 suggests that Grosseteste saw the spiritual and corporeal eye as connected; he writes 'so

[53] Grosseteste's commentary on the *Mystical Theology* of the pseudo-Dionysius has been edited and translated by James McEvoy in *Mystical Theology: The Glosses by Thomas Gallus and the Commentary of Robert Grosseteste on De Mystica Theologia* (Paris, Peeters, 2003). Grosseteste, commentary on the *Mystical Theology* (ed. and trans. McEvoy, 80-1) for the quote.

[54] Deidre Carabine, "Robert Grosseteste's Commentary on the Mystical Theology of the Pseudo-Dionysius," in *New Perspectives,* 169-88, at 175.

[55] For more on this incorrect authorship see Richard G. Newhauser, "The Optics of Ps-Grosseteste: Editing Peter of Limoges Tractatus Moralis de Oculo," in *Probable Truth: Editing Medieval Texts from Britain in the Twenty-First Century,* eds. Vincent Gillespie and Anne Hudson (Turnhout: Brepols 2003), 167-94, at 168-82.

[56] Newhauser, "Peter of Limoges," 37.

[57] Rahner, "Spiritual Senses in Origen," 99.

the spiritual eyes should be purified of earthly dregs.'[58] The prominence of the eye is made clear, he compares it to a minister who serves as opposed to a lord who rules; 'so the eye willingly provides for the other members (*membri*), not for its own benefit but, by grace, for theirs.'[59] It is not until *Dictum* 77 that Grosseteste goes into detail about the theological implications of the eye, comparing the inner and outer eye directly.[60] Compared to his frustration in the commentary on the *Super psaltarium* of the inadequacies of false allegory, here Grosseteste is sure to directly acknowledge the metaphorical case he is making – the eyelids opening and closing, for example, represent understanding and ignorance.[61]

Grosseteste uses the eye as a metaphor on a couple of occasions in his *Dicta* and elsewhere, and *Dictum* 77 is perhaps the most explicit and direct evidence of this.[62] In these works, it is also possible to glean an insight into his own understanding of the act of vision, and of the eye itself, of which there is little evidence of in his works.[63] In

[58] Grosseteste, *Dictum* 41 f. 30ra, 'ic debent oculi spirituales depurari a terrenis fecibus.' Author's translation.

[59] Grosseteste, *Dictum* 41 ff. 29vb-30ra, 'sic oculus providet ceteris menbris spontanee, nec sui comodi, sed comodi illorum gracia, nec sicut dominans, sed sicut ministrans.'

[60] This is overtly mentioned in the very title of the *Dictum* 77 f.56ra, 'brevis comparatio oculi interioris et exterioris.'

[61] Grosseteste, *Dictum* 77 f.56, 'ipsiusque ortus rei aspectus quasi palpebre est apercio, occasus rei quasi palpebre clausio.'

[62] See Grosseteste, *Dicta* 58, 77, and 41 for the most direct examples. The metaphor of the eye is also used in *Sermo* T69.6 (ed. Paul, 331) which mentions the glorification of the pupil as the vision of God, 'set cum glorificabitur pupilla, tunc videre poterit Deum in gloria in quam, sicut dicit Petrus, desiderant angeli prospicere.'

[63] Please note that here I am talking not of Grosseteste's optics, nor of his multiplication of species theory, of which there is plenty written, but rather his actual theory of vision. I am referring to what David Lindberg has described as Grosseteste's 'scant attention to the theory of vision' (Lindberg, *Theories of Vision*, 100).

Dictum 77, Grosseteste's information comes from Galen's (129-200 CE) *De usu partium* (*On the Usefulness of the Parts of the Body*) and Isidore of Seville's *Etymologies* (completed 615-630 CE). From a misreading of the *Etymologies* Grosseteste (incorrectly) explains that the pupil of the eye disappears three days after death; from Galen that there are three humours surrounded by seven membranes, although Grosseteste himself does not name them individually.[64] It is possible that Grosseteste adopted his description of the eye, its humours and membranes from William of St. Thierry who gives a detailed account of the purpose of each component; the three humours are considered the important parts in producing sight, whilst the seven membranes have individual roles in protecting the humours.[65] Whether lifted from William, directly from Galen, or some other intermediary, Grosseteste identifies the three humours with virtues of faith, hope, and charity, and the seven membranes (tunics) with the seven principal virtues.[66] Vision of God then, the ability to see God *facie ad faciam*, is due to the functioning of these virtuous humours and membranes. Because he does not go into detail in identifying which virtue is identified with which humour or membrane it is impossible to construct a schema relatable to sensation.

---

[64] In *Dictum* 77 Grosseteste writes that the pupil of the eye disappears three days *after* someone has died. This is likely a misreading of Isidore of Seville, *Etymologiae* 11.1.37, which states that the pupil of the eye disappears three days *prior* to death. Isidore of Seville, *Etymologiarum sive Originum libri XX,* ed. W. M. Lindsay (Oxford: 1911). For an English translation see *The Etymologies of Isidore of Seville*, trans. Stephen A. Barney et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 233. See also Margaret May, trans., *Galen on the Usefulness of the Parts of the Body. De usu partium Vol II* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1968), 463-9 for Galen on the eye. The three humours are the aqueus, vitreus and crystalline. The seven tunics (membranes) are the retina, chorois, sclera, ueva, cornea, conjunctiva, and arachnoid, see Lindberg, *Theories of Vision*, 34-36.

[65] William of St. Thierry, *De natura corporis et animae* 1.8 (ed. CCCM 88, p. 106; trans. CF 24, pp. 118-9).

[66] Grosseteste, *Dictum* 77 f. 56ra, 'pupilla, medius scilicet oculi punctus, ubi est vis videndi, triplici humore circumdatur, sic intelligentia sana fide, spe et caritate. Deinde septem donis Spiritus Sancti, vel septem virtutibus principalibus, velud septem tunicis circundatur.'

The eye is spoken of again at *Dictum* 41. Here Grosseteste shows a slightly more detailed knowledge of the functioning of the corporeal eye and the metaphor is not to virtues but to the Church. Grosseteste describes the role of the Church as the *spirituali oculi,* and he sets about detailing certain characteristics of the eye and compares them to the church; 'prelates and doctors of the Church are compared to the bodily eyes of Christ.'[67] The eye, he says, is easily distressed by dust and grit, smoke and steam, in the same way venial sins hurt the church.[68] This metaphor of dust as sin blinding the eyes of the Church can be traced to Gregory the Great's *Regula pastoralis* 2.7 where he explains that 'dust, driven by the wind of temptation, blinds the eyes of the Church.'[69] The eye moves without moving place, in the same way the Church's place is in God, but the movement to God is contemplation.[70] The eye is round so as to mitigate against the settling of dust and so that it can receive changes of colour from all angles, just as the Church must not allow sin to settle and must be receptive to all people.[71] The eye's membrane is also white so as to represent the chastity of the prelates.[72] There is also, at

[67] Grosseteste, *Dictum* 41 ff. 29vb-30ra, 'prelati et doctores ecclesie in corpore Christi comparantur oculis.'

[68] Grosseteste, *Dictum* 41 f. 30va, 'oculus autem a pulvere et levibus festucis leditur, et in lacrimas deducitur, a quibus cetera menbra nil paciuntur. Sic prelatum ecclesie pulvis et festuce venialium in lacrimas compunctionis deducunt, eique sunt sensibilia et dolorosa, que subiecto plebi sunt velut insensibilia.'

[69] Gregory the Great, *Regula Pastoralis* 2.7 (ed. SC 381, ll.23), 'nulla subditorum mentes exhortatio subleuat, eorum que culpas increpatio nulla castigat; quia dum per animarum praesulem terreni exercetur officium iudicis, a gregis custodia uacat cura pastoris; et subiecti ueritatis lumen apprehendere nequeunt, quia dum pastorum sensus terrena studia occupant, vento temptationis impulsus ecclesiae oculos pulvis caecat.' Author's translation. See also George E. Demacopoulos, "Gregory the Great," in *Spiritual Senses,* 71-85, at 81.

[70] Grosseteste, *Dictum* 41 ff. 30va-vb, *'*oculus eciam sicut celum movetur, non mutans locum. Sic prelati ecclesie fixi in loco suo, scilicet Deo, per contemplationem moventur prospiciendo et providendo necessitatibus subditorum per actionem.'

[71] Grosseteste, *Dictum* 41 ff. 30vb-31ra.

[72] Grosseteste, *Dictum* 41 ff. 31ra.

Dictum 41, a passing reference to those suffering from jaundice (*ictericus*) who see everything tinted yellow – this is not mentioned by Isidore or Galen, nor could it have come from Alhazen's *De aspectibus* as Lindberg attests there is no evidence Grosseteste had knowledge of this text.[73] Not only does this emphasis on the eye betray a clear preference for the sense of sight above all other senses, but, as with Jesus as the head of the body, it also conforms to the popular *corpus mysticum* of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.[74] This preference for voluntarist optics is found in other areas of Grosseteste's theological contribution; Nicholas Temple writes in his study of the optics of the additions to Lincoln Cathedral undertaken by Grosseteste; the anthropomorphism of the two Rose windows attest to the Bishop's 'redemptive notion of vision,' with the Bishop's eye looking towards the sunny South and the Dean's eye towards the darker North.[75] Whilst the spiritual senses in any doctrinal form may, as Coolman suggests, be waning in response to the waxing of the Aristotelian doctrine of corporeal sensation during this period, it is in this notion of voluntarist optics that Grosseteste finds an outlet for both.[76] *Dicta* 41 and 77 are both moral treaties on the eye, so much so that they likely contributed to the attribution of Grosseteste to the *Tractatus moralis de oculo.* The first chapter of the *Tractatus moralis* does bare striking similarities to *Dicta* 41 and 77; the soul is allegorised as the pupil requiring seven layers of protection.[77] It is here Peter explains that for the protection of the spiritual pupil, the seven principal

---

[73] Lindberg, *Theories of Vision,* 94 and 249 for a discussion on the incorrect assumption that the *Perspectiva* as listed in Grosseteste's *Tabula* is that of Alhazen.

[74] Boyd Taylor Coolman, "Alexander of Hales," in *Spiritual Senses,* 121-39, at 122.

[75] Nicholas Temple, "The Bishop's Eye: Robert Grosseteste and the Architecture of Light," in *Architectural Theory Review* 9, no. 1 (2004): 1-18, at 9-10, and n. 43 for a thirteenth-century description of the two Rose windows by Henry of Avranches (d. 1260).

[76] Coolman, "Alexander of Hales," 136 describes the decline in interest in the spiritual senses as an 'eclipse.'

[77] Peter of Limoges' *Tractatus de moralis de ocula* has been edited and translated by Richard Newhauser, *The Moral Treatise on the Eye. Peter of Limoges* (Toronto: PIMS, 2012). Peter of Limoges, *Tractatus de Moralis de Oculo* 1 (ed. and trans. Newhauser, 6).

virtues are required, as the seven membranes protect the corporeal pupil (and here, unlike Grosseteste, Peter names the parts of the eye).[78]

Smell as Hope.

Interestingly the next sense to be listed in T69 is smell which is compared to hope (*spes*) but there is little else in Grosseteste's corpus of work that details any kind of spiritual smell. This is not necessarily unusual, after all there is a lack of vocabulary that can describe perceptions of smell and what does exist (sweet, acrid and so on) is borrowed from taste; in the *Perambulavit Iudas* the sins of smell are the precursor to those of taste, and his section on smell is perhaps the shortest of all the sins amounting to only 20 lines in the Goering and Mantello edition (compared to 32 for hearing and sight).[79] A similar conception can be found in *Deus est*; smell is very much consigned to the same sinful gluttonous behaviour as taste, and those who unnecessarily perfume their clothes.[80] However, as Woolgar writes in his chapter on smell, 'it [smell] often provides a crucial dimension to a multi-sensory experience' and indeed Grosseteste notes this.[81] Indeed, Woolgar's examination of late-medieval responses to the sense of smell convincingly shows how good smells could be considered heavenly (such as descriptions of Paradise), and bad smells as evil.[82] It was not uncommon to moralise smells; grace and virtue smelled floral or sweet. Thus, in *Perambulavit Iudas* (and,

[78] Peter of Limoges, *Tractatus de Moralis de Oculo* 1 (ed. and trans. Newhauser, 6-7).

[79] Woolgar, *The Senses,* 117. Grosseteste, *Perambulavit Iudas* §10 (eds. Mantello and Goering, 151), 'odoratus quam perveriret ad gustum.' The difficulty in describing the sense of smell is raised by Aristotle in *De anima* 2.9 (ed. and trans. LCL 288, pp. 118-20).

[80] Grosseteste, *Deus est* (ed. Wenzel, 291), 'deinde de olfactu quaeratur, in quo peccant multum gulosi, quia non sufficit eis sapor in gustu nisi odor suavis immutet olfactum. Quia quidam vestimenta sua artificio faciunt redolentia propter odoris delectationem. Et sunt quidam vilius et turpius hoc sensu abutentes eo quod in foetidis et immundis delectantur.'

[81] Woolgar, *The Senses,* 117; Grosseteste, *Dest est* (ed. Wenzel, 262). See n. 113 below.

[82] Woolgar, *The Senses,* 117-146; Grosseteste alludes to the smells of paradise in *De cessatione legalium* 1.6.12.

more briefly, in *Deus est*), the sinful element of smell was not just taking too egregious a pleasure in the smells of spices and perfumes but in the 'exaggerated revulsion from unpleasant odours' arising from ill brothers.[83]

In *Deus est* Grosseteste mentions this multi-sensory quality mirroring Aristotle's *De anima*, writing that it is the *sensus communis* that distinguishes something to be white and sweet, or red and fragrant, thus it is the *sensus communis* that can divide as well as combine multi-sensory experiences.[84] It is important to note here that this allocation the ability of the *sensus communis* to be able to divide and distinguish the common sensibles is much closer to the Aristotelian original; Avicenna emphasises that it is the *imaginativa* that is responsible for this action and not the *sensus communis*.[85] This faithfulness to the Aristotelian *sensus communis* is reiterated in the *cPA* where Grosseteste writes that the *sensus communis* apprehends and discerns singulars.[86] The *sensus communis* then receives sense data and has the ability to adjudicate over two or more senses, and, as the first internal sense (or final corporeal sense) both imagination and memory rely on it functioning correctly.[87] The *sensus communis*, then, can a) combine sensitive qualities received by two or more senses (smell *and* sight) and b)

[83] Mantello and Goering, "Perambulavit Iudas" 138 (quote); Woolgar, *Senses* 126; Grosseteste, *Perambulavit Iudas* §10 (eds. Mantello and Goering, 152), 'porro si de aliquo sociorum meorum procederet exaltatio insipida sive per anelitum, sive per screationem, sive per aliquam aliam corporis infirmitatem, per aversionem vultus sive per aliquem gestum corporis signum abominationis ostendi ita ut scandalizaretur.'

[84] Grosseteste, *Deus est* (ed. Wenzel, 262), 'sensus communis, quo iudicata album esse dulce aut rubeum odoriferum.' Aristotle, *De anima* 3.1-2 (ed. and trans. LCL 288, pp. 142-55).

[85] Bloch, *Aristotle on Memory*, 177.

[86] Grosseteste, *cPA* 2.6 (ed. Rossi, 404), 'sensus enim particularis est apprehensivus singularium et sensus communis iudicativus, et est sensus potentia receptiva;' Wood, "Imagination and Experience," 28.

[87] Daniel Heller-Roazen, "Common Sense: Greek, Arabic, Latin," in *Rethinking the Medieval Senses: Heritage, Fascinations, Frames,* eds. Stephen G. Nichols, Andreas Kablitz, and Alison Calhoun (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), 30-50, at 42.

distinguish or discern these different qualities.[88] It seems that for Grosseteste, smell was subordinate to taste given that its vocabulary originates with taste, however, because of the peculiarity of the sense of smell it is a useful sense to describe this action of the *sensus communis.*

Hearing as Obedience.

It is interesting that hearing falls below smell in Grosseteste's ordering of the senses in this sermon; in other lists of the senses, such as the *Tabula,* smell is below hearing. The more traditional scheme of vision, hearing, smell, taste, and touch is inherited from Aristotle and can be found in the *Perambulavit Iudas*, where it is elaborated.[89] In *Sermon* T69 Grosseteste gives Psalm 17:45 'at the hearing of the ear they have obeyed me' as his biblical authority on the matter, writing only a sentence in support of this view. It is more common for hearing and vision to go together, not least because they are the two senses required for learning. Although many writers followed Origen in concluding that sensory language was a potentially dangerous way to describe God, language of hearing and seeing God remained popular.[90] Spiritually however, they often appear together and perhaps the greatest examination of this from Grosseteste's perspective can be found in his commentary on the *Mystical Theology*. Grosseteste explains that mystical theology is the 'most hidden speaking and talking with God' which is a result of 'most secret teaching and learning.'[91] From sermon T43, discussed above, we know that the three senses required for learning, alongside the inner senses of imagination and memory, are hearing, touch, and vision. Following corporeal sensation then it is no surprise that for this mystical teaching and learning, it is hearing that is the

[88] Juhana Touvainen "Peter Olivi on the Internal Senses," *British Journal for the History of Philosophy* 15, no. 3 (2007): 427-54, at 438.

[89] Grosseteste, *Perambulavit Iudas* §6-15 (eds. Goering and Mantello, 149-54).

[90] Rudy, *Language of Sensation*, 1-4.

[91] Grosseteste, commentary on the *Mystical Theology* 1 (ed. McEvoy, 66-7), 'dicitur etiam misticia quia occultissima et secretissima dosctrina et disciplina edocta est et suscepta. Dicta itaque theologia, que est secretissima et occultissima cum Deo locutio et sermocinatio.'

most useful. As Deidre Carabine has discussed in their work, this recurring definition of mystical theology as secret talking with God almost forms a *leitmotif* and is not found in the pseudo-Dionysian text but only in the commentary.[92] She continues that it is God who speaks and man who listens, which if Rudy is correct in arguing Augustine's idea of the spiritual senses as a gift, seems to be reiterated here by Grosseteste.[93] Indeed, just as spiritual (and corporeal) vision require an active participation through the eyes emitting rays either corporeally or, as Katherine Tachau posits, via the *acies mentis*, similarly hearing also requires activity on behalf of the hearer.[94]

Taste as Charity

The Biblical prompt for Grosseteste's declaration of taste as charity is Psalm 33:9 'taste and see that the Lord is sweet,' as well as Song of Songs 5:1, 'eat, O friends, and drink, and be inebriated, my dearly beloved.'[95] Gordon Rudy has pointed out that language of taste and of touch were, until the twelfth century, deemed inappropriate ways of describing any relationship with God.[96] These final two senses had little to do with the intellect and were considered base senses; theologians such as Augustine and Gregory the Great much preferred the mediated spiritual senses and, for Augustine, they are often received as a gift from God rather than something that belongs to us (as our corporeal senses do).[97] However, with Bernard of Clairvaux particularly, the hierarchy of the spiritual senses is overturned; touch and taste are the preferred senses *because* of

[92] Carabine, "Robert Grosseteste's Commentary," 172-3. Grosseteste repeats this definition of secret hearing and talking in his commentary on the *Mystical Theology* at (ed McEvoy), 66-7, 68-9, 84-5, 106-7.

[93] Rudy, *Language of Sensation*, 4-6.

[94] Tachau, "Seeing as Action," 344.

[95] Grosseteste, *Sermo* T69.9 (ed. Paul, 332).

[96] Rudy, *Language of Sensation,* 4-5.

[97] Rudy, *Language of Sensation* 4-6.

this direct, immediate, and embodied relationship between sense and the object of sense (God).[98]

Grosseteste uses the sense of taste not just in his recital of Psalm 33 as in T26.1 but also in his defence of scripture at *Dictum* 19. He declares that Scripture is the bread of heaven (*panis de caelo*) that is delectable and flavourful to all taste (*sapor*).[99] Indeed the very notion of "bread of heaven" puts into perspective the persistent tradition of knowing God through the senses (you can smell, touch, taste, and see Him), even if as Rudy asserts, before the twelfth century taste and touch were considered too base to be useful in knowing God.[100] Grosseteste repeats the comparison of Scripture to food later in the same sermon; it is milk for the infant (*lac parvulorum*) and bread for the adults (*panis perfectorum*), as well as the renewal of vision (*caecis est visus reparatio*).[101] Despite this emphasis on touch in some of his ecclesiological works, Grosseteste's hierarchy of the senses in his *Tabula* is not unusual – he starts with vision, followed by hearing, smell, taste, and finished with touch, the same order taken in the *Perambulavit*.[102] Whilst Grosseteste includes the sense of taste in his adherence to the five-fold Aristotelian schemata of the senses, there is a remarkable description of the origins of the sense of taste found in *De cessatione legalium*, suggesting that this is the least desired sense of the five. Grosseteste discusses the four senses (*quatuor sensibus*) of Adam, who is able to see the light of the sun, hear the voice of God and the birds of Paradise, smell the smells of Paradise, and touch the 'mild complexion' (*complexionis*

[98] Rudy, *Language of Sensation* 5.

[99] Grosseteste, *Dictum*19 ff. 16va-vb, 'est enim hec scriptura panis de celo, panis habens in se omne delectamentum et omnem saporis suavitatem.'

[100] Rudy, *Language of Sensation* 4.

[101] Grosseteste, *Dictum* 19 ff.17vb-18ra.

[102] Grosseteste, *Tabula,* MS Lyons 414 f.18b (ed. Thomson).

temperatissime) of human flesh.[103] By repeating the *four* senses of Adam rather than five, Grosseteste seems to be suggesting that the sense of taste came about as a result of the Devil's temptation, and that he did not possess this as a corporeal sense prior to this moment. He concludes his observation with a suggestion that 'perhaps he had not tasted anything up to this point.'[104] It seems however that Grosseteste does not relegate the sense of taste to solely and explicitly sinful acts; he follows a traditional ordering of the senses in both his *Tabula*, *Perambulavit Iudas* and *Deus est* of (in order) vision, hearing, smell, taste and finally touch.[105] It is interesting that taste is the only sense that receives its own specific sermon in *Dictum* 124, which references not only Aristotle but Galen and Augustine in its description. *Dictum* 124 is largely physiological, with descriptions of the divisions and qualities of taste, but it does reinforce the inevitable involvement of *lux* when he writes that 'taste is light incorporated' before comparing sweetness with wisdom (*sapientia*).[106]

Touch as Humility.

The final spiritual sense discussed by Grosseteste in T69 is to describe touch as humility, citing Job 19:21, 'have pity on me, have pity on me, at least you my friends, because the hand of the Lord hath touched me.'[107] Another allegory employed by Grosseteste to describe sensation is reminiscent of similar thirteenth-century mystical

[103] Grosseteste, *De cessatione legalium* 1.6.12 (eds. Dales and King, 31; trans. Hildebrand, 57), 'visui enim sano nil solis luce suavius; aut auditui, quod potuit esse suavius quam avium in paradiso concentus? Vocem quoque Domini audierat, qua nescio an auribus aliquid suavius influeret. Aromatibus quoque paradisi, quid magis nares oblectaret?'

[104] Grosseteste, *De Cessatione legalium* 1.6.13 (eds. Dales and King, 31; trans. Hildebrand, 58), 'gustu autem forte adhuc nichil tetigerat.'

[105] Grosseteste, *Deus est* (ed. Wenzel, 291); Grosseteste, *Perambulavit Iudas* §6-16 (eds. Mantello and Goering, 149-55). This is a different ordering to *Sermo* T69.

[106] Grosseteste, *Dictum* 124 f. 102rb, 'sapor est lux incorporata.'

[107] Grosseteste, *Sermo* T69.10 (ed. Paul, 332).

language – that is, Jesus Christ as the head of a body, connected by nerves of love to the parts of the body. This can be seen in *Dictum* 2, where nerves of love in the limbs, representing the Church, communicate with the head, Jesus Christ.[108] This reading of the Psalms is an archetypal example of prosopoligcal exegesis, whereby the reader 'assumes that the Psalms were either about Christ or his mystical body, the Church.'[109] Similar descriptions can be found in the work of Hugh of St. Victor, William of St. Thierry, Alexander of Hales, Bonaventure, and Peter Lombard.[110] The sensory language of touch implied by the nerves is central to mystical experience, for Alexander of Hales touch is the 'goal and fulfilment of all spiritually sensual knowledge.'[111] Compare this with the idea of beatific vision specifically and *facie ad faciem* and it is clear that the two different senses provide a different spiritual proximity to God: the sense of touch requires it to be closer (in fact, in direct contact) with its object, yet the sense of vision is considered the highest of the five; mysticism reverses this hierarchy and places touch at the top, *because* of this proximity.[112] Bernard of Clairvaux's use of touch emphasised the 'immediate, reciprocal, active, and noetic' relationship with God; Grosseteste in *Dictum* 91 seems to align touch with vision as the two most direct sensory unions with God (touch being non-mediated and vision being mediated); he writes that we can enjoy the 'vision and embrace' (*visione et amplexus*) of Jesus['s]' divinity.[113]

Following from Peter Lombard's emphasis on touch as presented by the ecclesial body, Alexander of Hales viewed touch as the 'most complete knowledge' and the most

[108] Grosseteste, *Dictum* 2 ff. 2va-vb.

[109] Ginther "Laudat Sensum," 234, Coolman, "Alexander of Hales," 126.

[110] Coolman, "Alexander of Hales," 126-7; Rahner, "Spiritual Senses," 106.

[111] Coolman, "Alexander of Hales," 134.

[112] Coolman, "Alexander of Hales," 128-133, McInroy, "Origen of Alexandria," 9.

[113] Rudy, *Language of Sensation* 59; Grosseteste, *Dictum* 91 ff. 72ra-rb.

'complete sense.'[114] In *Dictum* 15 touch (pain) is the first step to awakening someone from sleep (sin). However, just as touch can be used in a beneficial way, the proximity and closeness required by touch poses an obvious threat, outlined in the *Perambulavit.*[115] Touch is also used to show how, in *Dictum* 43, the imagination can be corrupted by lechery via being 'touched' (*tango*).[116] The use of *amplexus* (embrace) rather than *tango* as in *Dictum* 43 is likely because, unlike the other senses, touch is not by definition a verb of perception – two inanimate objects can touch each other and no sensation occurs by either of them.[117] *Amplexus* then relates to the person, not the object.

Rhetorical Synaesthesia: Mystical Experience and Hearing Lights.

In an article on how best to interpret Augustine's use of sensory language David Chidester describes two types of synaesthesia. The first is when two or more senses are 'integral to a single sensory experience,' smelling and seeing freshly cooked bread could be an example of this type of synaesthesia.[118] The second type, which he dubs 'radical' synaesthesia is when these two or more senses 'intermingle and transfer across modes,' hearing lights, for example.[119] Augustine asserts at *Confessions* 10.7 that what Chidester would describe as this second type of synaesthesia is not possible in corporeal sensation or perception, because God has ordained to each sense 'its own place and its

[114] Coolman, "Alexander of Hales," 133.

[115] Grosseteste, *Perambulauit Iudas* §14-15 (eds. Mantello and Goering, 153-4)

[116] Grosseteste, *Dictum* 43 f. 32rb, 'utpote cum imaginationem casti tangit coluptas luxurie.'

[117] Nelson Pike, *Mystic Union: An Essay in the Phenomenology of Mysticism* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992), 45; see also Rosemary Hale "Taste and See, for God is Sweet: Sensory Perception and Memory in Medieval Christian Mystical Experience" in *Vox Mystica: Essays on Medieval Mysticism in Honour of Professor Valerie M. Lagorio,* eds. Anne Clarke Bartless, Thomas H. Bestul, Janet Goebel, and William F. Pollard (Cambridge: D. S. Brewer, 1995), 1-34, at 5.

[118] Chidester, "Symbolism," 33-4.

[119] Chidester, "Symbolism," 33-4.

own function,' ordering eyes 'not to hear but to see' and ears 'not to see but to hear,' a notion that Grosseteste asserts in his commentary on the *Mystical Theology* 3.1.[120] For Augustine then, any kind of radical synaesthesia is restricted to spiritual sensation. Acknowledging the complexity of sensory-based language and rhetorical devices Gordon Rudy addresses this problem of the 'perennially popular topic' of synaesthesia.[121] He acknowledges and admires Chidester's attempt at a bi-fold definition of the term but suggests that his first definition, that of an experience formed of two or more senses reporting back data, is 'nearly useless' as almost all of our experiences are made this way.[122] Thus, just as Rudy encourages a focus on the rhetorical, somatic, and literary use of the spiritual senses rather than trying to glean information about an experience of God per se, so too does he encourage the use of rhetorical synaesthesia, that is, what it is like to write about, rather than to actually experience God in this way.[123] In this way rhetorical synesthetic language is apophatic; it breaks, distorts, manipulates and often negates traditional descriptions of somatic language in a way, as all apophatic language does, to 'discuss the incomprehensibility of the Trinity and the unfathomable otherness of God.'[124]

It seems clear that both corporeal and spiritual senses, however manifested, are gifts from God; the former disposed to us in nature, the latter by grace, according to Sermon T69. Grosseteste says so directly vis a vis corporeal sensation in the *Perambulavit Iudas* they are the 'five senses that God gave to me to do good so that I may know and be able

[120] Chidester "Symbolism," 33-4; Augustine, *Confessions* 10.7 (ed. CCSL 27; trans. Pine-Coffin, 213), 'oculo, ut non audiat, et auri, ut non videat, sed illi, per quem videam, huic, per quam audiam, et propria singillatim ceteris sensibus sedibus suis et officiis suis.' See also Grosseteste, commentary on the *Mystical Theology* 3.1 (ed. McEvoy, 96-7), 'id est partes habentes proprias operationes, ut oculus et auris et huiusmodi.'

[121] Rudy, *Language of Sensation,* 14.

[122] Rudy, *Language of Sensation,* 132 n. 30.

[123] Rudy, *Language of Sensation,* 13-15.

[124] Rudy, *Language of Sensation,* 14.

to act well.'[125] At 1.4 in the commentary on the *Mystical Theology* Grosseteste makes this point directly regarding the spiritual senses as a gift. He writes 'and the illumination of this ray and the reception of the illumination is mystical theology because it is the most secret speaking and talking of God and with God.'[126] This sentence is interesting for two reasons. The first is that in order to activate these divine senses (specifically hearing) God must illuminate the mind; thus, it is up to *God* to engage our spiritual senses, not us. If we compare this to corporeal sensation then it is the necessity of an object of sensation to engage our senses, after all, without any objects of sensation existing, we would not have any sensory experience whatsoever. According to Grosseteste (see Chapter 1), corporeal vision occurs when both object and observer are engaged; colours from an object's surface generate rays when suffused with light (this is the multiplication of the species), and these species multiply themselves from the surface in all directions.[127] When these species are met by the light emanating from our eye(s), perception occurs. If spiritual vision and corporeal vision work the same way, then God too is always emanating his "species" and it is only when our minds are illuminated are we able to actually see or perceive this illumination. Again, if we are to extend the metaphor to spiritual sensation then Divine Illumination is not merely passive in the same way that corporeal vision is not merely passive – our corporeal eyes also must actively emit rays in order to meet this multiplication of the species, then spiritual sensation, or indeed Divine Illumination, must also involve an active mind – it is not a passive action.

However this sentence is also significant for its synaesthetic quality – our (spiritual) hearing is only available to us through *illumination*, vision not usually being a

[125] Grosseteste, *Perambulavit Iudas* §5 (eds. Mantello and Goering, 149), 'quia corporis v sensus, quos Dominus dedit mihi ad bonum, ut scirem et possem recte connuersari.' See also Mantello and Goering, "Perambulavit Iudas," 136.

[126] Grosseteste, commentary on the *Mystical Theology* 1.4 (ed. McEvoy, 83-4), 'et hex huius radii illustratio et illustrationis susceptio mistica est theologia, quia secretissima Dei et cum Deo locutio et sermocinatio.'

[127] Tachau, "Seeing as Action," 340 for an excellent description of Grosseteste's theory of vision.

requirement for hearing (except, of course, as even Grosseteste shows in *De generatione sonorum* the vibrations of hearing are evident to sight and touch).[128] At first this appears to be a purely apophatic rhetorical device of synaesthesia, to purposefully confuse and mix somatic language as a means of describing the ineffability of God; after all, we typically do not need light to hear.[129] However, if we refer to Grosseteste's *Hexaëmeron* we are reminded that light is, indeed, involved in all sense perception not just vision; it is the *instrumentum primum* of sensation (see Chapter 1), because 'light is the first corporeal form.'[130] This is reiterated in *Dictum* 124 when he writes that 'taste is light incorporated' (*sapor est lux incorporata*). In the *cPA* Grosseteste confirms that these two lights work in the same way; the *lux spiritualis* suffuses corporeal objects as well as our mind's eye (*oculus mentis*) 'just as the corporeal sun relates to the bodily eye and to corporeal visible objects.'[131]

It is Grosseteste's preoccupation with light, both as *lux* and *lumen*, that takes Grosseteste's description of spiritual sensation as being more-than-metaphorical. Thus, Rudy's suggestion that all spiritual sensation should be looked at as purely metaphorical cannot be applied to Grosseteste, even when Grosseteste makes superficially anagogical comparisons such as T69 where he pairs taste and charity, or *Dictum* 91 where he discusses the vision and embrace of God. Thus, while Rudy acknowledges the difficulty in viewing the spiritual senses as anything more than metaphor, with Grosseteste, that light is everywhere and in everything as the first corporeal form, it is all but impossible to describe spiritual sensation as purely metaphorical. It is in this passage from the commentary on the *Mystical Theology* that helps us to expand on this thought; hearing requires this ray of illumination just as all sense perception requires light, as per

[128] Grosseteste, *De Generatione sonorum* §1 (ed. and trans. Sønnesyn, 244-5).

[129] Rudy, *Language of Sensation,* 14-15.

[130] Grosseteste, *Hexaëmeron* 2.10.1 (eds. Dales and Gieben, 97-8; trans. Martin, 97-8); Grosseteste, *De luce* (ed. Panti, 227; trans. Lewis, 240).

[131] Grosseteste, *cPA* 1.17 (ed. Rossi, 240-1). Tachau, "Seeing as Action," 343 translates and discusses this passage.

Hexaëmeron 2.10.1. Indeed, hearing involves an active agency just as the eye actively emits rays onto the object of perception – in *De iride* he cites Aristotle's *De animalibus* in asserting that in both sight, smell, and hearing, all 'issue from the organs [of perception] as water issues from pipes.'[132] If there is to be a comparison of spiritual and corporeal sensation then they are both active and they both involve light. It is this divine light that leads to difficulty, as with Augustine, in distinguishing the literal from the allegorical, and not just in terms of Divine Illumination. If, as he writes in *De luce, lux* is the first corporeal form and *lumen* is its accidental quality, then in sense perception both *lux* and *lumen* are received (even if *lux* is not actually perceived) after all, as Yael Raizman-Kedar summarises, 'in Grosseteste *lux* is always attached to matter as the form of corporeity.'[133] Thus if *lux* is present and inherent in all aspects of the material universe, but not visible in the same way of *lumen*, it is perhaps surprising that Grosseteste does not offer a second set of senses to perceive this *lux* inwardly more so than his contemporaries.[134] One possible explanation is that the *lux/lumen* distinction can be compared to the intention/form distinction of Avicenna and Averroes. In *Deus est,* which adheres somewhat to Avicennian psychology, the *aestimatio* receives the intentions and the *imaginatio receptiva* receives the forms; whilst Averroes distinguishes between intention and form he does not see the need for the *aestimatio*, instead suggesting that the imagination can receive and house both.[135] It would follow that *lux* could be housed in the *imaginatio receptiva* too. If the *imaginatio* is the seat of prophesy, and memory, following Augustine, as the *locus* for God, searched for and found in the act of confession. This would suggest that Divine Illumination then is both an internal and external process; external in that, as Simon Oliver has so persuasively written, the world is already Divinely Illuminated, and internal in that whilst the process

[132] Grosseteste, *De iride* (ed. Baur, 73), 'tres dicti sensus scilicet visus, auditus, olfactus, exeunt ab instrumentis, sicut aqua exit a canalibus.' Lindberg, *Theories of Vision,* 101 translates and discusses this passage.

[133] Grosseteste, *De luce* (ed. Panti, 226-8; trans. Lewis, 239-41); Raizman-Kedar, "Unity and Multiplicity," 390.

[134] Raizman-Kedar, "Unity and Multiplicity," 393.

[135] Grosseteste, *Deus est* (ed. Wenzel, 262).

of abstraction can jump from the particular sense-experience to the universal, it is through grace that we can "abstract" this *lux*. It is through this reading that there can be congruence between the corporeal and the spiritual senses though not necessarily in the dualistic way Rahner envisaged. There is still no clear comparison of each of the five senses to their spiritual counterpart but it does suggest that Grosseteste's focus on voluntarist optics is more than metaphorical; the seven membranes of the eye and the seven virtues in *Dictum* 77 are directly linked, through grace, to the ability to receive and abstract both *lux* and *lumen*; the spiritual and corporeal eye of *Dictum* 58 are also now more than metaphorically connected; we will quite literally see and interact with the world differently. In *Dictum* 44 Grosseteste writes that God can be compared to a point of *lux;* at *Dictum* 55 that 'sight is light indeed' and that *lux* can help distinguish other sensible perceptions once they have reached the common sense.[136] 'God' writes Grosseteste in *Dictum* 44 'comes into the mind by diffusion of his *lumen.*'[137] Thus *lux* enters the mind through *lumen* and via the activity of sight (or any other sense).

Though Grosseteste's comparison of the distinct spiritual senses to any corporeal counterpart (such as T69) is, it seems, purely exegetical, it is perhaps his use of rhetorical synaesthesia that is a more useful device in describing God somatically. In *Dictum* 21, in somewhat direct opposition to the acknowledgement in the commentary on the *Mystical Theology* that each of the senses have their own operations, Grosseteste turns this on its head.[138] He writes, cf. 1 Cor. 12:26, 'just as man walks by the foot, sees by the eye, and eats by the mouth, so too does his eye walk by the foot, writes by the hand, [and is] nourished by the service of the mouth,' a description useful for its apophatic qualities.[139] Grosseteste's use of spiritual sensation as a rhetorical device is

[136] Grosseteste, *Dictum* 44 ff. 32va-vb, 'huic puncto lucis comparari potest Deus qui.' Grosseteste, *Dictum* 55 f. 44rb, 'visus enim lux est.'

[137] Grosseteste, *Dictum* 44 ff. 32va-vb 'veniens in animam, diffusione lumnis sui.'

[138] Grosseteste, commentary on the *Mystical Theology* 3.1 (ed. and trans. McEvoy, 96-7).

[139] Grosseteste, *Dictum* 21 ff. 18vb-19ra, 'quia manus per pedem ambulat, per oculum videt, per os loquitur et comedit, similiter oculus per pedem ambulat, per manum scribit, per oris officium nutritur.'

apparent, particularly in his *Dicta*, and he uses it to great effect. Whilst he may not be describing an actual experience with God (outside of the discussion in the commentary on the *Mystical Theology*) it is clear that Grosseteste understands the value implicit in the very idea of corporeal sensation and how his audience could potentially relate to descriptions of God in this way. Grosseteste offers no suggestion that spiritual sensation and corporeal sensation work comparatively but the differentiation of those that are disposed to us by nature and by grace does suggest that they work together. It is Grosseteste's emphasis on light, however, that suggests a level of sensation, or perhaps experience, that goes beyond corporeal sensation and that is perhaps an object of spiritual sensation. Light, then, is the object of sensation for both the corporeal and the spiritual senses. The ever-present *lux/lumen* aspect of Grosseteste's theology and metaphysics so forcefully argued by Simon Oliver, thus becomes internalised by the imagination; the reception and retention of the *lux* by the internal senses via a process of spiritual sensation.

Conclusion.

Having explored Grosseteste's use of the spiritual senses it seems clear that he holds no explicit, constant, or particularly useful analogy between corporeal sensation and spiritual. Grosseteste appears less concerned with any spiritual memory than he does with the *memoria* that works alongside the internal faculties, working with the *phantasmata* left over from sense-perception and discussed in Chapter 1. However, this examination of the spiritual senses does highlight other important aspects of the applicability of Grosseteste's theology and his interest in natural phenomena. The first is of course the role of *lux* and *lumen* in sensation. Because of the very real role of light in all sensation it becomes difficult to discern what is metaphor from what is not and it is impossible to discuss any form of sensation, whether corporeal or spiritual, without disentangling light's role within it. After all, grace, described as the 'true light' (*lumen veritatis*) of the sun in *Perambulavit Iudas* is metaphorical but, because of Grosseteste's voluntarist optics, it is also descriptive of sensation; one needs grace in order to apprehend both *lux* and *lumen*.[140] Thus it is light that unites the three sets of senses;

[140] Grosseteste, *Perambulavit Iudas* §4 (eds. Mantello and Goering, 148-9); Ginther, *Sacred Page,* 165.

corporeal, psychological, and spiritual. Not only this but the linguistic link between the somatic qualities of the *aspectus* as something that can observe, as explicated in *De artibus liberalibus*, also emphasises this synaesthesia of theology and physiology. As I will show in Chapter 3, there is a further link between the *aspectus* so crucial to the Bishop's theology and the *aspectus* of memory-craft; again, Grosseteste is aware of this and uses it to his advantage.[141]

This is not to say that Grosseteste completely de-emphasises memory's *spiritual* qualities; after all, they are inherent to Augustine's Trinitarian theology of memory-understanding-love. This is made manifest not in Grosseteste's conceptualisation of the spiritual senses but rather, as I will show in Chapter 4, in the act of confession, whereby memory's role as a bridge between the corporeal, and with God, is at its most apparent. The spiritual element of memory in this chapter and Chapter 1 is associated more with the eternal memory (*memoria eterna*) of *Dictum* 60 where knowledge of God can be found and understanding drawn from. It is for this reason that confession becomes such a crucial act, the memory acting as a *topos* or, more fittingly, as a *locus* needing to be explored and discerned.

Grosseteste's descriptions of the spiritual senses are inconsistent and non-systematic; he acknowledges in *Dictum* 55 that light plays a role in the functioning of the psychological senses but he does not know *how,* there is no explanation in T69 for why he compares each particular sense to their virtuous counterpart; and the emphasis on the eye in several of his *Dicta* leaves one thinking that, considering his *lux/lumen* and his light metaphysics, they simply must go beyond metaphor. Unfortunately, it is not entirely clear how. A case could be made that the *lumen/lux* divide is similar to the *form/intention* divide respectively; that *lumen* is perceived by the *sensus communis* and then the *phantasmata* are carried away by (or, in some cases, to) the *phantasia* or imagination; the intentions are perceived by the *aestimatio* and housed in the memory. It is then a process of combing and manipulating at will. If this analogy is to work then

[141] See Grosseteste's use of the *aspectus* in his *Compotus corectorius*, I discuss this in Chapter 3.

lumen enters the mind through the *sensus communis* and *lux* enters the mind through the *aestimatio.* However, *Dictum* 55 complicates this reading because in it Grosseteste is adamant that the *sensus communis* responds to both *lux* and *lumen*; he is just unsure how. Instead, both *lux* and *lumen* enter the mind via their reception by the *sensus communis.* They are stripped and separated from one another, just as the *sensus communis* identifies red from sweet. The psychological senses deal with the *lumen* and its corresponding form/intention signification. Thus all humans born with their naturally-endowed senses can accomplish this act, completely removed from any notion of the accompanying *lux*. However, just as one needs the complete set of internal, psychological faculties to then manipulate form and intention in order to actually abstract any knowledge or understanding, one requires a complete set of spiritual senses to do the same with *lux.* As we know, these are not endowed by nature but by grace. One can participate in this light via a means of a different type of sensation; faith, hope, obedience, charity, and humility, and by the virtues (allegorised as humours) in *Dictum* 77. To arrive at the truth of anything then, one requires both grace and nature; *lumen* without *lux* reveals only partial truth. Unfortunately, Grosseteste does not offer anything approaching an answer to how these spiritual senses correlate other than in their unity. However it does suggest that corporeity is to be celebrated as a necessary and unique element of man's humanity and rebuffs the idea that sensation is inherently sinful.

It is clear that sensation offers a plethora of ways for Grosseteste to discuss and describe man's experience and the grace of God, as well as offering some, admittedly inchoate, suggestions as to how we may become closer to God. His incorporation of sensation this way into his theology does suggest an unusually positive anthropology; one that does not wane as Aristotelian empiricism waxes but rather two that grow together. Grosseteste's preference for anthropological metaphors (particularly the eye) are not purely to aide in memorisation but because they highlight something important and inherent to his own theology; the role of man's experience in this world, and of Jesus's incarnation and humanity. This use of our body and of our senses in this world will be explored more in Chapter 4 when I discuss the act of confession as it relates to a form of *experimentum*, idealised with reference to Aristotelian *causa* as well as the progressive relationship between sense-perception, memory, and experience.

Grosseteste's insistence on the necessary incarnation of Jesus is emphasised explicitly in *Dictum* 20, discussed in Chapter 1, where he denounces those who do not believe in the actual incarnation or the hypostatic union of Jesus; his divinity but, importantly, also his humanity as *verum hominem.* By referring to analogies of the body, hand, eye, and nervous system, Grosseteste's stresses not only Jesus's humanity but also man's relationship with him; we, too, require *total* deification of body *and* soul. By appealing to Jesus's humanity he is, apophatically, referencing man's own divinity; man's own inimitable relationship with the Son of God. Whilst Grosseteste's attitude to deification exceed the scope of this thesis I would like to suggest that Grosseteste's inclusion of somatic language and voluntarist optics is reflective of an interest in deification or theosis; it is no coincidence that the Greek and Patristic authors so interested in the spiritual senses, Origen, Maximus the Confessor, the Cappadocians, and Dionysius the Areopagite should also be the ones ideating such ideas as imitating, or participating, in God.[142]

Grosseteste's own attitude to deification is best attested by Giacchino Curiello who explicates at length Grosseteste's interest in the Dionysian corpus and suggests that the Bishop's own concept of deification is a desire to return to an ante-Lapsarian state.[143] Returning again to the remark in *De cessatione legalium*, where Grosseteste refers to Adam's four senses rather than five, it seems that the sense of taste is worth remarking on a little further. Accordingly, Adam only 'gained' this fifth sense *after* he had tasted the apple, thus after he had defiled himself and fallen into a state of sin. For certain proponents of deification, taste, or rather, the consumption of the Eucharist, alludes appropriately with the consumption of the *Logos;* as Frederick D. Aquino explains it,

---

[142] For more on deification see Norman Russell, *The Doctrine of Deification in the Greek Patristic Tradition* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).

[143] Giacchino Curiello, "Deification as the Goal of the Ordered Human," in *Theories of Education,* 19-33, at 26-9. See also Frederick D. Aquino, "Maximus the Confessor," in *Spiritual Senses,* 104-120 who discusses the relationship between the spiritual senses and deification in the works of Maximus the Confessor, author of a prologue on the pseudo-Dionysian *Celestial Hierarchy* translated by Grosseteste; see McEvoy, *Philosophy of Grosseteste,* 468-9.

'the Eucharist, for example, provides one way for the deiform person to share in the life of God and to be transformed by engaging in such a practice.'[144] Thus, when Grosseteste discusses in *Dictum* 19 the delectable bread of heaven of scripture, and, given this desire of (certain) proponents of deification to return to a ante-Lapsarian state (that is, of Adam *before* he had tasted) it is possible to suggest that Grosseteste's use of taste here surpasses the metaphor of the other senses. Thus, Augustine in *confessions* 7 writes,

> I am the food of full-grown men. Grow and you shall feed on me. But you shall not change me into your own substance, as you do with the food of your body. Instead you shall be changed into me.[145]

Given this rather unusual emphasis on taste, it is of no surprise that the only sense to receive its own unique *Dicta* is taste. Not only does Grosseteste reemphasise the role of *lux* in this specific, non-mediated sense, that 'taste is light incorporated' (*sapor est lux incorporata*), but he also compares sweetness (*dulcedo*) to 'incarnate wisdom' (*sapientia incarnata*).[146]

As Curiello describes, deification is, for Grosseteste, an 'imitative likeness and not a likeness of equality,' whilst Jesus may be a perfect *image* of God, we, as humans, can

---

[144] Aquino, "Maximus the Confessor," 111; see also Russell, *Doctrine of Deification,* 268.

[145] Augustine, *Confessions* 7.10 (trans. Pine-Coffin, 147). For more on deification see Ron Haflidson "We Shall Be That Seventh Day: Deification in Augustine," in *Deification in the Latin Patristic Tradition,* ed. Jared Ortiz (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2009), 169-89 for a recent re-evaluation of Augustine's attitude towards deification. Jared Ortiz also discusses the use of *bread* as transformative, see Jared Ortiz, "Making Worshippers into Gods: Deification on the Latin Liturgy," in *Deification in the Latin Patristic Tradition*, 9-29, at 23-6.

[146] Grosseteste, *Dictum* 124, f. 102rb-vb.

only be imitative of God.[147] I would suggest that Grosseteste, akin to Gregory of Nazianzus, emphasises the role of Jesus's incarnation in this process of deification.[148] Whilst Grosseteste's account of deification is murky, unconcise and inexplicit, hence its lack of appreciation by modern scholars, by using somatic language and anthropological analogies to describe theological concepts Grosseteste links humanity with God's creation; in the *Hexaëmeron*, his account of Creation, man is made 'in the likeness of the divine Trinity by resemblance [*imitatio*]' compared to Jesus whose likeness is 'according to equality [*equalitas*].'[149] Indeed, the humanity of Christ is emphasised in *Dictum* 123, as is man's relationship with his own fragile body.[150] Man, like a vine, is fragile and weak but man, like a vine, produces for himself the fruits of knowledge and joy. Memory, a unique conception of this trinity, is key to this prosses, a synthesis of both flesh and spirit. Despite Curiello's convincing suggestion that Grosseteste accepts a concept of deification, I do not believe it is one that seeks to return to an ante-Lapsarian state; for Grosseteste, the beauty of humanity lies in the *lux and the lumen* and in man's ability to participate in both. For this, the danger inherent in sensation, and man's ability to navigate this, is part of its beauty.

[147] Curiello, "Deification," 20.

[148] Russell, *Doctrine of Deification,* 221-4.

[149] Grosseteste, *Hexaëmeron* 8.1.1 (eds. Gieben and Dales, 217; trans. Martin, 221). James Ginther is perhaps the only other scholar prior to Curiello to take Grosseteste's attitude towards deification seriously, see Ginther, *Sacred Page,* 137, and 161-6, where he aligns it with Grosseteste's emphasis on the necessity of the incarnation.

[150] Grosseteste, *Dictum* 123, ff. 101vb-102ra.

Chapter 3. A New Rhetoric: The Form and Style of Grosseteste's *Pastoralia*.

In the previous two chapters I established Grosseteste's appreciation of sense perception as well as his acknowledgement of its dangers and contextualised it within a wider concept of his theological anthropology. These next two chapters use this information to suggest that it was in the *memory* that Grosseteste placed his emphasis for man's ability to act and do well in this world, as a storehouse of personal and intimately human experiences as well as, discussed in Chapter 2, the seat of our relationship with God. In order to fully establish this, as I will do in Chapter 4 when I discuss confession, this chapter will cover an aspect of memory related more to its artificiality; how it works, how one can train and improve it, and how it can be practically useful outside of that detailed in Chapter 1 and more in line with the art of rhetoric. By establishing the multiple aspects of memory familiar to Grosseteste I will show in the next and final chapter how the fundamental act of confession utilises, unites, and unifies on all of them.

Grosseteste's contribution to thirteenth-century penitential writings is well-acknowledged; he wrote a number of manuals some of which survived in popularity until the fifteenth century.[1] *Templum Dei* (ca. 1220-30), a popular confessional manual surviving in over ninety manuscripts in English, French, and German is perhaps the best-known example of his far-reaching impact.[2] His 'enormously popular' Anglo-Norman poem *Château d'Amour* (prior to 1235) can be found in full or in part in eighteen separate manuscripts identified by Evelyn Mackie, with translations into Middle English focusing on various different elements (such as the Four Daughters) of

[1] Joseph Goering and F. A. C. Mantello. "The Early Penitential Writings of Robert Grosseteste," *Recherches de Théologie Ancienne et Médiévale* 54 (1987): 52-112.

[2] Mantello and Goering, *Templum Dei*, 6-8.

the poem.[3] Whether or not it was intended to be accompanied by music is still debated, but it clearly was a popular work enjoyed by lay audiences.[4] Though these two works were perhaps the most widespread in the decades following Grosseteste's death he also produced a number of other *pastoralia* for different audiences. The *Perambulavit Iudas,* written in the same period as *Templum Dei* (1220-30) survives in four manuscripts and was translated into Anglo-Norman approximately forty years later; its audience was originally likely to have been a specific penitent.[5] Similarly, *Notus in Iudea Deus* (ca. 1235-53) is far briefer in length than *Perambulavit Iudas* and was also intended for the benefit of the penitent and shares some similarities.[6] *Deus est*, written sometime after 1240, survives in ten manuscripts and is similar in theme but not style to *Templum Dei.* It is intended for the priest administering confession rather than the penitents themselves as with *Templum Dei* and *De modo confitendi*.[7] The latter, surviving in five manuscripts, is a compendium of different works completed sometime between 1214-35 and, like *Deus est* and *Templum Dei* is intended for the priest/confessor, not the penitent.[8] *Quoniam cogitatio* (1239-40)*,* a shorter confessional manual with arguably a larger intended audience than *Perambulavit Iudas* and written slightly later, can be

[3] Rhodes, *Poetry Does Theology,* 51 (quote). There is a modern English prose version by Mackie, "Loss and Restoration," 153-79, and the MS list can be found at 159-60. For the Middle English versions see Sajavaara, *Middle English Translations.* Andrew Taylor suggests the *Château d'Amour* was not just popular but also commercially viable in the nascent book trade at Oxford, see "Was Grosseteste?" 82.

[4] Rhodes, *Poetry Does Theology,* 51 suggests it was intended for musical accompaniment, Mackie, "Loss and Restoration," 155 disagrees. McEvoy, *Robert Grosseteste*, 153 suggests it would have been sung.

[5] Mantello and Goering, "Perambulavit Iudas," 125, and 132; Matthias Hessenauer, "For a Larger Audience: Grosseteste's Perambulavit Iudas in Anglo-Norman," in *Robert Grosseteste: His Thought and its Impact*, ed. Jack Cunningham (Toronto: PIMS, 2012), 259-313, at 261-2.

[6] Mantello and Goering, "Notus in Iudea Deus," 253-4.

[7] Wenzel, "Deus est," 224, and 231.

[8] Goering and Mantello, "Notus in Iudea Deus," 253-4; Goering and Mantello, "Penitential Writings," 51-4.

found in thirty-six manuscripts, enjoying as it did a 'wide readership.'[9] A readership that has sadly dwindled in modern Grossetestian studies.

Not exhaustive, this list illustrates an impressive body of literature indicative of a man obsessed with the *cura animarum*, identifying an audience not just in the priest/Confessor but also in the penitent and wider lay audience.[10] The survival of such works is proof that he was an accomplished writer and able to utilise the technological methods of the day to produce such an output; when Andrew Taylor asks 'Was Grosseteste The Father of English Literature?' in his 2003 article it is prompted by an appreciation of the number of works produced for such a variety of audiences.[11] The exponential rise in *pastoralia* in the thirteenth century was largely a response to Lateran IV's focus on lay piety and to what Taylor describes as 'the social energy of an increasingly urban society' where a rise in standards of living and exposure to the written word garnered a more receptive lay audience.[12] A consequence of this focus on preaching and the corresponding boom in *ars praedicandi* was a return to the classical rhetoric tradition of Roman writers such as Quintilian, Cicero, and pseudo-Cicero, allowing medieval writers to explore not just the content of their work but to focus on form and technique.[13] This chapter will explore Grosseteste's *pastoralia* for evidence of his utilisation of classical rhetorical advice and will also show how his education led him to an appreciation of mnemonic devices in other aspects of his life. Thus, in this chapter I will also explore his early works, written prior to and around the time he was

[9] Mantello and Goering, "Quoniam cogitatio," 341.

[10] Andrew Reeves suggests that *Quoniam cogitatio* and *Templium Dei* were intended to be distributed with his statutes and shows how they were used by Bishop Walter Cantilupe; see Andrew Reeves, "Teaching Confession in Thirteenth-Century England: Priests and Laity," in *A Companion to Priesthood and Holy Orders in the Middle Ages*, ed. Greg Peters (Leiden: Brill, 2016), 252-80, at 264.

[11] Taylor, "Was Grosseteste?" 73–86.

[12] Taylor, "Was Grosseteste?" 75.

[13] Kennedy, *Classical Rhetoric,* 191-4.

at Oxford, all of which incorporate different heuristic devices. This chapter will explore the content and scribal technique of Grosseteste's work to show how what he learned in his early years was used to great effect in his *pastoralia*. In the next chapter I will establish why confession was such an important act of memory, and how he applied this expansive knowledge of artificial memory to his theology and the *cura animarum.*

An Education.

The content of Grosseteste's early education has been a topic of debate amongst historians and scholars for decades, but it is certain that by 1198 he was a Master of Arts.[14] By 1195 he was associated with the household of William de Vere, Bishop of Hereford, and by 1229-30 there is documentation that Agnellus of Pisa, the Provincial General of the English Franciscans, had appointed Grosseteste as the Franciscan's first theology lector at Oxford.[15] Grosseteste's own statement regarding his career offers few clues, conceding only that he was 'first cleric, then a master of theology and priest, and then bishop.'[16] It is during his educational training in the arts that Grosseteste would have encountered, either directly or indirectly, the *ars memorativa* as part of the curriculum on rhetoric, one of the seven liberal arts. In *De artibus liberalibus* §3 Grosseteste writes that rhetoric 'persuades desire' (*affectus...persuadet*) and though there is no reference to the craft of this art, it is clear it is familiar to him.[17] The Roman rhetorical treatises of Quintilian, Cicero, and the anonymous author of *Rhetorica ad Herennium* (pseudo-Cicero) reached the medieval universities perhaps more indirectly then directly, via the likes of Martianus Capella, Julius Victor, and Consultus

[14] McEvoy, *Philosophy of Grosseteste,* 6-7.

[15] Ginther, *Sacred page* 3-5 for the most recent evaluation of the scant evidence pointing to Grosseteste's time at Oxford. Ginther sees no reason to believe that Grosseteste was lecturing at Oxford prior to 1229/30.

[16] As quoted in Ginther, *Sacred Page,* 1 n. 2. The Latin is taken from *Sermo* 31, unedited, London, British Library, MS Royal 7.E.ii., f. 344rb, 'fui clericus, deinde magister in theologia et presbiter; et tandem episcopus.'

[17] Grosseteste, *De artibus liberalibus* §3 (ed. and trans. Sønnesyn, 74-5).

Fortunatianus.[18] Gasper et al. in their extended discussion of *De artibus liberalibus* have shown that Martianus Capella's *De nuptiis* provided a 'spur'[19] to Grosseteste's treaty on the liberal arts and it may be that it is from *De nuptiis* that Grosseteste encountered a description, albeit a brief one, of artificial memory; Martianus Capella describes Simonides as having 'discovered' (*invenio*) mnemonic or artificial memory.[20] This reference to Simonides as the inventor of architectural mnemonics is first discussed by Cicero in *De oratore*, as Janet Coleman describes, a 'technique [that] would be influential in Latin rhetorical teaching throughout the middle ages.' [21] As Neil Lewis writes, 'Grosseteste's brief remarks on rhetoric [in *De artibus liberalibus*] appear to be indebted to the classical authors Cicero, Quintilian, and Boethius.'[22] The concept of

[18] Carruthers, *Craft of Memory*, 1-32; Yates, *Art of Memory,* 50-81.

[19] Giles E. M. Gasper, "On the Liberal Arts and its Historical Context," in *Knowing and Speaking,* 9-35, at 9 (quote); Martianus Capella is described as being a 'spur' alongside Augustine, Boethius, and Isidore of Seville. Martianus Capella, *De nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii,* ed. James Willis (Leipzig: Teubner, 1983). The English translation appears as *Martianus Capella and the Seven Liberal Arts. Vol 2. The Marriage of Philology and Mercury*, ed. and trans. William Harris Stahl, Richard Johnson, with E. L. Burge (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1977).

[20] Martianus Capella, *De nuptiis* 5. 538 (ed. Willis, 189; trans. Stahl and Johnson, 203), 'Simonides huius rei praecepta invenisse perhibetur, poeta idem que philosophus: cum enim convivii locus subito corruisset, nec possent propinqui obtritos internoscere, discumbentium ordinem nomina que memoria recordante suggessit. Quo admonitus intellexit ordinem esse, qui memoriae praecepta conferret.' See also David Thomson, Giles E. M. Gasper, and Luigi Campi, "A Middle English Grosseteste: The Seven Liberal Arts," in *Knowing and Speaking,* 387-447, at 457-61 (Table 18.3), for a close comparison of the *De nuptiis* and a Middle English text, "The Seven Liberal Arts," inspired by Grosseteste's *De artibus liberalibus* and written ca.1400-20.

[21] Coleman, *Ancient and Medieval Memories,* 13 (quote). See Cicero, *De oratore* 2.84-2.88 (ed. and trans. LCL 348, pp. 464-73); Quintilian, *Institutio oratoria* 11.2 (ed. and trans. LCL 494, pp. 58-85). The basic elements of the Simonides story are that he was at a banquet reciting a poem, and, whilst he had stepped out for a moment, the building in which the banquet was being held collapsed, killing all. Simonides had remembered the seating location of all the attendees and so was able to inform the relatives of those killed.

[22] Neil Lewis, "The Trivium" in *Knowing and Speaking*, 96-111, at 108. A manuscript on rhetoric containing Cicero's *De inventione* and the pseudo-Ciceronian *Rhetorica ad Herennium* can be placed in

architectural mnemonics was first discussed by the anonymous author of the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, who, up until the sixteenth century, was believed to have been Cicero.[23] The final chapter of Book 3 (at 3.14-24) discusses memory, first natural and then artificial, and it is there that the author writes that the background to any visual memory should be 'a house, an intercolumnar space, a recess, an arch, or the like.'[24] None of the three great mnemonic tracts of antiquity appear in Grosseteste's *Tabula;* the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, Cicero's *De Oratore,* nor Quintilian's *Institutio oratoria,* yet Grosseteste was clearly aware of the idea of architectural mnemonics and used them in a number of texts, the *Chaâteau d'Amour* being perhaps the most successful.[25] Martianus Capella was clearly familiar with a Ciceronian perspective of artificial memory and the part that may have appealed to Grosseteste's sense of administrative efficiency is found at *De nuptiis* Book 5 §539, where Martianus Capella writes that to make the memorisation of long passages easier 'it will be of advantage to make symbols individually at those points which we particularly want to remember, they should not be read out loud, but rather memorised under our breath,' advising the recollecter to do this at night when we are 'not distracted by our senses.'[26] Whether or not Grosseteste had access to specific memory tracts of the Roman orators, either directly or via paraphrases

---

the Cathedral library of Hereford by 1300 but it is unknown if it was there during Grosseteste's time in Hereford in the 1190s and his continuing connection to the area in the first two decades of the 1200s, see Gasper, "On the Liberal Arts," 26.

[23] Carruthers, *Book of Memory*, 89.

[24] *Rhetorica ad Herennium* 3.16 (ed. and trans. LCL 403, p. 209), 'ut aedes, intercolumnium, angulum, fornicem, et alia quae his similia sunt.'

[25] Carruthers, *Book of Memory*, 89.

[26] Martianus Capella, *De nuptiis* 5.359 (ed. Willis, 190; trans. Stahl and Johnson, 204), 'sed, ut diximus, magnam exercitationem res laborem que conquirit, in qua illud observari compertum est solere, ut scribamus ipsi quae facile volumus retinere; deinde ut, si longiora fuerint, quae sunt ediscenda, divisa per partes facilius inhaerescant; tum apponere notas rebus singulis oportebit his, quae volumus maxime retinere; nec voce magna legenda sunt, sed murmure potius meditanda; et nocte magis quam interdiu maturius excitari memoriam manifestum est, cum et late silentium iuvat, nec foras a sensibus avocatur intentio.'

and commentaries of others, *memorativa* as an art-form would have been apparent in all aspects of the Trivium and Quadrivium; important in dialectics as well as grammar, mathematics, and music. Thus, the *ars memorativa* was not just an object of study but a tool *for* studying.[27] Grosseteste was certainly aware of Cicero's rhetorical tracts; in *Dictum* 147 the famed rhetorician is described as 'the most eloquent practitioner of the art of eloquence.'[28] It is Grosseteste's knowledge of computistical works that provides one of the earliest examples of his comfort with an aspect of his mnemonics - that of mnemonic verse. Like his *pastoralia,* Grosseteste's *Compotus* was popular, appearing in thirty-eight separate manuscripts from the thirteenth to the seventeenth century making it one of Grosseteste's most widespread scientific texts.[29]

Compotus

Written prior to 1229 and thus before his arrival at Oxford the *Compotus* instructs its users on time-reckoning, the structure of the Latin calendar and of its reliance on astrology.[30] Written as a textbook for students, Lohr and Nothaft have suggested it was one of the first critiques of the calendar.[31] Matthew F. Dowd suggests that the work is

[27] Carruthers, *Craft of Memory*, 14-17

[28] Grosseteste, *Dictum* 147 f. 121ra, 'Citheronis quid congruentius intelligitur quam fons eloquentie, cum ipse Cithero eloquentissimus fuit et eloquentie artem tradiderit?' Author's translation.

[29] Lohr and Nothaft, *Grosseteste's Compotus*, 1, 24. The text and translation used in this thesis is taken from the Lohr and Nothaft edition, as is their dating. This is the only translation of the work, and the first edition of the Latin since Steele's 1926 "Compotus venerabilis patris Domini et Sancti Roberti Grosse Capitis Lincolniensis Episcopi factus ad correctionem communis kalendrii nostri" in *Opera hactenus inedita Rogeri Baconi, Fasc. VI*, edited by Robert Steele, 212–67 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1926). Secondary literature on the *Compotus* is limited. Jennifer Moreton in 1995 disproved earlier assertions that Grosseteste was responsible for four *compotus*, proving beyond doubt that it is only the *Compotus* that can be definitively assumed to be Grosseteste's own work, see Jennifer Moreton, "Robert Grosseteste on the Calendar," in *New Perspectives,* 77-88.

[30] Lohr and Nothaft, *Grosseteste's Compotus,* 19, and 1.

[31] Lohr and Nothaft, *Grosseteste's Compotus,* 19-20.

'best understood as a textbook to introduce basic and essential computistical concepts that students at Oxford would need to learn.'[32] He bases his evidence not only on the basic content of the text but also on the near-universal inclusion of a table of contents, what he describes as a 'prototypical form of an index' as well as the use of chapter headings to act as referential finding devices.[33] As I will show later on in this chapter, whilst for the modern reader this would appear unexceptional, at the turn of the thirteenth century such scribal design is unusually innovative.

To return to the content of the work, the *Compotus* contains twenty-eight individual mnemonic verses, the majority of which are not original or unique to Grosseteste.[34] The inclusion of these mnemonics has been discussed briefly by Dowd who observes that 'it is clear that Grosseteste expects his readers to prefer a memorisation technique to a procedure for dividing the year.'[35] For Dowd, not only do the verses 'offer an additional way to order, retain, and access information,' they, alongside the inclusion of tables, allow the students to 'condense the information into a more manageable form.'[36] The three or four verses that Lohr and Nothaft have not found sources for, suggesting that they *may* be original, are found in the first three chapters; the first, to work out the bissextile numbers, then the days in each month, then the number of Ides and Nones in each month, and finally an additional verse to help the reader understand an earlier verse pertaining to the first letters of each month '*Altitonans Dominus divina….*' ('The

[32] Dowd, "Astronomy and Compotus," 281-2.

[33] Dowd, "Astronomy and Compotus," 285.

[34] Lohr and Nothaft, *Grosseteste's Comoptus* 7, 197-8 particularly n. 54. Jennifer Moreton's edition and translation of the contemporaneous *Compotus ecclesiasticus* contains many of the same mnemonics, see *Compotus Ecclesiasticus,* trans. Jennifer Moreton and edited by Immo Warntjes, Charles Burnett and Philipp Nothaft (Published Online, 2015), accessed 4th February, 2020, https://ordered-universe.com/ordered-universe-compotus-ecclesiasticus/.

[35] Dowd, "Astronomy and Compotus," 227-8.

[36] Dowd, "Astronomy and Compotus," 289.

Good Lord is ruling...')[37] This distich can be found in the other *compotus* works of Alexander of Villadieu's *Massa compoti* (ca. 1200) and John of Sacrobosco's *De anni ratione* (ca. 1235) although the original author of the couplet remains anonymous.[38] Lohr and Nothaft have shown that of Grosseteste's twenty-eight mnemonic verses twenty-two appear in the anonymous *Compotus ecclesiasticus*, a text of the early thirteenth century (and still being used into the fifteenth) and, as Jennifer Moreton suggests, written as a school text.[39] Originally attributed to Grosseteste and detailed by Samuel Harrison Thomson under the title *Compotus I* Moreton has persuasively argued that Grosseteste was *not* the author of this earlier *Compotus ecclesiasticus*.[40] Grosseteste thus copied from the *Compotus ecclesiasticus* many of the mnemonic verses intended to help students, as well as adding more practical information on the formation of the said verses.[41]

---

[37] See Lohr and Nothaft, *Grosseteste's Compotus* 197-8. The verses that *may* be attributed to Grosseteste alone can be found in Grosseteste, *Compotus* (eds. and trans. Lohr and Nothaft, 67, 71-3, and 85). The full verse, intended to inform the student of the Sunday letter relating to the first day of each relevant month, goes '*Altitonans Dominus Divina Gerens Bonus Extat Gratuito Coeli Fert Aurea Dona Fideli.*' Seb Falk has translated the verse as 'The good Lord is ruling, thundering on high; He freely brings divine golden gifts of heaven for the faithful,' see Seb Falk, *The Light Ages: A Medieval Journey of Discovery* (London: Allen Lane, 2020), 68-9.

[38] See Lynn Thorndike, "Unde Versus," *Traditio* 11 (1955): 163-93, at 168-9 for the similarity of these three verses in Sacrobosco and Alexander of Villadiu. Thorndike, "Unde Versus," 163-74 critically contrasts various mnemonic verses found in a number of early and high medieval *compotus,* including Grosseteste's; she uses London, British Library, MS Add. 275989 which is the edition printed by Steele, "Compotus venerabilis patris," abbreviated to 'Lai' in the Lohr and Nothaft edition. See also Moreton, *Compotus Ecclesiasticus,* 7.

[39] Moreton, "Grosseteste on the Calendar," 80-1.

[40] Moreton, trans. *Compotus ecclesiasticus,* 4-7.

[41] See Moreton, *Compotus eclesiasticus*, 35, 80; Grosseteste, *Compotus* (eds. and trans. Lohr and Nothaft, 80-4, and 94-5), and Thorndike, "Unde Versus," 171.

I shall not go at lengths to discuss all of the mnemonic verses in Grosseteste's *Compotus* in large part because the majority are not original, and those that (potentially) are, are not unique per se; it is enough to show that the verses are almost all preceded with a statement such as that in Book 3; 'and to aid the memory, the computists use these verses to retain' their information.[42] However, what it does show is that Grosseteste was familiar with the effect of mnemonic learning before his arrival at Oxford, ca. 1229-30.[43] Not least, some of the mnemonic verses, such as that in Book 3, aid in remembering the dominical letters using the sound of syllables.[44] To the modern reader this is an unusual mnemonic structure but students of the middle ages would have been taught mnemonics via syllabic structure.[45] Words and phrases were seen in combinations of syllables; they are, Carruthers declares, 'visual shapes that cue sounds.'[46] Thus for the medieval student of both the *Compotus ecclesiaticus* and *Compotus* the notion of syllabic meaning would have been as familiar as any other mnemonic technique.

Indeed there is one sentence in particular that shows the process and theory behind these mnemonic devices; Grosseteste writes above the introduction to an (original?) verse in order to aid the memorisation of the number of days in each year that he does so 'that they can easily present themselves to the gaze [*aspectus*] of the inquirer.'[47] The use of

[42] Grosseteste, *Compotus* (eds. and trans. Lohr and Nothaft, 78-9), 'et propter facilitatem memorie ponunt compotiste versus istos ad retinendum.'

[43] Lohr and Nothaft, *Grosseteste's Compotus*, 19.

[44] Grosseteste, *Compotus* (eds. and trans. Lohr and Nothaft, 94-5), 'prima enim sillaba horum versuum signat primum annum cycli et secunda secundum et ita deinceps. Et prima littera sillabe cuiuslibet signat litteram dominicalem totius anni.'

[45] See Carruthers, *Craft of Thought*, 135-8, 160; Carruthers, *Book of Memory*, 169-70, 408 n. 119.

[46] Carruthers, *Craft of Thought*, 136.

[47] Grosseteste, *Compotus* (eds. and trans. Lohr and Nothaft, 70-1), 'ut facile possint occurrere aspectui qurentis.'

aspectus is rather telling; the usual word to refer to the "glance" or "gaze" of the mind in medieval mnemonic work is *conspectus* but, as discussed in Chapter 1, *aspectus* was also used and is incorporated into Grosseteste's theology.[48] Whether written as *aspectus* or *conspectus* the principle remains the same; if referring to a visual aid, such as a table (or in this case, verse) the *conspectus* should be a single page; if referring to a mental picture then the whole image should be able to be seen in one glance of the mind's eye – almost like a mental scene, and in the *Compotus* at least, the *aspectus* is likened to the memory.[49] This idea of a certain scene being made available in one sweeping glance was a requirement of artificial memory in medieval mnemonic writings and is a process of *ekphrasis,* employed by writers as a way to be visually descriptive. Hugh of St. Victor's *De tribus maximis circumstantiis gestorum* ca. 1130 as well as his *De archa Noe* are classic examples, the former also emphasising number, location, and occasion as the best memory aids for learning history.[50]

By looking for examples of Grosseteste's mnemonics in his *Compotus* it is clear that not only is Grosseteste proficient in utilising them for his own needs and the needs of his students, but that he on occasion needs to clarify their importance or purpose; suggesting that they are a relatively new phenomena and that he is aware of his audience. He is not only (potentially, at least) able to create his own rhyme and verse but his use of more common verses is evidence that he himself is well-trained in this type of memory-craft. The *Compotus* is also evidence of his scholastic training, where much of the formative process of Grosseteste's knowledge of mnemonics takes place. It is within this scholastic setting that I will now explore Grosseteste's ability in adopting and utilising other aspects of memory-craft, that of scribal innovation and the utilisation of the written word.

---

[48] Carruthers, *Craft of Thought,* 63; Carruthers, *Craft of Memory* 12-13.

[49] Carruthers, *Craft of Thought*, 12.

[50] Carruthers, *Craft of Thought*, 63, *Craft of Memory*, 12-13. Hugh of St. Victor, *De tribus maximis* (ed. Green, 489; Carruthers, 36-7), 'tribus modis discernenda sunt in animo ea quae discuntur, secundum numerum, secundum locum, et secundum tempus.'

Writing as an Aide-mémoire: *Cedulae*, Notes, and the Defective Memory of Man.

In a *recapitilutatio* of Grosseteste's *Dicta* he writes that (emphasis added),

> In this book are 147 chapters, some of which are *brief notes* [*brevia verba*] that I *wrote down sketchily* [*scripsi breviter*] while I was in the schools, to *assist my memory* [*ad memoriam*] [...] I have supplied titles for them so that *the reader will be able to find more easily* what he wants in them.[51]

This autobiographical self-reflection complements an observation of Friar William of Alnwick († 1333) regent-master of the Franciscans seventy-five or so years after Grosseteste, who wrote that Grosseteste would make notes in the margins of his manuscript,

> when any notable *imaginatio* occurred to him he wrote it down so that it would not slip from his memory, and many of these notes [*cedulae*] that he wrote are not authoritative. None of these notes that he wrote in the margin of his copy of the *Physics* have any more authority than any other note he wrote.[52]

---

[51] This is recorded in Thomson, *Writings,* 214 'in hoc libello sunt 147 capitula quorum quedam sunt brevia verba que dum in scolis morabar scripsi breviter et in composito sermone ad memoriam [...] quorum titulos posui ut facilius quod vellet lector posset invenire.' See also Goering and Rosenfeld "Tongue is a Pen," 115.

[52] This observation is in Southern, *English Mind,* 37-8, but the translation above is my own. The observation is printed in Latin in Auguste Pelzer, "Les Versiones Latines de Ouvrages de Moral Conservés sous le Nom D'Aristote en Usage au XIII^{e} Siècle (Suite et Fin)," *Revue néoscholastique du philosophie* 20 (1921): 378-412, at 398, 'sed quando aliqua imaginatio notabilis sibi occurrebat ibi scripsit ne laberetur a memoria sua, sicud et multas cedulas scripsit que non omnes sunt autentice. Non enim est maioris autoritatis que dissute scripsit in margine libri phisicorum quam alie cedule quas scripsit.' Friar Alnwick, who was born some 25 years after Grosseteste's death, asserts that these *cedulae* must be distinguished from his other, authoritative works, such as the *Hexaëmeron*.

Three observations immediately become apparent. The first is that Grosseteste would make brief notes in the schools, to assist his own memory. The second is that he recognises the importance of titles in helping to organise his notes, not only for himself but for the reader.[53] The third is perhaps the most pertinent; he explains to the reader *why* he has included these titles - an acknowledgment of the novelty of the knowledge-organisation techniques that trickled down from university lectures.

When Friar Alnwick refers to the 'many notes' (*multas cedulas*) that appear in the margins of Grosseteste's copy of the *Physics* he is referring to one form of *cedula*; marginal notation.[54] As Carruthers points out however, *cedulae* can apply *either* to the style of marginal note-taking (as indeed in this case) *or* to the slip of paper on which notes are written. Grosseteste was also familiar with *cedula* of the other form; of slips of paper.[55] As an example of a confession, Grosseteste writes in *Notus in Iudea Deus* §24 that he had sinned by 'taking leaves [*folia*] and pieces of parchment [*cedulae*] from church books' during his youth in the schools, an act for which he is now repentant.[56] The desire (or rather, the pressure) to be able to take more notes could lead one to the temptation of theft.

Twelfth-century students would soon discover that their note-taking methods were inadequate for the new demands placed on them. Students were required to write faster,

---

[53] As Mary and Richard Rouse show, headings and subheadings only become common by 1220; see "Statim Invenire," 207.

[54] Carruthers, *Book of Memory*, 148-9, 411 n. 148. Translation of Fr. Alnwick's observation can be found in Southern, *English Mind,* 38.

[55] This second type of *cedula* is reproduced in Burnett, "White Cow," 18 (Fig. 5).

[56] Grosseteste, *Notus in Iudea Deus* §24 (eds. Mantello and Goering, 272), 'peccatum committere faciendo, folia a libris ecclesiasticis et cedulas, ceramque a candelis occulte capiendo, aliasque res, magnas vel parvas, sociorum meorum in scolis in iuventute.' See their discussion of this extract on 257.

resulting in the emergence of a new form of cursive script.[57] Grosseteste adopted what Carruthers has described as a 'highly abbreviated cursive' similar to Aquinas's more famous *littera inintelligibilis.*[58] Despite his best efforts, however, Thomson has described Grosseteste's attempt at perfecting this quicker, gothic script as being 'only partially successful.'[59] Indeed, Grosseteste's familiarity with and attention to the act of writing is manifest exquisitely in *Dictum* 54 where he contrasts the acts of the tongue and pen with detailed knowledge of the preparation involved prior to writing. The pen (*calamus*) needs to be sharp, trimmed, and shortened; it must be split, and rigid, and used with the correct ink.[60]

What Grosseteste describes in his *recapitulatio* is *reportatio*, a style of note-taking arising directly from the lectures, particularly popular amongst theology students for recording and remembering sermons.[61] Charles Burnett describes the purpose of *reportationes* (the notes themselves) 'simply reminded the student of the main points of the sermon or lecture, which he could fill out later from memory or from other sources, such as preaching manuals.'[62] Speed, then, was the driving force behind these new innovative advances in note-taking, not just speed in the actual writing down but in their ability to be found, consulted, utilised; they incorporated a new, referential quality, hence Grosseteste's description of titles as being there to help the reader 'find more

[57] Clanchy, *From Memory*, 130-1.

[58] Carruthers, *Book of Memory*, 146-7. An example of this cursive is reproduced as the frontispiece to Callus, ed., *Robert Grosseteste, Scholar and Bishop*. Clanchy, *From Memory*, 130 suggests that this may not be his writing, but that 'he, like other university masters, wrote in a fast, cursive script.' Grosseteste's utilisation of the *pen* is another example of his confidence with these new innovations, this is discussed at length in Goering and Rosenfeld, "Tongue is a Pen."

[59] Thomson, *Writings,* 23.

[60] Grosseteste, *Dictum* 54 (eds. Mantello and Goering, 118-22).

[61] Burnett, "White Cow," 8-9.

[62] Burnett, "White Cow," 9

easily' what they need.[63] This referential aspect of the written word as a complement to memory (rather than replacer) is exhibited in Grosseteste's *Reulles,* where he instructs the Countess of Lincoln to 'keep this roll by you and often study the first roll and this one so that you can find out quickly what you ought to do.'[64] These sorts of innovations suggest to Dowd that Grosseteste's *Compotus* was intended for students; the near-universal inclusion of a table of content in the MS tradition as well as the inclusion of chapter headings, as per the *recapitulatio*, to aid the reader in their search for information he describes as 'a rather primitive form of an editorial device to enhance the use of the text.'[65] Whilst this may seem uninspired, when one contextualises Grosseteste's lifetime within the history of writing it becomes clear that he was an early adopter of the new approach of record-keeping which was not popularised until the reign of Edward I (1272-1307), well after Grosseteste's death.[66] That Grosseteste, when Bishop, was 'among the first to keep a register' is poignant because registers, unlike other types of record-keeping, were among the new 'summaries of other documents, deliberately made for reference.'[67] This is what places Grosseteste into Clanchy's magisterial history of the written word. The *Tabula*, written before his episcopacy, is testament to this belief in the power of reference, the epitome of the written prompt as being the 'archive of the mind.'[68]

---

[63] See also Rivers, *Preaching the Memory*, 36-40.

[64] Grosseteste, *Reulles* §2 (ed. Oschinsky, 388-9), 'e retenez co roulle od vus e sovent regardez le primer roulle e cetuy ausi ke prestement sachez trover co dunt averez a fere.' See Oschinsky, ed., *Walter of Henley,* 191-9 and 388-415 for Grosseteste's authorship pertaining to the *Statuta*, *French Reulles*, and *Latin Rules*.

[65] Dowd, "Astronomy and Compotus," 285.

[66] The best monograph on this topic remains Clanchy, *From Memory,* 77, 97, 121-2, and 130-1.

[67] Clanchy, *From Memory*, 77-8.

[68] Clanchy *From Memory*, 174.

In addition to his comments in the *recapitulatio* and other secondary observances on *cedulae* there is another source that illustrates Grosseteste's attitude to writing as an aide-mémoire and that is his *De cessatione legalium*, composed 1230-35, again likely shortly after his time at Oxford. At 1.7.2 he writes,

> It would be superfluous for the natural or positive law to be written, until the memory of man was so slipshod [*labilis*] that he could not remember the positive law given to him without the support of the Scriptures. For there are no Scriptures except to aid a defective memory. Primeval men, however, had very strong memories [*memorie vivacitatem*], by which they could remember the law without forgetting it. The natural law is naturally easy to remember because the whole of it necessarily and logically [*ordinate et necessario*] follows from the law of charity. The positive law, though, as has been said, had not been added immediately after sin. It had been added before the writing of the Law and did not have many precepts, and it is the many precepts that make remembering [*retinere*] difficult.[69]

Here, again, the importance of order in the act of recollection is referred to; something is easier to remember if it is necessary and logical, and brevity is best. For anyone trained in memory-craft, this is basic knowledge; brevity (as opposed to prolixity) is emphasised in *Dictum* 54. Scripture, as with all writing, is intended to *aid a defective memory,* not to replace it.

Grosseteste's reaction to non-Scriptural authoritative texts, according to Bacon, was one of scrutiny; we are told how he 'neglected' the works of Aristotle and other authorities

[69] Grosseteste, *De cessatione legalium* 1.7.2 (eds. Dales and King, 34-5; trans. Hildebrand 61-2), 'legem autem sive naturalem sive positivam scribi superfluum esset, donec hominis memoria ita labilis esset quod legem sibi positam sine scriptura adminiculo retinere non posset. Non enim est scriptura nisi propter supplendum memorie defectum. Homines autem primi temporis habuerunt multam memorie vivacitatem, qua potuerunt legem sine oblivione retinere.'

and, as Southern identifies, Grosseteste's emphasis on independent observation over testimony is indicative of his personality.[70] That is not to say that Grosseteste eschewed all sources of testimonial evidence; in *De colore* he acknowledges the work of others who are capable of manipulating the medium, in *De iride* he refers to 'that other experiment' (*per experimentum illud*) and in *De speculis* and in *De Sphaera* he discusses the experiments of others (*per certa experimenta*) of Ptolemy and Thabit ben Qura.[71] The Old and New Testaments are, of course, the ultimate testimony, implicit in their very name. For Grosseteste they are the foundation stones (*lapides fundamentales*) of instruction at Oxford, the teaching of which must be carried out in the mornings.[72] In his justification for doing so Grosseteste appears to combine mnemonic language with scriptural verse. The first reason is to do with order. He quotes 1 Cor. 14.40 'but let all things be done decently, and according to order,' order being a key component for successful rhetoric.[73] Not only does the teaching of Scripture in the early hours help the correct ordering of a syllabus as well as a person, but it also acts as a thesaurus from which other lectures can be built upon. He quotes Matthew 13:52 'therefore every scribe instructed in the kingdom of heaven, is like to a man that is a householder, who bringeth forth out of his treasure [*thesaurus*] new things and old.' Again, this is reminiscent of the popular idea of a memory as a thesaurus. By referring to a *thesaurus* and order it appears that secondary to Grosseteste's concern on the subject matter of what is taught is that he clearly understands the mornings as a more conducive to aiding memory; put simply, students are more attentive in the mornings.

[70] Southern, *English Mind,* xli, and 172-3.

[71] Grosseteste, *De iride* (ed. Baur, 73-4), 'hoc autem manifestum est per experimentum illud, quod ponitur principium in libro de speculis;' *De sphaera* (ed. Baur, 25-6), 'thebit vero, qui operatus est super operationes Ptolemaei, invenit per certa experimenta motum stellarum fixarum esse alium.' See also Hackett, "Scientia Experimentalis," 111.

[72] Grosseteste, *Letter* 123 (ed. Luard, 346-7; trans. Mantello and Goering, 365).

[73] Grosseteste, *Letter* 123 (ed. Luard, 346-7; trans. Mantello and Goering, 365).

From Etymology to Exegesis.

The emphasis placed on Biblical exegesis arises from Grosseteste's own interest in etymology, itself an aspect of mnemonics. In the *Compotus* Grosseteste utilises etymology as an aide-mémoire when etymologising on the names of the months of the year.[74] As Carruthers explains, etymology has a similar mnemonic affect as punning and is an example of *memoria verborum*.[75] Rita Copeland and Ineke Sluiter have described this use of etymology, following Carruthers, as an 'epistemological archive' whereby 'language itself will reveal the truth of the world and is thus an instrument of divine providence.'[76] Thus when Grosseteste etymologises his *Compotus* he is according himself to a tradition of artificial memory techniques dating to Cicero.[77] Carruthers writes,

> the mnemonic efficacy of etymology was never questioned. Its standing as a valuable pedagogical practice, a sub-set of powerful inventional [sic] mnemonics, was to a large extent independent of philosophical investigations (with differing outcomes) into the truth value of etymologising.[78]

It is this affinity for etymologising that lays the groundwork for Biblical exegesis, according to Carruthers; this close association and focus on every word sets 'in motion the associational paronomasia of our memories of sacred texts.'[79] By choosing to study

---

[74] Grosseteste, *Compotus* (eds. and trans. Lohr and Nothaft, 72-4).

[75] Carruthers, *Craft of Thought*, 118, and 155-8. See also Mary Carruthers, "Inventional Mmnemonics and the Ornaments of Style: The Case of Etymology," *Connotations* 2, no.1 (1992): 103-14.

[76] Copeland and Sluiter, *Medieval Rhetoric,* 233.

[77] Grosseteste, *Compotus* (eds. and trans. Lohr and Nothaft, 72-4).

[78] Carruthers, *Craft of Thought*, 156.

[79] Carruthers, "Inventional Mnemonics," 111.

and become proficient in Greek and quite possibly Hebrew, Grosseteste was conforming to this interest in etymology to understand the myriad of Biblical interpretations available to him through close, careful inspection of each word.[80] A striking example of what Southern has described as his 'endless etymologies' is his *Prooemium* to the *Hexaëmeron,* which contains 150-plus examples of Biblical-based etymology.[81] The criticality of exegesis is thus well established not only in the Christian tradition but, via the emphasis on etymology, in the scholastic too. Considering Grosseteste's knowledge of Greek, a number of etymological works can be found in his corpus, such as the Byzantine *Suda*, his Greek-Latin translation containing 71 articles, and the *De cane ethimologia*, a shorter, 16-line text, possibly noted down by a student of his.[82]

The Relationship Between the Written and Spoken Word.

In *De generatione sonorum* Grosseteste occupies himself with the relationship between the written and spoken word in a very practical manner; he writes at §5 that 'the voice's capacity for being written down, therefore, is nothing other than this shaping of the vocal instruments and of the breaths by which the letter is generated internally.'[83] That truth can be found in testimonial experience and narrative is, of course, crucial to the transmission of Biblical reading and exegesis. Peter King has suggested that Augustine

[80] McEvoy, *Robert Grosseteste,* 120-21 discusses the evidence, albeit scant, for Grosseteste's knowledge of Hebrew.

[81] Southern, *English Mind,* 184; *Prooemium* to the *Hexaëmeron* (eds. Dales and Gieben, 17-48; trans. Martin, 14-46). Other examples of Grosseteste's use of etymologies are his commentary on the Psalms and his dissection of Greek words in his commentary on the *Nicomachean Ethics*.

[82] Thomson, *Writings* 63-4 and 148 respectively. For more on Grosseteste's translation of the *Suda* see Tiziano Dorandi, "Liber Qui Vocatur Suda La Traduction de la Souda de Robert Grosseteste," *Aevum* 87 (2013): 391-440.

[83] Grosseteste, *De generatione sonorum* §5 (ed. and trans. Sønnesyn, 246-7), 'potentia vero vocis ad hoc ut scribatur nihil alius est nisi ipsa figuratio instrumentorum vocalium et spirituum qua littera interius generatur, ideo possibilis est representari per figuram visibilem assimilatam figure sue generationis.'

was an early adopter of the importance of 'testimony as a source of knowledge'[84] with his famous passage in *De Trinitate,*

> but far be it from us to doubt the truth of those things which we have perceived through the senses of the body [...] far be it also from us to deny what we have learned from the testimony of others.[85]

This emphasis on the Bible as a *book of memory* is detailed most defiantly in *De cessatione legalium,* where Grosseteste compares his lamentably 'small and little' (*parvitati et paucitati*) own memory with the memory of the men of the Old Testament.[86] For Grosseteste the primary necessity of the Bible lies in its function as a memory record, partly as a result of the Fall. At 1.7.7 a similar sentiment to that of 1.7.2 and man's 'slipshod' memory quoted above, is repeated; that the number of laws is difficult to remember so they are 'commended to the Scriptures to aid the faulty memory' (*suplendam labilitatem memorie*).[87] Brevity is necessary for successful memorisation and recall. Due to the poor-quality memory that post-Lapsarian man is saddled with it is easier to retain (*retineo*) a small number of laws rather than a large number.[88] In this discussion on the strength of Scripture in taking the written form of

---

[84] Peter King, "Augustine on Knowledge," in *The Cambridge Companion to Augustine,* eds. David Vincent Meconi and Eleonore Stump, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 142-65, at 159.

[85] Augustine, *De trinitate* 15.12 (ed. CCSL 50A, ll. 72; trans. FOTC 45, p. 483).

[86] Grosseteste, *De cessatione legalium* 1.1.1 (eds. Dales and King, 7; trans. Hildebrand, 27).

[87] Grosseteste, *De cessatione legalium* 1.7.7 (eds. Dales and King, 38; trans. Hildebrand 64-5), 'sed quia multitudo est ad memorandum difficilis congruebat ut multiplicate iussiones commendarentur scripture ad suplendam labilitatem memorie.'

[88] Grosseteste, *De cessatione legalium* 1.7.2 (eds. Dales and King, 35; trans. Hildebrand, 61-2), 'et que adiecta fuit ante legis scriptionem non habuit preceptorum multitudinem que faceret retinendi difficultatem.'

memory, Grosseteste refers to the phrase 'primitive man's strong memory' (*vivacitatem memorie primitivorum hominum*) stating that the strength of a person's internal senses relies on the strength of their external senses.[89] Augustine emphasises this point in book four of *Contra Iulianum* when he writes,

> the quality of sensation [*vivacitas sentiendi*] enables one according to his capacity to perceive the truth in corporeal things corresponding to their mode and nature, and to distinguish more or less accurately the true from the false.[90]

Grosseteste is fond of the phrase, in *Dictum* 7 it is the *vivacitas sensuum* that greets and receives the sensible perceptions before carrying them to the *sensus communis.*[91] However, the most intriguing use of *vivacitas sensuum* is found in Eustratius's commentary on Book 1 of Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*, and Grosseteste's following *notule.* Eustratius († ca. 1120) writes in his commentary at Chapter 2 that the four bodily virtues are complemented by four general virtues (*generales virtutes*), so that justice is paired with health, fortitude with bodily strength, temperance with beauty and finally prudence with sharpness of sense (*vivacitas sensuum*).[92] Grosseteste repeats this

---

[89] Grosseteste *De cessatione legalium* 1.7.3 (eds Dales and King, 35; trans. Hildebrand, 62), 'sed harum virium bonitas esse non potest absque bonitate virtutum sensitvarum.'

[90] Augustine, *Contra Iulianium* 4.14 (ed. PL 44: col. 0770; trans. FOTC 35, p. 222), 'vivacitas sentiendi est, qua magis alius, alius minus in ipsis corporalibus rebus pro earum modo atque natura quod verum est percipit, atque id a falso magis minusve discernit.' I have kept the translation of *vivacitatem sentiendi* as 'quality of sensation' offered by FOTC as it emphasises the strength and intensity, which 'vivacity' does not confer.

[91] Grosseteste, *Dictum* 7 ff. 8rb-8va, 'contra hunc populum intrantem egreditur vivacitas sensuum, et intrantem populum excipit et introducit in communem sensum, quasi in vestibulum ante ostium, ubi ostiarius, quasi fanthasia, hunc populum excipit et in aulam memorie introducit.'

[92] Eustratius of Nicea, trans. Grosseteste, commentary on Book 1 of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, (ed. Mercken, vol. 1, p. 35), ''Sicut enim in anima quattuor sunt generales virtutes : prudentia, fortitudo, temperantia, iustitia, ita in corpore haec quattuor sunt : vivacitas sensuum corporalium, robur, pulchitrudo, sanitas.' Eustratius then expands on these pairings. See also István Pieter Bejczy, "The

in his *notule* in 1.17, referring to them as '*virtus corporis...et animae.* '[93] It is not until Walter Burley († ca. 1344) and his commentary on the *Ethics* that there is a more definitive category of the *virtutes corporales* as corresponding directly to the *virtutibus cardinalibus*, who then repeats the Eustratius/Grosseteste schemata.[94]

Testimony, particularly Biblical or prophetic testimony has the capacity to convey credibility and truth, but only if the person relaying the testimony is credible not just in their writing but in their original perception. At *Dictum* 113 Grosseteste discusses this via a discussion on contingencies and determinates.[95] Contingencies, he says, can only be known through the senses. Determinates however are contingencies that are now past, one way or another, and are known only through sense but through, often enough, the sense of others. He clarifies this by then stating that what he means is that those who have not sensed the contingencies (in the present) must get their knowledge from

---

Cardinal Virtues in the Medieval Commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics, 1250-1350," in *Virtue Ethics in the Middle Ages: Commentaries on Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, 1200*-1500, ed. István Pieter Bejczy (Ledien: Brill, 2008), 199-222, at 206-7.

[93] Eustratius of Nicea, trans. Grosseteste, commentary on Book 1 of the Nicomachean Ethics (ed. Mercken, vol. 1, p. 177), 'quia est quaedam et virtus corporis, est autem et animae (sanitas enim et pulchitrudo et vivacitas sensuum et robur corporis virtutes, quemadmodum iustitia, temperantia, prudentia, fortitudo animae).'

[94] See Judson Boyce Allen, *The Ethical Poetic of the Later Middle Ages: A Decorum of Convenient Distinction* (Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1982), 206.

[95] Grosseteste, *Dictum* 113 ff. 94ra-rb, 'ratione hac satis evidenter ostenditur prophetiam esse, et ex hoc et supradictis constat eam non esse hominis sed Dei munus. Licet autem contingentia cum fiunt presentia et transeundo per presens fiunt preterita, fiunt de contingentibus non contingentia, sed veritatem determinatem habentia, non tamen scibilia sunt human scientia nisi sensitiva. Unde qui non senserunt illa cum fuerunt presentia, credere possunt hiis que ea senserunt, sive narrantibus sive scribentibus. Scire autem ea non possunt nisi aliquo modorum quo presciri potuerunt futura. Unde presentium et preteritorum que sunt de genere contingentium non apprehensorum per sensum, non est certa scientia nisi prophetia. Et qui ea non per sensum certe sciunt, prophete sunt, sciuntque ea non alio modo quam presciuntur futura. Propter tamen consignationem prioritatis scientie ad eventum rei, familiarius dicitur prophetia futurorum quam aliorum.'

someone who had sensed them – and these are now determinates. For this, the person needs to be able to believe (*credere*) the person who actually perceived (*senserunt*) them 'by their narrations or their writings' (*sive narrantibus sive scribentibus*). Testimony and shared experience are clearly linked for Grosseteste to an idea of history. He defines a Historian as someone who has the ability to share their narratives with others, 'for the many things he had seen and experienced [*experiri*].'[96] In *De cessatione legalium* 1.7.2 the written word is emphasised as an 'aid' to the 'defective memory' of post-Lapsarian humankind (*supplendum memorie defectum*).[97] A similar statement is repeated at 1.9.2; 'history does not pass down to posterity certainties, except by writing.'[98] Combined with the etymologising of philosophy and history in the Prooemium to the *Hexaëmeron* it is clear that Grosseteste's emphasis on history and its relationship to writing, memory, and experience is drawn from Isidore's *Etymologies;* that it is related to grammar because 'whatever is worthy of remembrance is committed to writing' (1.41.2) and that 'the use of letters was invented for the sake of remembering things, which are bound by letters lest they slip away into oblivion' (1.3.2).[99]

The concept of *logos* is one of huge importance to the Christian Biblical tradition, particularly John 1:1 'in the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God,' it is of no surprise therefore that Grosseteste's knowledge of Greek would help him return to the original λόγος.[100] George Kennedy in his examination of Christian use of classical rhetoric emphasises two important aspects of logos to Biblical

[96] Grosseteste, *Prooemium* to the *Hexaemeron* §95 (eds. Dales and Gieben, 38; trans. Martin, 35), 'dicuntur autem proprie historici rerum visarum narratores [...] quia multa viderat et expertus fuerat.'

[97] Grosseteste, *De cessatione legalium* 1.7.2 (eds. Dales and King, 34; trans. Hildebrand, 61), 'non enim est scriptura nisi propter supplendum memorie defectum.'

[98] Grosseteste, *De cessatione legalium* 1.9.2 (eds. Dales and King, 48; trans. Hildebrand, 77), 'historia autem non transfertur ad posteros certa, nisi per scripturam.'

[99] Isidore of Seville, *Etymologies* 1.41.2 and 1.3.2 (trans. Barney et al., 67 and 39).

[100] Kennedy *Classical Rhetoric*, 125-32.

interpretation; the first is that of a spoken covenant with God as per Genesis 1:3 'and God said' and the second is the role of Jesus as a preacher; the emphasis on the aural transmission of his words is here reflected in the written.[101] Thus when Kennedy writes that 'truth must be apprehended by the listener, not by the speaker' he is suggesting a similar notion to Grosseteste's instruction in the *Hexaëmeron* to investigate and distinguish the words of authority in order to arrive at a conclusion via our own senses.[102] Indeed Grosseteste's account of the relationship between hearing and listening is similar - in the Prooemium to the *Hexaëmeron* he writes that the voice has a 'hidden operation' (*latentem operationem*) leaving a 'strong impression' (*imprimendi fortis*) on the mind of the listener 'as it enters through the hearer's ears' (*ingedientis per aures auditories*).[103] An appreciation of *logos* and its relationship with memory is not just found within Biblical authority; there is a passage in the *Posterior Analytics* that semantically relates logos, memory, and perception in a similar way the relationship between sense-perception, memory, and experience can be found at *Metaphysics* 1.1. Towards the end of the *Posterior Analytics* at 2.19 Aristotle writes,

> if this [perception] happens repeatedly, a distinction immediately arises between those animals who derive a coherent impression [*ratio*] from the persistence [*memoria*] and those who do not.[104]

[101] Kennedy, *Classical Rhetoric*, 120-5.

[102] Kennedy, *Classical Rhetoric*, 127. Grosseteste, *Hexaëmeron* 4.3.2 (eds. Dales and Gieben; 125; trans. Martin, 126).

[103] Grosseteste, *Prooemium* to the *Hexaëmeron* §52 (eds. Dales and Gieben, 31; trans. Martin, 28), 'habet autem viva vox latentem operationem imprimendi fortis in mente auidtoris sensum quem intelligetn in voce loquens. Ipsa enim loquentis intelligentia vita est et forma vocis verbi ingredientis per aures auditoris.' Trans. Martin. This is discussed further in Chapter 4.

[104] Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* 2.19 100a1-3 (ed. and trans. LCL 391, pp. 256- 7).

Aristotle's use of *logos* (*λόγος*) can refer to account, definition, or explanation, although in this case James of Venice has (correctly) identified *logos* with reason (*ratio*).[105] Grosseteste's own definition of *logos* in his Prooemium to the *Hexaëmeron* recognises it as having many meanings in Greek but of being 'the Word, and the reason, and the cause of everything' as per Augustine.[106] With this in mind the statement has a remarkably different rendering; repeated perceptions bring about the memory, and the memory in turn brings about the Word.[107] Clearly, Aristotle was not referring to the Christian *logos,* but for Grosseteste this etymologising may have offered practical and theological application in the meaning of experience. Just as Grosseteste may well have found theological utility in Aristotle's etymology of light in the very wording of *phantasia* in *De anima* 3.3, so too may he have found levels of meaning in this *ratio/logos.* The allusions to Platonic Recollection, as well as the abstraction of universals from singulars via the repeated interference of the memory, are clear.

The Tabula.

The *Tabula* is the most commonly cited evocation of Grosseteste's memory and again arises from the time in his life in which he had connection to the University of Oxford. A topical concordance it dates to ca. 1230 and contains a list of over 400 symbols and what they signify, split into nine distinctions.[108] Prior to the twelfth century indexing

[105] James of Venice, *Iacobus Veneticus translator Aristotelis. Analytica posteriora*, 2.19 100a (AL 4.4, p. 105), 'multis igitur factis huiusmodi iam differentia quedam fit, quare in his quidem est fieri rationem ex talium memoria, in aliis vero non.' For an excellent discussion of this passage see Pavel Gregorić and Filip Grgić, "Aristotle's Notion of Experience," *Archiv Für Geschichte Der Philosophie* 88, no. 1 (2006): 1-30, at 22.

[106] Grosseteste, *Prooemium* to the *Hexaemeron* §57 (eds. Dales and Gieben, 31-2; trans. Martin, 28-9), 'logos autem derivatur ab hoc verbo greco *lego* λεγω quod est 'dico.' et habet apud Grecos hec diccio *logos* multis significationes, ut hic tangit Ieronimus. Quomodo autem sapientia Patris sti "Verbum, et ratio, et uniuscuiusque rei causa," evidentissime exponitur ab Augustino in pluribus locis.' Trans Martin.

[107] Gregorić and Grgić, "Notion of Experience," 22

[108] Rosemann, "Tabula," 235-320, see also Thomson, "Concordantial Signs," 39-53. It is discussed by Clanchy, *From Memory*, 181 and more extensively by Carruthers, *Book of Memory,* 146-150.

systems remained in the memory of the reader; rare in written form up to 1220 but common by 1280.[109] As Clanchy notes, this is because the proliferation in all forms of writing, administrative, ecclesiastical, scholastic, 'made reliance on identifying material solely by mental indexing less effective. The psalms might be learned by heart, but the accumulating mass of glosses on them could not.'[110] The sheer amount of knowledge produced by the universities, and demanded of their students, placed a huge strain on the very concept of memory.

Grosseteste's *Tabula*, then, appearing as it did around 1230, is evidence of an early adoption of this new referential system. The symbols themselves are largely abstract though some do have clear relation to the category they represent particularly those that relate to organs (*De auditu* is represented by a basic drawing of an ear, for example).[111] The vast majority, however, reveal no apparent significance to their topic; as Thomson describes, 'all the letters of the Greek and Roman alphabets, mathematical figures, conjoined conventional signs, modifications of the zodiacal signs, and additional dots and strokes and curves are pressed into service.'[112] Their lack of relationship to the category which they represent is by no means an impediment; Clanchy has observed that the lack of recognisable connection between subject heading and symbol is not unusual; it is its 'memorability' that has to be foremost; concluding that 'effective symbols are memorable regardless of whether they make sense of the subject matter which the mind associates with them.'[113]

[109] Clanchy, *From Memory*, 180.

[110] Clanchy, *From Memory*, 180.

[111] Grosseteste, *Tabula* f. 18b (ed. Thomson), similarly, '*De stillis'* is represented by a star and *'De luna'* by a crescent moon.

[112] Thomson, '"Topical Concordance," 140.

[113] Clanchy, *From Memory*, 176.

The *Tabula* is a useful source for indicating the books in Grosseteste's possession by 1230, and, as Richard Hunt has shown, 'more books containing autograph notes by him have perhaps survived than of any medieval writer of comparable eminence.'[114] That it was expanded upon by Adam Marsh and other Franciscans at Oxford into the second half of the thirteenth century is testament to the enormity of the work, Mary Carruthers describes it as a 'prosthetic artifact made for his memory' and that 'as a prosthetic, others also evidently found it useful' as a subject index.[115] However, the same factors that contribute to the success of the *Tabula* are also illustrative of its limitations. The 400-plus logograms, bearing, mostly, little resemblance to their topic make it almost exclusively personally heuristic. Though for Roman notaries memorising 400-plus symbols may have been an achievable task, 1,000 is the limit suggested by the *ad Herennium* 3.23.[116] That it is unfinished - the MS contains space for more categories, and there are 54 topics that *do not* have corresponding symbols - suggests that it was becoming too burdensome and too difficult to continue beyond Grosseteste. Indeed, the *ad Herennium* at 3.23 bemoans communal reference lists for two reasons; the first is that the more personal the symbol-system the more effective they are, and second, it is the very process of *constructing* such an index/concordance that makes it an effective aide-mémoire. Grosseteste acknowledges this in his *Compotus* - he not only provides tables he himself has constructed to act as a quick referential aid, but he, importantly, instructs the reader on how to construct their own charts and references.[117] That the entries in the *Tabula* are slightly inconsistent in that cited works are not given in the same order suggests that Grosseteste compiled the index entirely from his memory rather than copying from a book.[118] Thus, inheriting an index-list is akin to inheriting someone else's notes; the lack of personal affinity makes it less memorable.

---

[114] Hunt, "Library of Grosseteste," 121-45, at 132.

[115] Hunt, "Library of Grosseteste," 125; Carruthers, *Book of Memory,* 410 n. 137.

[116] *Rhetorica ad Herennium* 3.23 (ed. and trans. LCL 403, p. 223) states how it is 'ridiculous to collect images for a thousand' categories.

[117] Dowd, "Astronomy and Compotus," 289.

[118] Carruthers, *Book of Memory,* 149.

Indeed, it is the characteristically unsystematic use of logograms that suggests to Clanchy that Richard Hotot, a contemporary of Grosseteste, may have encountered his *Tabula* and been influenced by it, noting that Hotot's and Grosseteste's symbols are 'comparable in appearance and date.'[119] A comparison of Hotot's symbols in London, British Library, Add. MS 54228, f. 6b and Grosseteste's *Tabula* in MS Lyons 414 ff. 17a-20a reveals that his symbols are unique, despite their clear similarity in appearance to Grosseteste's.[120] Additionally, the purpose of the two documents are dissimilar; Grosseteste acts more as a florilegium whereas Hotot's are akin to a modern system of footnotes.[121] Hotot uses the logograms as a quick reference guide for his detailed list of land rental in Turvey. Though both are memory-prompts, they are for different purposes. As the transcriber of Hotot's estate management book elaborates, the ordering of the footnotes does not necessarily follow the order of the text, suggesting that it was 'annotated piecemeal.'[122] Altogether this suggests that whilst Hotot had possibly seen Grosseteste's *Tabula* or, perhaps more likely, a copy of his work that contained his hand-written symbols, the symbols are incomparable. It is clear that by the 1230s Grosseteste was well-acquainted with the technicalities of scribal technologies, the nature of note-taking and the effectiveness of administrative efficiencies such as reference lists and charters as well as the utilisation of mnemonic verse as relates to his computational work. Thus, at the same time his scientific writings are overshadowed by more of an interest in theology, he uses this knowledge and applies it to his *pastoralia.*

---

[119] Clanchy, *From Memory*, 181. An example of Hotot's logograms is printed in Clanchy, *From Memory,* 385 (Plate 15).

[120] Clanchy, *From Memory,* 384-5 contains a reproduction of this folio. A transcript, sadly missing the relevant logograms, can be found in Edward King "A Northamptonshire Miscellany," *Northamptonshire Record Society* 32 (1983): 1-58. The relevant transcript for Plate 15 in Clanchy, *From Memory*, 385 is King, "Northamptonshire Miscellany," 24-5.

[121] Carruthers, *Book of Memory*, 149; King, "Northamptonshire Miscellany," 25 n. 132.

[122] King, "Northamptonshire Miscellany," 25 n. 132.

From Lectern to Pulpit.

The *Templum Dei*, 1220-30, is the perfect example of this shift from a career in education to a career as theologian applying as it does several techniques to a far more theological content. Between the *Templum Dei*, *Dicta* 43 and 50, and the *Château d'Amour* one can see a flourishing in Grosseteste's adoption of the architectural mnemonic system so popular amongst Roman rhetoricians. As I will show, Grosseteste's use of the mnemonic style begins classically, with religious architecture, and simply, with few architectonic motifs. By the time he wrote the *Château d'Amour* however Grosseteste is eminently comfortable with the tradition and, by applying it to secular architecture and incorporating other popular techniques he ensures its legacy. He uses these devices as a means to an end; the teaching of the Christian faith and the promotion of virtue over vice. Christiania Whitehead in her study of architectural allegories has suggested three reasons why artificial mnemonics found such a resurgence in the mid-twelfth century, resulting in the widespread interest of the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* by the likes of Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas.[123] The first reason she argues is a new 'preoccupation with public speaking,' its outlet being both the universities in the form of *disputatio*, and in preaching.[124] Second, newly available tracts by Aristotle had discussions on memory in *De anima*, *De sensu et sensibilibus*, as well of course as *De memoria et reminisentia*. Finally, Whitehead suggests that it was the organisational abilities of the Dominicans and their 'efficient organisation of textual material for learning purposes.'[125] Grosseteste, then, would have been completely receptive to this resurgence; influenced by Lateran IV, familiar with the new Aristotle, and clearly an efficient (though not Dominican) organiser.[126]

[123] Whitehead, *Castles of the Mind*, 32-3.

[124] Whitehead, *Castles of the Mind*, 32.

[125] Whitehead, *Castles of the Mind*, 33.

[126] Rivers, "Writing the Memory," 39 suggests that Franciscans had a 'deep interest in the subject' of mnemonic devices comparable to that of the Dominicans.

A well-used example of the boundary-crossing between lecture and sermon is the utilisation of Aristotle's four causes by preachers to the laity which had, by the fourteenth century, become common.[127] Thus in the *praeambulum* to *Deus est* Grosseteste uses the four causes as a form of stylistic *divisio* to enable the preacher to organise the virtues.[128] Though not unique this does perhaps highlight more concisely his ability to apply the skill and technique of his education to that of preaching; after all, the four causes are a rational way of ordering information, no less or more so than the *distinctiones* of the *Tabula.* Rivers has suggested that the impetus for the introduction of the four causes in classical literature came *from* a knowledge of rhetoric and dialectics, that is, of memory prompts.[129] She continues by suggesting that by the twelfth century this order had reversed; that topics (such as the four causes) became in themselves mnemonic prompts for other subjects.[130] Thus, as Ginther notes, 'such rhetorical strategies not only confirm the author is trained in scholastic methods, he [Grosseteste] also expects his readers to be the same,' that is, 'familiar with the rhetorical methods of the schools.'[131]

Whilst the influence and utility of scholastic rhetoric is clearly manifest in the new demands on the oratorical skills of preachers, Rivers has posited that actually it was the elevation of dialectics and its use in the schools that contributed to the method of medieval preaching methods as pertains to the *ars praedicandi.*[132] Dialectics she

[127] Rivers, "Medieval Preaching," 266.

[128] Grosseteste, *Deus est* (ed. Wenzel, 250), 'sed non vos lateat quod est virtus materialis, formalis, agens, et perfecta.'

[129] Rivers, *Preaching the Memory*, 45.

[130] Carruthers also discusses this in *Book of Memory*, 189.

[131] James R. Ginther, "Robert Grosseteste's Theory of Pastoral Care," in *A Companion to Pastoral Care in the Late Middle Ages (1200-1500),* ed. Ronald J. Stansbury (Brill: Leiden, 2010), 95-122, at 105.

[132] Rivers, *Preaching the Memory*, 75-7

compares to the universal; rhetoric to the particular. The elevation of Aristotelian epistemological focus on the universal was thus reflected in an elevation of dialectics in the medieval *studium*.[133] Because rhetoric was concerned with particular circumstances, the rules of rhetoric could be applied to the realm of ethics; this will be explored in the next chapter. As Rivers writes, 'because human experience is saved through memory and the images of past events, a system that enhances such memories through image-making will fit the requirements of a moral life.'[134]

Templum Dei and an Early Appreciation of Architectural Mnemonics.

As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter the *Templum Dei* is one of Grosseteste's most popular works and its example as a 'mnemonic exercise' is attested by Mantello and Goering in their edition of the text based on its design.[135] Other scholars, those of medieval literature, have noted its incorporation of architectural mnemonics, often including it in their discussions alongside *Château d'Amour.*[136] Acknowledging the sheer number of referential charts, lists, and diagrams manifest in the text, Andrew Taylor writes that it is illustrative of the,

> technical innovation in book design, including experimentation which schematised charts and diagrams, alphabetised arrangements, headings and sub-headings, and indices, all to facilitate the memorisation and retrieval of information.[137]

[133] Rivers, *Preaching the Memory*, 75-7.

[134] Rivers, *Preaching the Memory,* 87.

[135] Mantello and Goering, *Templum Dei,* 8.

[136] See for example Christiania Whitehead, *Castles of the Mind,* 25-6 for a discussion on *Templum Dei*.

[137] Taylor, "Was Grosseteste?" 83.

That it was only by 1220 that scribal techniques of red and blue headings, subheadings, cross-references, and initials had become 'standard' shows that Grosseteste was, again, using the newest style of manuscript creation that fifty years previously would have been unrecognisable.[138] As described by Mantello and Goering in their preface to the *Templum Dei*,

> stylistically, it is unique. Nearly three-quarters of the text consist of charts, lists, and diagrams. Formally, these schemata serve to break up the text and highlight the important elements. Easily distinguished on the page, they serve as a means of quick reference and as an aid to study similar to the table of contents and the systematic subject index, two other contemporary experiments designed to make written texts effective and efficient educational tools.[139]

They contend that the *Templum Dei* was so detailed in its schematic design that its popularity was intense but ultimately short lived.[140] As with the *Tabula* its technicality was too cumbersome to be effectively utilised by others. Having said this, the *Templum Dei* did survive in popularity at least in the immediate aftermath of its creation. Although technically difficult to reproduce it is possible to follow without the need for any referential list to complement it, rather it met the need of its reader (a priest) in providing an easy-to-access, referential and memorable digestion of important theological concepts.

So much for the form of the *Templum Dei.* Its purpose was to provide priests with a quick, referential aid to administering confession. The content of the *Templum Dei* also reflects this intention on the behalf of Grosseteste to make its content readily

[138] Rouse and Rouse, "Statim Invenire." 207.

[139] Mantello and Goering, *Templum Dei*, 7.

[140] Mantello and Goering, *Templum Dei,* 7-8.

memorable. One such way he does this is by employing architectonic mnemonics, albeit in a very simplified form, and only at the beginning of the text. It begins with a comparison of the bodily and spiritual temple. The bodily temple is built from three parts; the kidneys/stomach, as foundation, represent temperance and faith, the breast, as walls, represents fortitude and hope, the head, as roof, represents prudence and charity. In the spiritual temple, the foundation represents faith, the walls hope, and the roof charity.[141] Christiania Whitehead notes that this particular schema is unique in patristic and scholastic exegesis but that it is in keeping with popular Biblical verses such as Ezekial 44:2, as well as 1 Corinthians. 3:36 'you are the temple of God' and 1 Corinthians 6:19 'your members are the temple of the Holy Ghost' and Revelation 21:10.[142] Whitehead suggests that this aspect of the *Templum Dei* is highly illustrative of Plato's *Timaeus* which depicts the body as a city-state, a technique used in both *Notus in Iudea Deus* and *Perambulavit Iudas*.[143] Grosseteste was clearly fond of this allegory and found it purposeful. In the *Timaeus* 69E-70E the head is an acropolis, the heart is the 'chamber of the bodyguard' and the stomach is a manger.[144] Thus Whitehead writes that Grosseteste, 'melding the Platonic metaphor with the Pauline notion of the temple of the Spirit, he reconfigures Plato's *polis* as the Judaic house of worship.'[145] This temple, Grosseteste continues at 6.2, is built with the 'hand that builds' (*manu oportet operari*).[146]

---

[141] Grosseteste, *Templum Dei* 1.4 (eds. Mantello and Goering, 30).

[142] Whitehead, *Castles of the Mind,* 25. See Whitehead's chapter "Temple" in *Castles of the Mind,* 7-27 for more on scriptural architecture as allegory, and Wheatley, *Idea of the Castle,* 92-6.

[143] Whitehead, *Castles of the Mind,* 25.

[144] Plato, *Timaeus* 70a-c (ed. and trans. LCL 234, pp. 180-3).

[145] Whitehead, *Castles of the Mind*, 25.

[146] Grosseteste, *Templum Dei* 6.2 (eds. Goering and Mantello, 37). Temperance battles flesh, fortitude battles the devil, and both justice and prudence battle the world.

A little later at *Templum Dei* 2.5 Grosseteste uses two other, this time secular metaphors, to describe the instruments of operation; a castle, with its moat, walls, and tower, and a ship, with its mast, hold, and sail.[147] This allegory of the ship is unusual; but that its concern are the instruments of operation (*instrumenta operativa*) may be a hint towards another text of Grosseteste's that allegorises *navi*s; *cPA* 1.14. Grosseteste writes that through the repetition of multiple sense experiences, the 'reasoning is awakened mixed with these very sensible things and is borne along in the senses to the sensible things *as in a ship*.'[148] Grosseteste's *Dicta*, specifically 7, 43, and 50, all contain architectural mnemonics to help aid the understanding of the audience.[149] Its use in *Dictum* 7 is perhaps the briefest, and its meaning has been discussed in Chapter 1, but here I will comment on its architectonic aspect. *Dictum* 7 utilises the idea of rooms as repositories, hallways as passages, and windows as entrances, a building complete with a helpful *ostiarius* (porter) to transport sensible perceptions to and fro. Grosseteste's description of the internal faculties using this metaphor is not unique; William of St. Thierry in *De natura corporis et animae* 2 describes reason as the Queen of a city who oversees personified familiar and unfamiliar sensible perceptions entering into a castle, where, once distinguished, she 'gives each its room in the memory.'[150] Richard of St.

---

[147] Grosseteste, *Templum Dei* 2.5 (eds. Goering and Mantello, 31), 'hec sunt in castello materiali: fossetum, muri, et turris; hec sunt in navi: sentina, malus, et velum.' See Whitehead, *Castles of the Mind,* 25, 270 n. 82 for commentary and translation on this passage.

[148] Grosseteste, *cPA* 1.14 (ed. Rossi, 214), 'cum itaque processu temporis agant sensus per multiplicem obviationem sensus cum sensibilibus, expergiscitur ratio ipsis sensibus admixta et in sensibus quasi in navi delata ad sensibilia.' Trans taken from Crombie, *Origins,* 72, emphasis added. Perhaps the most famous medieval mnemonic "ship" is Hugh of St. Victor's representation of Noah's Ark in *Libellus de formatione Arche,* a richly detailed cosmography presented visually in two separate forms – as a plan, and as an elevation. See Carruthers, *Book of Memory*, 293-302.

[149] Grosseteste, *Dictum* 52 also refers to the five porches of the Tabernacle as the five bodily senses.

[150] William of St. Thierry, *De natura corporis et animae* 2.3 (ed. CCCM 88, p. 125; trans. CF 24, p. 129), 'quasi enim regina sedens ratio in media ciuitatis suae arce, portis sensuum undique patentibus, domesticos domestica, peregrinos peregrina ingerentes, suo unumquemque vultu et habitu discernit et suscipit, et collocat suo unumquemque scientiae loco, per genus etiam et cognationes et gentes singulos discernens, singulis que suas memoriae mansiones distribuens.'

Victor, in his metaphor in *Benjamin minor*, describes the *imaginatio* as an *ancilla* or handmaid - again, the parallels to *Dictum* 7 and its *ostiarius* are apparent.[151] Describing her in this way is emblematic of two attributes of *imaginatio* held by Richard -- the first is that she, as with Grosseteste's *ostiarius,* is not stationary but active; she escorts sensible impressions from a to b. The second is that, as with all *ancillis* she is bound to something (someone) else; for Richard, reason is her mistress and sense, her own servant.[152]

Dictum 43 extends the metaphor beyond a house to a city; the walls are built with three different type of stone; rough, precious, resplendent (*rudes*, *preciosi*, *splendentes*), representing hell, the work of Jesus and the saints, and heaven respectively.[153] Mortar holds these stones together, representing our imagination; thus it must not be mixed with sand, which would be lust.[154] As with *Dictum* 7, *Dictum* 43 uses an architectural metaphor to describe the internal senses. Another, brief, architectural mnemonic, one which as with *Château d'Amour* actually uses a secular *castrum* rather than *templum* arises in *Dictum* 51, where the seven sacraments are seven steps, confession is a river and Baptism a moat.[155] This will be discussed more in Chapter 4 as it relates to confession.

---

[151] Richard of St. Victor, *Benjamin Minor* 5 §3 (ed. SC 419, p. 102). Grover Zinn discusses imagination and cognition in this work in Grover Zinn, "Personification Allegory and Visions of Light in Richard of St Victor's Teaching on Contemplation," *University of Toronto Quarterly* 46, no. 3 (1977): 190-214, at 193-4.

[152] Zinn, "Personification Allegory," 194.

[153] Grosseteste, Dictum 43, ff. 32ra-rb, 'in quo muro pene infernales sunt sicut lapides rudes, et inpoliti, et asperi, positi in fundamento. Exempla Iesu Christi et sanctorum sunt sicut lapides preciosi, politi, positi in muro ubi a terra surgit. Premia celestia bonis debita sunt sicut lapides splendentes positi in muri eminencia.'

[154] Grosseteste, *Dictum* 43 ff. 32ra-rb.

[155] Grosseteste, *Dictum* 51, f. 37va, 'sacramenta ecclesie sunt velud castri tutissima municio. Quod castrum, velud fluvius immensus, primo circuit aqua baptismi, primoque cohercet hostiles accessus.

Dictum 50, however, elevates the architectural metaphor with clear allusions to Bede's *De templo. Dictum* 50 is a lengthy architectonic mnemonic that utilises several different techniques for recall, including colour, chronology, and imagery. Each step apart from the first has at least one 'sculpture' depicting a theme or motif to aid the person in their recollection. The first of the eight virtuous steps is an emerald foundation stone of faith, which is itself split into twelve to represent the twelve articles of faith. The next step is mercy, signified by a *matrona* surrounded by various buildings such as guesthouses for travellers, gold and silver for the redemption of prisoners, refectories representing the hungry and so on. The third step is knowledge which is similar to the second but 'suffused with an ethereal and celestial light.'[156] Patience follows as the fourth step, made of diamond due to its strength, and its 'sculpture' is that of a woman defending herself in battle. Piety follows at step six, and the image of step two is again referenced. From there one can then move to step seven which is brotherly love. It is here that martyrs are depicted and whilst the stone itself is not precious (unlike the diamond of step four or the emerald in step one) it is coloured red-purple to signify the blood of the martyrs and that of their persecutors. When one arrives at this step they can look to their right and there, in chronological order (*ut pro tempore*) one can see the martyrdom of the twelve apostles and all martyrs who followed.[157] The final step, step eight, is love, coloured by pure light. The image to remember this is the eye; specifically of Leah and of Rachel.[158] *Dictum* 50 is a considerable achievement reflecting Grosseteste's ability to

---

Deinde in interioribus ripis fluminis est confessio et penitencia, velud vallum et murus exterior. In medio autem, velud turris fortissima, sacramentum altaris collocatur, ad quam turrim per septem ordines ascenditur, velud per septem gradus.

[156] Grosseteste, *Dictum* 50, f. 35vb, 'et luce etherea et celesti superfusa.'

[157] Grosseteste, Dictum 50, f. 36vb, 'in dextera vero parte primo per ordinem sculpuntur gloriosa martiria duodecim Apostolorum, et consequenter ut pro tempore sibi successerunt constantes victorie et invincibiles constancie martirorum quas non terrent tonitrua minarum nec quaciunt aut frangunt fulmina tormentorum.'

[158] Grosseteste, *Dictum* 50, f. 36vb.

create a visually stimulating, memorable depiction of the eight virtues mentioned. The use of steps and the visualisation of the sculptures and sculptors (*artificis*) help the recollected, the mode itself is architectural but when one arrives at step two, the matron of mercy, there is yet another architectural element - that of the scene of the refectory, graveyard, and guesthouses. The use of colour is again significant and intended purely as a mnemonic device as well as having its own symbolism (such as the strength of the diamond, the blood of the martyrs). Additionally, when Grosseteste writes that one must remember the martyrs in step seven *ut pro tempore* this is more to aid the recollected than for any particular significance, after all, a memory well-ordered is the best kind of memory.

Whitehead gives three contributing factors for the twelfth century's 'widespread architectonic imagination,' one in which Grosseteste clearly flourished.[159] The first is that imaginatively they are 'extremely effective organisational structures in an age obsessed' with organisation, second that they are 'invaluable aide-memoires' and third because of 'nostalgia;' the 1099 capture of Jerusalem by the Crusaders and their defeat at Hattin in 1187 may well have prompted an interest in the physical shape of Jerusalem and the Temple.[160] The *Templum Dei* and his architecturally-leaning *Dicta* were thus a product of their time. The *Château d'Amour*, however, elevates these principles still further.

The *Château d'Amour*: An Apex in Architectonic Mnemonic.

James McEvoy has described the *Château d'Amour* as 'one of the few really successful medieval allegories.'[161] Anna Siebach-Larsen, in two of the most recent studies of the poem, has described it as a 'versified incarnation of what Grosseteste understood as the perfect harmony of intellectual exploration and pragmatic action that Grosseteste sought

[159] Whitehead, *Castles of the Mind*, 19.

[160] Whitehead, *Castles of the Mind*, 18-19

[161] McEvoy, *Robert Grosseteste,* 150.

throughout his career.'[162] Formed of 884 octosyllabic couplets the poem details the creation of the world (indeed, *Carmen de creatione mundi* is the only medieval title of the poem known; *Château d'Amour* is a modern title) and also the history of salvation, famously personifying the four virtues of Mercy, Truth, Justice and Peace as Four Daughters of the king (God) and the allegory of the Castle as God's presence on earth.[163] Surviving in eighteen manuscripts including in those of highly popular works such as the *Manuel des pechiez,* Andrew Taylor has suggested that not only was the *Château d'Amour* popular but that, of these copies, their 'style and level of decoration, quality of hand, and preparation of parchment all suggest that they were copied by professionals for sale.'[164] Taylor continues that the proliferation, style, and survival of the *Château d'Amour* is evidence of the 'cross-fertilisation between Grosseteste and the Oxford book trade.'[165]

Secondary work on the *Château d'Amour* has shown that it is a hugely under-used resource for scholars, particularly for those of Grosseteste's work specifically.[166]

---

[162] Anna Siebach-Larsen, "Structures of Thought in Robert Grosseteste's Chasteau d'amour and the Tateshal Miscellany," in *Literary Echose of the Fourth Lateran Council in England and France, 1215-1405,* ed. Maureen B. C. Boulton (Toronto: PIMS, 2019), 170-96, at 171.

[163] McEvoy, *Robert Grosseteste*, 149-53.

[164] Full list in Mackie, "Restoration of Creation," 159-60. A beautifully decorated MS containing *Château d'Amour* is Princeton, University Library, Taylor Medieval MS 1, ff. 172v-198r, discussed by Siebach-Larsen in "Structures of Thought." See also Andrew Taylor, "Was Grosseteste?" 82.

[165] Taylor, "Was Grosseteste?" 83.

[166] When I refer to the *Château d'Amour* in this thesis I will be using the Murray 1918 Anglo-Norman version. Kara Saravajara has published four Middle English translations of the work and done extensive work on the MS tradition of the works, see Sarajavara, *Middle English Translation.* Evelyn Mackie has published an English, but prose, version of the poem, see Mackie, "Loss and Restoration," 151-79. Jim Rhodes has discussed the influence of the poem on Langland and has, importantly, focused on the theological issues raised in the poem, see Rhodes, *Poetry Does Theology,* 43-72. Abigail Wheatley, *Idea of the Castle,* and Christiania Whitehead, *Castles of the Mind,* have both explored the allegory of the castle and placed it within the context of other medieval architectural allegories. Suzanne Akbari has

Abigail Wheatley, in her study of medieval castle allegories, has described Grosseteste as a 'pioneer of mnemonic methods.'[167] For the purposes of its discussion in this Chapter I will focus exclusively on the allegory of the castle, which occupies lines 571-821 of the Murray edition. In the allegory of the castle Grosseteste first describes its architectural structure (ll. 571-662) explaining what each edifice represents; the four turrets are to remind one of the cardinal virtues, the three baileys represent the three virtues of Mary (maidenhood, chastity, and marriage), the seven barbicans represent the ways in which one can overcome the seven deadly sins, as well as a fountain of grace and a ditch (moat) of voluntary poverty.[168] The architecture-motif also has Biblical exegetical applications; a house built on a rock per Matthew 7:24, particularly when the protagonist of the poem interacts with the castle trying to gain sanctuary which Wheatley suggests is reminiscent of Revelation 3.20 and Song of Songs 5.2. Thus, the *Château d'Amour* is 'designed as an elaborate mnemonic, constituted to facilitate the recall of a series of sacred texts and devotional precepts,' composed with 'a highly sophisticated series of verbal echoes and allegorical linkages.'[169]

---

shown how the *Château d'Amour* demonstrates 'how grace permeates fallen mankind just as light is refracted through the medium' in Suzanne Akbari, *Seeing Through the Veil: Optical Theory and Medieval Allegory* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012), 43. Anna Siebach-Larsen most recently has produced two excellent articles on the allegory of the Castle, 'bringing together Grosseteste's scientific, theological, and pastoral interests and binding them in a densely constructed and radiant allegory aimed at instructing, illuminating, and transforming its reader through the material workings of vision and light,' (Siebach-Larsen, "Structures of Thought," 179). See also Anna Siebach-Larsen, "The Materialisation of Knowledge in Thirteenth-Century England: Joan Tateshal, Robert Grosseteste, and the Tateshal Miscellany," in *Women Intellectuals and Leaders in the Middle Ages,* eds. Kathryn Kerby-Fulton, Katie Ann-Marie Bugyis, and John van Engen (Woodbridge: D. S. Brewer, 2020), 227-37, at 234 where Larsen describes the process of reading (or hearing) the poem as being an experience in itself.

[167] Wheatley, *Idea of the Castle,* 97.

[168] McEvoy, *Robert Grosseteste,* 152, Wheatley, *Idea of the Castle,* 94-5. Whitehead, *Castles of the Mind*, 90-100 for an analysis of the *Château d'Amour* and its place in contemporaneous and later literature.

[169] Wheatley, *Idea of the Castle,* 96-7.

In the *Château d'Amour* there are eight (nine if counting the colour bands) architectural features that, combined, represent twenty theological attributes; the foundational rock as the heart of Mary, four turrets as the four cardinal virtues, three baileys as the three virtues of Mary, seven barbicans as the virtues to overcome the seven deadly sins, one fountain of grace, with four streams flowing into the moat of poverty, and the three colours of the three cardinal virtues which light up the exterior of castle, not necessarily an architectural feature but something which I believe should be counted as such.[170] It is worth noting here that in Hugh of St. Victor's *De arche Noe* also has an instruction to imagine three colours banded across a wall, and colour is used throughout the treatise, although the allegory is very different.[171] Grosseteste has taken the theme of a castle allegory and developed it into something much more memorable. Aelred of Rievaulx's *In assumptione Sancta Maria (Sermo* 19*)* has a moat of humility, walls of chastity, and a tower of charity, as well as the principle of Jesus being able to leave the walls of the castle (Mary) inviolate.[172] Bernard of Clairvaux also discusses a moat of humility and walls of obedience in *Parabola* 1 thus it is likely Grosseteste was keenly familiar with the concept, although in the *Château d'Amour* the moat is voluntary poverty (*voluntrive povertez*) suggesting he took his inspiration from the literature but intended to make it a

[170] Grosseteste, *Château d'Amour* ll. 663-820 (ed. Murray, 107-111, trans. Mackie, 166-9). Only one version of the poems assigns allegory to the four streams flowing from the fountain, that is *Myrour of Lewed Men*, (ca. 1425) London, British Museum, Egerton MS 927, ff. 1-28, a transcription of which can be found in Sajavaara *Middle English Translations*, 320-53.

[171] Hugh of St. Victor's *de arche Noe* is a text by Hugh of St. Victor that instructed the medieval student to imagine in their mind Noah's ark. The ark is designed and structured so as to allow a quick reference of different Biblical interpretations. The text also contains a description of a spiritual journey, using mnemonic devices such as ladders and steps, rooms and chambers, colours and numbers. The text, originally part of Migne's PL 176 has been critically edited and is now included in the CCCM at 176. There is a translation by Jessica Weiss, "Hugh of St. Victor, A Little Book About Constructing Noah's Ark," in *Craft of Memory,* 41-70. Hugh of St. Victor, *De archa Noe* (ed. CCCM 176, trans. Weiss, 52-6)

[172] Cornelius, "Figurative Castle," 45-49; For the architecture of Mary see Aelred of Rievaulx, *Sermo* 19 §5-12 ("In Assumptione Sancta Maria"), (ed. CCCM 2A, pp. 148-9). See also Whitehead, *Castles of the Mind*, 93, who acknowledges Anselm's *Homily* IX as another source for the inviolate walls of Mary.

creation of his own.[173] The architectural mnemonic of the castle is a flowering of earlier prototypes that can be found in *Dictum 50* and *Templum Dei.* Though the original intended audience is debated the eventual popularity of the poem was assured based on certain conscious choices made by Grosseteste in his writing style. The octosyllabic metre was popular in narrative literature of the twelfth century, a style he uses in his 666-lined poem *Le mariage des neuf filles du diable*.[174] This early poem appears in Thomson's catalogue of Grosseteste's works, describing it as an attempt at 'popularising, or perhaps we should say, visualising, religion.'[175] High praise for such an under-studied piece of work, one which evidences the mnemonic process of *ekphrasis.*

The *Château d'Amour* was not written in English (indeed, Andrew Taylor notes that *none* of Grosseteste's works were written in English) but it was quickly translated into Middle English from the original Anglo-Norman.[176] Grosseteste himself opens the poem recognising the importance of vernacular preaching; lines 15-28 state that even if you have no knowledge of Hebrew, Greek, or Latin, it is important to learn of God's redemption and to be able to praise him accordingly.[177] Teaching and preaching in the

[173] Bernard of Clairvaux, *Parabola* I §5 (ed. BO 6/2, p. 264). For a truncated translation and discussion of the castle in this parable see Mette Bruun, *Parables: Bernard of Clairvaux's Mapping of Spiritual Topography* (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 167-8 and 198-9. Grosseteste, *Château d'Amour* ll. 757-8 (ed. Murray, 110), 'E ke sunt donc li fozzez / Fors voluntrive povertez.' See also Wheatley, *Idea of the Castle,* 29-30.

[174] Wheatley, *Idea of the Castle*, 97. Grosseteste's *Le mariage des neuf filles du diable* is edited in Paul Meyer, "Notice Du MS. Rawlinson Poetry 241 (Oxford)," *Romania* 29 (1900): 1–84, poem at 61-72. This piece of Grosseteste's literary output is critically understudied.

[175] Thomson, *Writings,* 156.

[176] Taylor, "Was Grosseteste?" 74.

[177] Grosseteste, *Château d'Amour* (ed. Murray, 89; trans. Mackie, 160), 'Tuz avum mestier de aïe / Mes trestuz ne poüm mie / Save le langage en fin / D'ebreu, de griu ne de latin, / Pur loer sun creature; / Ke la buche de chanteür / Ne seir close de Deu loer / Ne sun seint nun nuncier, / E ke shescun en sun langage / En li conuisse sanz folage, / Son deu e sa redempcion.'

vernacular was a concern for Grosseteste; *Letter* 52 is a clear indication of this. He instructs his priests to 'repeatedly teach the laity in the vernacular tongue.'[178] The use of the vernacular and the rhyming scheme thus made it immediately popular. Stylistically, Grosseteste structured the poem in such a way that would enable smaller sections to survive aside from the poem of as a whole; Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Digby 86, compiled between 1271 and 1283, contains only the extracts of the Four Daughters, Mercy, Truth, Justice, and Peace (ll. 205-460), re-enforcing the suggestion that the poem was intended as a preaching tool.[179] The castle allegory made it immediately memorable.

Returning to Whitehead's three reasons for the resurgence in aide-mémoire in the thirteenth century, the castle/temple analogy is responsive to the architectural mnemonics of antique texts (*Rhetorica ad Herennium* in particular) as well as the 'body-as-building' metaphors that were popular, albeit which had begun to be seen as old-fashioned, particularly with allusions to Old Testament architecture, by the thirteenth century.[180] By reconfiguring these ideas into vernacular verse, which were themselves then adapted into four Middle English translations, by adopting octosyllabic couplets that were popular in contemporary narrative literature, and by allowing for the text to be broken into sections, Grosseteste strengthened and promulgated this idea of architectural mnemonic and clearly appreciated the power of aide-mémoire as well as having the ability to produce them.[181] Grosseteste was, if not consciously aware of this shift from religious-architecture to secular architecture, then at least conformed to it. As Whitehead has explained, this shift from religious architecture to secular actually aided and strengthened the ecclesiastical demonstration; if the *Château d'Amour* really was

[178] Grosseteste, *Epistola* 52 (ed. Luard, 154-5; trans. Mantello and Goering, 183), 'doceant frequenter lacios in idiomate communi.'

[179] Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Digby 86, ff. 116v-18v, "De iiii files."

[180] Whitehead, *Castles of the Mind,* 26-7.

[181] Wheatley, *Idea of the Castle,* 92-7

intended to be for a lay audience, then an in-depth description of a religious or Biblical building may have been too esoteric.[182] Thus by shifting the architectural mnemonic to a castle Grosseteste's actions are illustrative of a 'psychologically astute preaching fraternity, carefully selecting the images that would make the greatest impact upon their listeners and operating them to inculcate the basics of Christian doctrine and belief.'[183] Just as the intended audience was more comfortable *listening* in the vernacular language, they would have been comfortable *imagining* in the vernacular (secular) architecture. As Roberta D. Cornelius writes of the castle/temple allegory,

> no story or romance of the Middle Ages could possibly be written without its castles: no more could allegory, mirroring life in abstraction, dispense without the most important social institution of the time.[184]

Perhaps the most famous castle mnemonic (as a visual schemata rather than allegory) is John of Metz's thirteenth century *Tower of Wisdom*.[185] The *Tower of Wisdom* is a diagrammatic drawing featuring 131 named components and 23 architectural elements. Moral meanings are attributed to every architectural physical component, be it step, column, brick, rampart and so on.[186] The *Tower of Wisdom* is much more elaborate than *Château d'Amour*; for one, it is drawn out rather than merely described, combining mnemonic with religious *memoria* or *collatio.* However, it is easy to see the *Château d'Amour* as a prototype of the *Tower of Wisdom*; albeit much simplified. Whilst the

---

[182] Whitehead, *Castles of the Mind,* 87-8.

[183] Whitehead, *Castles of the Mind,* 88.

[184] Cornelius, "Figurative Castle," 12-13.

[185] Carruthers, *Book of Memory*, 332. For an introduction to the *Tower of Wisdom* see Lucy Freeman Sadler, "John of Metz, The Tower of Wisdom," in *Craft of Thought,* 215-24.

[186] I describe the *Tower of Wisdom* in Munich, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, CLM 16104a f. 113r, which is reproduced in Sadler, "Tower of Wisdom," 216-17.

Tower of Wisdom describes twenty-three architectural elements, the *Château d'Amour* has far fewer, although more than that mentioned in *Templum Dei* (suggesting that the former was produced after the latter), and likely just enough for the audience. That *Templum Dei* was viewed as an architectural mnemonic is manifest in the fifteenth-century manuscript Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, Latin 3473, where it appears behind a copy of the *Tower of Wisdom* as well as other didactic tables and mnemonic verses.[187] The *Château d'Amour* utilises architectural mnemonics, vernacular rhyme, secular architecture, and the ability to be divided into smaller, more memorable sections in such a way as to instruct parishioners on important articles of the Christian faith. I will end this chapter by exploring two more aide-mémoire that Grosseteste uses, both of which are found in his *Dicta*, and both of which are intended to instruct the audience. Again, both reflect his experience in the schools and apply this experience to the *cura animarum.*

Memorable Preaching Design.

The first of these aide-mémoires employed by Grosseteste arises in *Dictum* 50, the same *Dictum* that contains the elaborate architectonic mnemonic described above. However, it also contains an interesting, but brief, hand mnemonic. Grosseteste declares that each finger of the hand represents one of the five ways to good works; remembering God the Creator, Christ the Redeemer, the attainment of heaven, purging of sin, and the elevation of good over bad.[188] Thus a person may look at their hands and be reminded of the ways to achieve good works. Heuristically, this is a simple concept achievable by anyone with knowledge of a five-fingered hand; it allows the layperson in the audience to hold their hand in front of them and to remember the *totum opus bonum* or good

[187] Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, MS Latin 3473; *Templum Dei* appears ff. 191-209, "Tower of Wisdom" at f. 79v, various didactic tables ff. 81-84v, and mnemonic verses ff. 212-212v. This MS can be viewed online at https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/btv1b10074019n, accessed 21st March, 2021.

[188] Grosseteste, *Dictum* 50 f. 34vb, 'unitas autem et integritas manus dispartitur in quinarium digitorum. Sic totum opus bonum dispartiri debet in quinque, quia totum opus debes Deo creatori, totum Christo redemptori, totum celo adquirendo, totum peccato purgando, totum pro proximo a miseria sublevando vel in bono promovendo.'

works.[189] This is quite likely inspired by a knowledge of musical hands, a memory aid that arose in the ninth century from its origins in rhetoric.[190] Known more commonly as the "Guidonian" hand Carol Berger describes this *manus* or *gamut* as the

> direct ancestor of the modern gamut or scale; that is, a set of steps (pitches taken not in absolute term, but relative to other steps in the gamut) and arranged in an ascending order and representing the tonal material of music.[191]

Though far less complicated than the Guidonian hand and its precursors, by the thirteenth century the *manus* had become, at least in scholastic circles, a well-established aide-mémoire, ripe for someone like Grosseteste to appropriate for his own theological purposes.[192] Additionally, this use of the hand is representative of Grosseteste's focus on the incarnation and his positive anthropology; in *Dictum* 3 he does something similar by discussing the love of Jesus using the metaphor of nerves. This hand-mnemonic is not useful for the preacher; it does not help them to remember a confusing or particularly complex theological attribute. However, its intention is to help aid the audience. As Kimberly Rivers explains,

> classical mnemonic treatises advocated schemes that would aid the speaker's memory and pass unnoticed by the audience; the authors of preaching treatises, instead, advised techniques that would help their listeners recall the salient points of the sermon later.[193]

---

[189] Grosseteste, *Dictum* 50 f. 34vb.

[190] Carol Berger, "The Hand and the Art of Memory," *Musica Disciplina* 35 (1981): 87-120, at 88-9. See also Berger, "The Guidonian Hand," *Craft of Memory,* 71-83.

[191] Berger, "The Hand," 89.

[192] Berger, "The Hand," 88.

[193] Rivers, "Medieval Preaching," 255.

By focusing on anthropological elements Grosseteste is contributing to what would become a peculiarity in popular Franciscan preaching that used anthropological mnemonics.[194] The second and perhaps most under-explored of Grosseteste's contribution to mnemonics is his *scutum fidei* found in Durham, Cathedral Library, MS A.III.12, f. 14v, one of the earliest depictions of a Shield of Faith still popular today.[195] Whilst a more detailed study of these shields is necessary, I include them here as I believe them to be reflective, again, of Grosseteste ability to apply mnemonic to his own theological outlook. The shape of the triangular shield is in itself a mnemonic device; Grosseteste writes in *Dictum* 112 that the 'figure of Christ is the figure of the shield if two straight lines are drawn from the corners to the foot.'[196] Grosseteste's use of shields as a mnemonic device is most apparent in MS A.III.12, where they are drawn next to their descriptions in *Dicta* 95 and 96, as well as *Dictum* 112 where he describes three separate shields, one of which is repeated in *Dictum* 50. Grosseteste uses a separate shield-image in *Dicta* 112 and 50. He describes the shield as being 'triangular in shape because it represents the cross of Christ' and in both *Dicta* 112 and 50 the

---

[194] Rivers, "Writing the Memory," 39.

[195] The MS can be viewed online, https://iiif.durham.ac.uk/index.html?manifest=t1m9593tv186&canvas=t1t1r66j2302, accessed 10th May 2021. See also Southern, *English Mind,* 72-3, 113-6, and 167 discusses this manuscript, produced when Grosseteste was lecturing at Oxford 1229-1232. Though not written in Grosseteste's hand 'it shows Grosseteste at the height of his academic influence, when the record of his words was eagerly seized, annotated, and passed from one owner to another,' (Southern, *English Mind*, 73). Goering also discusses this MS in "When and Where," 44. The most extensive examination of the *scuta* however is in C. S. Adoyo, "Dante Decrypted: Musica Universalis in the Textual Architecture of the 'Commedia.'" *Bibliotheca Dantesca: Annual Journal of Research Studies* 1, no. 1 (2018): 37-69, at 53-5. The folia features two other shields of *bona voluntas.*

[196] Grosseteste, *Dictum* 112 f. 92ra, 'ipsa enim figura crucis figura scuti est si a duobus cornibus ligni transversalis [transversatis MS] ad pedem trahuntur due linee recte.' One of the shields described in Dictum 112 (three are described) is identical to that of *Dictum* 50, which are in themselves different to those in Durham, MS A.III.12, f. 14v. Trans. Jackson, *Dicta*, vol. 10, p. 27.

biblical reference for this shield is 1 John 2.17 'and the world passeth away, and the concupiscence thereof: but he that doth the will of God, abideth for ever' which forms the inscription on the bottom angle. The left and right corners of the shield have inscribed, respectively, Proverbs 3:16 'length of days is in her right hand, and in her left hand riches and glory.' However, by far the most striking and visually descriptive *scuta* is the middle shield described in Dictum 112. To remember Isaiah 24.17 ('fear, and the pit, and the snare are upon thee, O thou inhabitant of the earth') one can imagine a shield, in the bottom corner is a man cowering in fear, in the right is a hand bound and snared, and in the left is a prostitute lying in wait in a pit.[197] As with *Letter* 1, Grosseteste uses both *pingo* and *depingo* (depict) to describe this process of ekphrasis and mental image-making.

It is possible that these shields were designed with the preacher in mind, not the audience, as they are used to remember specific bible passages. However, just as the image of Jerusalem was used in architectural mnemonics because of the fall of Hattin, it is not surprising the idea of a shield would be a useful aide-mémoire given the context of the Crusades. *Letter* 6*,* letter from Grosseteste to Richard Marshal, earl of Pembroke in 1232 uses this technique to great effect, in which he describes a knight on horseback wearing eleven pieces of armour, each reflecting a different quality.[198] Clearly taking inspiration from Ephesians 6 Grosseteste builds on the armour of the soul; the bridle is discretion, the saddle; circumspection, stirrups of humility and repentance, and spurs of heaven and hell.[199] As Michael Evans has shown, medieval literature popularised this

[197] Grosseteste *Dictum* 112 f. 92rb, 'in pede ergo scuti depingantur omnia penarum genera, et in medio illarum homo pallidus timore se contrahens, ibique scribatur, [Is. 24:17] "Formido super te qui habitator es terre." In dextro cornu pingatur impotencia per similitudinem manus aride paralitice omnibus generibus vinculorum ligate, ut paralisis retorqueatur ad impotenciam nocendi in se, ligamenta ad impedimenta ab extrinsecus, ibique scribatur, [Is. 24:17] "Laqueus super te qui habitator es terre." In sinistro vero cornu depingatur infatuacio ignorancie per similitudinem faciei insidiatricis, fovea circumsepte, cum oculis cecucientibus, ibidemque scribatur, [Is. 24:17] "Fovea super te qui habitator es terre."

[198] This is *Epistola* 6, (ed. Luard, 40-1; trans. Mantello and Goering, 72-3).

[199] Grosseteste, *Epistola* 6 (ed. Luard, 40-1; trans. Mantello and Goering, 72-3).

metaphor; the ca. 1225 *Lancelot du luc* has the Lady of the Lake instructing Lancelot 'in the meaning of his arms, each of which is emblematic of one of the knight's duties to the Church.'[200] Neither should it be forgotten that the Franciscans were a religious order whose beginnings were in-part shaped by the Crusades; St. Francis, keen to preach to and convert the Muslims, accompanied the army of the Fifth Crusade (1217-21) to Damietta where he foretold of a disastrous trap the would befall the Christians in their attempts to take the stronghold.[201] Just as Jerusalem may have appealed as a city in which to base a mnemonic because of contemporaneous crusading activity, so too did the shield.

Conclusion

A number of conclusions can be drawn from this evidence as it pertains to both Grosseteste's education and his theology in theory and in practice. His corpus epitomises the artificiality in any distinction between preaching and the classroom, as so fastidiously examined by Richard and Mary Rouse; of the clarity of the 'close interrelationship between classroom lectern and pulpit, between theology lecture and sermon, between university preparation and parish application.'[202] By the time he became Bishop in 1235 he had produced a number of works that relied on the technical training in the *ars memorativa* that he had picked up in the schools, either as a student himself or as regent master at Oxford. His efficiency in administrative organisation, illustrated by the *Reulles*, his Bishop's registers, and his *Tabula* all suggest that he had

---

[200] Michael Evans, "An Illustrated Fragment of Peraldus's Summa of Vice: Harleian MS 3244," *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes,* 45 (1982): 14-68, at 19. Peraldus's *Summa de vitiis*, dating to 1236, depicts a knight in armour on horseback. Each item of armour, and of the horse's attire, represents a specific Christian quality; there are sixteen in total. See also Evans, "Illustrated Fragment," 14-21 where he discusses the evolution of this phenomena in the following years.

[201] See John Tolan, *Saint Francis and the Sultan: The Curious History of a Christian-Muslim Encounter* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 69-71 for more on Thomas de Celano's description of the encounter.

[202] Rouse and Rouse, "Statim Invenire," 218.

recognised the importance of new textual and scribal innovations which allowed for quick, referential documents to be produced to aid the memory. Not only this but he also recognised that it was in the act of writing that the written word - such as computational tables - is the best aid of all. His *Compotus* is perhaps the most technically routine; it was written as a textbook for students and offers little in the way of originality, other than being evidence of a mind comfortable with mnemonic devices and the very idea of referenceable indices. Additionally, he anticipated the novelty of this reliance on writing, tables, and charts; his attestation in the *recapitulatio* is testament to this; he needs to *instruct* the reader on how to use his work. This is not to say that he was always successful; though the *Templum Dei* was popular for centuries and though the symbols of the *Tabula* survive in a large number of manuscripts, they were perhaps too radical; too burdensome. The schema of the *Templum Dei* made it difficult to reproduce as intended, requiring some simplification. The *Tabula,* though used by other students after him, was burdensome, too vast a collection of personal symbols that made it less useful for users.

Lateran IV's emphasis on preaching gave Grosseteste the opportunity to apply these skills to his *cura animarum,* and his use of mnemonics reflected his own theology and mission. By secularising religious architecture, by turning the *templum* into a *chateau*, by adding popular rhyme and writing in the vernacular (Anglo-Norman), Grosseteste could ensure the longevity of his work because it was memorable for both preacher and audience. His conviction in the necessity of Jesus's incarnation is reflected not just in his own defence of sense-perception as a whole but in the metaphors and allegories he uses to explain theological concepts; the hand of *Dictum* 50, the knight's armour of *Letter* 6, the spiritual and bodily temples of *Templum Dei*. Just as he may have been influenced by his own environment - in choosing a chateau, or in opting for Jerusalem - his use of *scuta* as aide-mémoire reflects again not only the context of the crusades but also of Jesus's body on the cross; he makes this explicit.

That one of the earliest appearances of the *aspectus* arises in reference to memory; in that a picture (memory-aide) must present itself in one single glance, suggests that Grosseteste's conviction in his *aspectus/affectus* relationship relies in some part on

memory, particularly in images. In this case the *aspectus* is not "weighed down" by *phantasmata* but utterly dependent on them. In this case the *aspectus* is prompted to knowledge by the recollection of a mental vision of a scene or image. He clearly had a knowledge of the utility in mental images; the temple of *Dictum* 50, with its eight steps each reflecting a "scene" is testament to this. That Grosseteste refers to remembering the martyrs *ut pro tempore* is a common memory technique; the reliance on order and chronology is what will be explored in the next chapter as it pertains to the act of confession.

Chapter 4. Autobiographical Memory: Confession as *cognitio experimentalis.*

In Chapter 3 I focused on the form and style of Grosseteste's *pastoralia* as evidence of a scholar-turned-bishop who was manifestly comfortable in applying a knowledge of mnemonics to his responsibility for the *cura animarum* of his flock. In this chapter I will focus particularly on his confessional manuals, with attention on the *Quoniam cogitatio* which is hitherto a rather under-explored penitential text when compared to *Templum Dei*, *Perambulavit Iudas,* or *Deus est*. In the act of confession memory is the location, *topos* or *locus,* which must be explored and searched; this searching is the act of recollection. Memory is not just required by the penitent but by the priest also, who must rely on their own experience and knowledge to mete out the correct penance; he has to think for himself, contextualise the sin, and apply judgment.[1] I will show that Grosseteste applied the language of memory, of rhetorical memory training's *loci* and the mnemonic trinity of number, location, and occasion, to the very act of confession, turning it into an act of experiential memory not just in how it is described but in how it is performed and executed. Alexander Murray has utilised the *Quoniam cogitatio* in his study on medieval confession to great effect, describing confession as the discovery of a 'historical world; the medium of its exploration, memory.'[2] Interestingly, Richard Southern uses this work by Murray as evidence for the 'illuminating remarks on the importance of imagination in Grosseteste's directions on confession' yet Murray's emphasis is clearly on memory, not imagination - he describes memory as confession's 'chief witness' who requires coaxing.[3]

[1] Murray, "Counselling," 90.

[2] Murray, "Historical Source,"50.

[3] Southern, *English Mind,* 44. Southern references Alexander Murray's "Historical Source," 51 where Murray describes memory as a 'chief witness.'

This chapter explores the *Quoniam cogitatio* because it is in this work that a number of elements concerning memory and its relation to confession arise. In the introduction to the text Mantello and Goering observe the peculiarity of the partial inclusion of Seneca's *Naturalium quaestionum liber* at §12, writing that 'it is hard to imagine anyone but Grosseteste applying [*Naturalium quaestionum liber*] to an understanding of confession.'[4] They also note that in the *Tabula* Grosseteste again refers to Seneca's bodies of water under the heading *De Confessione*. The connection between water and ablution is of course manifest most directly in the act of baptism but dates to Greek mythology; holding *Lethe* as the river of the underworld representing forgetfulness. In *Dictum* 51, Grosseteste describes confession not as a river or stream but rather as the banks to a river (representing Baptism), allowing it to meander and wind.[5] *Dictum* 147 details various allegories of bodies of water including that inherited from Isidore's *Etymologia* 8.13.3 of the two rivers of Boeotia, one confirming memory and the other; forgetfulness.[6] Clearly, flowing water was a perfect allegory for confession for Grosseteste *because* of its literary and allegorical link with both remembering and forgetting and the ablution of sins.

This chapter also highlights the impact that the *Nicomachean Ethics* had on Grosseteste. Alexander Murray is perhaps the only historian to appreciate this explicitly; he disregards those who saw its translation as a hobby or academic exercise, mocking the so-called 'unfathomable mysteriousness' that previous scholars had lazily applied to its

[4] Mantello and Goering, "Quoniam cogitatio," 344. The part of the text they refer to is at 371.

[5] Grosseteste, *Dictum* 51, f. 37va. The Church is described as a castle, encircled by a river of baptism. The river maintains its course by the an embankment of Confession and walls of Penance. There is then an altar in the form of a tower, and seven steps leading to it. Again, the architectonic *ekphrasis* is apparent. 'Sacramenta ecclesie sunt velud castri tutissima municio. Quod castrum, velud fluvius immensus, primo circuit aqua baptismi, primoque cohercet hostiles accessus. Deinde in interioribus ripis fluminis est confessio et penitencia, velud vallum et murus exterior. In medio autem, velud turris fortissima, sacramentum altaris collocatur, ad quam turrim per septem ordines ascenditur, velud per septem gradus.'

[6] Grosseteste, *Dictum* 147, f. 12ra, 'in Boecia sunt duo fontes, alter oblivionem alter memoriam affert.'

origins.[7] Instead, Murray emphatically points out that the translation was a totally in-keeping outpouring of his own philosophical interests. By exploring similarities in Grosseteste's pastoral works to certain crucial sections of the *Nicomachean Ethics* - notably, the circumstances (*circumstantiae*) as not just heuristic but as instrumental in defining voluntary/involuntary actions, as well as the spiritual senses of the soul repeated in *Dictum* 15, I would suggest that Grosseteste was far more influenced by the text than has hitherto been afforded. That Grosseteste moves from the five circumstances of the *Perambulavit Iudas* to the seven of *Quoniam cogitatio* suggests that he understood the usefulness of the concept in not just being able to (re)construct the penitent's memories effectively but in getting to the true cause - in his early manuals he does not bother with the "why" or motivation of sin and sinning. Had Grosseteste no affiliation with the *Nicomachean Ethics* one would conclude that his use of the circumstances was purely technical, conforming to a tradition of interrogation found in many confessional manuals. However, that Grosseteste spent what is likely years of his life translating this text, it would be obtuse to suggest that it had no impact on him at all; instead, some traces can indeed be found. When combined with the influences of Ciceronian rhetoric it is clear that Grosseteste, though he never quite formally found a synthesis with Cicero, Aristotle, and ethics, was well aware of the relationship.

Grosseteste's confessional manuals, some of which are written for the penitent and some for the administering priest reveal an understanding of the role of autobiographical memory and the way in which one can recollect; even going so far as to comment on the difference between true and false memories. In them he notes the necessity of chronology in the recollective process. As was common practice he applies a structure of investigation based on Boethius's *De differentiis topicis;* the seven *circumstantiae* of *quis, quid, cur, quomodo, ubi, quando, quibus auxiliis* (who, what, why, where, how, when, with what).[8] This emphasis on the individuality of each and every act of confession is reflected in the wording of Canon 21 of Lateran IV; the priest

[7] Murray, "Historical Source," 79.

[8] Robertson, "Circumstances," 11-12.

must be adept at 'carefully inquiring into the circumstances of the sinner and the sin.'[9] The act of confession is not a silent, solitary act but a shared experience between priest and penitent requiring a verbalisation of sin and judgement. Goering saw that the act of confession 'illustrated clearly the value of Grosseteste's academic studies in medical physiology and psychology' but he does not offer any precise detail on this assertion; he does not explore Grosseteste's exposure to rhetorical memory training nor does he discuss memory in any kind of depth.[10]

In several of his *Dicta* Grosseteste describes memory as a 'book of conscience' (*liber conscientiae*) which, if not 'obliterated' (*delevit*) through penance will be laid bare before everyone.[11] Clearly this *liber conscientiae* is the memory which must be verbally read out during confession, containing as it does 'secrets of the heart' (*occulta cordium*). It is interesting though that in this case, once confessed, the memories are seemingly destroyed. It is far better, Grosseteste writes, to confess privately to a priest than to be exposed publicly, condemned by the 'testimony of your own conscience.'[12] In *Dictum* 60 Grosseteste makes the assertion that remembering a particular memory does not destroy it but rather strengthens it; yet here, once confessed, the memory is seemingly obliterated. However, by using *delevit* Grosseteste does not suggest that the memory is destroyed as a memory but rather that the sin *attached to the memory* has

[9] *Concilium Lateranense IV,* Canon 21 (ed. and trans. DDGC, p. 570, pp. 259-260), 'sacerdos autem sit discretus et cautus ut more periti medici superinfundat vinum et oleum vulneribus sauciati diligenter inquirens et peccatoris circumstantias et peccati per quas prudenter intelligat quale illi consilium debeat exhibere et cuiusmodi remedium adhibere diversis experimentis utendo ad sanandum aegrotum.'

[10] Goering, "When and Where," 33.

[11] Grosseteste, *Dictum* 51 f. 37vb, 'ad predictum eciam contra vicia defentionem non parum confert si describatis in mentibus subditorum quomodo in die iudicii aperti erunt libri conscientie singulorum et manifesta erunt occulta cordium, omniaque singulorum peccata que hic non delevit vera penitentia.' See also *Dictum* 106 f. 88va and *Dictum* 138 ff. 114rb-114va.

[12] Grosseteste, *Dictum* 106 f. 88va, 'omnia peccata tua in libro conscientie tue apertissime scribentur omnibus explicita temetipsum palam accusantia teipsum testimonio conscientie tue condempnanda.' Similar assertions repeated in *Dictum* 138.

been destroyed. Bernard of Clairvaux describes the process that Grosseteste is referring to in his *De conversione* 15.28,

> [God's] pardon wipes out sin, not from the memory, but in such a way that what before was both present in the memory and rendered it unclean is now, although it is still in the memory, no longer a defilement to it.[13]

These defilements on the memory are perhaps the blemishes on the mind-mirror of *Dictum* 60, described in Chapter 1. Thus, confession cleans the sin and the pain of the memory, but not the memory itself.[14] As the book containing secrets of the *heart* the memory here is spiritual as well as psychological. The use of *liber* again recalls a relationship between memory and the written word, and when Grosseteste writes that the secrets must be 'made manifest' he is referring to auricular confession; a verbal unfolding.[15] Describing conscience, or memory, in this way was not unusual; Eric Jager, in his study of the idea of the book of the heart in medieval writing, notes that the metaphor of memory as a wax-tablet is associative of memory and writing, an association used repeatedly by Augustine.[16] Grosseteste too refers to this metaphor

---

[13] Trans G. R. Evans, "On Conversion" in *Bernard of Clairvaux: Selected Works,* ed. Emilie Griffin (San Francisco, CA: HarperSanFrancisco, 2005), 1-47, at 33. Bernard of Clairvaux, *Sermo de conversione ad clericos (textus longior)* §28 (ed. BO 4, p. 103), 'huius indulgentia delet peccatum, non quidem ut a memoria excidat, sed ut quod prius inesse pariter et inficere consuevisset, sic de cetero insit memoriae, ut eam nullatenus decoloret.' Kisha G. Tracy, *Memory and Confession in Middle English Literature* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2017),18 uses this quote to compare the purging of sin from memory with the purging of actual memory as in the case of the *Fasciculus Morum*.

[14] In contrast, the anonymous fourteenth century *Fasciculus Morum* suggests that the memory is actually removed through Confession; the tongue acts not as a pen but as a penknife or *cultello*, see Tracy, *Memory and Confession,* 18-19.

[15] This Neoplatonic idea of a verbal *unfolding* is discussed below.

[16] Eric Jager, "The Book of the Heart: Reading and Writing the Medieval Subject," *Speculum* 71, no.1 (1996): 1-26, at 1-6

which had become popularised by the twelfth century; in *Dictum* 54; the idea of God writing on the 'tablets of the heart' (*tabulis cordis carnalibus*) is central.[17] The fleshy nature of these hearts makes reception easier, but preservation harder, as discussed in Chapter 1. Perhaps the most famous thirteenth-century *pastoralia* that examines the book of conscience is Robert de Sorbon's *De conscientia* which focuses on the 'examination of conscience as a preliminary to confession' by comparing it to the mental preparation before an examination undertaken by a student at the university of Paris.[18] Whilst Grosseteste does not offer a similar metaphor I will show that he clearly identifies within the act of confession an opportunity to explore sense data and to use memory and recollection as tools to abstract from this sense data knowledge of both self and God, fulfilling the requirements of *cognitio experimentalis.*

Grosseteste on how to Successfully Recollect.

The emphasis on order, particularly chronological order, in improving a person's recollection dates to antiquity.[19] The *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, at 3.7, instructs the orator to 'recount the events, observing their precise sequence and chronology, so that one may understand what the person under discussion did.'[20] Martianus Capella's *De nuptiis* also emphasises order; 'it is order which makes possible the rules of memory.'[21]

[17] Grosseteste, *Dictum* 54 f. 43rb; Jager, "Book of the Heart," 12.

[18] F. N. M. Diekstra, "Robert de Sorbon's "De Conscientia": A Truncated Text and Full Text," *Recherches de théologie et philosophie médiévales* 70 no.1 (2003): 22-117, at 23-4.

[19] Aristotle, *De memoria et reminscentia* 451b29 (trans. Sorabji, 55), 'and thus whenever someone wishes to recollect, he will do the following. He will seek to get a starting-point for a change after which will be the change in question. And this is why recollections occur quickest and best from a starting-best. For as the things are related to each other in succession, so also are the changes. And whatever has some order, as things in mathematics do, is easily remembered.'

[20] *Rhetorica ad Herennium* 3.7 (ed. and trans. LCL 403, pp. 178-9), 'deinde ut quaeque quove tempore res erit gesta ordine dicemus, ut quid quamque tute cauteque egerit intellegatur.'

[21] Martianus Capella, *De nuptiis* 5. 538 (ed. Willis, 189; trans. Stahl and Johnson, 203), 'quo admonitus intellexit ordinem esse, qui memoriae praecepta conferret.'

In *Dictum* 50 Grosseteste briefly refers to this chronological ordering; he instructs those at step 7 to remember the 12 martyrs *ut pro tempore.*[22] In *Quoniam cogitatio* §16 he explains why; confession should be conducted 'clearly and orderly, and in the order of the said past events' because, Grosseteste writes, 'remembering facts in due chronological order is no small help to one's search [*perscrutatio*].'[23]

A little later, at §28, Grosseteste refers to three other aspects with which to recall (*recolentes*); the instrument, the act itself, and the place in which it was undertaken. He writes,

> recollect chronologically, so far as we are able, the total accumulation of our works. And because, when we try to reminisce [*reminiscentia*] and focus on the time we did something, we often fail to recall it, it may be that we are able to recall the act by focusing instead on the instrument with which it was done, or from the place in which it was carried out; our *perscrutatio* must diligently run through all of these (and other circumstances) to impress upon and arouse our memory.[24]

---

[22] See Chapter 3.

[23] Grosseteste, *Quoniam cogitatio* §16 (eds. Mantello and Goering, 372-3), 'et ut hec fiant plene et ordinabiliter secundum ordinem temporum preteritorum, scrutetur ordinem factorum, primo, videlicet, primi anni unde recolit facta perscrutans, secundo secundi, et ita deinceps; et in singulis annis per singulorum, quantum poterit, distintas seriatim partes vigilanti perscrutatione incedat. Non enim parvum et iuvamentum ad facta memoranda ordinatem per temporum seriem discurrens perscrutatio.' Author's translation. Alexander Murray, "Historical Source," 50-1 has a partial translation of pieces of the *Quoniam cogitatio* from two different MSS to that of Mantello and Goering; Murray uses Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Bodley 52 ff. 151a-160b and Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Bodley 830 ff. 168d-174b, which Murray refers to using its older name, *De confessione I.* What is known today as *Deus est,* (ed. Wenzel), is referred to by Murray again by its older name, *De confessione II.* The differences are minor between the manuscripts used by Murray and Mantello and Goering, but I base my translation on the more recent Mantello and Goering edition.

[24] Grosseteste, *Quoniam cogitatio* (eds. Mantello and Goeting, 375), 'recolentes, in quantum possumus, ex serie temporum totam congeriem nostrorum operum. Et quia sic se habet nostra reminiscentia quod

These instructions to focus on time and location which can act as signposts to a certain memory or memories is emphasised in Geoffrey of Vinsauf's *Poetria Nova*, written ca. 1208-13.[25] Having survived in over two hundred manuscripts the *Poetria Nova* was an influential, if not the most influential, medieval *ars poetriae.*[26] Whilst the majority of the two-thousand line hexameter poem discusses the five rules or canons of rhetoric in detail, its discussion on memory is brief, but it may well have resonated with Grosseteste. Geoffrey instructs the orator to recall the 'places, times, images' (*loca, tempora, formae*) of whatever it is he wishes to remember, so that they act as 'signposts' (*notulae*) on a pathway to recollection itself.[27] These instructions are no less valid for the act of confession, and Grosseteste acknowledges the use of temporal location and distance. In an act reminiscent of Cicero's punning on *notatio* Geoffrey uses the word *notula* more usually associated with the act of small marginal notes to describe the process of memory organisation (see Chapter 3); Margaret F. Nims has translated this to 'signpost' to accurately reflect this double meaning.[28] Both Geoffrey

---

plerumque id quod egimus in aliquo tempore non recordatur ex eiusdem temporis apprehensione, et fortasse eundum actum revocabit in recordationem vel ex apprehensa virtute operante, vel ex apprehenso instrumento cum quo operatum est, vel ex genere ipsius actus, vel ex loco in quo gestum est, debet nostra perscrutatio vigilanter discurrere per hec omnia, et si qua sunt alia ex expergisci nostra memoria.' Author's translation.

[25] Geoffrey of Vinsauf, *Poetria Nova,* in Edmond Faral ed. *Les arts poétiques du XIIe et du XIIIe siècle: Recherches et documents sur la techniquelittéraire du moyen âge* (Paris: Librairie H. Champion, 1962), 194-262. A translation of this text can be found in Margaret F. Nims, *Poetria Nova of Geoffrey of Vinsauf* (Toronto: PIMS, 1960). For background see Copeland and Sluiter, *Medieval Grammar,* 594-6.

[26] Copeland and Sluiter, *Medieval Grammar,* 594-5

[27] The section on memory can be found in Geoffrey of Vinsauf, *Poetria Nova,* ll. 1970-2030 (ed. Faral, 258-9; trans. Nims, 87-91). 'Adde modos alios quibus utor et expedit uti. Visa, vel audita, vel praememorata, vel ante / Acta, mihi meminisse volens, ita confero mecum: / Sic vidi, sic audivi, sic mente revolvi, / Sic egi, vel tunc, vele ibi : loca, tempora, formae / Aut aliquae similes notulae mihi sunt via certa / Qua me ducit ad haec. Et in his inteligo signis. / Illud et illud erat, et imaginor illud et illud,' (ed. Faral, 259; trans. Nims, 89).

[28] Carruthers, "Inventional Mnemonics," 109.

and Grosseteste may have been inspired by Consultus Fortunatianus who incorporated Quintilian rhetoric into his fourth-century *Ars rhetorica,* writing that 'we will assign some kind of sign [*signum*] in the likeness of what has been written or thought.'[29]

The origin of Geoffrey of Vinsauf's *loca, tempora, formae* can be found in Hugh of St. Victor's *De tribus maximis circumstantiis gestorum id es personis locis temporibus* which as the title suggests emphatically lists number, location, and occasion as a means of learning and classifying information. As Hugh himself writes, 'whoever holds these three by memory in his soul will find that he has built a good foundation for himself.'[30] He continues,

> Indeed I consider nothing so useful for stimulating the memory as this; that we also pay attention careful to those circumstances of things which can occur accidentally and externally, so that, for example, together with the appearance and quality or location of the places in which we heard one thing or the other, we recall also the face and habits of the people from whom we learned this and that, and, if there are any, the things that accompany the performance of a certain activity.[31]

---

[29] Consultus Fortunatianus, *Ars rhetorica* 3.13 in *Rhetores Latini Minores*, ed. Karl Halm (Teubner, 1863), 81-134. There is a partial translation of this text by Jan M. Ziolkowski, "Consultus Fortunatianus, On Memory," in *Craft of Memory,* 295-7. Consultus Fortunatianus, *Ars rhetorica* 3.13 (ed. Halm, 129; trans. Ziolkowski, 296), 'tunc ad scripta vel cogitata aliquid signi ad eius similitudinem conlocabinus.'

[30] Hugh of St Victor, *De tribus maximis* ll.18-19 (ed. Green 491; trans. Carruthers, 39).

[31] Hugh of St. Victor, *De tribus maximis* ll.25-30 (ed. Green, 490; trans. Carruthers, 38), 'ego puto ad memoriam excitandam etiam illud non nichil [sic] prodesse, ut eas quoque extrinsecus accidere possunt circumstantias rerum non neglegenter attendamus, ut verbia gratia, cum faciem et qualitatem sive situm locorum reminiscimur ubi illud vel illud audivimus, vultus quoque et habitus personarum a quibus illa vel illa didiscimus, et si qua sunt talia quae gestionem cuiuslibet negotii comitantur.'

This clearly resonated with Grosseteste. *De tribus maximis* is not a treatise on confession; it is instead a technical instruction, written to his students, on how best to begin their Bible studies, with Hugh giving advice on how best to remember the Psalms, prefacing a chronology of Biblical history - indeed the title states that these are the 'best memory aids for learning history.' [32] However, just as Geoffrey of Vinsauf found utility in its application to poetry it seems that Grosseteste may also have found it useful in his exploration of the act and meaning of confession. Though number, location, and occasion act as scaffolding to the (re)construction of memories during the act of confession, they are not the only ones; rather, the *circumstantiae* of confession are listed in Grosseteste's manuals and those of his contemporaries.

The *Circumstantiae* of Confession.

As noted above, even the wording of Lateran IV's Canon 21 itself refers to the circumstance of the penitent as being important in mediating the priest's response to the sin and sinner. D. W. Robertson Jr. has shown that by the thirteenth century the set of circumstances, a mainstay in Greek and Latin rhetoric, had become important to theologians and were frequently incorporated into confessional manuals.[33] The generic nature of the circumstances, Robertson writes,

> afforded a much more flexible instruction for interrogation than the cumbersome older lists of specific cases which could not include all of the possibilities of a person, incident, and motivation which might confront the confessor.[34]

Robertson traces the origins of the circumstances from Hermagoras (First century) through to Boethius, with variations by Cicero, Consultus Fortunatianus, Victorinus,

[32] Carruthers, *Craft of Memory*, 32-3 for brief introduction and Zinn, "Hugh of Saint Victor," 211-34.

[33] Robertson, "Circumstances," 6-9.

[34] Robertson, "Circumstances," 7.

and C. Julius Victor, but it was Boethius's *De differentiis topicis* that lists them in their 'final' form of *quis, quid, cur, quomodo, ubi, quando, quibus auxiliis* established in legal practice.[35] As a hexameter, with its origins in Roman rhetoric, it became a popular and 'useful mnemonic and organising tool' in twelfth- and thirteenth-century penitential and theological works.[36] Additionally, the *circumstantiae* were used as 'standard medieval pedagogy' and the trinity of who, where, and when was commonly used in Biblical exegesis, dating back to Gregory the Great and Bede.[37] Thus Grosseteste would not have been at all unfamiliar with this kind of *divisio,* although, as Copeland and Sluiter note,

> the rhetorical circumstances penetrate so deeply and broadly into medieval and literary persuasive discourse that it would be impossible and unnecessary to trace every use of it to Boethius's *De topicis differntiis,*[38]

It is of note that one of the first to incorporate the circumstances as 'attributes of persons and attributes of actions' in confessional treaties was William de Montibus († 1213) master of the cathedral school in Lincoln, whose works may well have been familiar to Grosseteste.[39] We thus find evidence of Grosseteste's use of *circumstantiae* in *Quoniam cogitatio*, *Deus est*, *Ecclesia sancta celebrat*, *Perambulavit Iudas,* and, to

---

[35] Robertson, "Circumstances," 7-12.

[36] Rivers, *Preaching the Memory*, 60 (quote) especially n. 133-135; see also Copeland and Sluiter, *Medieval Grammar,* 191-4 and Robertson, "Circumstances," 6-12.

[37] Carruthers, *Craft of Memory*, 32,

[38] Copeland and Sluiter, *Medieval Grammar,* 193.

[39] Marjorie Curry Woods and Rita Copeland, "Classroom and Confession," in *The Cambridge History of Medieval English Literature,* ed. David Wallace (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 376-407, at 386 for more on William's use of the circumstances in the *Penitas cito.* Gasper, "On the Liberal Arts," 14.

an extent, in *Notus in Iudea est.*[40] In the *Quoniam cogitatio, Ecclesia sancta celebrat,* and *Deus est* he lists seven as 'who, what, where, with what, why, how, and when' but in the *Perambulavit Iudas* §7 he lists only five, 'what, when, where, how, how much.'[41] Towards the end of the text, at §40, Grosseteste enumerates a verse to help aid the Confessor. He writes that Judas's transgressions can be identified by examining the 'age, sense, location, time, instrument, sin, and extent, as it is said in the verse "examine carefully [*scrutans*] the age, sense, place, time, and instrument."[42]

Though variations were not uncommon it is interesting that in the *Perambulavit Iudas* there is a glaring omission of *cur* or why. Given that the *Quoniam cogitatio* was likely written 1239-40, whereas the *Perambulavit Iudas* was written 1230-40, it is possible the addition of *why* is a maturation in Grosseteste's thought on confession, one that becomes more interested in the motivation of a particular sin; suggesting that the *Perambulavit Iudas* was composed earlier in the 1230s rather than later. Though the

[40] Grosseteste, *Quoniam cotiatio* §6 (eds. Goering and Mantello, 373); *Perambulavit Iudas* §16 (eds. Goering and Mantello, 155); *Deus est* (ed. Wenzel, 257); *Notus in Iudea est* §15 (eds. Mantello and Goering, 269); *Ecclesia sancta celebrat* §26-32 (ed. McEvoy, 181-84).

[41] Grosseteste, *Quoniam cogitatio* §7 (eds. Goering and Mantello, 373), 'que circumstantie septem sunt hoc versa notate: Quis, quid, ubi, quibus auxiliis, cur, quomodo, quando;' *Deus est* (ed. Wenzel, 257) lists 'quarat,' 'quis,' 'quibus,' 'quomodo,' 'ubi,' and 'quando.' *Perambulavit Iudas* §16 (eds. Mantello and Goering, 155) lists 'quid, quando, ubi, quomodo, quantum,' recounting seven different circumstances a little later, at §40 (p. 167), 'annorum, sensuum, locorum, temporum, membrorum, peccatorum, preceptorum' which one can search by remembering 'etates, sensus, loca, tempora, membra,' discussed below. An even more basic formula can be found in *Notus in Iudea Deus* §15 (eds. Mantello and Goering, 269) where he writes 'confiteatur igitur penitens quociens, ubi, cum quantis, et cum quibus peccaverit, et quibus consenserit, et quociens consenserit.' *Ecclesia sancta celebrat* §26 (ed. McEvoy, 181) goes into detail on some, but not all, of the *circumstantiae,* 'quae sunt quis, quid, ubi, quibus auxiliis, cur, quomodo, quando.'

[42] Grosseteste, *Perambulavit Iudas* §40 (eds. Mantello and Goering, 167), 'perambulavit ergo iste Iudas diligenter universitatem annorum, sensuum, locorum, temporum, membrorum, peccatorum, preceptorum, sicut dicitur in versu : 'Scrutans etates, sensus, loca, tempora, membra.' Author's translation.

circumstantiae were incorporated into confessional manuals to aid the priest in their interrogation, it is worth remembering that they also form part of the structure for the penitent who responds to these questions (directly or indirectly) and they are thus incorporated into the scaffolding of recollection, just as much as Hugh of St. Victor's number, location, and occasion as a means of allowing the penitent to search their memories.

Whilst there are a variety of means by which Grosseteste would have come into contact with the seven circumstances, not least via Augustine's *De rhetorica* 7.2-3, a recent article by Michael C. Sloan has prompted a re-examination of their origins, not from Hermagoras as is conventionally ascribed but from Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* 3.3.[43] Sloan suggests that a passage at 1111a3, which is usually translated as having six circumstances by which one can determine voluntary and involuntary actions, should actually be split into seven.[44] Sloan translates the passages as follows:,

> therefore it is not a pointless endeavour to divide these circumstances by kind and number: (1) the who, (2) the what, (3) around what place or (4) in which time something happens, and sometimes (5) with what, such as an instrument, (6) for the sake of what, such as saving a life, and (7) the how, such as gently or violently.[45]

[43] Michael C. Sloan, "Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics as the Original Locus for the Septem Circumstantiae," *Classical Philology* 105 (2010): 236-51.

[44] For Sloan the problem lies in the passage which is 'riddled with vague constructions composed of prepositions combined with particles, and relative, demonstrative, and indefinite pronouns,' (Sloan, "Original Locus," 237) leading to mistranslations. He compares three popular translations of the same passage on 242.

[45] Sloan, "Original Locus," 239

For Sloan, the key lies in the rendering of Aristotle's grammar when describing the when (4) and the where (3). Grosseteste's translation of this text seems to correspond closely with Sloan's interpretation, which I have included in square brackets,

> forsitan igitur non malum determinare haec, quae et quot sunt, et [1] quis utique et [2] quid et [3] circa quid vel in quo operatur, [4] quandoque autem et [5] quo, puta instrumento, et [6] gratia cuius, puta salutis, et [7] qualiter, puta quiete vel vehementer.[46]

For Grosseteste the *circumstantiae* of every action is not just heuristic, it is not simply a rhetorical device inherited from ancient rhetoric to help structure the *investigation* of confession, but it is fundamental in establishing voluntary and involuntary acts, per Aristotle. The reason for this is found at 1109b32*,*

> hence it seems to be necessary for the student of ethics to define the difference between the Voluntary and the Involuntary; and this will also be of service to the legislator in assigning rewards and punishments.[47]

For Grosseteste this has clear and obvious ramifications in the act of confession particularly in the imposition of any penance upon the penitent. As such, he goes into great detail regarding the individual circumstances of each case, such as in *De modo*

---

[46] Grosseteste, commentary on the *Nicomachean Ethics 3*.3 (ed. Mercken, vol. 1, pp. 243-4. Though Grosseteste's translation was the first to tackle the work as a whole, the *Ethica Vetus*, which was available prior to Grosseteste, contained Books 1-3; as such, Grosseteste's translation of this particular passage was not new per se.

[47] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 3.3 (ed. and trans LCL. 73, p. 117). For Aristotle there are voluntary, non-voluntary, and involuntary actions. Involuntary actions are those performed under compulsion or through ignorance, and which induce regret after the fact. This is different to a non-voluntary action, which is an action performed through ignorance or compulsion but which does *not* induce regret after the fact. This is discussed in the *Nicomachean Ethics* 3.1.

confitendi et paenitentis, where he suggests that the priest and the penitent come to an agreement on suitable penances so as not to be too burdensome.[48]

The *Quoniam cogitatio:* Confession as a (Re)constructive Search.

Book 10 of Augustine's *Confessions* describes an act of deep personal introspection. Chapters 8-25 detail the power of the memory not just in remembering 'all that I have ever learned of the liberal sciences' (10.9) but also 'how I learned them' (10.13).[49] It is in Chapter 25 where the ultimate power of the memory lies; the memory is the dwelling place (*habitus*) of God and only in the memory can God be found (*invenio*) when reminded.[50] This activity described by Augustine is specifically only available to humans; animals do not recollect (though they do have memory - see the fish at Bulla Regia, Chapter 1). Recollection as an exclusively human activity is discussed by Aristotle in *De memoria et reminiscentia*; it is a type of a reason (*sillogisimus*) an 'association of ideas' to quote Richard Sorabji.[51] By defining it as 'a sort of search' (*questio*) as Aristotle does at 453a12 it is an activity available exclusively to humans, and, with its reliance on experience, sense-perception, and, crucially, on time, it is highly autobiographical.[52] Thus David Bloch describes the ability of Aristotle's

[48] Grosseteste's *De modo confitendi et paenitentis iniungendi* appears in "Penitential Writings," 52-112, at 80-111. Grosseteste, *De modo confitendi* 2.15 (eds. Goering and Mantello, 96). He suggests that if a woman's penance for adultery is to fast, but if this fasting would arouse suspicion then it would be preferable for the woman to eat a little in order to quell this suspicion. This is discussed by Murray, "Counselling," 101.

[49] Augustine, *Confessions* 10.9 and 10.13 (trans. Pine-Coffin, 216, and 219).

[50] Augustine, *Confessions* 10.25 (trans. Pine-Coffin, 231), 'truly you do dwell in it, because I remember you ever since I first came to learn of you, and it is there that I find you when I am reminded of you.'

[51] Sorabji, *Aristotle on Memory*, 42.

[52] Aristotle, *De memoria et reminscentia* 2, 453a12 (trans. Sorabji, 59). James of Venice, 2 (453a) *Iacobus Veneticus translator Aristotelis. De memoria et reminiscentia* (ed. AL 14.1), 'causa autem est quia reminisci est ut sillogismus quidam: quod aliquid prius vidit aut audivit aut aliquid huiusmodi passus fuit, sillogizatur reminiscens, et est ut questio quedam.'

memoria as to 'constitute the life of an individual in general, providing it with coherence.'[53] This understanding of memory corresponds very well with the memory in Augustine's *Confessions*.

The *Quoniam cogitatio* treats the act of confession in an unrelenting Augustinian manner; he describes one's memory as a *thesaurus* at §16.[54] Quoting Isaiah 38:15 Grosseteste instructs the penitent to reflect (*recogito*) on the years of bitterness in their soul by searching their memory and scrutinising their deeds, vis-a-vis Augustine in *Confessions*.[55] *De modo confitendi* has a similar task for the penitent, that is one that requires interrogation (*interrogo*) in order to search what is both in and not in the memory.[56] In *Quoniam cogitatio* this self-scrutiny or search is described as *perscrutatio* and needs to extend to acts committed in childhood, for which other testimony, such as that from other witnesses, may be required as the penitent may not hold these in their memory.[57] In the *Perambulavit Iudas* §40 the instruction is to search (*scrutans*) the five topics of ages, sense, location, time, and instrument.[58] According to the *Quoniam*

[53] Bloch, *Aristotle on Memory,* 62.

[54] Grosseteste, *Quoniam cogitatio* §16, (eds. Mantello and Goering, 372), 'debet itaque qui plene vult confiteri cogitatione sua perscrutari totum thesaurum memorie sue.'

[55] Grosseteste, *Quoniam cogitatio* §16 (eds. Mantello and Goering, 373), 'ideo dicit: "Recogitabo tibi omnes annos meos."

[56] Grosseteste *De modo confitendi* §1.11 (eds. Mantello and Goering, 82), 'carissime frather, non omnia quae fecisti ad memorian veniunt. Ideo interrogabo te.'

[57] Grosseteste, *Quoniam cogitatio* §16 (eds. Mantello and Goering, 372), see also 344.

[58] Grosseteste, *Perambulavit Iudas* §40 (eds Mantello and Goering, 167), 'perambulet ergo iste Iudas dilligenter universitatem annorum, sensuum, locorum, temporum, membrorum, peccatorum, preceptorum, sicut dicitur in versu: 'scrutans etates, sensus, loca, tempora, membra.' *Etates*: quid scilicet in puericia, quid in iuventute commisit, et sic de ceteris; *sensus*: quid per gustum, quid per tactum, et sic de ceteris; *loca*: quid hoc quid illo loca; *tempora*: uno tempore vel alio; membra: quomodo uno membro, quomodo alio; *peccatorum*: quid uno peccator, quid alio-- singula debemus confiteri ('Lavabo per singulas noctes...'); *praeceptorum*: quantum ad ommisionem.'

cogitatio, this should be done chronologically and, due to the fallible nature of our memories, other witnesses to sinful acts should be sought in order to confess fully.[59] One of these witnesses, Grosseteste writes at §32, can be the sense organs themselves – they are corporeal instruments warned of in §28 and an examination of these body parts can help with the act of confession by focusing on it heuristically, just as the *manus* described in Chapter 3 helps the recollecter to focus on the five points represented by the five fingers.[60] It is the art of recollection that is so valuable to Grosseteste in the act of confession; it is the year-by-year search through what we can recall (*recolit facta perscrutans*) that gives us the subject-matter of confession.[61] Grosseteste's choice of words in the *Quoniam cogitatio* pertaining to remembering and recollection is pertinent because it betrays an Aristotelian leaning. At §28 Grosseteste explicitly refers to the act of *reminiscentia* as the act involved in confession. For Aristotle the distinction between remembering and recollecting is crucial because all animals can remember, but only humans can recollect. This is because 'recollecting is, as it were, a sort of reasoning' (*sillogisimus*) that involves the deliberative part.[62] John Blund repeats this distinction in his *Tractatus de anima* at 20.275, suggesting that recollection (*reminisci*) is only of universals, whereas remembering (*memorari*) is of universals and singulars.[63] By using *reminiscentia* Grosseteste is suggesting that the universal can be known via the act of confession, emphasising its theological importance. *Reminiscentia* belongs to the

---

[59] Grosseteste *Quoniam cogitatio* §28 (eds. Mantello and Goering, 375-6) see also 345-6.

[60] Grosseteste, *Quoniam cogitatio* §32 (eds. Mantello and Goering, 376-7) see also 346.

[61] Grosseteste, *Quoniam cogitatio* §16 (eds. Mantello and Goering, 372-3), 'primi anni unde recolit facta persrutans...' and §28 (pp. 375-6) as well as discussion on 344.

[62] Aristotle, *De memoria et reminiscentia* 2 453a12 (trans. Sorabji, 59). James of Venice, *Veneticus translator Aristotelis. De memoria et reminiscentia* 453a (ed. AL 14.1), 'causa autem est quia reminisci est ut sillogismus quidam: quod aliquid prius vidit aut audivit aut aliquid huiusmodi passus fuit, sillogizatur reminiscens, et est ut questio quedam.'

[63] Blund, *Tractatus de anima* 20.275 (eds. Callus and Hunt, 74), 'hinc habetur quid reminisci est universalium tantum, memorari est et universalium es singularium.' See also Coleman, *Medieval Memories,* 372.

thinking part of the soul, and Aristotle emphasises time as fundamental requirement; in the *Quonaim cogitatio* Grosseteste repeatedly refers to time as it relates to apprehension and its distance from recollection - the difference in time of a childhood sin to it constituting an act of confession. This suggests that Grosseteste was knowledgeable of *De memoria et reminiscentia* either directly or indirectly, and appreciated the value placed on *reminiscentia* as a *perscrutatio.*

This emphasis on recollection is an important one for Grosseteste, who is using it here to establish a specifically human ability. He has established elsewhere that animals have, to some extent, a memory that contributes to the formation of habit - the fish of Bulla Regia who can 'keep in their memory the usual times of feeding,' the sick ant-eating bears and monkey-eating lions of *Dicta* 121 and 122 do so out of habit to aid their health.[64] What is interesting to note about both of these scenarios is that neither refer to knowledge, or knowing, or intelligence, or reason or anything approaching such phenomenon – they are all simply something a lion (or bear) does. This suggests that Grosseteste understood the animals as acting by their *phantasmata*, but without reason or understanding.

Though Grosseteste offers in *Quoniam cogitatio* many suggestions on how best to recollect (the *circumstantiae,* ruminating on a particular bodily instrument, focusing on time and location), he does acknowledge that there are occasions where our memory simply fails us in supplying the objects of thought. Thus, he says at §16 we must rely on the testimony of others when trying to recall our childhood,

> we are able to infer and affirm events from the credible testimony of others. From this retelling of events we are able to bring forth that which has escaped

[64] Grosseteste, *Hexaëmeron* 6.9.1 (eds. Dales and Gieben, 191; trans. Martin, 194), 'nam certis experientiis compertum est pisces retinere memoria consuetas nutrimentorum recepciones.' Grosseteste, *Dictum* 121*,* f. 101ra, 'ursus eger formicas devorat;' Grosseteste, *Dictum* 122*,* ff. 101rb – 101va, 'leo eger simeam querit ut devoret, quo posset sanari.'

> our memory. As Augustine did in his *Confessions*, it was from watching other children that he was able to see what he himself had done as a child.[65]

Additionally, the penitent can also utilise their *imaginatio* in order to confess things they may not necessarily have either placed in their memory at the time (that is, when they were young) or are unable to recollect at the time of the act of confession.[66] He writes at §28,

> our *perscrutatio* should recollect, as far as possible, the places we have been; if the memory is not able to recall these places at the time, then the imagination might.[67]

Mantello and Goering have described this as a directive to 'imagine plausibly.'[68] Grosseteste is clearly instructing the penitent to "fill-in" memories that one cannot find in their internal *perscrutatio;* the imagination's ability to manipulate *phantasmata* is here beneficial. Because these are not actual memories, the act of confession then moves to the *locus* of imagination. Does this then suggest that the memory is an action

---

[65] Grosseteste, *Quoniam cogitatio* §16 (eds. Mantello and Goering, 373), 'set et facta que possumus ratiocinando arguere et ex aliorum credibili relatione intelligere, lice a nostra exciderit memoria nos ea fecisse. Hoc enim facit Augustinus in libro confessionum suarum, ex simili videlicet quod videt in aliis pueris arguens quid ipse puer corrigendum et confitendum egerit.' Author's translation.

[66] Grosseteste, *Quoniam cogitatio* §16 (eds. Mantello and Goering, 373) regarding memories of childhood; §28 (p. 376), 'recogitet igitur, quantum potest, nostra perscrutatio eciam loca in quibus fuimus, si forte ex loci in quo quid gessimus imaginatione occurrat memorie quod non potuit recordari ex tempore'.

[67] Grosseteste, *Quoniam cogitatio* §28 (eds. Mantello and Goering, 376), 'recogitet igitur, quantum potest, nostra perscrutatio etiam in loca in quibus fuimus, si forte ex loci in quo quid gessimus imaginatione occurrat memorie quod non potuit recordari ex tempore.' Author's translation.

[68] Mantello and Goering, "Quoniam cogitatio," 344

or operation of the imagination, if we are able to invent memories through that particular faculty? Mantello and Goering suggest so; their reading of the text recommends that the effort of Confessing actions having occurred in infancy, for example, 'might spark one's imagination to recall deeds that had otherwise been forgotten.'[69] *Imaginatio* here seems to take on the ability to manipulate, or indeed create, memories and to incorporate the memories of others; at §16 he refers to *Confessions* 1.7 about relying on the testimony of others to provide a false memory of one's infancy.[70] Indeed this would seem to fit with Grosseteste's statement in the *Hexaëmeron* about childhood being the time in which 'memory begins to gain strength' thus we cannot recollect (*recordor*) what was never in the memory in the first place; for this we must substitute what we can produce in our imagination from other sources.[71] Clearly, for Grosseteste, the act of confession is fundamentally an act of memory (or, in some instances, of imagination), specifically an act of recollection, but it is also an *exercitatio animi,* what Teske defines as 'an exercise to train the mind' similar, then, to a thought experiment.[72]

Whist the application of the (seven) circumstances to the act of confession is ostensibly to aid the average priest in allowing for an 'easily remembered' and 'much more flexible instrument for interrogation,' Grosseteste was no average priest.[73] Familiar as he was with the *Posterior Analytics,* which at the beginning of Book 2 lays out the four questions that are necessary for scientific enquiry, that of *quia, propter quid, si est,* and *quid est,* roughly translatable as that, why, whether, and what, it is possible that he saw

[69] Mantello and Goering, "Quoniam cogitatio," 345-6.

[70] Augustine, *Confessions* 1.7 (trans. Pine-Coffin, 28), 'I do not remember that early part of my life, O Lord, but I believe what other people have told me about it.'

[71] Grosseteste, *Hexaëmeron* 8.32.2 (eds. Dales and Gieben, 256; trans. Martin, 262); Grosseteste, *Quoniam cogitatio* §16, 28 (eds. Mantello and Goering, 327-3, and 375-6).

[72] Teske, "Augustine's Philosophy," 151.

[73] Robertson, "Classical Origin," 7.

a similarity in the circumstances of confession with those of scientific enquiry.[74] As L. M. De Rijk explains, '*quia* and *propter quid* ask about some state of affairs (*pragma*) whereas the other two concern the subject involved in the state of affairs.'[75] Grosseteste saw in the act of confession an opportunity to apply vigorous inquiry of the knowable world in order to abstract from the particular (the specific occasion of sin) to the universal (knowledge of one's own self, and of God). Important to confession is not just what happened (De Rijk's "state of affairs") but also the human element (De Rijk's "subject involved"). Leonard Boyle and, more recently, Jacqueline Murray have commented that this act of confession 'becomes more personal, more aware of self' and that confession 'helped the laity to develop skills of self-analysis and self-knowledge, skills that would allow them to understand themselves, think for themselves, and perhaps even reach their own conclusions.'[76] The language of Lateran IV's Canon 21 reflects this idea of confession as an act of discernment (*discerno*) not just of the penitent but of the priest who must evaluate the circumstances (*circumstantiae*) by referring to his own experience (*diversis experimentis*).[77]

This suggestion of "filling in" the blanks from childhood is reminiscent of an instruction from classical rhetorical training, whereby pseudo-Cicero instructs on how to create reliable mnemonic architecture as an aide-mémoire (this takes up the majority of Book 3). He writes 'hence, if we are not content with our ready-made supply of

[74] Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* 2.1 89b23 (ed. and trans. LCL 391, p. 175). James of Venice *Iacobus Veneticus translator Aristotelis. Analytica posterioria* 2.1 (89b), (ed. AL 4.1, p. 69), 'querimus autem quator, quia, propter quid, si est, quid est.' See also De Rijk "Posterior Analytics," 106.

[75] De Rijk, "Posterior Analytics," 106.

[76] Boyle, "Fourth Lateran Council," 34; and Jacqueline Murray, "Confessions of a Medieval(ist)."

[77] *Concilium Lateranense IV* Canon 21 (ed. and trans. DDGC, p. 570, pp. 259-60), 'sacerdos autem sit discretus et cautus, ut more periti medici superinfundant vinium et oleum vulneribus sauciati; diligenter inquirens et peccatoris circumstantias et peccati, per quas prudenter intelligat, quale illi consilium debeat exhibere, et huiusmodo remedium adhibere, diversis experimentis utendo ad sanandum aegrotum.' The DDGC translates *diversis experimentis* as 'different experiments' which I do not find suitable.

backgrounds, we may in our imagination create a region for ourselves and obtain a most serviceable distribution of appropriate backgrounds.'[78] Whilst the purpose of this instruction is intended towards artificial memory training, Grosseteste seems willing to apply it to autobiographical memory with relative ease. The 'backgrounds' or *loci* of the *ad Herennium's* mnemonic architecture become the *loci* of sin, regardless of whether they are real or not they can still function in their role of aiding recollection.

Footprints: *Vestigia*.

The locational aspect of Grosseteste's conceptualisation of memory is apparent not just in his architectural descriptions but in this idea that memory is a *locus* and *habitus* to be explored and discovered by a retrospective *perscrutatio,* a search that is structured and precise via the interrogative practices of the priest. The *topos* of the tract *Notus in Iudea Deus* resonates with sin; the five corporeal cities are the five cities of Egypt and the sinner must become the Maccabean hero Judas who, just as he destroyed the cities in Egypt, must destroy (or, rather, conquer) the evil cities of the bodily senses.[79] Perhaps what is most interesting about the two is the similarity to Bernard of Clairvaux's *Qui Habitat* Sermon 3 in which the monks are warned not to return to Egypt.[80] Mette Bruun has described the 'demonic topoi' that Bernard presents to the reader; that of an evil Babylon and Egypt, and a good Jerusalem, a 'spiritual topography' that Grosseteste also explores with the evil corporeal cities of Egypt in *Notus in Iudea Deus* and *Perambulavit Iudas*.[81] This is suggestive of a broader tradition of the trope of the body

[78] *Rhetorica ad herennium* 3.19 (ed. and trans. LCL 403, pp. 212-13), 'quare licebit, si hac prompta copia contenti non erimus, nosmet ipsos nobis cogitatione nostra regionem constituere, et idoneorum locorum commodissimam distinctionem conparare.'

[79] Grosseteste, *Notus in Iudea Deus* §3 (eds. Mantello and Goering, 266), 'terra Egipti: corpus peccati; quinque civitates: 5 corporis sensus.' Grosseteste, *Perambulavit Iudas* §5 (eds. Mantello and Goering, 149) has a near-identical phrasing.

[80] Bernard of Clairvaux*, Qui habitat* Sermo 3.5 (ed. BO 4, p. 396), 'legimus enim de filiis Israel, quia corde redierunt in Aegyptum Nam corpore reverti, clausum post eorum talos Rubrum mare prohibebat.'

[81] Bruun, *Spiritual Topography*, 52, 225, 279.

politic found in the likes of Plato's *Republic* and al-Farabi's *The Book of the Views of the Inhabitants of the Virtuous City,* where the corporeal senses are presented as regions of a kingdom reporting back news to an ultimate king (the *sensus communis*).[82]

If the memory is a *topos* then it needs to be experienced just as the external *topos* of the corporeal world does. To do this Grosseteste employs more locational language that has roots in Quintilian rhetoric; using *footprints* or *vestigia. Vestigium* as 'trace' or 'footprint' has long been a part of the language and rhetoric of memory; it is used by Quintilian in the *Institutio oratore* to liken hunting and memory-searching, looking for the traces of their prey and Augustine 'often speaks of memories as being like animals hunted from their lairs, whose tracks or vestiges are to be followed through their familiar pathways in the forest.'[83] In the *Hexaëmeron* Grosseteste speaks of the *vestigia* of Biblical interpretation as akin to searching for clues.[84] In the Commentary on the *Mystical Theology* one searches for the *vestigia* of God, and in *De libero arbitrio* one searches for the 'vestige, similitude, and image of his creator' (*vestigium et similitudo et imago sui creatoris*).[85] Brett Smith briefly discusses Grosseteste's use of *vestigia* and holds that in this reference in *De libero arbitrio recensio posterior* 16.10 it is synonymous with image and similitude, but when one incorporates an understanding of *vestigia* as pertains to memory-craft this is not necessarily solely the case.[86] For Brett

[82] Hellen-Roazan, "Common Sense," 39.

[83] Carruthers, *Book of Memory* xi, 324, referring to Augustine, *Confessions,* 11.18. Quntilian, *Institutio oratore* 5.9-5.10 (ed. LCL 125, pp. 362-33, and 374-7).

[84] Grosseteste, *Hexaëmeron* 4.1.4 (eds. Dales and Gieben, 123; trans. Martin, 124), 'volo autem scire lectorem quod se qua non ex auctenticis verbis scribendo intersero, non enunciativo modo eadem profero, sed exercicii sloco auditoribus intimo, "coniercturis quibusdam atque indiciis veritatis persequens vestigia.'" See also Grosseteste, *Hexaëmeron* 4.3.2.

[85] Grosseteste, *De libero arbitrio recensio posterior* 16.10 (ed. and trans. Lewis, 226-9); Grosseteste, commentary on the *Mystical Theology* 1.4 (ed. and trans. McEvoy, 82-3).

[86] Smith, "Affectus and Aspectus," 329-30.

Smith the importance of the use of *vestigia* in Grosseteste's work as it relates to his *affectus/aspectus* dichotomy is that 'it is like how a footprint reveals the shape and size of a foot' - it reveals the divine exemplar to 'some degree.'[87] Smith is clear in his understanding of *vestigia* here; 'the point is that sensible things bear an imitatory likeness of the divine Light.'[88] A footprint in the snow can show the shape and size of the foot that left it, but it is distinct from that same foot. Smith uses this to argue that knowledge of the divine mind may be found in examplars, likeness, and copies that are all around us. However, I read it in a different way. Rather than being evidence for the imitations of divine exemplars found in all creation, the footprint/*vestigia* example is similar to the seal-in-wax analogy of memory; the retaining of impressions. Additionally, *vestigium* itself has a mnemonic connotation, and any student of Roman rhetoric would immediately identify this Quintilian description of memory-traces. The use of *vestigia* instead suggests that, if *vestigium* is to be taken as akin to a memory phantasm that one must trace or hunt then memory is *just another way* of finding the Creator. This idea of vestiges of God which can be find in the memory is again indicative, Simon Oliver suggests, of some sort of concept of Platonic Recollection akin to the 'awakening' of the soul via repeated sense impressions in his *cPA*.[89] I posit that in Smith's reading the problem of the *vestigia* is here the same as the problem of the seal-in-wax metaphor in *Letter* 1 and *Dictum* 60; a footprint in the snow leaves the same impression as a seal in wax. Instead, the *vestigia* is a mnemonic or heuristic trace of the Creator. If God is found in the memory as per Augustine, then the concept of following *vestigia* in order to find Him would not be ill fitting. Just as Quintilian's 'hunter' must use his senses to search for the *traces* of animals in the analogy so too must one search their own memory for the *vestigia* of God.[90]

---

[87] Smith, "Affectus and Aspectus," 30.

[88] Smith, "Affectus and Aspectus," 229.

[89] Grosseteste, *cPA* 2.6 (ed. Rossi, 404); Oliver, "Light, Truth, Experimentum," 168-9.

[90] Grosseteste, commentary on the *Mystical Theology* 1.4 (ed. and trans. McEvoy, 82-3).

Confession as Performance: a Verbal Unfolding Between Priest and Penitent.

As discussed above, the relationship between priest and penitent is an important one in the discussion of confession. Not only does it rely on the priest's own experiences in the giving out of advice, but it is an inherently private relationship that relies on the verbalisation of one's autobiographical recollections. The act of confession was, for the priest who hears it, a difficult exercise to accommodate due to its peculiar context; it was individual, instant, secret, and unscripted, to use Alexander Murray's terms.[91] confessional manuals were intended to help the priest gauge the applicable penance but ultimately each experience was individual and so each remedy needed to be tailor-made, and it was here that prudence's importance became clear.[92] The large variety of examples found in confessional manuals attest to this difficulty by highlighting the uniqueness of individual circumstances, with the outcome relying on the priest's ability to judge and discern these circumstances correctly, often relying on a variation of the seven circumstances. As the text of Lateran IV's Canon 21 states, discernment was required on the side of the penitent and the priest. confession was not required until the penitent had reached the 'age of discretion' (*annos discretionis pervenerit*).[93] The priest, for their part,

> shall be discreet and cautious [*discretus et cautus*] [...] carefully inquiring into the circumstances of the sinner and the sin, [*peccatoris circumstantias et peccati*] from the nature of which he may understand [*prudenter intelligat*] what kind of advice to give and what remedy to apply, making use of different experiments [*diversis experimentis*] to heal the sick.[94]

[91] Murray, "Counselling," 89.

[92] Murray, "Counselling," 90-3.

[93] *Concilium Lateranense IV* Canon 21 (ed. and trans. DDGC, p. 570, pp. 259-60).

[94] *Concilium Lateranense IV* Canon 21 (ed. and trans. DDGC, p. 570, pp. 259-60), 'sacerdos autem sit discretus et cautus, ut more periti medici superinfundant vinium et oleum vulneribus sauciati; diligenter inquirens et peccatoris circumstantias et peccati, per quas prudenter intelligat, quale illi consilium debeat exhibere, et huiusmodo remedium adhibere, diversis experimentis utendo ad sanandum aegrotum.' As I explain in n. 77 above, I disagree with the DDGC's rendering of 'diversis experimentis' as 'diverse experiments.'

Every act of confession is individual, unique; particular. David Tell has remarked that Augustine's *Confessions* is an act of 'performative remembering' whereby speech, that is, the act of verbal confession, becomes the remembering itself.[95] Remarkably this is similar to a discussion of memory in Plotinus's *Enneads* where he writes at 4.3.30,

> the verbal expression unfolds its content and brings it out of the intellectual act into the image-making power, and so shows the intellectual act as if in a mirror, and this is how there is apprehension and persistence and memory of it.[96]

The verbal expression that is unfolding for Grosseteste is confession, brought out of the intellectual act of reminiscence and into the image-making power of *phantasia* which, according to the Neoplatonists, can reflect higher realms as well as lower. It is this Platonic account of memory linked with language that is, for Augustine, crucial to epistemology; as Janet Coleman writes, 'man must come to God through a linguistic rejuvenation, and his [Augustine's] theory of cognition through speech required an active participation of the memory,' arguing that Augustine's early career as an orator placed heavy emphasis on language.[97] Thus, for Augustine as for Plotinus, memory was not just the sensory-impressions of sensible objects; it was also the *verbal expression* - this is how one remembers formulae that do not have their related images or *phantasmata*, for example.[98] This, of course, flies in the face of Aristotle's account that all thinking, and all memory, involves images but it does allow Grosseteste to combine

---

[95] Tell, "Beyond Mnemotechnics," 234-6.

[96] Plotinus, *Enneads* 4.3.30 (ed. and trans. LCL 443, pp. 130-1). Sheppard, *Poetics*, 52 discusses this at length.

[97] Coleman, *Medieval Memories,* 84, and 81-3.

[98] Coleman, *Medieval Memories,* 70-1, and 82.

his physiology of speech, as outlined in *De artibus liberalibus* (see Chapter 1) with the function of an elevated, nobler memory. This focus on the act of recollecting as being necessary for salvation, expounded by Lateran IV, is entirely compatible with Aristotelian memory theory; at 449b22 of *De memoria et reminiscentia* he writes 'for whenever someone is actively engaged in remembering, he always says in his soul in this way that he heard, or perceived, or thought this before.'[99] Memory, as the *thalamus* of *Dictum* 54 is where the interior word originates. Memory, then, is both the producer and retainer of words (*verbi*) and if it is from memory that words are given life then confession is an ideal manifestation of this vivacity.

Thus, in confession, experience is shared between the priest and the penitent. The *cPA* 2.6 explains how multiple experience form multiple memories (which form knowledge of the universal), but, in the act of confession memory, or rather, recollection forms the experience itself. Grosseteste's enthusiasm for confession, prompted by Lateran IV and formalised in the sheer quantity and survival of confessional manuals he produced, suggests that he saw in the act of confession a sharing of experiences. Alexander Murray has tentatively described this idea in the following way,

> if one confessor learned this from the experience of *his* life, may not others, less literary than he, have learned it too? And if each learned it individually, and if they habitually shared their experiences, may they not in some sense have learned it collectively?[100]

Thus, shared memories become shared experiences, and memory becomes its own epistemological tool. The verbal unfolding of confession allows for an opportunity not just for a shared expression between the sinner and the speaker but for the opportunity

[99] Aristotle, *De memoria et reminiscentia* 449b22 (trans. Sorabji, 48).

[100] Murray, "Historical Source," 72-3.

for the sinner themselves to "re-remember" -- as Grosseteste writes in the Prooemium to the *Hexaëmeron*,

> the living voice has a hidden operation of making a strong impression, on the mind [*in mente*] of the reader, of the meaning that the speaker understands in the utterance. For the understanding of the speaker is the life and form of the utterance of the word as it enters through the hearer's ears.[101]

Thus, when the sinner verbally confesses a sin (that they may not actually be remembering, as per the instructions in *Quoniam cogitatio* §16 and §28), the imagined, fake memory transforms into a real memory. The strength of the *logos* is emphasised via its ability to be (re)impressed on the memory. As Carruthers notes,

> in their understanding of the matter, it was memory that made knowledge into useful experience, and memory that combined their pieces of information-become-experience into what we call "ideas," what they were more likely to call "judgements."[102]

For the priest, memory was the *treasury* of their own experience, one that allowed them to pick and choose the appropriate forms of penance.

---

[101] Grosseteste, *Prooemium* to the *Hexaëmeron* §52 (eds. Dales and Gieben, 31; trans. Martin, 28), 'habet autem viva vox latentem operationem imprimendi fortis in mente auidtoris sensum quem intelligetn in voce loquens. Ipsa enim loquentis intelligentia vita est et forma vocis verbi ingredientis per aures auditoris.'

[102] Carruthers, *Book of Memory*, 2.

From Rhetoric to Ethics: Confession, Discernment, and *Prudentia*.

Kimberly Rivers has argued that one of the achievements of Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas in their treatment of memory was their ability to ally Cicero's *loci* techniques with Aristotle's emphasis on the importance of order in the act of recollection, writing,

> because human experience is saved through memory and the images of past events, a system that enhances such memories through image-making will fit the requirements for a moral life.[103]

That confession involves discernment on behalf of the priest is manifest in Canon 21, but it is the linking of memory with *prudentia* and the ability to maintain a moral life that highlights a culmination of thirteenth-century attitudes towards memory by referring back to Cicero's tripartite *prudentia* as being formed of memory, intelligence, and foresight (*memoria, intelligentia, providentia*).[104] This allying of memory with the future is thus an important one for this shift, and though he does not necessarily do so in his confessional manuals (at least, not explicitly, only in the way that confession, an act of memory, can lead to and is a required part of a morally good life), there is one occasion where he does link the two. In *Dictum* 52 I suggest Grosseteste describes confession using the metaphor of a courtroom, one which is nestled into an elaboration of the nine spirits in which he takes the audience through vivid descriptions of each, placed as they are in a tabernacle.[105] Architectonically speaking, the sermon is weak;

---

[103] Rivers, *Preaching the Memory*, 86.

[104] Cicero, *De inventione* 2.53 (ed. and trans. LCL 386, pp. 326-7), 'prudentia est rerum bonarum et malarum neutrarumque scientia. Partes eius: memoria, intellegentia, providentia. Memoria est per quam animus repetit illa quae fuerunt; intellegentia, per quam ea perspicit quae sunt; providentia, per quam futurum aliquid videtur ante quam factum est.' Bloch, *Aristotle on Memory,*190-7. See also Carruthers, *Book of Memory*, 83-9.

[105] Grosseteste, *Dictum* 52. Declan Lawell discusses this *Dictum* as it relates to a sermon of Thomas Gallus in Declan Lawell, "Qualiter Vita Prelatorum Conformari Debet Vite Angelice: A Sermon (1244-

there is little emphasis placed on mnemonics other than *ekphrasis* or the creation of vivid images and the only *ordo* is the Dionysian hierarchy. It is however his discussion of Thrones, a class of judicial angel, that proves relevant in the context of confession as a judicial act and the powers of the soul. He starts by comparing Thrones to school masters, sitting as magistrates and deliberating on universals and singulars; he then compares this act to ecclesiastical judges, and then to the king.[106] However, Grosseteste, conscious of being too esoteric, then suggests how even the laity can imitate Thrones,

> but those who can be neither masters nor scholars nor judges of the Church, for fear they may seem entirely deprived of the imitation of these blessed spirits, let them judge themselves lest they be judged, 'for if we would judge ourselves, we should not be judged.' So in the city of our soul these people elect reason to be the judge of the powers of the soul, for whom Holy Scripture will be the law; the tribunal immovability and inflexibility to the four affections of the soul; the ushers recollection, contemplation, expectation [*recordatio, contuitio, expectatio*], who will summon the desires to judgement, the active, the voluntary, the past, the present and the future in deliberation; the courtroom [*auditorium*] will be memory [*memorie aula*]; the witness-box [*testis*] conscience.[107]

46?) Attributed to Thomas Gallus," *Recherches de Theologie et Philosophie Medievales* 75, no. 2 (2008): 303–36.

[106] Grosseteste, *Dictum* 52 f. 41rb,

[107] Grosseteste, *Dictum* 52 ff. 41rb-va, 'qui autem nec magistri possunt esse scolastici nec iudices eccesiastici, ne horum beatorum spirituum imitatione videantur omnino privari, diudicent semetipsos ne iudicentur. Quia [1 Cor. 11:31] "si nosmetipsos diudicaremus, non utique iudicaremur." In civitate itaque anime nostre populus virium anime iudicem eligat rationem, cui sit lex Scriptura sacra, tribunal immobilitas et inflexibilitas a quatuor anime affectibus, apparitores recordatio, contuitio [sic] expectatio, qui populum voluntatum et actuum voluntariorum preteritorum, presentium, et in deliberatione futurorum vocent ad iudicium. Auditorium sit memorie aula, testis cuiuslibet conscientia.' Trans Jackson, *Dicta*, vol. 5, p. 18. Notice how here the *memoria* is clearly the *auditorium* of the court, with conscience as the witness - compare this to Murray who describes *memory* as the 'chief witness' in "Historical Source," 51.

The unusualness of using a judicial metaphor is discussed by Declan Lawell; he uses it as evidence of a close relationship between Thomas Gallus and Grosseteste.[108] There are a number of interesting factors in this passage. First, the level of detail of a courtroom as *locus* is attractive to the mnemonist; he offers several different aspects such as the judge, the law, the tribunal, the ushers, the courtroom itself and the testimony of a witness. The use of a courtroom would have been familiar to rhetoricians -- the famous example found in the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* 3.20 is that of a detailed, memorable courtroom scene. [109] The detail in that image is based on the idea discussed in the previous chapter, that rhetoric is intended to help aid the memory of a particular, singular circumstance - in the *ad Herennium's* case, the trial of a suspected poisoner. Grosseteste's description is less imaginative, suggesting that he is less concerned with a particular scene but rather the *act* of judgement more universally. The second is that the judicial metaphor, the *auditorium* in which it takes place, the judges, and the *testis* of conscience all reinforce the idea of verbality; the shared experience of a verbal unfolding. The third aspect relates to the ushers (*apparitores*) who represent recollection, contemplation, and expectation, paired with the deliberation of past, present, and future actions which, per the metaphor, all occur in the *aula memorie* (hall of memory), this time specifically described as a courtroom. By discussing judgement, the quoting of 1 Corinthians 11. 31 ('but if we judge ourselves, we should not be judged'), by referring to past acts (*actus*) held in the memory and by beginning with how applicable this idea is to the everyone (not just doctors, lawyers, magistrates, kings and so on) it seems clear that Grosseteste is describing confession in this way, using a judicial or legal metaphor.[110] Recollection and contemplation are expected aspects of

[108] Lawell, "Qualiter Vita Prelatorum," 303-36.

[109] *Rhetorica ad Herennium* 3.20 (ed. and trans. LCL 403, pp. 214-15).

[110] This description of a courtroom in *Dictum* 52 could of course be describing aa court of ecclesiastical or even Divine law, however, Grosseteste introduces the description by saying this court is accessible to those who are 'neither masters nor scholars nor judges of the Church,' ('qui autem nec magistri possunt esse scolastici nec iudices eccesiastici.') What is crucial in this metaphor is not which law is being interpreted or discussed, but the physicality of the courtroom and mechanisms of trial.

confession; it is the addition here of expectation that is unique in its explicitness, one which aligns memory and recollection with *prudentia.* The Aristotelian pairing of memory and expectation has been discussed by James Warren. He notes that, per *De partibus animalium* 3.6, only humans are endowed with this capacity of expectation or hope for the future.[111] Warren writes that,

> since 'memories and expectations' are likely to function as a pair we should probably think that memory here is not just a general ability to preserve and recall things we have learned but also the specific human capacity for deliberately recollecting one's own past experiences and imagining future ones.[112]

This pairing is raised again in the *Nicomachean Ethics* at 1166a23, where, as Grosseteste himself translates from the Greek, 'good memories of the past and good hopes of the future, which are agreeable.'[113] The act of confession then is a direct application of this Aristotelian exhortation to search one's own autobiographical memories, revealing as it does 'something important about that subject's moral character,' a core component of confession.[114] Not only does Grosseteste highlight *recordacio* as being a distinct activity separate from *memoria* itself, but by pairing it with *expectatio* via the act of *cognitio* he is establishing a link with *providentia* or foresight, vital for *prudentia.* This then suggests that Grosseteste *did* have an understanding of Ciceronian *prudentia,* so crucial for Aquinas and Albertus Magnus in

[111] Aristotle, *De partibus animalium* 669a19 (ed. and trans. LCL 323, pp. 256-7); Warren, *Pleasures of Reason,* 60 discusses this at length.

[112] Warren, *Pleasures of Reason,* 60.

[113] Michael of Ephesus, trans. Grosseteste, commentary on Book 9 of the *Nicomachean Ethics* (ed. Mercken, vol. 2, p. 227), 'operatorum etenim delectabiles memoriae et futurorum spes bonae.' Trans. author's own.

[114] Warren, *Pleasures of Reason,* 157.

shifting *memoria* from logic and rhetoric to ethics.[115] Mary Carruthers has shown how Aquinas's "proof" for shifting memory from rhetoric to ethics, *Summa Theologia* 2.2 Question 49 Article 1 is based on his interpretation of *Metaphysics* 981a1 and the *Nicomachean Ethics* 1103a14.[116] I have detailed Grosseteste's use of *Metaphysics* 1.1 above, in Chapter 1. It is worth detailing Grosseteste's use of the *Nicomachean Ethics,* which he himself translated along with the Greek commentaries some time before 1246. Forming as it does one of the four core cardinal virtues for Christians, Aristotle turns *prudentia* into one of the five intellectual virtues, one that requires experience and time, and, as we know from *Metaphysics* 981a1, experience requires memory.[117] Cicero also allies prudence with memory again because of memory's relationship with time; prudence is built from memory, intelligence, and foresight according to *De inventione* 2.53.

Grosseteste's translation of the *Nicomachean Ethics* and its Greek commentaries as it relates to his corpus of work as a whole is largely underexplored.[118] However, McEvoy has observed that Grosseteste must have been 'awestruck, at once by the novelty of the enterprise itself and by the success of its purely rational and philosophical probing of human nature and experience.'[119] Alexander Murray has traced the influence of Grosseteste's translation in *Deus est*, that the *Nicomachean Ethics* is found in 'spirit' (if

[115] Bloch, *Aristotle on Memory,* 190-7. See also Coleman, *Medieval Memories,* 416-647 on Albertus Magnus and Aquinus.

[116] Carruthers, *Book of Memory,* 83.

[117] Bejczy, "Cardinal Virtues," 202.

[118] Murray in "Historical Source," 78-86 offers convincing suggestions that the *Nicomachean Ethics* was 'congenial' to Grosseteste's purpose and mission as Bishop.

[119] McEvoy, "Aristotliean friendship," 165.

not in 'footprint') in the work's use of the moral mean, so central to the Aristotelian text.[120] He writes of Grosseteste's motivation,

> to return once more to Lincoln: the bombardment of confessors by moral dilemmas, arising from the case histories of ordinary lay-folk, has been suggested here as the main stimulus for Grosseteste's translation of Aristotle's *Ethics*. It remains to see what effect the new Aristotle may have had on these confessors, and the search must begin with Grosseteste.[121]

Murray finds his evidence in *Deus est*, not just because of the mean but because children lack the *experience* to 'persevere in the indiscreet penances they have assumed.'[122] According to *Nicomachean Ethics* 2.1 intellectual virtues (of which prudence is one) require experience and time; thus children lack these virtues.[123] Memory, according to *De memoria reminiscentia*, relies on the same two precepts. In his *Notule* on the *Nicomachean Ethics* Grosseteste pre-empts a similar position on *prudentia* as Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas. István Bejczy describes it thus,

---

[120] Murray, "Historical Source," 82-3. Wenzel, "Deus est," 218-39 discusses Aristotelian influence in Grosseteste's text, *Deus est*.

[121] Murray, "Historical Source," 82.

[122] Murray, "Historical Source," 83. Murray's text uses MS Bodleian 801, whereas the Wenzel edition Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Rawlinson A. 446 does not mention children in that particular section.

[123] Grosseteste, commentary on the *Nicomachean ethics* 2.1 (ed. Mercken, vol. 1, p. 194), 'duplici autem virtute existente, hac quidem intellectuali, hac autem morali, ea quidem quae intellectualis plurimum ex doctrina habet et generatione et augmentum. Ideo experimento indiget et tempore.'

> remarkably [...] Grosseteste argues that prudence is an intellectual virtue in its cognitive function, but a moral virtue in that it directs the operations of justice, temperance, and fortitude.'[124]

There is another suggestion of Grosseteste's interest in *prudentia* that can be found in his *Tabula.* Though it should be noted that the symbols Grosseteste picks do not usually relate to their topic, as discussed in Chapter 3, there are some that are easily recognisable; the trinity as △ for example.[125] The symbol for the four cardinal virtues is ⁘, the symbol for *prudentia* seems to connect and unite the four virtues in the symbol ⊡ (f. 17b). Whilst this falls short of "proof" it does suggest that *prudentia* is the defining and controlling cardinal virtue, and, by placing it in the middle of the square, acts as a fifth virtue, suggesting that it is perhaps inspired as an Aristotelian intellectual virtue too. That he is aware of these intellectual virtues by 1230 is apparent from *Dictum* 15, where he lists the five spiritual senses as *sapientia, intellectus, scientia, ars, prudentia*, the same as those listed in the *Nicomachean Ethics* 6.3.[126] Having explored *Quoniam cogitatio*, itself composed around the same time as Grosseteste was finishing his translation of the *Nicomachean Ethics,* it is clear that experience is also important,

---

[124] Bejczy, *"*Cardinal Virtues," 203 quotes a *notule* at 1.13 not reproduced in the Mercken edition, but from MS Oxford All Souls 84 f. 43r, 'prudentia quo ad primam operacionem suam, que est cognitio agendorum exteriorum et omittendorum virtue est intellectualis et speculativa; inquantum autem extendit se in directionem operorum iusticie, temperantie et fortitudinis, inter virtutes morales et activas computatur.'

[125] Grosseteste, *Tabula* f. 17a (ed. Thomson).

[126] Grossetsete, *Dictum* 15 f. 12ra, 'hoc est, sensus spirituales anime sunt sapientia et intellectus, scientia, ars, et prudentia sive consilium.' These are the five states of the soul listed in the *Nicomachean Ethics* 6.3(4) 1139b15. The Mercken edition of Grosseteste's translations of the commentaries does not contain Books 5-6, however there is an incomplete edition of Grosseteste's translation (minus the commentaries) by R. A. Gauthier, *Robertus Grosseteste translator uel reuisor translationis Aristotelis - Ethica Nicomachea,* Aristoteles Latinus 26.1-3 (1972). For Grosseteste's translation of this passage see Grosseteste, *Robertus Grosseteste translator uel reuisor translationis Aristotelis - Ethica Nicomachea: libri IV - VII; VIII.6 - X ('recensio pura')*, 6. 3 (ed. Gauthier, AL. 26.2, p. 255), 'hec autem sunt ars, scientia, prudentia, sapientia, intellectus.'

as is recollection. It also suggests that by the late 1240s Grosseteste had begun to see confession in a way that allowed the penitent to explore his own experiences "scientifically"- to repeatedly engage with their own memories, instruments (such as hands), and reasoning, and to utilise their imagination when necessary, with *circumstantiae* replacing the four causes.

Conclusion: Confession as the Ultimate Manifestation of Memory, and the *Experimentum* of Confession.

It is in the act of confession that Grosseteste is able to identify and truly explore the concept of autobiographical memory ontologically. The *Quoniam cogitatio* itself is a rich *thesaurus* of memory training, techniques, and understanding. Not only does he reveal a knowledge of artificial memory training - he writes at §28 that it is easier to remember and recall chronologically, *ex tempore* - but there is also a clear acknowledgement of associative memory; to focus on the time, place, or bodily instrument if one is struggling to remember, to help "spark" it, and of false memories used beneficially.

If, after this, the memory is still unable to recall something one wishes to focus on, one can rely on the testimony of others - this is particularly useful when dealing with childhood memories (or lack of). The imagination's ability to create *phantasmata* is here useful, just as it is in thought experiments, because it creates believable or likely situations that have their origins in sense. confession is treated as akin to a thought experiment in this way, a thought experiment that is conducted at least once a year by every Christian, allowing them to think for themselves, to ruminate on their own experiences and to apply the results to their every-day life going forward. Just as in prayer, in the act of confession one participates in the light of God's grace.[127] The memory act in confession strikes at the heart of the Aristotelian adage that when one recollects one *says it in their soul.* It is a communicative act between not only body and soul but between priest and penitent, one that is based entirely on experience. Thus, aids

[127] Grosseteste, *Perambulavit Iudas* §4 (ed. Mantello and Goering, 149); see also Ginther, *Sacred Page*, 165.

to confession are useful - such as the *Templum Dei*, which allows for quick reference - but based on the individuality of each penitent, they can only go so far. That is why a priest with experience is so valuable.

The instruction to focus on a bodily *instrumentum* to aid our recollection, one that explicitly relies on our *phantasmata* of past experiences is the exact opposite of the type of memory instruction at *Hexaëmeron* 8.5.1 which operates 'without any clouding of *phantasmata*, and without any bodily instrument.'[128] The memory that belongs to the trinity of memory, understanding, will, is an 'eternal memory' (*memoria eterna)* and the most apt reflection of God the Trinity. However, the linking of memory with understanding and love (or will) is perfectly reflected in the act of confession - memory of experiences, an understanding of these experiences, and the will to act, is deeply resonant. As with the Augustinian trinity, in the act of confession 'memory draws out of itself the actual understanding of that knowledge.'[129] Important for the purpose of confession, recollection/verbalisation 'does not destroy the memory but rather strengthens and confirms' it as in *Dictum* 60, although, following Bernard of Clarivaux, the accompanying sins will be destroyed (*delere*).[130]

In one of the most recent explorations of Grosseteste's pastoral charge, Philippa Hoskin notes the importance of confession for Grosseteste. She writes,

> Christ's redemptive act not only rescued humanity itself, but also provided a potential route to reunify God and all of creation, undoing the work of the Fall.

[128] Grosseteste, *Hexaëmeron* 8.5.1 (eds. Dales and Gieben, 224; trans. Martin, 228), 'sine nubulo phantasmatum, et non per corporeum instrumentum.'

[129] Grosseteste, *Dictum* 60 f. 48ra, 'intelligat itaque memoriam suam gignentem de se actualem intelligentiam quarundam scientiarum.'

[130] Grosseteste, *Dictum* 60 f. 48ra, 'ipse actus intelligendi non destruit memoriam, sed pocius confirmat et roborat eam in nobis.'

> Only humanity, able to communicate with, and containing, both the spiritual and the worldly, could bring that about. The priest must guide the laymen and women in their obligation to confess their sins not just for their own personal salvation, but also because individuals had a role to play in the cosmic battle to save and restore the divine purpose, that is, to reunify God and his creation. Confession repeatedly brought man and God back into communion with each other by restoring the unity broken by the weakening privation of sin, and put man right with the natural world.[131]

What is worth noting here is this emphasis on *repetition,* so crucial to Aristotelian notions of experience and recollection, per *Metaphysics* 1.1. The act of confession allowed the penitent to deploy certain methodologies of discovery, similar to that of a thought experiment, but that it needed to be repeated, at the very least annually, pushing it closer to an act of discovery and understanding; the 'repeated observation of two concomitant events.'[132] Oliver has noted this emphasis on repetition, suggesting that,

> repetition of experiment is not important because of the need to overcome the problem of enumerative induction, but simply because our souls are asleep and require rousing.[133]

Whilst I would agree that there is an element of Platonic recollection at play in Grosseteste's discussion at *cPA* 2.6, I would proffer that it is quite distinct from, and additional to, the emphasis on repetition as related to *experimentum*. Repetition *is* important to enumerative induction because it is the best method for the memory to

---

[131] Philippa Hoskin, *Robert Grosseteste and the 13th-Century Diocese of Lincoln. An English Bishop's Pastoral Vision* (Leiden: Brill, 2019), 55-6.

[132] Grosseteste, *cPA* 1.14 (ed. Rossi, 215), 'ex frequente visione horum duorum visbilium.' See also Dinkova-Bruun et al., *De Colore*, 28, and above Chapter 1.

[133] Oliver, "Light, Truth, Experimentum," 179

operate, and Grosseteste's awareness from this comes from his knowledge of classical rhetoric, one that is emphasised in his discourse on confession. In the act of confession memory is a *topos* - the *auditorium* of *Dictum* 52 - the metaphor of a courtroom foreshadows the implicit connection between memory and judgement. Grosseteste's conceptualisation of memory is evidently locational, both as it relates to time and to place. As a *topos* the penitent and the priest explore it together, retrospectively. It is an action that is only performable by humans; animals cannot interrogate their memories (thus they cannot recollect) they are simply moved by their *phantasmata* without an understanding of how or why (similar to dream *phantasmata* that can sometimes produce physical movement in sleep) thus they have no ability to judge. On this, both Augustine and Aristotle agree.[134] Not only does confession rely on experience but it is an experience in itself, an opportunity for discovery, one that leads the penitent closer to God. It is from this experience, the "singular" of confession, that, per *Metaphysics* 1.1, leads to knowledge of the universal and to God; in the courtroom scene of *Dictum* 52 Grosseteste himself suggests the appearance of universals and singulars. Though confession is described as water, in terms of ablution, that it is also described in terms of the light of grace, such as in *Perambulavit Iudas* §4 lends credence to the idea of the complex notion of light held by Grosseteste. The 'thorny question' of Divine Illumination, of Grosseteste's attempted synthesis of Aristotelian experience with Augustinian theology becomes less prickly when confession is viewed as the mediator between the two theories.[135] Aristotelian *experimentum*, formed from empirical, sensorily-derived evidence and data, is entirely elevated *when fully experienced* via the act of confession. This act, which is performed in the full light of God's grace, illuminates our own understanding of this experience, elevating it from empirical to theological; from particular to universal knowledge. This act of introspection, searching and judging, available only to humans, is reinforced by habit, by the repetition of the act, and by the use of the *circumstantiate* as *causa.* It is the ultimate application of scientific inquiry into human nature in an attempt at moral edification, an exercise of

[134] Sorabji, *Aristotle on Memory*, 41, Aristotle, *De memoria et reminscentia*, 453a12 (trans. Sorabji, 59); Augustine, *Confessions* 10.6 (ed. PL 32, trans. Pine-Coffin, 213) explains how animals may have memory but 'cannot inquire [*interrogare*] into its meaning because they are not guided by reason, which can sift [*iudex*] the evidence relayed to them by their senses.

[135] Ginther, *Sacred Page*, 57.

thought, conscience, and memory that is available not just to learned scholars and theologians but to every single Christian capable of Confessing. The universality of confession must have been attractive to Grosseteste, keen as he was in the *cura animarum* of his entire flock.

The particularity of confession is thus why rhetoric was so useful a tool to be studied and used. In Grosseteste's eyes, confession, a repeated act, has the ultimate goal of abstracting from acts of particular, singular sensation[s] - the sinful acts - through to a knowledge of the universal - of God, or of the created world. It is the ultimate *cognitio experimentalis*, the experiential knowledge described in the Prooemium to the *Hexaëmeron*, discussed in Chapter 1. Memory thus lies at the heart of experience and the ability to know, from the abstraction of universals, to knowledge of God. In the most Augustinian sense, memory is the *habitus* of God; we can see how Grosseteste adopts and adapts this in his sermonising on confession as a restorative, creative act demanded of all Christians in their search for themselves and for God.

Conclusion.

It is clear that Grosseteste's attitude towards memory is multi-faceted and complex, at times reflecting this lingering uneasiness of memory's relationship with the imagination, negotiating *phantasmata's* corruptible influence. Though the impetus for this thesis was to garner an understanding of Grosseteste's psychological memory and its epistemological function, it immediately became apparent that memory's greatest epistemological advantage is in the role of confession. Not only was it an advantage for Grosseteste in his ultimate goal - the *cura animarum* - but it gave Grosseteste the opportunity to apply the very essence of *experimentum* to his theology. He thus reconfigures confession as *cognitio experimentalis* by placing emphasis on the inquiry itself. His *pastoralia* are thus instruction manuals on how to carry this out. By conceptualising intellectual changes concerning memory and imagination into four "sea changes," I suggested that whilst psychological memory was one facet of memory that needed to be explored, it was not the *only* facet. The true, peculiarly medieval multidimensionality of memory would not have been revealed by a simple exploration of memory's role in this way. Thus, I suggested it was not just his "scientific" works that needed to be examined for an account of memory but his other works too, particularly his *pastoralia* relating to confession. Grosseteste's position within the time period of these changing emphasises on memory, and his role as both scholar and bishop, offer a unique exposition of the various treatments of memory within the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries. The four ways in which I theorised the role of memory in this time period are (1) psychologically per the "new" Aristotle, (2) technologically, per the scribal innovations that occurred alongside this reintroduction within the nascent universities, (3) pastorally, per the rejuvenated interest in Roman rhetoric resulting from Lateran IV, and (4) ethically, per the shifting of memory from rhetoric to ethics. Though Grover Zinn may be correct in asserting that there is 'scant evidence of any concern with the *art* of memory before the thirteenth century,' (emphasis added) this thesis has shown that there was a concern *with memory*.[1] Memory's epistemological function then is not merely how it operates within the realm

[1] Zinn, "Hugh of Saint Victor," 211.

of sensation and perception but how it can be applied (and trained) to other areas of one's life, whether it be administrative, theological, or educative. Inherent in this focus on memory was a focus on imagination, more identifiably distinguishable to modern scholars than to those of the medieval period. The lack of specific pieces carrying in their title a focus on work on either *memoria* or *imaginatio* required an expansive survey of his remarks and comments across all his works; his views on the two needed to be pieced together before they could be pulled apart and examined. By conceptualising the four "sea changes" as I did in my introduction, themes that ran through my chapters and allowed Grosseteste to be placed into a much wider context of twelfth- and thirteenth-century attitudes, it becomes immediately clear that Grosseteste was driven by, and contributed to, many aspects of medieval ideas concerning memory and imagination.

In broadening this study of memory far beyond the traditional psychological paradigm so far explored by current research on Grosseteste it is possible to shed light on ways in which, for example, his use of Aristotelian *experimentum* has influenced his theology. As I have pointed out in my introduction, it is unclear whether Grosseteste understood Aristotle's comment at *Metaphysics* 981a1 of experience as resulting from a repeated, singular memory, or the repetition of multiple memories. However, what is clear is that repetition is key. It is perhaps for this reason that his emphasis on confession - a repeated (annually) *act* of memory - is so fundamental to his pastoral care. The act of confession becomes a form of a thought experiment reliant as it is on *phantasmata* of things experienced. Not only this but experience is needed by the priest too, to help them in their discernment. When *searched* for, via an act of recollection, one is engaged in a form of abstraction. To be successful, the priest's interrogative practices need to be of the best quality. This study has shown that confession, as an ultimately autobiographical act, is where Aristotelian and Augustinian memory meet, and where Aristotle's emphasis on *reminiscentia* is fundamental to an overall Augustinian cause of finding God internally. Because confession becomes more of an *experimentum* within itself Grosseteste is able to utilise a structured methodology beyond time, location, and place and beyond the mnemonic parameters of interrogation established in confession manuals. Rather, the seven *circumstantiae* offer not just a heuristic structure of investigation that is easy to remember but one that is important as a tool for ascertaining

Aristotle's differentiation of voluntary and in-/non-voluntary acts; they are tools for judging moral and ethical character. When the act of confession becomes an *experimentum* in and of itself, the *cirumunstantia* transform from heuristic device into psuedo-*causae.* It is here, in the act of confession, that Grosseteste is able to combine the principles of *experimentum* with those of theological growth. He utilises the rules of rhetoric and identifies the role of *prudentia* in this miasma, central to which is memory. Thus in both theory and in practice, *memoria* is fundamental.

This rationalisation of confession, a crucial element of post-Lateran Christianity, is reflective of an anthropologically positive theology. Whilst Grosseteste inherits from Augustine a negative view of the senses in that they leave humanity susceptible to sin, he leaves far more room to appreciate the positive aspect of sensation which chimes with an Aristotelian approach to sense-data and abstraction. Grosseteste's focus on sensation complements his interest in the Greek fathers of the Church, and it may be from them that he inherits his notion of spiritual sensation. Despite being inchoate, Grosseteste's interest in the spiritual senses is tied to this under-developed idea of his of deification or theosis, again, a theological concept that was of topic to the Greek fathers. Thus, Grosseteste is keen to emphasise the humanity of Jesus, apophatically commenting on the divinity of humans. Whilst I do not contest that Grosseteste was a proponent of deification I would suggest that our corporeal senses are a very necessary component. It is clear that his interest in the spiritual senses, the hypostatic union of Jesus, and the very experience of Creation that one can take part in by becoming an active Christian, including God's *lux* in this Creation, suggest an unusually positive theological anthropology. By our very actions, by our very sensible perceptions, we participate in this Divine light. Without our senses the act of confession would not be necessary; its redemptive qualities left unfulfilled.

Because of light's manifest role in all of sensation Grosseteste avoids the need for the traditional reckoning of Divine Illumination as a "spark." It is memory, with its place in the body (per the Aristotelian sense-memory-experience-universal epistemology) as well as the soul (per Augustine's memory-understanding-love triune) that allows for this ultimate unity. This is highlighted best in confession's reliance on memory and

viewing the act of confession as a rational exploration of sense-experience leading to knowledge of God. Confession allows the penitent to arrive at the universal from the particular, the priest helps the penitent "abstract" from their own sense-data the *prudentia* necessary to move forward to become a better Christian; this is done through recollection's *perscrutatio* or search. Repetition, as with any *experimentum*, is fundamental, as is the penitent's ability to utilise their internal faculties in order to arrive at this universal.

The act of confession gives Grosseteste the opportunity to Christianise Aristotelian *experimentum* in five distinctive ways. The first, as remarked upon by Jacqueline Murray, is that confession allows the penitent to think for themselves about their prior actions and, with the help of an experienced priest, to draw conclusions in the form of appropriate penance. The second is that these conclusions, and confession itself, are ultimately reliant on the memory (or, in some cases, the imagination's role as a sort of under-study, ready to jump in when the memory fails). For Grosseteste this necessitated a better understanding of memory itself within those administering confession; after all, without a penitent's ability to remember their past actions and thoughts, confession would be otiose. Third is the repetition of experience that is so crucial to Aristotelian *experimentum,* no less important in confession. The priest needs to be experienced in order to administer the correct penance, something which can only be achieved with the passing of time in that more experienced priests have been exposed to more scenarios, each one totally individualistic and unique. The penitent, for their part, needs to repeat the act at least annually, improving their ability to self-analyse, a fundamental engagement with *prudentia.* Fourth, confession, as all good *experimentum* should, allows for a consideration of the singular and the universal. By cogitating on particular sinful acts the penitent is encouraged to appreciate the universal; just as Augustine must search for God in his memory through his internal self-reflection and *search* of his sensorial actions, so too can any penitent under the correct supervision and direction. Finally, by returning to classical rhetoric for advice on how to administer confession (and how to write memorable confessional manuals) as was vogue, Grosseteste appreciated the Boethian *circumstantiae* not just as aide-mémoire but as akin to *causae*. His gradual engagement with, and emphasis on, the *why* reveal an understanding of

confession as the ultimate *experimentum* into the human condition, a most practical, theologically necessary application of the skills he had mastered in his previous career.

Whilst the nature of memory may be more ambiguous for Grosseteste because of the confluence of such a large number of authorities on the topic, the nature of recollection is perhaps easier to examine. This is largely because recollection's role in confession is so readily identifiable, and rather than presenting a conflict between Aristotle and Augustine, instead offers a synergy. Confession, as an exclusively human action, aligns itself with the Aristotelian adage that whilst plenty of animals can have memory, only humans can recollect. In addition, that recollection is 'a sort of search' for Aristotle demands the rational quality of the act; it is not, necessarily, easy to do. For Augustine confession too is an overt act of autobiographical memory, a self-interrogation. One must not only be genuinely contrite but to truly benefit from confession the penitent must really dig deep in their self-search; the repeated references to Isaiah 38:15 in *Quoniam cogitato* emphasise the need to explore one's experiences in the context of their own life, to evaluate their circumstances, and to come to a conclusion in the form of penitence with their priest. This process that is undertaken by the penitent is, arguably, the ultimate experiential knowledge, or *cognitio experimantalis*. It is clear that memory and its discourse permeate much of Grosseteste's work, not just that which relates to sensation as a means of abstracting knowledge and understanding of natural phenomena. I will now summarise the applicability of Grosseteste's work to the four areas of flux that I identified in my introduction that existed 1150-1250.

(1) Memory and Imagination in the "new" Psychology of Aristotle.

The exploration of corporeal sensation in Chapter 1 and of spiritual sensation in Chapter 2 indicate a preoccupation with sense-perception as a method of knowledge acquisition. Grosseteste's defence of sense-perception, explicit in his *cPA* and *Dicta*, and his use of anthropological metaphors and voluntarist optics reinforce this idea that he held a positive anthropology, a result and reflection of his interest in the necessary incarnation of Jesus. For this reason, Aristotelian epistemology would have been attractive, based as it is on sense-data. By suggesting as he does that light is involved not just in the operation of the external senses but the internal as well, received as it is by the *sensus*

communis, Grosseteste is able to establish an illuminatory theory of knowledge that operates within the parameters of Aristotelian theory of sense perception. Both *lux* and *lumen* are received by any individual sense-organ, and thus the internal faculties. Based on this conviction in the utility of sense-perception he is unusually defensive of *phantasmata,* the mnemic "leftovers" of sense-impressions with which both the imagination and memory operate. For Grosseteste, with his frequent reference to thought experiments (Southern's "considerations") *phantasmata* simply replace observation. Indeed, *phantasmata* are sometimes *better* than observation because they can be manipulated any which way and can be reproduced an infinite number of times. Of course, Grosseteste is also aware of the negative aspect uncontrolled (or rather, incorrectly ordered) *phantasmata* can have. However, it seems that the usefulness of *phantasmata* is found not in spite of their ultimate inseparability from sense-impression, but because of it. Thus, when it comes to the act of confession both memory and imagination are repositories from which to draw.

What is also clear from my two studies of corporeal and spiritual sensation is that, other than the role of light in sensation, he is largely inconsistent with his definitions of individual faculties. At times, the *phantasia* is the imagination, at other times it is merely a functioning or operation of the *sensus communis.* Memory and imagination have a detailed, intricate, and often confused relationship; it is unclear what faculty Grosseteste ascribes the power of prophecy; he himself admits this. His variety of metaphor when discussing memory; *aula*, bedchamber, mirror, thesaurus, and seal-in-wax, reflect an uneasiness of understanding, as well as evidence of a number of authorities on the subject from which he drew. Each metaphor also represents different qualities of memory; seal-in-wax as an Aristotelian memory of impressions, the *speculum mentis* as potentially a more Neoplatonic, spiritual, higher reflective memory of the Divine, the Augustinian thesaurus of words and knowledge and his *aula* as an utterly universal memory of absolutely everything, in which God can be found.

(2) Scribal Innovation

Andrew Taylor, in his remarks on the style of the *Templum Dei,* described Grosseteste as demonstrating 'a strong interest in new forms of external presentation.'[2] What is clear from this thesis is that Grosseteste internalised much of his scholastic experience of notes and note-taking and applied it both ecclesiastically and administratively. His *Compotus* portrays him as a teacher who was comfortable with syllabic rhyme, verses and, importantly, the heuristic nature of charts and tables. By detailing the instructions on how to create them it is clear Grosseteste saw the benefit in creating the tables rather than simply referring to them, and I have shown this to be the case with his *Tabula,* thus reflecting the deeply personal nature of memory. His cursive handwriting, his use of both types of *cedulae* (notetaking in the margins of work, as well as physical scraps of paper), and his instructions in the *recapitulatio* all indicate that he was adept at using these types of new innovations and was also cognizant of the fact that others might not be, instructing them as he does on the reason, the why, for including titles. His conscious relationship with the written word continues throughout his life and is most apparent in *De cessatione legalium* where he explains that writing is not meant to replace memory but to aid it. His seeming enjoyment of etymology in detailing certain aspects of the calendar in his *Compotus,* his 150-plus etymologies in the *Prooemium* to the *Hexaëmeron,* his transliteration of Greek words in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, and his frequent references to Isidore's *Etymologia* in his *Dicta* are emblematic of his interest in wordplay as mnemonic device. His scriptural exegesis, then, is an extension of this, with added theological import.

(3) Lateran IV's Return to Classical Rhetoric.

Canon 10 of Lateran IV precipitated a meteoric rise in the production of preaching manuals and related *pastoralia.* Grosseteste, in this sense, was no different from his contemporaries. He wrote a small number of *pastoralia* but ones that proved to be immensely popular. Where Grosseteste perhaps differs however is his focus on accessibility; his shift from religious buildings to secular, his experimentation with the vernacular, and his appropriation of traditionally scholastic mnemonic devices, such as the hand, to a broader theological purpose. In the case of the hand, and of those devices

[2] Taylor, "Was Grosseteste?" 76.

that are anthropological (the humours of the eye, for example, or the *scuta* in his *Dicta)* with their related descriptive comparisons to the crucifixion of Jesus, these in themselves reflect and intensify aspects of Grosseteste's own theology, that of a positive anthropology and the crucial role of the incarnation of Jesus. The listing of number, location, and occasion was not just important in devising and reciting speeches, as those of the Roman oratory tradition taught, but it reflected the way in which memory worked; hence its inclusion in such tracts as *Quoniam cogitatio*. Indeed, it is arguably the inclusion of the *circumstantiae*, inherited from the classic rhetoricians, that elevated the realm of memory from the study of Rhetoric to that of Ethics.

(4) From Rhetoric to Ethics.

The interest in classical rhetoric as a result of Lateran IV, combined with the resurgence in Aristotelian memory and the accessibility of *De memoria et reminiscentia* allowed for the shift of the place of memory from rhetoric to ethics because of the central role that *prudentia* plays, inherently reliant as it is on experience. Whilst I do not argue that Grosseteste arrived here before Aquinas or Albertus Magnus I do suggest that he saw a relationship between *prudentia* and memory based, as Albertus and Aquinas do, on a combination of classical rhetoric and Aristotle, and from his own experience in fostering confession. From his metaphor of the courtroom of memory, staffed by ushers of recollection, contemplation and expectation, to the metaphor of memory as a bedchamber requiring *circumspectia prudens* to escort words from there to the mouth, it is clear that memory, and thus *prudentia*, is reliant on experience. For Grosseteste, Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* establishes this precedent beyond doubt. Not only would he have seen the seven *circumstantiae* as being heuristically useful but they were necessary tools in discerning the morality of actions; something which Grosseteste would have been keenly aware of.

The bulk of high medieval literature on memory emerged in France; Hugh of St. Victor's most famous treaties, for example, as well as the early commentaries on *De memoria et reminiscentia* by William of Champeaux, Alain of Lille and Thierry of Chartres were a result of a peculiarly French interest in memory; complemented by the

Parisian commentaries of Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas.[3] It is no coincidence, given this preoccupation with memory, that 'in later twelfth-century Paris, a circle of reforming theologians had paid extraordinary attention to the 'circumstances' of sin and sinner.'[4] This is not to say that this thesis suggests a 'Parisian sojourn' of the 1220s, advocated by Goering, but it does indicate an indirect familiarity with the intellectual milieux at Paris.[5] The *circumstantiae* may have been purely heuristic in the twelfth century but by the thirteenth their usefulness in the practice of confession was substantial. Rita Copeland and Marjorie Curry Woods offer examples of the *circumstantiae* in a number of thirteenth-century confessional manuals, describing their inclusion as,

> two dimensions of instruction to priests: the text first offers a mnemonic scheme to help the priest remember the circumstantial method, and then explains how the circumstances are used to extract the right kind of information from the penitent.[6]

However, it is the circumstances when included with a knowledge of their use in the *Nicomachean Ethics* that is so unique to Grosseteste (and, consequently, Albertus Magnus and Aquinas). It was the application of prudence by the priest to the

---

[3] Carruthers, *Book of Memory*, 186-8.

[4] Peter Biller "Confession in the Middle Ages: Introduction," in *Handling Sin: Confession in the Middle Ages*, eds. Peter Biller and A. J. Minnis (York: York Medieval Press, 2012), 1-34, at 8.

[5] Goering, "When and Where," 39. Grosseteste's relationship with Paris, whether he studied there during the interdict of 1209, is debated; Goering's "When and Where" discusses the evidence at length. However, as James Ginther, "Theological Education at the Oxford Studium in the Thirteenth Century: A Reassessment of Robert Grosseteste's Letter to the Oxford Theologians," *Franciscan Studies* 55 (1998), 83-104 has observed, Grosseteste was familiar with the curriculum and style of teaching, petitioning Innocent IV (successfully) 'so that Oxford's practices would come into line with the Parisian course of study,' (Ginther, "Theological Education," 94).

[6] Woods and Copeland, "Classroom and Confession," 393-4.

information extracted via the structure of the circumstances that was so novel; but prudence was required on the side of the penitent too; in negotiating their own memories and experiences during their *perscrutatio.*

The scope of this thesis was intentionally broad based on my assertion that memory is more than merely an internal faculty responsible for retaining intentions; it is multifaceted and multidimensional. As such, there are areas of his work that could be explored further. What is immediately apparent is that the *Quoniam cogitatio* is vastly under-examined, barely discussed by scholars of Grosseteste. I would also suggest that there is much to learn from a full edition of Grosseteste's *Tabula*. Whilst Rosemann's edition extends Thomson's in that it identifies the works listed under the completed categories, a cross-reference index would be useful, as would a full detail of the manuscripts that contain which symbol. It is one of the few manifestations of Grosseteste's memory that exist, a "prosthetic artifact" according to Carruthers that illuminates his own mental *thesaurus.* Additionally, although there are some works that explore the connection between memory and confession such as David Tell's 2006 paper "Beyond Mnemotechnics: Confession and Memory in Augustine" little work has been conducted on Lateran IV's impact on the scope and importance of confession as it relates to medieval memory *in actu.* What does exist, such as Paul D. Teichman's 2016 monograph *Confession and Memory in Early Modern English Literature* and Kisha G. Tracy's 2017 *Memory and Confession in Middle English Literature* both centre on confession as it is found in their respective literature-related contexts and frameworks rather than in religious *pastoralia* more specifically. What would be interesting with regards to medieval memory would be to identify trends in how the *act* of confession was seen, taught, and understood by both priest and penitent as it is no coincidence that this shift from rhetoric to ethics occurred within 50 years of a renewed surge in the sacrament of confession.

Ultimately, this thesis has shown that concerning the works of Robert Grosseteste, broader methodologies of study offer an attractive approach for modern scholars. Very recently, attempts have been made to approach Grosseteste from an intersectional

approach; C. S. Adoyo and Anna Siebach-Larsen have both explored aspects of Grosseteste's literature (his *scuta* and his *Château d'Amour* respectively) that complement his scientific and psychological thought. Grosseteste's career and personality, stretching as they do over such a remarkable period of scholastic transition, establish him as an object of infinite interest. The Ordered Universe Project, with its sights set on publishing new editions and translation of the scientific works of Grosseteste, will elevate his reputation still further. This thesis has explored one small aspect of Grosseteste's thought that transgresses, unites, and underpins many aspects of his life and work; that of memory. There are undoubtedly more.

Bibliography.

Primary Sources.

Works of Grosseteste in Latin.

Château d'Amour. Edited by James Murray. In *Le Chateau D'Amour de Robert Grosseteste, Évêque de Lincoln*, edited by James Murray. Paris: Librairie Champion, 1918.

De Artibus Liberalibus. Edited by Sigbjørn O. Sønnesyn. In *The Scientific Works of Robert Grosseteste. Volume 1, Knowing and Speaking: Robert Grosseteste's De artibus liberalibus "On the Liberal Arts" and De generatione sonorum "On the Generation of Sounds,"* edited by Giles E. M. Gasper, Cecilia Panti, Tom C. B. McLeish, and Hannah E. Smithson under the aegis of the Ordered Universe Research Project, 74-95. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019.

De Causis. Edited by Ludwig Baur. In *Die Philosophischen Werke des Robert Grosseteste, Bischofs von Lincoln*, edited by Lurwid Baur. 120-6. Münster, i.W: Aschendorff, 1912.

De Cessatione Legalium. Edited by Richard C. Dales and Edward B. King. De Cessatione Legalium, edited by Richard C. Dales and Edward B. King. Auctores Britannici Medii Aevi 7. London: Published for the British Academy by Oxford University Press, 1986.

De colore. Edited by Greti Dunkova-Bruun, Giles E. M. Gasper, Michael Huxtable, Tom C. B. McLeish, Cecilia Panti, and Hannah Smithson. In *The Dimensions of Colour: Robert Grosseteste's De colore,* 16-19, edited by Giles E. M. Gasper, Michael Huxtable, Tom C. B. McLeish, Cecilia Panti, and Hannah Smithson. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2013.

Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics. Edited by H. P. F. Mercken. *The Greek Commentaries of the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle. Corpus Latinum Commentariorum in Aristotelem Graecorum.* 2 vols. Vol. 1, *Eustratius on Book 1 and The Anonymous Scholia on Books II, III, and IV.* Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1973. Vol 2, *The Anonymous Commentator on Book VII, Aspasius on Book VIII, and Michael of Ephesus on Books IX and X.* Leuven: University Press, 1991. Mercken's edition is incomplete. The translation, minus the commentaries, is edited by R. A. Gauthier in three volumes for the Aristoteles Latinus database vols. 26.1-3 (1972-74); *R. Grosseteste reuisor transl. Aristotelis - Ethica Nicomachea: libri I - III; VIII.1-5 ('rec. pura' -Burgundii transl. recensio)* and "Robertus Grosseteste translator uel reuisor translationis Aristotelis - Ethica Nicomachea: libri IV - VII; VIII.5 (6) – X ('recensio pura').

Commentarius in VIII Libros Physicorum Aristotelis. Edited by Richard C. Dales. Boulder, CO: University of Colorado Press, 1963.

Commentarius in Mystica Theologia. Edited by James McEvoy. In *Mystical Theology: The Glosses by Thomas Gallus and the Commentary of Robert Grosseteste on De Mystica Theologia,* edited by James McEvoy, 60-121. Paris, Peeters, 2003.

Commentarius in Posteriorum Analyticorum Libros. Edited by Pietro Rossi. Firenze: Leo S. Olschki, 1981.

Compotus. Edited by Alfred Lohr and C. Philipp E. Nothaft. *Robert Grosseteste's Compotus*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019.

Deus Est (De Confessione II). Edited by Siegfried Wenzel. "Robert Grosseteste's Treatise on Confession, Deus est." *Franciscan Studies* 30 (1970): 218-93. Accessed 8th January, 2019, doi:10.1353/frc.1970.0005.

Dicta. Edited by Joseph Goering, from Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Bodley 798. "The Electronic Grosseteste." Accessed 21st March, 2021, http://grosseteste.org/grosseteste/dicta.htm.

Dictum 54. Goering, Joseph, and Randall Rosenfeld. "The Tongue Is a Pen: Robert Grosseteste's Dictum 54 and Scribal Technology." *Journal of Medieval Latin* 12 (2002): 114-40. Accessed 28th July, 2020, https://www.jstor.org/stable/45019551.

Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat. Edited by James McEvoy. "Robert Grosseteste's Theory of Human Nature with the Text of His Conference Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat." *Recherches de Théologie ancienne et médiévale* 47 (1980): 131-87. Reprinted in *Robert Grosseteste, Exegete and Philosopher*, edited by James McEvoy, 131-87. Aldershot: Variorum, 1994. Page numbers refer to 1994 edition, though they reflect the 1980 original.

Epistolae. Edited by Henry Luard. *Roberti Grosseteste Episcopi Quondam Lincolniensis Epistolae.* Rolls Series. London, 1861.

De Finitate Motus et Temporis. Edited by Richard C. Dales. "Robert Grosseteste's Treatise 'De Finitate Motus et Temporis." *Traditio* 19 (1963): 245-66. Accessed 7th November, 2018, https://www.jstor.org/stable/27830748.

De Generatione Sonorum. Edited by Sigbjørn O. Sønnesyn. In *The Scientific Works of Robert Grosseteste. Volume 1, Knowing and Speaking: Robert Grosseteste's De artibus liberalibus "On the Liberal Arts" and De generatione sonorum "On the Generation of Sounds,"* edited by Giles E. M. Gasper, Cecilia Panti, Tom C. B. McLeish, and Hannah E. Smithson under the aegis of the Ordered Universe Research Project, 245-55. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019.

Hexaëmeron. Edited by Richard C. Dales and Servus Gieben. Auctores Britannici Medii Aevi 6. London: Published for the British Academy by Oxford University Press, 1982.

De Impressionibus Aeris. Edited by Ludwig Baur. In *Die Philosophischen Werke des Robert Grosseteste, Bischofs von Lincoln*, edited by Ludwig Baur, 42-51. Münster i.W: Aschendorff, 1912.

De Iride. Edited by Ludwig Baur. In *Die Philosophischen Werke des Robert Grosseteste, Bischofs von Lincoln*, edited by Ludwig Baur, 72-8. Münster i.W: Aschendorff, 1912.

De Libero Arbitrio (recensio prior et recensio posterior). Edited and translated by Neil Lewis. In *Robert Grosseteste on Free Decision,* edited and translated by Neil Lewis. Auctores Britannici Medii Aevi 29. Oxford: Published for the British Academy by Oxford University Press, 2017.

De Lineis. Edited by Ludwig Baur. In *Die Philosophischen Werke des Robert Grosseteste, Bischofs von Lincoln*, edited by Ludwig Baur, 59-65. Münster i.W: Aschendorff, 1912.

De Luce. Edited by Cecilia Panti. In *Robert Grosseteste and His Intellectual Milieu,* edited by John Flood, James R. Ginther and Joseph W. Goering, 193-238. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2003.

Le mariage des neuf filles du diable. Edited by Paul Meyer. "Notice du MS. Rawlinson Poetry 241 (Oxford)." *Romania* 29, no. 113 (1900): 1-84. Accessed 20th January 2020, https://www.jstor.org/stable/45043153.

De Modo Confitendi et Paenitentis Iniungendi. Edited by Joseph Goering and F. A. C. Mantello. "The Early Penitential Writings of Robert Grosseteste." *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 54 (1987): 52-112. Accessed 14th April, 2020, https://www.jstor.org/stable/26188945.

De motu supercaelestium. Edited by Ludwig Bauer. In *Die Philosophischen Werke des Robert Grosseteste, Bischofs von Lincoln*, edited by Ludwig Baur, 92-100. Münster i.W: Aschendorff, 1912.

Notus in Iudea Deus. Edited by Joseph Goering and F. A. C. Mantello. "Notus in Iudea Deus: Robert Grosseteste's Confessional Formula in Lambeth Palace MS 499." *Viator* 18 (1987): 253-74. Accessed 29th January, 2019, doi:10.1484/J.VIATOR.2.301393.

De Operatione Solis. Edited by James McEvoy. "The Sun as Res and Signum: Grosseteste's Commentary on Ecclesiasticus; ch. 43, vv. 1-5." *Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales* 41 (1974): 38-91.

Perambulavit Iudas. Edited by Joseph Goering and F. A. C. Mantello. "The 'Perambulavit Iudas' (Speculum Confessionis). Attributed to Robert Grosseteste." *Revue bénédictine* 96, no. 1-2 (1986): 125-68.

Quoniam Cogitatio. Edited by F. A. C. Mantello and Joseph Goering. "Robert Grosseteste's Quoniam Cogitatio, A Treatise on Confession." *Traditio* 67 (2012): 341-84. Accessed 6th March, 2019, https://www.jstor.org/stable/24712368.

Reulles. Translated by Dorothea Oschinsky. In *Walter of Henley and Other Treatises on Estate Management and Accounting,* edited by Dorothea Oschinsky, 388-407. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971.

Sermones. Sermons from Durham, Cathedral Library, MS A. III. 12. Edited by Suzanne Paul. "An Edition and Study of Selected Sermons of Robert Grosseteste." Vols. 1-2. Ph.D. diss., University of Leeds, 2002.

De Sphaera. Edited by Ludwig Baur. In *Die Philosophischen Werke des Robert Grossetests, Bischofs von Lincoln*, edited by Ludwig Baur, 11-32. Münster i.W: Aschendorff, 1912.

Tabula. Edited by Philipp W. Rosemann. In *Opera Roberti Grosseteste Lincolniensis*, edited by James McEvoy, 235-320. Corpus Christianorum Continuatio Mediaevalis. Turnhout: Brepols, 1995 (CCCM 130).

Tabula. Edited by Samuel Harrison Thomson. "Grosseteste's Concordantial Signs." *Medievalia et Humanistica* 9 (1955): 39-53.

Templum Dei. Edited by Joseph Goering and F. A. C. Mantello. *Robert Grosseteste, Templum Dei.* Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1984.

Translated Works of Grosseteste.

De Artibus Liberalibus [*On the Liberal Arts*]. Translated by Sigbjørn O. Sønnesyn. In *The Scientific Works of Robert Grosseteste. Vol. 1: Knowing and Speaking: Robert Grosseteste's De artibus liberalibus "On the Liberal Arts" and De generatione sonorum "On the Generation of Sounds,"* edited by Giles E. M. Gasper, Cecilia Panti, Tom C. B. McLeish, and Hannah E. Smithson under the aegis of the Ordered Universe Research Project, 74-95. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019.

Chateau d'Amour [*Castle of Love*]. Translated by Evelyn Mackie. "Robert Grosseteste's Anglo-Norman Treatise on the Loss and Restoration of Creation, Commonly Known as Le Château D'Amour: An English Prose Translation." In *Robert Grosseteste and the Beginnings of a British Theological Tradition. Papers Delivered at the Grosseteste Colloquium Held at Greyfriars, Oxford on 3rd July 2002*, edited by Mauro O'Carroll, 151-79. Bibliotheca Seraphico-Capuccina 69.2. Rome: Instituto Storico De Cappuccini, 2003.

Commentarius in Mystica Theologia [Commentary on the *Mystical Theology*]. Edited by James McEvoy. In *Mystical Theology: The Glosses by Thomas Gallus and the Commentary of Robert Grosseteste on De Mystica Theologia,* 60-121. Paris, Peeters, 2003.

Compotus. Translated by Alfred Lohr and C. Philipp E. Nothaft. *Robert Grosseteste's Compotus*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019.

De Cessatione Legalium [*On the Cessation of the Laws*]. Translated by Stephen M. Hildebrand. *On the Cessation of the Laws.* The Fathers of the Church Mediaeval Continuation 13. Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2012.

De Colore [*On Colour*]. Translated by Greti Dinkova-Bruun, Giles E. M. Gasper, Michael Huxtable, Tom C.B. McLeish, Cecilia Panti, and Hannah Smithson. *The Dimensions of Colour: Robert Grosseteste's De Colore*, 16-19. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2013.

Dicta. Translated by Gordon Jackson. *Robert Grosseteste. The Complete Dicta in English.* Vols. 1-13. Lincoln: Asgill Press, 2003-2006.

Dictum 54. Translated by Joseph Goering and Randall Rosenfeld. "The Tongue Is a Pen: Robert Grosseteste's Dictum 54 and Scribal Technology." *The Journal of Medieval Latin* 12 (2002): 114-40. Accessed 28th July, 2020, https://www.jstor.org/stable/45019551.

Epistolae [Letters]. Translated by F. A. C. Mantello and Joseph Goering. *The Letters of Robert Grosseteste, Bishop of Lincoln*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010.

De Generatione Sonorum [*On the Generation of Sounds*]. Edited by Sigbjørn O. Sønnesyn. In *The Scientific Works of Robert Grosseteste. Volume 1, Knowing and Speaking: Robert Grosseteste's De artibus liberalibus "On the Liberal Arts" and De generatione sonorum "On the Generation of Sounds,"* edited by Giles E. M. Gasper, Cecilia Panti, Tom C. B. McLeish, and Hannah E. Smithson under the aegis of the Ordered Universe Research Project, 245-55. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019.

De Iride [*On the Rainbow*]. Translated by Amelia Carolina Sparavigna. "Translation and Discussion of the De Iride, a Treatise on Optics by Robert Grosseteste." *Interntional Journal of Sciences* 2, no. 9 (2013): 108-13. Accessed 12th January, 2019, https://arxiv.org/pdf/1211.5961.pdf.

Hexaëmeron. Translated by C. F. J. Martin. *On the Six Days of Creation. A Translation of the Hexaëmeron.* Auctores Britannici Medii Aevi 6 (2). Oxford: Published for the British Academy by Oxford University Press, 1999.

De Libero Arbitrio [*On Free Decision*]. Translated by Neil Lewis. *Robert Grosseteste On Free Decision.* Auctores Britannici Medii Aevi 29. Oxford: Published for the British Academy by Oxford University Press, 2017.

De Luce [*On Light*]. Translated by Neil Lewis. In *Robert Grosseteste and His Intellectual Milieu,* edited by John Flood, James R. Ginther and Joseph W. Goering, 239-48. Toronto, Canada: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 2003.

Reulles [*The Rules of Robert Grosseteste*]. Translated by Dorothea Oschinsky. In *Walter of Henley and Other Treatises on Estate Management and Accounting,* edited by Dorothea Oschinsky, 388-407. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971.

Other Primary Sources, in Latin.

Aelred of Rievaulx. *Dialogus de anima*. Edited by C. H. Talbot. In *Aelredus Rievallensis. Opera omnia I. Opera ascetica,* edited by A. Hoste, C. H. Talbot, and R. Vander Plaetse, 685-755. Corpus Christianorum Continuatio Mediaevalis 1, 1971. (CCCM 1).

Aelred of Rievaulx. *Sermones*. Edited by G. Raciti. In *Aelredus Rievallensis*. *Opera omnia II. Sermones I-XLVI (Collectio Claraevallensis prima et secunda),* edited by G. Racti. Corpus Christianorum Continuatio Mediaevalis 2A, 1989. (CCCM 2A).

Augustine. *Confessionum libri XIII.* Edited by L. Verhijen. Corpus Christianorum Series Latina 27, 1981. (CCSL 27).

Augustine. *Contra Faustum Manichaeum Libri Triginta Tres.* Edited by J. Zycha. In *De utilitate credendi, De duabus animabus, Contra Fortunatum Manichaeum, Contra Adimantum, Contra epistulam fundamenti, Contra Faustum Manichaeum,* edited by J. Zycha, 251-797. Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum 25/1, 1891. (CSEL 25/1).

Augustine. *De civitate Dei libri XI-XXII.* Edited by B. Dombart and A. Kalb. *De civitate Dei (Augustinus).* Corpus Christianorum Series Latina 48, 1955. (CCSL 48).

Augustine. *Contra Iulianum*. Edited by J. P. Migne, *Patrologiae Tomus XLIV. S. Aurelii Augustini Opera Omnia. Tomus Decimus (Pars Prior).* Patrologia Latina 44, 1845. (PL 44).

Augustine. *De Genesi ad literam libri duodecim*. Edited by J. Zycha. In *De Genesi ad litteram, De Genesi ad litteram liber imperfectus, Locutiones in Heptateuchum,* edited by J. Zycha, 3-435. Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum 28/1, 1894. (CSEL 28/1).

Augustine. *De musica*. Edited by M. Jacobson. Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum 102, 2017. (CSEL 102).

Augustine. *De Trinitate libri XV.* Edited by W. J. Mountain and F. Glorie. *Libri I-XII*, Corpus Christianorum Series Latina 50, 1968. (CCSL 50). *Libri XIII-XV,* Corpus Christianorum Series Latina 50A, 1968. (CCSL 50A

Augustine. *De vera religione liber I*. Edited by K. D. Daur. In *De doctrina christiana. De vera religione (Augustinus),* edited by K. D. Daur, 187-260. Corpus Christianorum Series Latina 32, 1962. (CCSL 32).

Augustine. *Epistulae*. Edited by K. D. Daur. *Epistulae I-LV (Augustinus).* Corpus Christianorum Series Latina 31, 2004. (CCSL 31).

[Anonymous] *De spiritu et anima.* Edited by J. P. Migne. *Patrologiae Tomus XL. S. Aurelii Augustini. OPera OMnia. Tomus Sextus.* Patrologia Latina 40, 1845. (PL 40).

[Aristotle] *Anonymous saec. XII translator Aristotelis. De somno et vigilia (translatio 'vetus'*). Edited by H. J. Drossaart Lulofs, *Aristotelis de somno et vigilia liber.* Leiden, 1943.

Bernard of Clairvaux. *Parabolae*. Edited by J. Leclercq and H. M. Rochais. Bernardi Opera vol. 6.2, 1972. (BO 6/2).

Bernard of Clairvaux. *Sermo de conversione ad clericos (textus longior).* Edited by J. Leclercq and H. M. Rochai. Bernardi Opera vol. 4, 1966. (BO 4)

Bernard of Clairvaux. *Sermones de diversis*. Edited by J. Leclercq and H. M. Rochais. Bernardi Opera vol. 6.1, 1970. (BO 6/1).

Bernard of Clairvaux. *Sermones super Cantica Canticorum.* Edited by J. Leclercq, C. H. Talbot, and H. M. Rochais. Bernardi Opera vol. 2, 1957-1958. (BO 2).

Bernard of Clairvaux. *Sermones super psalmum 'Qui habitat'.* Edited by J. Leclercq and H. M. Rochais. Bernardi Opera vol. 4, 1966. (BO 4).

Concilium Lateranense IV. Edited and translated by H. J. Schroeder. *Disciplinary Decrees of the General Councils: Text, Translation, and Commentary*. St. Louis, MO: B. Herder, 1937. (DDGC).

Consultus Fortunatianus. *Ars rhetorica.* Edited by Karl Halm. *Rhetores Latini Minores,* 81-134. Teubner, 1863.

Geoffrey of Vinsauf. *Poetria Nova.* Edited by Edmond Faral. *Les arts poétiques du XIIe et du XIIIe siècle: Recherches et documents sur la techniquelittéraire du moyen âge.* Paris: Librairie H. Champion, 1962.

Gregory the Great. *Regula pastoralis.* Edited by F. Rommel. *Grègoire le Grand. Règle Pastorale*. Sources Chrétiennes 381, 1992. (SC 381).

Hugh of St. Victor. *De archa Noe.* Edited by P. Sicard. *De archa Noe. Libellus de formatione arche.* Corpus Christianorum Continuatio Mediaevalis 176, 2001. (CCCM 176).

Hugh of St. Victor. *Didascalicon.* Edited by C. H. Buttimer. *Hugonis de Sancto Victore Didascalicon De Studio Legendi*. Washington DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1939.

Hugh of St. Victor. *De Tribus Maximis Circumstantiis Gestorum.* Edited by William M. Green. "Hugo of St. Victor: De Tribus Maximis Circumstantiis Gestorum." *Speculum* 18, no.4 (1943): 484-93. Accessed 4th February, 2020, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2853664.

Isidore of Seville. *Etymologiae.* Edited by W. M. Lindsay. *Etymologiarum sive Originum libri XX.* Oxford: 1911.

James of Venice. *Iacobus veneticus translator Aristotelis. Metaphysica: libri I - IV.4 (translatio 'vetustissima')*. Edited by G. Vuillemin-Diem. Aristoteles Latinus 25.1-1a, 1970 (AL 25.1-1a).

James of Venice. *Iacobus veneticus translator Aristotelis. De anima.* Edited by J. Decorte and J. Brams. Aristoteles Latinus 12.1. (AL 12.1)

James of Venice. *Iacobus Veneticus translator Aristotelis. Analytica posteriora.* Edited by L. Minio-Paluello and B. G. Dod. Aristoteles Latinus 4.1-.4, 1968. (AL 4.1-.4).

James of Venice. *Iacobus Veneticus translator Aristotelis. De memoria et reminiscentia.* Edited by Silvia Donati. Aristoteles Latinus 14.1. (AL 14.1).

John Blund. *Tractatus de Anima.* Edited by D. A. Callus and R. W. Hunt. *Iohnnes Blund Tractatus de Anima.* Auctores Britannici Medii Aevi 2. London: Oxford University Press for the British Academy, 1970.

Martianus Capella. *De nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii*. Edited by James Willis. Leipzig: Teubner, 1983.

Richard of St. Victor. *Benjamin minor*. Edited by Jean Châtillon and Monique Duchet-Suchaux. *Ricardus de Sancto Victore. De duodecim patriarchis Beniamin minor*. Sources Chrétiennes 419, 1997 (SC 419).

Roger Bacon. *Compendium philosophiae.* Edited by J. S. Brewer. In *Fr. Rogeri Bacon Opera Quaedam Hactenus Inedita,* vol.1, edited by J. S. Brewer, 391-520. London, 1859.

Thomas Aquinas. *Summa theologiae secunda secundae.* Edited by the Leonina Commission XIII P. M. *Sancti Thomae Aquinatis Doctoris Angelici Opera Omnia,* vol. 8. Rome: Ex Typographia Polyglotta, 1895.

William of Moerbeke. *Guillelmus de Morbeka revisor translationis Aristotelis. Metaphysica: libri I - X; XII - XIII.2 (translationis 'mediae' recensio).* Edited by G. Vuillemin-Diem. Aristoteles Latinus 25.3, pars secunda, 1995. (AL 25.3).

William of St. Thierry. *De natura corporis et animae.* Edited by P. Verdeyen. *Opera omnia III (Guillelmus a Sancto Theodorico).* Corpus Christianorum Continuatio Mediaevalis 88, 2003. (CCCM 88).

Other Primary Sources, Translated.

[Anonymous]. *Treatise on the Spirit and the Soul.* Translated by Erasmo Leiva and Benedicta Ward. In *Three Treatises on Man: A Cistercian Anthropology,* edited by Bernard McGinn, 179-288. Cistercian Fathers Series, 24. Kalamazoo, MI: Cistercian Publications, 1981. (CF 24).

Aelred of Reivaulx. *Dialogue on the Soul.* Translated by C. H. Talbot. *Aelred of Rievaulx: Dialogue on the Soul.* Cistercian Fathers Series, 22. Kalamazoo, MI: Cistercian Publications, 1981. (CF 22).

Augustine. *Against Julian*. Translated by Matthew A. Schumacher. Fathers of the Church A New Translation, 35. Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1957. (FOTC 35).

Augustine. *Confessions.* Translated by R. S. Pine-Coffin. London: Penguin, 2003.

Augustine. *Letters*. Translated by Wilfrid Parsons. *Saint Augustine: Letters. Vol. 1 (1-82).* Fathers of the Church A New Translation, 12. Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1951. (FOTC 12).

Augustine. *The Trinity.* Translated by Stephen McKenna. Fathers of the Church A New Translation, 45. Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1963. (FOTC 45).

Avicenna. *Liber de Anima.* Translated by F. Rahman. *Avicenna's Psychology. An English Translation of Kitab Al-Nakat, Book II, Chapter VI with Historico-Philosophical Notes and Textual Improvements on the Cairo Edition.* Westport, CN: Hyperion Press, 1981.

Aristotle. *Parts of Animals.* [*De partibus animalium*]. Translated by E. S Forster. Loebl Classical Library 323. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1937. (LCL 323).

Aristotle. *Generation of Animals*. [*De generatione animalium*]. Translated by A. L. Peck. Loeb Classical Library 366. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1942. (LCL 366).

Aristotle. *De memoria et reminiscentia [On Memory and Recollection].* Translated by Richard Sorabji. *Aristotle on Memory*, edited by Richard Sorabji, 47-62. 2nd ed. London: Bloomsbury, 2012. Originally published by Duckworth, 1972. The 2012 edition is itself a reprint of the 2nd ed., published in 2004. Page references are to the 2012 edition.

Aristotle. *Metaphysics*. Translated by Hugh Tredennick. Loeb Classical Library 271. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1933. (LCL 271).

Aristotle. *Nicomachean Ethics.* Translated by H. Rackman. Loeb Classical Library, 73. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1926. (LCL 73).

Aristotle. *Posterior Analytics.* Translated by E. S. Forster. Loeb Classical Library 391. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1960. (LCL 391).

Aristotle. *On Sleep and Waking*. Translated by W. S. Hett. Loeb Classical Library 288. Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1957. (LCL 288).

Aristotle. *On the Soul.* Translated by W. S. Hett. Loeb Classical Library 288. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957. (LCL 288).

Basil the Great. *Nine Homilies on the Hexaemeron.* Translated by Agnes Clare Way. *Saint Basil. Exegetic Homilies.* Fathers of the Church A New Translation, 46. Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2003 (FOTC 46).

Bernard of Clairvaux. *De conversione.* [*On Conversion*]. Translated by G. R. Evans. In *Bernard of Clairvaux: Selected Works,* edited by Emilie Griffin, 1-47. San Francisco, CA: HarperSanFrancsico, 2005.

Consultus Forunatianus. *On Memory* [*Ars rhetorica*]. Translated by Jan M. Ziolkowski. In *The Medieval Craft of Memory: An Anthology of Texts and Pictures,* edited by Mary Carruthers and Jan M. Ziolkowski, 295-6. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2003.

Galen. *De usu partium*. Translated by Margaret May. *Galen. On the Usefulness of the Parts of the Body.* Vols. 1-2. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1968.

Geoffrey of Vinsauf. *Poetria Nova.* Edited and translated by Margaret F. Nims. *Poetria Nova of Geoffrey of Vinsauf*. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1960.

Hugh of St. Victor. *The Didascalicon*. Translated by Jerome Taylor. *The Didascalicon of Hugh of St. Victor.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1961.

Hugh of St. Victor. *The Three Best Memory Aids for Learning History.* Translated by Mary Carruthers. In *The Medieval Craft of Memory: An Anthology of Texts and Pictures,* edited by Mary Carruthers and Jan M. Ziolkowski, 33-40. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2003.

Hugh of St. Victor. *De arca Noe*. Translated by Jessica Weiss. In *The Medieval Craft of Memory: An Anthology of texts and Pictures,* edited by Mary Carruthers and Jan M. Ziolkowski, 41-70. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2003.

Isidore of Seville. *Etymologiae.* Translated by Stephen A. Barney, W. J. Lewis, J. A. Beach, and Oliver Berghof. *The Etymologies of Isidore of Seville.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.

M. Tullius Cicero. *De inventione.* Translated by H. M. Hubbell. Loeb Classical Library 386. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1949. (LCL 386).

M. Tullius Cicero. *De oratore.* Translated by Harry Rackham and E. W. Sutton. Books 1-3. Loeb Classical Library 348-349. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1942. (LCL 348-349).

[M. Tullius Cicero]. *Rhetorica ad Herennium.* Translated by Harry Caplan. Loeb Classical Library 403. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1954. (LCL: 403).

Martianus Capella. *The Marriage of Philology and Mercury*. Translated by William Harris Stahl, Richard Johnson, and E. L. Burge. *Martianus Capella and the Seven Liberal Arts. Volume 2. The Marriage of Philology and Mercury.* New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1977.

Peter of Limoges. *Tractatus de moralis de oculo.* Translated by Richard Newhauser. *The Moral Treatise on the Eye. Peter of Limoges.* Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2012.

Plato. *Timaeus.* Translated by R. G. Bury. *Timaeus. Critias. Cleitophon. Menexenus. Epistles.* Loeb Classical Library 234. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1929. (LCL 234).

Plotinus. *Enneads.* Translated by A. H. Armstrong. Loeb Classical Library 440-445. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1969. (LCL 440-445).

Quintilian. *Institutio Oratoria*. Translated by Donald A. Russell. *Quintilian. The Orator's Education*. Loeb Classical Library 124. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002. (LCL 124).

Thomas Aquinas. *Summa Theologica*. Translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. *The "Summa Theologica" of St. Thomas Aquinas. Part II (Second Part) Second Number (QQ. XLVII-LXXIX.)* New York, NY: Benziger Brothers, 1918.

William of St. Thierry. *The Nature of the Body and Soul.* Translated by Benjamin Clark. In *Three Treatises on Man: A Cistercian Anthropology,* edited by Bernard McGinn, 101-152. Cistercian Fathers Series, 24. Kalamazoo, MI: Cistercian Publications, 1981. (CF 24).

Secondary Sources.

Adoyo, C. S. “Dante Decrypted: Musica Universalis in the Textual Architecture of the ‘Commedia." *Bibliotheca Dantesca: Annual Journal of Research Studies* 1, no. 1 (2018): 37–69. Accessed 29th April, 2020, https://repository.upenn.edu/bibdant/vol1/iss1/3/.

Akbari, Suzanne. *Seeing Through the Veil: Optical Theory and Medieval Allegory*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012.

Allen, Judson Boyce. *The Ethical Poetic of the Later Middle Ages: A Decorum of Convenient Distinction*. Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1982.

Aquino, Frederick D. “Maximus the Confessor.” In *The Spiritual Senses: Perceiving God in Western Christianity*, edited by Paul L. Gavrilyuk and Sarah. Coakley, 104-20. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.

Bejczy, István Pieter. *Virtue Ethics in the Middle Ages: Commentaries on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, 1200-1500.* Leiden: Brill, 2008.

Bejczy, István Pieter. “The Cardinal Virtues in the Medieval Commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics, 1250-1350.” In *Virtue Ethics in the Middle Ages: Commentaries on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, 1200 -1500*, edited by István Pieter Bejczy, 199-222. Brill’s Studies in Intellectual History Series, 160. Leiden: Brill, 2014.

Berger, Carol. “The Guidonian Hand.” In *The Medieval Craft of Memory: An Anthology of texts and Pictures,* edited by Mary Carruthers and Jan M. Ziolkowski, 71-82. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2003.

Berger, Carol. “The Hand and the Art of Memory.” *Musica Disciplina* 35 (1981): 87-120.

Biller, Peter. “Confession in the Middle Ages: Introduction.” In *Handling Sin: Confession in the Middle Ages,* edited by Peter Billier and A. J. Minnis, 1-34. York: York Medieval Press, 2013.

Black, Deborah. “Imagination and Estimation: Arabic Paradigms and Western Transformations.” *Topoi* 19 (2000): 59-5. Accessed 6th February, 2018, https://doi-org.ezproxy3.lib.le.ac.uk/10.1023/A:1006399407731.

Black, Deborah. “Memory, Individuals, and the Past in Averroes’s Psychology.” *Medieval Philosophy and Theology* 5 (1996): 161-87. Accessed 6th February, 2018, https://www.pdcnet.org/collection/fshow?id=medievalpt_1996_0005_0002_0161_0187&file_type=pdf.

Bloch, David. *Aristotle on Memory and Recollection. Text, Translation, Interpretation, and Reception in Western Scholasticism.* Brill: Leiden, 2007.

Boyle, Leonard. “The Fourth Lateran Council and Manuals of Popular Theology.” In *The Popular Literature of Medieval England,* edited by Thomas J. Heffernan, 30-43. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1985.

Boyle, Leonard E. “Robert Grosseteste and the Pastoral Care.” In *Pastoral Care, Clerical Education and Canon Law, 1200-1400*, edited by Leonard E. Boyle, 3–51. London: Variorum Reprints, 1981. First published in *Medieval and Renaissance Studies* 8 (1976): 3-51. Page numbers are identical.

Bruun, Mette B. *Parables: Bernard of Clairvaux’s Mapping of Spiritual Topography*. Leiden: Brill, 2007.

Burnett, Charles. “Give Him the White Cow: Notes and Note-Taking in the Universities in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries.” *History of Universities* 14 (1998): 1–30.

Carabine, Deirdre. “Robert Grosseteste’s Commentary on the Mystical Theology of the Pseudo-Dionysius.” In *Robert Grosseteste: New Perspectives on His Thought and Scholarship. Instrumenta Patristica XXVII*, edited by James McEVoy, 169–88. Turnhout: Brepols, 1995.

Carruthers, Mary. “Inventional Mnemonics and the Ornaments of Style: The Case of Etymology.” *Connotations* 2, no. 1 (1992): 103–14. doi:10.25623/conn002.1-carruthers-1.

Carruthers, Mary, and Jan M. Ziolkowski. *The Medieval Craft of Memory: An Anthology of Texts and Pictures*, edited by Mary J. Carruthers and Jan M. Ziolkowski. Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania, 2003.

Carruthers, Mary. “Rhetorical Memoria in Commentary and Practice.” In *The Rhetoric of Cicero in Its Medieval and Early Renaissance Commentary Tradition*, edited by Virginia Cox and John O. Ward, 209–37. Leiden: Brill, 2006.

Carruthers, Mary. *The Craft of Thought. Meditation, Rhetoric, and the Making of Images, 400-1200.* 4th ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.

Carruthers, Mary. *The Book of Memory. A Study of Memory in Medieval Culture*. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013.

Chidester, David. “Symbolism and the Senses in Saint Augustine.” *Religion* 14, no. 1 (1984): 31–51. Accessed March 17th, 2021, https://doi.org/10.1016/S0048-721X(84)80028-7.

Clanchy, Michael. *From Memory to Written Record. England 1066-1307.* 3rd ed. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2012.

Coleman, Janet. *Ancient and Medieval Memories: Studies in the Reconstruction of the Past*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992. Reprint, Cambridge University Press, 1995. Page numbers refer to the 1995 edition.

Coolman, Boyd Taylor. *Knowing God by Experience: The Spiritual Senses in the Theology of William of Auxerre*. Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2004.

Coolman, Boyd Taylor. “Alexander of Hales.” In *The Spiritual Senses: Perceiving God in Western Christianity*, edited by Paul L. Gavrilyuk and Sarah. Coakley, 121-39. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.

Copeland, Rita, and Ineke Sluiter. *Medieval Grammar and Rhetoric: Language Arts and Literary Theory, AD 300-1475*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.

Cornelius, Roberta D. “The Figurative Castle: A Study in the Mediaeval Allegory of the Edifice with Especial Reference to Religious Writings.” PhD diss, Bryn Mawr College, 1930.

Crombie, A. C. *Robert Grosseteste and the Origins of Experimental Science 1100-1700*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1953.

Curiello, Giacchino. “Deification as the Goal of the Ordered Human.” In *Robert Grosseteste and Theories of Education,* edited by Jack P. Cunningham and Steven Puttick, 19-33. (Oxford: Routledge, 2020).

Dales, Richard C. “Robert Grosseteste’s Place in Medieval Discussions of the Eternity of the World.” *Speculum* 61, no. 3 (1986): 544–63. Accessed 10th January, 2018, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2851595.

Dales, Richard C. *The Problem of the Rational Soul in the Thirteenth Century*. Leiden: Brill, 1995.

Demacopoulos, George E. “Greogry the Great.” In *The Spiritual Senses: Perceiving God in Western Christianity*, edited by Paul L. Gavrilyuk and Sarah. Coakley, 71-85. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.

Diekstra, F. N. M. “Robert de Sorbon’s “De Consciencia”: A Truncated Text and Full Text,” *Recherches de théologie et philosophie médiévales* 70, no. 1 (2003): 22-117. Accessed 21st March 2021, https://www.jstor.org/stable/26170109.

Dod, Bernard G. “Aristoteles Latinus.” In *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy: From the Rediscovery of Aristotle to the Disintegration of Scholasticism, 1100–1600*, edited by Norman Kretzmann, Anthony Kenny, Jan Pinborg, and Eleonore Stump, 43–79. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982. doi:10.1017/CHOL9780521226059.004.

Dowd, Matthew F. “Astronomy and Compotus at Oxford University in the Early Thirteenth Century: The Works of Robert Grosseteste.” PhD diss., University of Notre Dame, 2003. Accessed 22nd November, 2019, https://curate.nd.edu/show/x920ft86v09.

Dunbabin, Jean. “Robert Grosseteste as Translator, Transmitter, and Commentator: The ‘Nicomachean Ethics.'" *Traditio* 28 (1972): 460–72. Accessed 2nd March 2018, http://www.jstor.org/stable/27830947.

Eastwood, Bruce S. "Mediaeval Empiricism: The Case of Grosseteste's Optics." *Speculum* 43, no. 2 (1968): 306–21. Accessed 16th January, 2018, http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2855937.

Eastwood, Bruce S. "Grosseteste's 'Quantitative' Law of Refraction: A Chapter in the History of Non-Experimental Science." *Journal of the History of Ideas* 28, no. 3 (1967): 403-14. Accessed 10th January, 2018, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2708626.

Evans, Michael. "An Illustrated Fragment of Peraldus's Summa of Vice: Harleian MS 3244." *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institute,* 45 (1982): 14-68. Accessed 15th May, 2020, https://www.jstor.org/stable/750966.

Falk, Seb. *The Light Ages: A Medieval Journey of Discovery.* London: Allen Lane, 2020.

Frede, Dorothea. "The Cognitive Role of Phantasia in Aristotle." In *Essays on Aristotle's De Anima*, edited by Martha Craven Nussbaum and Amélie Rorty, 279–96. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992.

Fulton, Rachel. "Taste and See That the Lord Is Sweet (Ps. 33:9): The Flavor of God in the Monastic West." *The Journal of Religion* 86, no. 2 (2006): 169–204. Accessed 14th October 2019, doi:10.1086/499638.

Franceschini, Ezio. "Sulla presunta datazione del 'De impressionibus aeris' di Roberto Grossatesta." *Rivista di filosofia neo-scholastica* 44 (1952): 22-3. Accessed 21st March 2021, https://www.jstor.org/stable/43067128.

Gammie, Rosamund. "Robert Grosseteste on Eudaimonia, Happiness, and Learning: Why the Nicomachean Ethics May be Useful." In *Robert Grosseteste and Theories of Education,* edited by Jack P. Cunningham and Steven Puttick, 34-54. Oxford: Routledge, 2020.

Gavrilyuk, Paul L., and Sarah Coakley, eds. *The Spiritual Senses: Perceiving God in Western Christianity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.

Giles E. M. Gasper, Cecilia Panti, Tom C. B. McLeish, and Hannah E. Smithson under the aegis of the Ordered Universe Research Project*,* eds. *The Scientific Works of Robert Grosseteste. Volume 1, Knowing and Speaking: Robert Grosseteste's De artibus liberalibus "On the Liberal Arts" and De generatione sonorum "On the Generation of Sounds."* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019.

Gasper, Giles, E. M. "On the Liberal Arts and its Historical Context." In *The Scientific Works of Robert Grosseteste. Volume 1, Knowing and Speaking: Robert Grosseteste's De artibus liberalibus "On the Liberal Arts" and De generatione sonorum "On the Generation of Sounds,*" edited by Giles E. M. Gasper, Cecilia Panti, Tom C. B. McLeish, and Hannah E. Smithson under the aegis of the Ordered Universe Research Project, 9-35. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019.

Gilson, Etienne. *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages*. 3rd ed. London: Sheed and Ward, 1978.

Gilson, Etienne. “Pourquoi Saint Thomas a Critiqué Saint Augustin.” *Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age* 1 (1926-1927): 5-127. Accessed 21st March, 2021, https://www.jstor.org/stable/44403436.

Ginther, James R. “The Super Psalterium of Robert Grosseteste (ca. 1170-1253): A Scholastic Psalms Commentary as a Source for Medieval Ecclesiology.” PhD diss., University of Toronto, 1995. Accessed 12th January 2020, https://www.academia.edu/824291/The_Super_Psalterium_of_Robert_Grosseteste_Ca_1170_1253_a_Scholastic_Psalms_Commentary_as_a_Source_for_Medieval_Ecclesiology.

Ginther, James R. “Theological Education at the Oxford Studium in the Thirteenth Century : A Reassessment of Robert Grosseteste’s Letter to the Oxford Theologians.” *Franciscan Studies* 55 (1998): 83–104. Accessed 15th May 2020, https://www.jstor.org/stable/41975200.

Ginther, James R. “Robert Grosseteste and the Theologian’s Task.” In *Robert Grosseteste and the Beginnings of a British Theological Tradition. Papers Delivered at the Grosseteste Colloquium Held at Greyfriars, Oxford on 3rd July 2002,* edited by Maura O’Carroll, 239-63. Bibliotheca Seraphico-Capuccina 69. Rome: Instituto Storico De Cappuccini, 2003.

Ginther James R. “The Super Psalterium in Context.” In *Editing Robert Grosseteste,* edited by Evelyn A. Mackie and Joseph Goering, 31-60. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003.

Ginther, James R. “Laudat Sensum et Significationem: Robert Grosseteste on the Four Senses of Scripture.” In *With Reverence for the Word: Medieval Scriptural Exegesis in Judasim, Christianity, and Islam*, edited by Jane Dammen McAuliffe, Barry D. Walfish, and Joseph W. Goering, 237–55. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.

Ginther, James R. *Master of the Sacred Page: A Study of the Theology of Robert Grosseteste, ca. 1229/30-1235*. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004.

Ginther, James R. “Robert Grosseteste’s Theory of Pastoral Care.” In *A Companion to Pastoral Care in the Late Middle Ages (1200-1500),* edited by Ronald J. Stansbury, 95-122. Brill: Leiden, 2010).

Goering, Joseph. “When and Where Did Grosseteste Study Theology?” In *Robert Grosseteste: New Perspectives on His Thought and Scholarship,* edited by James McEvoy, 17-52. *Instrumenta Patristica* 27. Turnhout: Brepols Publishers, 1995.

Goering, Joseph, and F. A. C. Mantello. “The Early Penitential Writings of Robert Grosseteste.” *Recherches de Théologie Ancienne et Médiévale* 54 (1987): 52–112. Accessed 14th April 2020, https://www.jstor.org/stable/26188945.

Grant, Edward. *The Foundations of Modern Science in the Middle Ages: Their Religious, Institutional, and Intellectual Contexts.* 11th ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011.

Gregorić, Pavel, and Filip Grgić. "Aristotle's Notion of Experience." *Archiv Für Geschichte Der Philosophie* 88, no. 1 (2006): 1–30. Accessed 1st May, 2020, doi:10.1515/AGPH.2006.001.

Hackett, Jeremiah. "Scientia Experimentalis: From Robert Grosseteste to Roger Bacon." In *Robert Grosseteste: New Perspectives on His Thought and Scholarship*, edited by James McEvoy, 89–120. Turnhout: Brepols Publishers, 1995.

Haflidson, Ron. "We Shall be That Seventh Day: Deification in Augustine." In *Deification in the Latin Patristic Tradition*, edited by Jared Ortiz, 169-89. Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2019.

Hale, Rosemary. "'Taste and See, for God Is Sweet': Sensory Perception and Memory in Medieval Christian Mystical Experience." In *Vox Mystica: Essays on Medieval Mysticism in Honor of Professor Valerie M. Lagorio*, edited by Anne Clarke Bartlett, Thomas H. Bestul, Janet Goebel, and William F. Pollard, 3–14. Cambridge: D. S. Brewer, 1995.

Heller-Roazen, Daniel. "Common Sense: Greek, Arabic, Latin." In *Rethinking the Medieval Senses: Heritage, Fascinations, Frames*, edited by Stephen G. Nichols, Andreas Kablitz, and Alison Calhoun, 30–50. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008.

Hendrix, John. *Unconscious Thought in Philosophy and Psychoanalysis*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015.

Hessenauer, Matthias. "For a Larger Audience: Grosseteste's Perambulavit Iudas in Anglo-Norman." In *Robert Grosseteste: His Thought and Its Impact*, edited by Jack Cunningham, 259–313. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2012.

Hoskin, Philippa M. *Robert Grosseteste and the 13th-Century Diocese of Lincoln. An English Bishop's Pastoral Vision.* Leiden: Brill, 2019.

Hunt, Richard. "The Library of Robert Grosseteste." In *Robert Grosseteste Scholar and Bishop*, edited by D. A. Callus, 121–45. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1955.

Hunt, Richard. "Manuscripts Containing the Indexing Symbols of Robert Grosseteste." *Bodleian Library Record* 4 (1953): 241–54.

Jager, Eric. "The Book of the Heart: Reading and Writing the Medieval Subject," *Speculum* 71, no. 1 (1996): 1-26. Accessed 16th November, 2020, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2865198.

Johnson, Holly. "The Imaginative Landscape of An English Monk-Preacher: Robert Rypon and the Court of Memory." *Mediaeval Studies* 75 (2013): 117-204.

Karnes, Michelle. *Imagination, Meditation and Cognition in the Middle Ages*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2017.

Kemp, Simon, and Garth J. O. Fletcher. "The Medieval Theory of the Inner Senses." *The American Journal of Psychology*, 106, no. 4 (1993): 559-76. Accessed 22nd January 2019, https://www.jstor.org/stable/1422969.

Kennedy, George. *Classical Rhetoric and its Christian and Secular Tradition from Ancient to Modern Times*. London: Croomhelm, 1980.

King, Edward. "A Northamptonshire Miscellany." *Northamptonshire Record Society* 32 (1983): 1-58.

King, Peter. "Augustine on Knowledge." In *The Cambridge Companion to Augustine*, edited by David Vincent Meconi and Eleonore Stump, 142-65. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014.

King, Peter. "Mediaeval Thought-Experiments: The Metamethodology of Mediaeval Science." In *Thought Experiments in Science and Philosophy*, edited by Tamara Horowitz and Gerald J. Massey, 43–64. Savage, MD: Rowan & Littlefield, 1991.

King, Richard. *Aristotle and Plotinus on Memory*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2009.

Kuksewicz, Z. "Criticisms of Aristotelian Psychology and the Augustinian - Aristotelian Synthesis." In *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy from the Rediscovery of Aristotle to the Disintegration of Scholasticism, 1100-1600*, edited by Eleonora Stump, Norman Kretzman, Anthony Kenny, and Jan Pinborg, 623-8. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982.

LaNave, Gregory F. "Bonaventure" in In *The Spiritual Senses: Perceiving God in Western Christianity*, edited by Paul L. Gavrilyuk and Sarah. Coakley, 159-73. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.

Lawell, Declan. "Qualiter Vita Prelatorum Conformari Debet Vite Angelice: A Sermon (1244-46?) Attributed to Thomas Gallus." *Recherches de Theologie et Philosophie Medievales* 75, no. 2 (2008): 303–36. Accessed 22nd September 2020, doi: 10.2143/RTPM.75.2.2033407.

Lewis, Neil. "The Trivium." In *The Scientific Works of Robert Grosseteste. Volume 1, Knowing and Speaking: Robert Grosseteste's De artibus liberalibus "On the Liberal Arts" and De generatione sonorum "On the Generation of Sounds,*" edited by Giles E. M. Gasper, Cecilia Panti, Tom C. B. McLeish, and Hannah E. Smithson under the aegis of the Ordered Universe Research Project, 96-111. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019.

Lindberg, David C. *Theories of Vision from Al-Kindi to Kepler.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976.

Lindberg, David C., and Katherine H. Tachau. "The Science of Light and Color, Seeing and Knowing." In *The Cambridge History of Science*, edited by David C. Lindberg and Michael H. Shank, 485–511. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013.

Lootens, Matthew. "Augustine." In *The Spiritual Senses: Perceiving God in Western Christianity*, edited by Paul L. Gavrilyuk and Sarah. Coakley, 56-70. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.

Lynch, Lawrence E. “The Doctrine of Divine Ideas and Illumination in Robert Grosseteste, Bishop of Lincoln.” *Medieval Studies* 3 (1941): 161–73.

Mack, Michael. *Sidney’s Poetics. Imitating Creation.* Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2005.

Marrone, Stephen P. “Metaphysics and Science in the Thirteenth Century: William of Auvergne, Robert Grosseteste and Roger Bacon.” In *Routledge History of Philosophy. Vol. 3, Medieval Philosophy*, edited by John Marenbon, 203–24. New York: Routledge, 1998.

Marrone, Stephen P. *William of Auvergne and Robert Grosseteste: New Ideas of Truth in Early Thirteenth Century*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983. Reprint, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014. Page numbers refer to the 2014 edition.

McEvoy, James. “The Chronology of Robert Grosseteste’s Writings on Nature and Natural Philosophy.” *Speculum* 58, no. 3 (1983): 614–55. Accessed 27th January, 2018, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2848962.

McEvoy, James. “Grosseteste’s Reflections on Aristotelian Friendship: A ‘New’ Commentary on Nicomachean Ethics VIII. 8-14.” In *Robert Grosseteste: New Perspectives on His Thought and Scholarship*, edited by James McEvoy, 149–68. Turnhout: Brepols Publishers, 1995.

McEvoy, James. *Robert Grosseteste.* Great Medieval Thinkers. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.

McEvoy, James. *The Philosophy of Robert Grosseteste.* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982. Reprint, Oxford: University Press, 2011. Page numbers refer to 2011 edition.

McInroy, Mark J. “Origen of Alexandria.” In *The Spiritual Senses: Perceiving God in Western Christianity,* edited by Paul L. Gravilyuk and Sarah Coakley, 20-35. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.

Miles, Margaret. “Vision: The Eye of the Body and the Eye of the Mind in Saint Augustine’s De Trinitate and Confessions.” *The Journal of Religion* 63, no. 2 (1983): 125-42. Accessed 18th February, 2019, https://www.jstor.org/stable/1202858.

Moreton, Jennifer, Immo Warntjes, Charles Burnett, and Philipp Nothaft. *Compotus Ecclesiasticus: Edition, Translation and Apparatus Criticus*, 2015. Accessed 4th February, 2020, https://ordered-universe.com/ordered-universe-compotus-ecclesiasticus/.

Moreton, Jennifer. “Robert Grosseteste on the Calendar.” In *Robert Grosseteste: New Perspectives on His Thought and Scholarship. Instrumenta Patristica XXVII,* edited by James McEvoy, 77–88. Turnhout: Brepols, 1995.

Murray, Alexander. “Confession as a Historical Source in the Thirteenth Century.” In *Conscience and Authority in the Medieval Church*, edited by Alexander Murray, 49-86. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015. Originally published in *The Writing of History*

in the Middle Ages, Essays Presented to R.W. Southern, edited by R. H. C. Davis and J. M. Wallace Hadrill, 275-322, Oxford: 1981. Page numbers refer to the 2015 edition.

Murray, Alexander. "Counselling in Medieval Confession." In *Conscience and Authority in the Medieval Church*, edited by Alexander Murray, 87-104. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015. Originally published in *Handling Sin: Confession in the Middle Ages,* edited by Peter Billier and A. J. Minnis, 63-77, York: York Medieval Press, 1998. Page numbers refer to the 2015 edition.

Murray, Jacqueline. "Cultural Studies/Sexual Anxiety: The Confessions of a Medieval(ist)." *Cultural Studies, Medieval Studies, and Disciplinary Debate, held at the University of Saskatchewan March 13-14, 1998.* Accessed 21st March 2021, http://www.usask.ca/english/colloqu/index.htm#murray.

Nash, Ronald H. *The Light of the Mind: St Augustine's Theory of Knowledge*. Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1969.

Newhauser, Richard G. "Peter of Limoges, Optics, and the Science of the Senses." *The Senses and Society* 5, no. 1 (2010): 28–44. Accessed 5th March 2019, doi:10.2752/174589310X12549020528095.

Newhauser, Richard G. "The Optics of Ps-Grosseteste: Editing Peter of Limoges Tractatus Moralis de Oculo." In *Probable Truth: Editing Medieval Texts from Britain in the Twenty-First Century. Texts and Transitions* 5, edited by Vincent Gillespie and Anne Hudson, 167–94. Turnhout: Brepols Publishers, 2013.

Nordström, Folke. "Peterborough, Lincoln, and the Science of Robert Grosseteste: A Study in Thirteenth Century Architecture and Iconography." *The Art Bulletin* 37, no. 4 (1955): 241–72. Accessed 10th January, 2018, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3047618.

O'Gorman, Ned. "Aristotle's Phantasia in the Rhetoric: Lexis, Appearance, and the Epideictic Function of Discourse." *Philosophy & Rhetoric* 38, no. 1 (2005):16-40. Accessed 8th April, 2018, http://www.jstor.org/stable/40238199.

Oliver, Simon. "Robert Grosseteste on Light, Truth and Experimentum." *Vivarium* 42, no. 2 (2004): 151–80. Accessed 18th January, 2018, https://www.jstor.org/stable/41963724.

Olson, Paul A. *The Journey to Wisdom: Self-Education in Patristic and Medieval Literature*. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1995.

Ortiz, Jared. "Making Worshippers into Gods: Deification on the Latin Liturgy." In *Deification in the Latin Patristic Tradition*, edited by Jared Ortiz, 9-29. Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2009.

Pelzer, August., "Les Versiones Latines de Ouvrages de Moral Conservés sous le Nom D'Aristote en Usage au XIII^{e} Siècle (Suite et Fin)." *Revue néoscholastique du philosophie* 20 (1921): 378-412.

Pike, Nelson. *Mystical Union: An Essay in the Phenomenology of Mysticism.* Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992.

Polansky, Ronald M. *Aristotle's De Anima*. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

Rahner, Karl. "The 'Spiritual Senses' According to Origen." In *Theological Investigations* Vol. 16. Translated by David Morland, 81-103. London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1979.

Rahner, Karl. "The Doctrine of the 'Spiritual Senses' in the Middle Ages." In *Theological Investigations* Vol. 16. Translated by David Morland, 104-34. London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1979.

Raizman-Kedar, Yael. "Plotinus's Conception of Unity and Multiplicity as the Root to the Medieval Distinction between Lux and Lumen." *Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A* 37, no. 3 (2006): 379-97. Accessed 29th January, 2018, doi:10.1016/j.shpsa.2006.06.006.

Reeves, Andrew. "Teaching Confession in Thirteenth-Century England: Priests and Laity." In *A Companion to Priesthood and Holy Orders in the Middle Ages,* edited by Greg Peters, 252-80. Leiden: Brill, 2016.

Rhodes, Jim. *Poetry Does Theology: Chaucer, Grosseteste, and the Pearl-Poet*. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2001.

de Rijk, L. M. "The Posterior Analytics in the Latin West." In *Knowledge and the Sciences in Medieval Philosophy: Proceedings of the Eigth International Congress of Medieval Philosophy (S.I.E.P.M), Helsinki 24-29 August 1987.* Vol. 1, edited by Monika Asztalos, John E. Murdoch, and Ilkka Niiniluoto, 104–27. Helsinki, 1990.

Rivers, Kimberly. "Memory, Division, and the Organisation of Knowledge in the Middle Ages." In *Pre-Modern Encylopaedic Texts. Proceedings of the Second COMERS Congress, Groningen, 1-4 July 1996*, edited by Peter Binkley, 147-58. Leiden: Brill, 1997.

Rivers, Kimberly. "Memory and Medieval Preaching: Mnemonic Advice in the Ars Praedicandi of Francesc Eiximenis (ca. 1327-1409)." *Viator* 30 (1999): 253-84. Accessed 25th August 2020, doi.10.1484/j.viator.2.300837.

Rivers, Kimberly. "Writing the Memory of the Virtues and Vices in Johannes Sintram's (D. 1450) Preaching Aids." In *The Making of Memory in the Middle Ages*, edited by Lucie Doležalová, 31-48. Leiden: Brill, 2010.

Rivers, Kimberly. *Preaching the Memory of Virtue and Vice: Memory, Images, and Preaching in the Late Middle Ages*. Turnhout: Brepols, 2010.

Robertson Jr., D. W. "A Note on the Classical Origin of 'Circumstances' in the Medieval Confessional." *Studies in Philology* 43, no. 1 (1946): 6-14. Accessed 24th September, 2020, https://www.jstor.org/stable/4172741.

Rosemann, Philip W. "Robert Grosseteste's Tabula." In Robert Grosseteste: New Perspectives on His Thought and Scholarship. Instrumenta Patristica 27, edited by James McEvoy, 321–56. Turnhout: Brepols, 1995.

Rouse, Richard and Mary Rouse. "Statim Invenire: Schools, Preachers, and New Attitudes to the Page." In *Renaissance and Renewal in the Twelfth Century*, edited by Robert L. Benson, Giles Constable, and Carol D. Lanham, 201–28. Toronto: University of Toronto Press in association with Medieval Academy of America, 1982.

Rudy, Gordon. *The Mystical Language of Sensation in the Later Middle Ages.* Medieval History and Culture, vol. 4. London: Routledge, 2002.

Russell, Norman. *The Doctrine of Deification in the Greek Patristic Tradition.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.

Sadler, Lucy Freeman. "John of Metz, The Tower of Wisdom." In *The Medieval Craft of Memory: An Anthology of texts and Pictures,* edited by Mary Carruthers and Jan M. Ziolkowski, 215-25. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2003.

Sajavaara, Kari. *The Middle English Translations of Robert Grosseteste's 'Château d'Amour'. Mémoires de La Société Néophilologique de Helsinki* 32. Helsinki: Société néophilologique, 1967.

Schofield, Malcolm. "Aristotle on the Imagination." In *Essays on Aristotle's De Anima,* edited by Martha C. Nussbaum and Amélie Oksenberg Rorty, 249-278. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992. Reprint, Oxford Clarendon Press, 2003. Page numbers refer to the 2003 edition. Originally published in G. E. R. Lloyd and G. E. L. Owen, eds. *Aristotle on Mind and the Senses. Proceedings of the Seventh Symposium Aristotlelicum*, 99-140. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978.

Serene, Eileen F. "Robert Grosseteste on Induction and Demonstrative Science." *Synthese* 40, no. 1 (1979): 91–115. Accessed 10th January, 2018, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20115339.

Sheppard, Anne. *The Poetics of Phantasia. Imagination in Ancient Aesthetics.* London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2014.

Siebach-Larsen, Anna. "Structures of Thought in Robert Grosseteste's Chasteau d'amour and the Tateshal Miscellany." In *Literary Echoes of the Fourth Lateran Council in England and France, 1215–1405*, edited by Maureen B. C. Boulton, 170–96. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2019.

Siebach-Larsen, Anna. "The Materialization of Knowledge in Thirteenth-Century England: Joan Tateshal, Robert Grosseteste, and the Tatsehal Miscellany." In *Women Intellectuals and Leaders in the Middle Ages*, edited by Kathryn Kerby-Fulton, Katie Ann-Marie Bugyis, and John van Engen, 227–37. Boydell & Brewer, 2020.

Sønnesyn, Sigbjørn O. and Giles E. M. Gasper. "Aristotle, Priscian, and Isidore." In *The Scientific Works of Robert Grosseteste. Volume 1, Knowing and Speaking: Robert Grosseteste's De artibus liberalibus "On the Liberal Arts" and De generatione sonorum "On the Generation of Sounds,"* edited by Giles E. M. Gasper, Cecilia Panti, Tom C. B. McLeish, and Hannah E. Smithson under the aegis of the Ordered Universe Research Project, 267-306. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019.

Sønnesyn, Sigbjørn O. and Giles E. M. Gasper, Cecilia Panti, and Neil Lewis. "On the Generation of Sounds: Translation, Historiography, and Synopsis." In *The Scientific Works of Robert Grosseteste. Volume 1, Knowing and Speaking: Robert Grosseteste's De artibus liberalibus "On the Liberal Arts" and De generatione sonorum "On the Generation of Sounds,"* edited by Giles E. M. Gasper, Cecilia Panti, Tom C. B. McLeish, and Hannah E. Smithson under the aegis of the Ordered Universe Research Project, 237-55. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019.

Sloan, Michael C. "Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics as the Original Locus for the Septem Circumstantiae." *Classical Philology* 105 (2010): 236-51. Accessed 21st October 2020, https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/656196.

Smalley, Beryl. "The Biblical Scholar." In *Robert Grosseteste Scholar and Bishop. Essays in Commemoration of the Seventh Century of his Death*, edited by D. A. Callus, 70-97. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1955.

Smith, Brett W. "Aspectus and Affectus in the Theology of Robert Grosseteste." PhD diss., Catholic University of America, 2018. Received from author via email, 14th January, 2019.

Sorabji, Richard. *Animal Minds & Human Morals: The Origins of the Western Debate*. London: Duckworth, 1993.

Southern, Richard. *Robert Grosseteste: The Growth of an English Mind in Medieval Europe*. 2nd ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992.

Stock, Brian. "Experience, Praxis, Work, and Planning in Bernard of Clairvaux: Observations on the Sermones in Cantica." In *The Cultural Context of Medieval Learning: Proceedings of the First International Colloquium on Philosophy, Science, and Theology in the Middle Ages, September 1973*, edited by John Emery Murdoch and Edith Dudley Sylla, 219–70. Dordrecht: Reidel, 1973.

Synan, Edward. "The Four "Senses" and Four Exegetes." In *With Reverence for the Word: Medieval Scriptural Exegesis in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam*, edited by Jane Dammen McAuliffe, Barry D. Walfish, and Joseph W. Goering, 225-36. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.

Tachau, Katherine H. "Seeing as Action and Passion in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries." In *The Mind's Eye: Art and Theological Argument in the Middle Ages*, edited by Jeffrey F. Hamburger and Anne-Marie Bouché, 336-59. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006.

Taylor, Andrew. "Was Grosseteste the Father of English Literature?" *Revista Canaria de Estudios Ingleses* 47 (2003): 73-86.

Tell, Dave. "Beyond Mnemotechnics: Confession and Memory in Augustine." *Philosophy & Rhetoric* 39, no. 3 (2006): 233-53. Accessed 13th February, 2018, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20697155.

Temple, Nicholas. “The Bishop’s Eye: Robert Grosseteste and the Architecture of Light.” *Architectural Theory Review* 9, no. 1 (2004): 1-18. Accessed 8th February, 2019, doi: 10.1080/13264820409478503.

Teske, Roland. “Augustine’s Philosophy of Memory.” In *The Cambridge Companion to Augustine*, edited by Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann, 148-58. Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2001.

Thomson, David, Giles E. M. Gasper, and Luigi Campi. “A Middle English Grosseteste: The Seven Liberal Arts.” In *The Scientific Works of Robert Grosseteste. Volume 1, Knowing and Speaking: Robert Grosseteste’s De artibus liberalibus “On the Liberal Arts” and De generatione sonorum “On the Generation of Sounds,”* edited by Giles E. M. Gasper, Cecilia Panti, Tom C. B. McLeish, and Hannah E. Smithson under the aegis of the Ordered Universe Research Project, 384-447. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019.

Thomson, Samuel Harrison. *The Writings of Robert Grosseteste, Bishop of Lincoln 1235-1253*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1940. Reprint, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013. Page numbers refer to the 2013 edition.

Thorndike, Lynn. “Unde Versus.” *Traditio* 11 (1955): 163-93. Accessed 4th February 2020, https://www.jstor.org/stable/27830312.

Toivanen, Juhana. “Peter Olivi on Internal Senses.” *British Journal for the History of Philosophy* 15, no. 3 (2007): 427-54. Accessed 28th March, 2019, doi.10.1080/09608780701444865.

Tolan, John. *Saint Francis and the Sultan: The Curious History of a Christian-Muslim Encounter.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.

Tracy, Kisha G. *Memory and Confession in Middle English Literature*. Palgrave Macmillan, 2017.

Unger, Dominic J. “Robert Grosseteste Bishop of Lincoln (1235-1253) on the Reasons for the Incarnation.” *Franciscan Studies* 16, no. 1/2 (1956): 1-36. Accessed 17th May, 2020, https://www.jstor.org/stable/41974748.

Van Dyke, Christina. “An Aristotelian Theory of Divine Illumination: Robert Grosseteste’s Commentary on the Posterior Analytics.” *British Journal for the History of Philosophy* 17, no. 4 (2009): 685-704. Accessed 12th January, 2018, doi:10.1080/09608780902986581.

Van Dyke, Christina. “The Truth, the Whole Truth, and Nothing but the Truth: Robert Grosseteste on Universals (and the Posterior Analytics).” *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 48, no. 2 (2010): 153-70. Accessed 12th January, 2018, doi:10.1353/hph.0.0207.

Warren, James. *The Pleasures of Reason in Plato, Aristotle, and the Hellenistic Hedonists*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014.

Watson, Gerard. “ΦAnta∑ia In Aristotle, De Anima 3. 3.” *Classical Quarterly* 32, no. 1 (1982): 100-13. Accessed 8th March, 2018, doi:10.1017/S0009838800022849.

Wenzel, Siegfried. *The Sin of Sloth: Acedia in Medieval Thought and Literature*. Chape Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1967.

Wheatley, Abigail. “The Idea of the Castle in Medieval England.” York: York Medieval Press, 2004.

Whitehead, Christiania. *Castles of the Mind, a Study of Medieval Architectural Allegory*. Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2003.

Wolfson, Harry Austryn. “The Internal Senses in Latin, Arabic, and Hebrew Philosophic Texts.” *The Harvard Theological Review* 28, no. 2 (1935): 69-133. Accessed 18th February 2019, https://www.jstor.org/stable/1508009.

Wood, Rega. “Imagination and Experience in the Sensory Soul and Beyond: Richard Rufus, Roger Bacon & Their Contemporaries.” In *Forming the Mind. Essays on the Internal Senses and the Mind/Body Problem from Avicenna to the Medical Enlightenment,* edited by Henrik Lagerlund, 27-57. Dordrecht: Springer, 2007.

Woods, Marjorie Curry, and Rita Copeland. “Classroom and Confession.” In *The Cambridge History of Medieval English Literature*, edited by David Wallace, 376–407. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

Woolgar, C.M. *The Senses in Late Medieval England*. Yale, CT: Yale University Press, 2006.

Yates, Frances. *The Art of Memory*. London: Routledge and Paul, 1966. Reprint, Routledge and Paul, 1972. Page numbers refer to the 1972 edition.

Zinn, Grover. “Personification Allegory and Visions of Light in Richard of St Victor’s Teaching on Contemplation.” *University of Toronto Quarterly* 46, no. 3 (1977): 190-214. Accessed 1st May, 2020, doi:10.3138/utq.46.3.190.