The Robustness of Anti-Atheist Prejudice as Measured by Way of Cognitive Errors
Giddings, L. and Dunn, T.J. (2015) The Robustness of Anti-Atheist Prejudice as Measured by Way of Cognitive Errors. The International Journal for the Psychology of Religion, 26 (2). pp. 124-135. ISSN 1050-8619
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Abstract
Over the past decade, distrust of atheists has been documented in psychological literature yet remains relatively understudied. The current research sought to test the robustness of anti-atheist prejudice. Specifically, it examined the extent to which an individual’s anti-atheist prejudice remained unchanged in light of new information. 100 participants from the UK completed an online experiment. The experiment involved reading a vignette describing the actions of an untrustworthy individual. Participants were asked to make a judgment with regards to the untrustworthy individual’s identity. The occurrence of a cognitive bias, namely the conjunction fallacy, was used to measure the frequency of anti-atheist prejudice. An examination of judgment errors (i.e., conjunction fallacies) under different conditions was used to test the robustness of anti-atheism prejudice. The results show that anti-atheist prejudice is not confined either to dominantly religious countries or religious individuals but rather appears to be a robust judgment about atheists.
| Item Type: | Article |
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| Additional Information: | Published by Taylor & Francis. All rights reserved. Reproduced in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy. |
| Divisions: | School of Social Science |
| Depositing User: | Dr Thomas Dunn |
| Date Deposited: | 30 Aug 2017 14:01 |
| Last Modified: | 23 Jul 2019 14:20 |
| URI: | https://bgro.repository.guildhe.ac.uk/id/eprint/202 |
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