The Robustness of Anti-Atheist Prejudice as Measured by Way of Cognitive Errors

Giddings, L. and Dunn, T.J. (2015) The Robustness of Anti-Atheist Prejudice as Measured by Way of Cognitive Errors. The International Journal for the Psychology of Religion, 26 (2). pp. 124-135. ISSN 1050-8619

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Over the past decade, distrust of atheists has been documented in psychological literature yet remains relatively understudied. The current research sought to test the robustness of anti-atheist prejudice. Specifically, it examined the extent to which an individual’s anti-atheist prejudice remained unchanged in light of new information. 100 participants from the UK completed an online experiment. The experiment involved reading a vignette describing the actions of an untrustworthy individual. Participants were asked to make a judgment with regards to the untrustworthy individual’s identity. The occurrence of a cognitive bias, namely the conjunction fallacy, was used to measure the frequency of anti-atheist prejudice. An examination of judgment errors (i.e., conjunction fallacies) under different conditions was used to test the robustness of anti-atheism prejudice. The results show that anti-atheist prejudice is not confined either to dominantly religious countries or religious individuals but rather appears to be a robust judgment about atheists.

Item Type: Article
Additional Information: Published by Taylor & Francis. All rights reserved. Reproduced in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy.
Divisions: School of Social Science
Depositing User: Dr Thomas Dunn
Date Deposited: 30 Aug 2017 14:01
Last Modified: 23 Jul 2019 14:20

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